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1.
An experiment is designed to provide a snapshot of the strategies used by players in a repeated price competition game with a random continuation rule. One hundred pairs of subjects played the game over the Internet, with subjects having a few days to make their decisions in each round. Occasionally subjects are asked to enter one-period-ahead pricing strategies instead of prices. According to the elicited strategies, between 90% and 95% of subjects punish less harshly (in their initial response to a deviation) than implied by the grim trigger strategy, and do so in a way that depends on the size of the other subjectʼs deviation. Future earnings are highest for subjects adopting the tit-for-tat strategy, even after controlling for a subjectʼs past earnings. Punishment strategies are generally softer and more graduated than implied by a grim trigger strategy, and do better as a result. 相似文献
2.
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories
we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information
about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188–1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627–657, 2003).
In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly
known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary
factors such as reciprocity.
This paper was started while the authors were visiting the Harvard Business School during the fall of 2000. We are grateful
for their hospitality and financial support. Vesterlund acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and Potters
from the Royal Netherlands’ Academy of Arts and Sciences. We thank Henrik Orzen for assistance in conducting the experiment.
We also thank David Cooper and an anonymous referee who helped us improve the paper. Finally we thank Chris Anderson, Jim
Andreoni, John Duffy, Simon Gaechter, Ernan Haruvy, Muriel Niederle, Jack Ochs, Elke Renner, Al Roth, participants at ESA-meetings
(Barcelona, 2001), the Leadership and Social Interactions Workshop (Lyon, 2003), SITE (Stanford, 2004) and seminar participants
at Alabama, CMU, Duke, Keele, Maryland, Nottingham, NYU, Pittsburgh, OSU, and York for valuable comments. 相似文献
3.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,54(2):151-169
Participants in experimental games typically can only choose actions, without making comments about other participants' future actions. In sequential two-person games, we allow first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially according to whether first movers express a hope for favorable or unfavorable treatment. Responders largely ignore first movers' expressed preferences for favorable responses, however, when the first movers misbehave. As in earlier experiments without preference expression, subjects assign a high positive weight to another person's payoffs when ahead and misbehavior elicits a strong negative response. Logit regressions estimate the weight placed on another (non-misbehaving) person's payoffs to be positive, even when one is behind. There is suggestive evidence that positive reciprocity is enhanced when a preference for favorable treatment is expressed. 相似文献
4.
Individual sense of fairness: an experimental study 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Many prior studies have identified that subjects in experiments demonstrate preferences for fair allocations. We present an
experimental study designed to test whether a similar concern for fairness manifests itself when the decision maker is choosing
among differing probabilistic allocation mechanisms that will all generate an ex post unfair allocation by assigning an indivisible prize to one individual. This investigation is inspired by Karni and Safra
(Econometrica, 70, 263–284, 2002 ) in which a structure for preferences for fairness in such an environment was developed.
Here we use this model to design experiments that allow us to test for the presence of concern for fairness in individual
choice behavior and examine some factors that may affect the intensity of the concern for fairness.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
5.
We use data from experiments on finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching to investigate the effect of different types of information on cooperation. The data come from 71 studies using the voluntary contributions paradigm, covering 122 data points, and from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly, covering another 50 data points. We find similar effects in the two sets of experimental games. We find that transparency about what everyone in a group earns reduces contributions to the public good, as well as the degree of collusion in oligopoly markets. In contrast, transparency about choices tends to lead to an increase in contributions and collusion, although the size of this effect varies somewhat between the two settings. Our results are potentially useful for policy making, because they provide guidance on the type of information to target in order to stimulate or limit cooperation. 相似文献
6.
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models
that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our
experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson
and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash
equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying
coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough
experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this
hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and
prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium
within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently
similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.
相似文献
7.
In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice.Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers. 相似文献
8.
Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making. 相似文献
9.
In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other(s). If players can renegotiate after a defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that recognizes this fact, and show that in many games the prospect of renegotiation strictly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained. We characterize those outcomes in general, and in the prisoner's dilemma, Cournot and Bertrand duopolies, and an advertising game in particular. 相似文献
10.
We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that historical precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two repeated games. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game despite the possibility that efficient play can be sustained as an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game. Similarly, a precedent for inefficient play in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games may have less to do with historical precedents and might instead depend more on strategic considerations associated with the different payoffs of these similar repeated games. 相似文献
11.
Experimental Economics - We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a... 相似文献
12.
Adaptation and complexity in repeated games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make ‘cautious’ inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases. 相似文献
13.
Pablo Casas-Arce 《Economic Theory》2010,43(1):67-80
This paper studies repeated games, where player 1 can decide to let the opponent continue or replace her by a new player.
We also allow for the possibility of player 2 quitting the game. When only layoffs can occur, a folk theorem for finite horizons
obtains due to the threat that termination of the relationship imposes on player 2. However, quits limit this result to those
cases in which the outside option for player 2 is small (lower than some Nash equilibrium payoff of the stage game). 相似文献
14.
We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2×2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we characterize the asymptotic outcomes for all 2×2 games. In the prisoners’ dilemma game, for example, the players cooperate in the limit if and only if the gain from defecting against cooperation is “modest.” 相似文献
15.
Ran Spiegler 《Journal of Economic Theory》2005,121(2):214-235
Under most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by off-equilibrium events. I propose an equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, called “Nash Equilibrium with Tests” (NEWT), according to which players can only justify their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. In NEWT, players test every threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action that they take. The tests are an integral part of equilibrium behavior. Characterization of equilibrium outcomes departs from the classical “folk theorems”. The concept provides new insights into the impact of self-enforcement norms, such as reciprocity, on long-run cooperation. 相似文献
16.
Jason Shachat 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,114(2):280-309
We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model. 相似文献
17.
We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find that prevalent strategies in games with low outcome entropy are more likely to be used in the games with high outcome entropy, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings suggest that people do not treat strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games. 相似文献
18.
Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the development of conventions of trust in what we call intergenerational games, i.e., games played by a sequence of non-overplapping agents, who pass on advice on how to play the game across adjacent
generations of players. Using the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) as our experimental decision problem, advice seems to decrease
the amount of trustthat evolves when this game in played in an inter-generational manner in that it decreases the amount of money sent from Senders
to Returners. Ironically, advice increases trustworthinessin that Returners tend to send more back. Further, subjects appear to follows conventions of reciprocity in that they tend
to Send more if they think the Returners acted in a “kind” manner, where kind means the Sender sent more money than the receiver
expected. Finally, while we find a causal relationship running from trustworthiness to trust, the opposite can not be established.
We note that many of our results can only be achieved using the tools offered by inter-generational games. The inter-generational
advice offered provides information not available when games are played in their static form. Combining that information with
elicited beliefs of the Senders and Returners adds even more information that can be used to investigate the motives that
subjects have for doing what they do.
Electronic supplementary material Electronic supplementary material is available for this article at and accessible for authorised users.
JEL Classification C91 · C72
Resources for this research were provided by National Science Foundation grants SBR-9709962 and SBR-9709079 and by both the
Center for Experimental Social Science and the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University. We would like
to thank Shachar Kariv for both his comments and research assistance. We also thank Mikhael Shor and Judy Goldberg for research
assistance, and Yevgeniy Tovshteyn for computer programming. 相似文献
19.
20.
Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide a new equilibrium concept of repeated games that involve incomplete information ( rationalized subjective equilibrium ) and a related framework ( subjective game ), and to analyse the relationships between players' subjective images of games and the realized outcomes. We demonstrate the relationships among rationalized subjective equilibria, subjective equilibria, and original Nash equilibria by providing several examples. We also present several theorems analogous to the ordinary folk theorem and a simple application using the Cournot duopoly model. JEL Classification: C70, C72
Equilibres subjectifs rationalisés dans des jeux répétés L'objectif de cet article est de proposer un nouveau concept d'équilibre dans les jeux répétés où l'information est incomplète (équilibre subjectif rationalisé) et un cadre d'analyse approprié( jeu subjectif ), ainsi que d'analyser les rapports entre les images subjectives que les acteurs ont des jeux et de leurs résultats. On montre les rapports entre équilibres subjectifs rationalisés, équilibres subjectifs, et équilibres à la Nash à l'aide de divers exemples. On présente aussi plusieurs théorèmes analogues au « ordinary folk theorem >> et une application simple utilisant le modèle de duopole de Cournot. 相似文献
Equilibres subjectifs rationalisés dans des jeux répétés L'objectif de cet article est de proposer un nouveau concept d'équilibre dans les jeux répétés où l'information est incomplète (équilibre subjectif rationalisé) et un cadre d'analyse approprié( jeu subjectif ), ainsi que d'analyser les rapports entre les images subjectives que les acteurs ont des jeux et de leurs résultats. On montre les rapports entre équilibres subjectifs rationalisés, équilibres subjectifs, et équilibres à la Nash à l'aide de divers exemples. On présente aussi plusieurs théorèmes analogues au « ordinary folk theorem >> et une application simple utilisant le modèle de duopole de Cournot. 相似文献