Trust and reciprocity: misunderstandings

We contest a reductive view of trust, quite diffused in economics, and in studies influenced by the Game-Theory framework: the idea that trust has necessarily to do with contexts requiring “reciprocation”; or that trust is trust in the other’s reciprocation. A multi-layer cognitive model of trust will be proposed. Trust is not conceived only as an attitude towards the other, implying different kinds of beliefs (evaluations, expectations, beliefs on the other”s motives, etc.), but also as a willingness to rely on others that makes us dependent and vulnerable to them, as well as a concrete act of reliance based on this. Not necessarily we trust people because they will be willing to reciprocate; and we do not necessarily reciprocate for reciprocating. Trust (even “genuine” trust) is based on a variety of motivations ascribed to others and makes prevail the adoption of our needs and goals: from “altruism” to “self-interest”, from reciprocation to norms or to affective reasons.     

Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

Individuals are often given the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of a group or an organization. However, little is known about preferences or behavior in such contexts. In an adapted trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group-representatives differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous situation. Group-representatives are given the responsibility of unilaterally and privately making a decision on behalf of a three-person group. Results from both the main and the follow-up studies show that people trust less and reciprocate less as group-representatives, and thus demonstrate that the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect not only exists in group behavior but also in individual behavior of group-representatives. Moreover, results show that trusting behavior is driven by reciprocity expectations, while reciprocating behavior is not sensitive to the first mover's behavior, i.e., the level of trust experienced.     

Partnership,reciprocity and team design

This paper studies the effect of intention-based reciprocity preferences on the free-riding problem arising in partnerships. Our results suggest a tendency of efficient partnerships to consist of members whose sensitivity to reciprocity is – individually or jointly – sufficiently high. Sufficient conditions for the implementation of the efficient strategy profile require a reciprocity-based sharing rule so that each partner gets a fraction of the output, which is a percentage of his own sensitivity to reciprocity with respect to the overall sensitivity in the team. Finally, we introduce the concept of psychological strong Nash equilibrium and show that it allows for the unique and collusion-proof implementation of the efficient strategy profile.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size or on a Folk theorem that requires coordinated punishment and, hence, highly accurate information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the punishment of shirkers depends on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to contribute altruistically to a joint project and also to bear costs in order to discipline fellow members who do not contribute. This alternative does not require small group size, complex coordinated punishing activities, or implausible informational assumptions. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity and how it differs from unconditional altruism.     

The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design

Summary. In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This effect is shown here to depend as much upon the use of large monetary transfers among the agents as it does upon dependence: if the transfers are bounded in magnitude, then nonexistence in the case of independence of an efficient, incentive compatible, ex ante budget-balanced and interim individually rational mechanism is robust to the introduction of a small amount of dependence among types. This robustness result supports the use of the simplifying assumption of independence in mechanism design. Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

On virtual communities: individual motivations, reciprocity and we-rationality

Within knowledge-based economies, one of the major forms of organisational change concerns the impact of the introduction and dissemination of information and communication technologies on markets, consumers and firms. The existence of virtual or ‘electronic’ communities is one of the main consequences of this impact. In this context, the main purpose of this article is to answer the following questions: Why do firms and consumers take part in these communities? Are they driven by the usual or by more specific motivations based on reciprocity or we-rationality? Do these potentially new types of organisation and interaction, and new motivations change the working and the dynamics of our economic systems?     

Long-run determinants of pollution: A robustness analysis

This paper examines how robust economic, political, and demographic variables are related to water and air pollution. Employing Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) for a cross section of 47 countries, 34 variables and 3 proxies for air and water pollution over a period from 1980 to 2000 we confirm the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and highlight the relevance of variables that are not directly related to production.     

Inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity: results of an experiment with small businessmen

We investigate inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity by having subjects from distinct ethnic origins play the trust game [Games Econom. Behav. 10 (1995) 122]. The participants in the experiment are male small businessmen of Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin, all of whom have a business in the same city (Ghent, Belgium). Our main finding is that the average levels of trust and reciprocity are independent of ethnic origin and, moreover, independent of the ethnic origin of the opposite party.     

Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction [A. Matsui, K. Matsuyama, An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434]. Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.     

Multilateral tariff cooperation under fairness and reciprocity

Abstract This paper explores the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries reward kind behaviour (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unkindly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can support a greater degree of cooperation than self‐interested ones. However, when only very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on multilateral tariff cooperation.Thus, our model provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in trade negotiations.     

Trust and growth: a shaky relationship

We conduct an extensive robustness analysis of the relationship between trust and growth by investigating a later time period and a bigger sample than in previous studies. In addition to robustness tests that focus on model uncertainty, we systematize the investigation of outlier influence on the results by using the robust estimation technique Least Trimmed Squares. We find that when outliers (especially China) are removed, the trust-growth relationship is no longer robust. On average, the trust coefficient is half as large as in previous findings.      

Antipeponthos and reciprocity: the concept of equivalent exchange from Aristotle to Turgot

In modern discussions of reciprocity the concept is distinguished from that of self-interested exchange. In the problem of value in exchange, however, as set up in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics the concept of reciprocity (antipeponthos) as equivalent exchange was central in commercial transactions. The paper discusses (1) the concept of antipeponthos in Aristotle, (2) how issues of trust and inequality of services provided were dealt in Aristotle and (3) the trajectory of the concept of equivalent exchange from Aristotle to Turgot.     

信任研究:理论演进

近年来,信任研究方兴未艾,已经成为许多社会科学学科研究的课题,经济学也已经将其纳入了研究范围,并且得到了广泛关注.本文试图以经济学的信任研究为核心,同时与其他学科的研究作比较分析,梳理信任研究的理论及其演化路径,并在此基础上进行简单评述,以资借鉴.     

Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be approximate best responses for all measures that define a player's belief. Conditions are derived under which robustness is characterized by a newly defined strategic continuity property, which can be verified without reference to perturbations and corresponding ambiguous belief games.     

Introduction to model uncertainty and robustness

This article introduces the symposium on model uncertainty and robustness.     

Trust and Growth

Why does trust vary so substantially across countries? This paper presents a general equilibrium growth model in which heterogeneous agents transact and face a moral hazard problem. Agents may trust those with whom they transact, but they also have the opportunity to invest resources in verifying the truthfulness of claims made by transactors. We characterise the social, economic and institutional environments in which trust will be high, and show that low trust environments reduce the rate of investment. The predictions of the model are examined empirically for a cross-section of countries and have substantial support in the data.