融资模式对商业银行风险的影响:一个文献综述

次贷危机前,随着金融脱媒的快速发展,西方国家商业银行的融资模式已经发生变化,零售存款的比重逐渐下降,非存款融资占比不断提高,商业银行越来越倾向于以货币市场和资本市场金融创新为支撑的短期批发融资。本文对商业银行融资模式及其对银行风险影响的文献进行梳理,厘清商业银行融资模式的内涵和分类,分析融资模式对银行风险影响的机理,综述现有实证研究的不同研究方法和结论,以期对我国商业银行融资模式变化及对银行风险的影响提供参考。     

世行贷款新政策

2001～2003年世行贷款新政策: 世行总的政策仍然是减少贫困,开发人力资源,促进可持续发展.除了对项目继续提供贷款以外,世行更加重视运用世界各国的成功经验,为借款国提供管理、机构和体制改革,政策调整等方面的帮助和建议,如加强公共部门管理和责任,包括宏观经济管理和财政货币政策;推动向市场经济转轨,建立法律和监管框架,促进金融体制改革,国企改革和私营部门发展,人力资源投资;促进农村发展,提高农业生产力和农民收入水平,开放和管理水资源,改善自然资源管理和环境保护;促进城市发展,推进住房、土地和劳动力市场改革等.     

商业银行筹资成本和筹资策略探析

筹资成本构成对银行筹资策略选择具有影响。除了传统的筹资利息成本和非利息成本之外，还存在看筹资的流动性成本和利率风险成本。分析各类筹资成本的可控性和可核算性，提出银行筹资策略选择准则和成本控制的重点；分析客观存在的同业间筹资成本构成的差异和与债权人的利益差异，提出旨在主动利用这些差异的筹资策略。     

Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments

This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit-funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short-run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.     

Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating and Allocating House Transaction Funding Price Differentials

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This study examines house transaction price differentials observed among funding type combinations; accounting for potential sample selection and...     

Comparing Present Value Cost Differentials between Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Loans: A Mortgage Simulation

When a borrower chooses between a fixed-rate and an adjustable-rate loan, he is doing so based on expectations of future interest rates and the expected life of the loan. This paper demonstrates how Monte Carlo simulation can be employed to assist in decision making when the borrower is confronted with the choice of fixed or adjustable-rate mortgages. Present value costs of future mortgage payments are modeled using actual lending parameters offered over a 50-month period, at varying borrower discount rates, and with different mortgage holding periods. The selection of a fixed-rate or a variable-rate mortgage is shown to be sensitive to mortgagee holding period and discount rates as well as to market conditions.     

银行并购后绩效问题研究综述

西方学对银行并购绩效问题已经进行了很多的研究,对这些研究进行系统的梳理是有必要的。因为影响银行并购的因素十分多,所以银行并购后的绩效也呈现出十分复杂的结果,市场对并购的反应也不尽相同。     

税收福利成本文献述评

税收在资源配置过程中除有形的经济负担之外,还会产生无形的负担,即税收的课征会影响人们在经济活动中的决策。本文通过介绍税收福利成本概念,税收福利成本计量模型的介绍以及对税收福利成本实证研究的回顾三个角度对文献进行整理与评述,并进一步提出研究方向。     

汇率变动与银行稳定相关研究述评

文章就亚洲金融危机以来汇率变动与银行业稳定的研究理论和研究方法进行了综述。主要是从基于传统货币危机模型中的汇率变动与银行稳定研究,基于银行业危机模型的汇率变动与银行稳定研究,银行业间接汇率风险和直接汇率风险的衡量方法等视角对国外汇率变动与银行稳定的新进展进行综述和评价。     

西方银行贷款定价理论评述

作为金融中介理论的重要组成部分，银行贷款定价理论围绕对银行行为的探讨而展开，已形成了较完整的理论体系。本文选择三种有代表性的银行贷款定价理论——基于市场结构的贷款定价、基于关系型贷款的定价和最前沿的基于风险的贷款定价理论进行介绍与评价，以期为我国银行贷款定价实践提供理论指导。     

货币政策成本和中央银行利润

本文以中央银行资产负债表数据为基础,测算中央银行实施宏观货币政策的财务成本,并计算其中的外汇对冲和准财政职能成本,纳入收入后形成中央银行2003年以来的利润表。结果表明,中央银行实施宏观货币政策调控付出了巨额成本,但外汇储备收入的增加使其营业利润为正,政策实施效果良好。然而,考虑外汇储备资产自身的损益后,中央银行出现亏损,这与长期以来被动的外汇干预政策有着直接联系,根本原因来自于中国货币供给的内生性。     

Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital

This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral-hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank-loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral-hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.     

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.     

银行脆弱性理论述评

银行脆弱性是近年来才兴起的前沿理论,学者们就其内涵、生成机理、判断与测度进行了探讨,本文在阐述已有研究成果的基础上,对其作出评析.