Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

What really works

When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.     

Zero defections: quality comes to services

Companies that want to improve their service quality should take a cue from manufacturing and focus on their own kind of scrap heap: customers who won't come back. Because that scrap heap can be every bit as costly as broken parts and misfit components, service company managers should strive to reduce it. They should aim for "zero defections"--keeping every customer they can profitably serve. As companies reduce customer defection rates, amazing things happen to their financials. Although the magnitude of the change varies by company and industry, the pattern holds: profits rise sharply. Reducing the defection rate just 5% generates 85% more profits in one bank's branch system, 50% more in an insurance brokerage, and 30% more in an auto-service chain. And when MBNA America, a Delaware-based credit card company, cut its 10% defection rate in half, profits rose a whopping 125%. But defection rates are not just a measure of service quality; they are also a guide for achieving it. By listening to the reasons why customers defect, managers learn exactly where the company is falling short and where to direct their resources. Staples, the stationery supplies retailer, uses feedback from customers to pinpoint products that are priced too high. That way, the company avoids expensive broad-brush promotions that pitch everything to everyone. Like any important change, managing for zero defections requires training and reinforcement. Great-West Life Assurance Company pays a 50% premium to group health-insurance brokers that hit customer-retention targets, and MBNA America gives bonuses to departments that hit theirs.     

The uncompromising leader

Managing the tension between performance and people is at the heart of the CEO's job. But CEOs under fierce pressure from capital markets often focus solely on the shareholder, which can lead to employee disenchantment. Others put so much stock in their firms' heritage that they don't notice as their organizations slide into complacency. Some leaders, though, manage to avoid those traps and create high-commitment, high-performance (HCHP) companies. The authors' in-depth research of HCHP CEOs reveals several shared traits: These CEOs earn the trust of their organizations through their openness to the unvarnished truth. They are deeply engaged with their people, and their exchanges are direct and personal. They mobilize employees around a focused agenda, concentrating on only one or two initiatives. And they work to build collective leadership capabilities. These leaders also forge an emotionally resonant shared purpose across their companies. That consists of a three-part promise: The company will help employees build a better world and deliver performance they can be proud of, and will provide an environment in which they can grow. HCHP CEOs approach finding a firm's moral and strategic center in a competitive market as a calling, not an engineering problem. They drive their firms to be strongly market focused while at the same time reinforcing their firms' core values. They are committed to short-term performance while also investing in long-term leadership and organizational capabilities. By refusing to compromise on any of these terms, they build great companies.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

The new boundaries of the "boundaryless" company

In an economy founded on innovation and change, one of the premier challenges of management is to design more flexible organizations. For many executives, a single metaphor has come to embody this managerial challenge and to capture the kind of organization they want to create: the "corporation without boundaries." According to Larry Hirschhorn and Thomas Gilmore of the Wharton Center for Applied Research, managers are right to break down the boundaries that make organizations rigid and unresponsive. But they are wrong if they think that doing so eliminates the need for boundaries altogether. Once the traditional boundaries of hierarchy, function, and geography disappear, a new set of boundaries becomes important. These new boundaries are more psychological than organizational. They aren't drawn on a company's organizational chart but in the minds of its managers and employees. And instead of being reflected in a company's structure, they must be "enacted" over and over again in a manager's relationships with bosses, subordinates, and peers. In this article, Hirschhorn and Gilmore provide a guide to the boundaries that matter in the "boundaryless" company. They explain how these new boundaries are essential for both managers and employees in coping with the demands of flexible work. They describe the typical mistakes that managers make in their boundary relationships. And they show how executives can become effective boundary managers by paying attention to a source of data they have often overlooked in the past: their own gut feelings about work and the people with whom they do it.     

Managing in the whitespace

The assumption today is that new value in a company can be created only when people shed their suits, don khakis and Hawaiian shirts, and think and act like the most passionate entrepreneurs. The problem is, they're rarely told when it makes sense to do those things--or how to do them. With help from a team of ethnographers and senior organization specialists, authors Mark Maletz and Nitin Nohria recently conducted a unique research project that attempted to full those gaps. Their project focused on whitespace: the large but mostly unoccupied territory in every company where rules are vague, authority is fuzzy, budgets are nonexistent, and strategy is unclear--and where entrepreneurial activity that helps reinvent and renew an organization most often takes place. The researchers shadowed entrepreneurial managers operating in the whitespace and met with top managers about their efforts to oversee whitespace activities. Using examples from the financial services, computer, and e-commerce industries, the authors explain when it's imperative to operate in the whitespace--and when it's wiser to stay in the traditional blackspace. They describe how effective whitespace managers subtly and resourcefully lead successful efforts, and how senior executives nurture whitespace projects by putting aside their traditional planning, organizing, and controlling techniques. Finally, they examine the ultimate issue for any successful whitespace project: should it be moved into the blackspace, kept in the whitespace indefinitely--or, despite its apparent success, killed off? If companies leave this valuable territory to the scattershot whims and talents of individual managers, the authors say, they are likely to miss out on many of the opportunities that come from exploring the next frontier.     

The Impact of Recognition Versus Disclosure on Financial Information: A Preparer's Perspective

We investigate whether recognition on the face of the financial statements versus disclosure in the footnotes influences the amount that financial managers report for a contingent liability. Using an experiment with corporate controllers and chief financial officers, we find that financial managers in public companies expend more cognitive effort and exhibit less strategic bias under recognition than disclosure. This difference appears to be associated with capital market pressures experienced by public company managers as we find that both the cognitive effort and bias exhibited by private company managers are unaffected by placement. As a result, public company managers make higher liability estimates for recognized versus disclosed liabilities. Their liability estimates are similar to those of private company managers for recognition but lower than private company managers’ estimates for disclosure. Our results have implications for auditors and financial statement users in evaluating recognized versus disclosed information for public and private companies.     

Execution without excuses. Interview by Thomas A. Stewart and Louise O'Brien

The success of Dell--it provides extraordinary rewards to shareholders, it can turn on a dime, and it has demonstrated impeccable timing in entering new markets--is based on more than its famous business model. High expectations and disciplined, consistent execution are embedded in the company's DNA. "We don't tolerate businesses that don't make money," founder Michael Dell tells HBR. "We used to hear all sorts of excuses for why a business didn't make money, but to us they all sounded like 'The dog ate my homework.' We just don't accept that." In order to double its revenues in a five-year period, the company had to adapt its execution-obsessed culture to new demands. In fact, Michael Dell and CEO Kevin Rollins realized they had a crisis on their hands."We had a very visible group of employees who'd gotten rich from stock options," Rollins says. "You can't build a great company on employees who say, 'If you pay me enough, I'll stay.'" Dell and Rollins knew they had to reignite the spirit of the company. They implemented an employee survey, whose results led to the creation of the Winning Culture initiative, now a top operating priority at Dell. They also defined the Soul of Dell: Focus on the customer, be open and direct in communications, be a good global citizen, have fun in winning. It turned outto be a huge motivator. And they increased the focus on developing people within the company. "We've changed as individuals and as an organization," Rollins says. "We want the world to see not just a great financial record and operational performance but a great company. We want to have leaders that other companies covet. We want a culture that makes people stick around for reasons other than money."     

What is a global manager?

To compete around the world, a company needs three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency, local responsiveness, and the ability to leverage learning worldwide. No single "global" manager can build these capabilities. Rather, groups of specialized managers must integrate assets, resources, and people in diverse operating units. Such managers are made, not born. And how to make them is--and must be--the foremost question for corporate managers. Drawing on their research with leading transnational corporations, Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal identify three types of global managers. They also illustrate the responsibilities each position involves through a close look at the careers of successful executives: Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble. The first type is the global business or product-division manager who must build worldwide efficiency and competitiveness. These managers recognize cross-border opportunities and risks as well as link activities and capabilities around the world. The second is the country manager whose unit is the building block for worldwide operations. These managers are responsible for understanding and interpreting local markets, building local resources and capabilities, and contributing to--and participating in--the development of global strategy. Finally, there are worldwide functional specialists--the managers whose potential is least appreciated in many traditional multinational companies. To transfer expertise from one unit to another and leverage learning, these managers must scan the company for good ideas and best practice, cross-pollinate among units, and champion innovations with worldwide applications.     

Integration managers: special leaders for special times

Although the integration of an acquired company with the parent organization is a delicate and complicated process, traditionally no one has ever been responsible for that process--for charting how the two companies will combine their operations, for seeing to it that the integration project meets its deadlines and performance targets, and for educating the new people about the parent company and vice versa. Some enlightened companies have recognized this gap and have appointed a guide--the integration manager--to shepherd everyone through the rocky territory that two organizations must cross before they can function effectively together. The authors have interviewed a number of these leaders in depth, as well as some of the people with whom they've worked. They've determined that integration managers help the merger process in four principal ways: they speed it up, create a structure for it, forge social connections between the two organizations, and help engineer short-term successes. In this article, the authors detail five acquisitions--at TI, General Cable, Meritor Automotive, Lucent, and Johnson & Johnson--and discuss the role that integration managers played in each. They describe exactly what sort of person should do this job. The integration manager must be able to jump into complex situations quickly, relate to many levels of authority smoothly, and bridge gaps in culture and perception. The ever-changing organizations of the Internet age will need leaders with similar skills. In fact, the authors contend, the integration manager should be considered a prototype for the leader of the future.     

The ambidextrous CEO

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.     

Changing the way we change

More and more companies struggle with growing competition by introducing improvements into every aspect of performance. But the treadmill keeps moving faster, the companies keep working harder, and results improve slowly or not at all. The problem here is not the improvement programs. The problem is that the whole burden of change typically rests on so few people. Companies achieve real agility only when every function and process--when every person--is able and eager to rise to every challenge. This type and degree of fundamental change, commonly called revitalization or transformation, is what many companies seek but rarely achieve because they have never before identified the factors that produce sustained transformational change. The authors identify three interventions that will restore companies to vital agility and then keep them in good health: incorporating employees fully into the principal business challenges facing the company, leading the organization in a different way in order to sharpen and maintain incorporation and constructive stress, and instilling mental disciplines that will make people behave differently and then help them sustain their new behavior. The authors discovered these basic sources of revitalization by tracking the change efforts of Sears, Roebuck & Company, Royal Dutch Shell, and the United States Army. The organizations used these interventions to alter the way their people experienced their own power and identity, as well as the way they dealt with conflict and learning. As at Sears, Shell, and the U.S. Army, any major shift in those four elements will create a landmark shift in any organization's operating state or culture.     

Managing the right tension

Of all the competing objectives every company faces, three pairs stand out: profitability versus growth, the short term versus the long term, and the whole organization versus the units. In each case, progress on one front usually comes at the expense of progress on the other. The authors researched the performance of more than 1000 companies worldwide over the past two decades and found that most struggle to succeed across the three tensions. From 1983 to 2003, for example, only 32% of these companies more often than not achieved positive profitability and revenue growth at the same time. The problem, the authors discovered, is not so much that managers don't recognize the tensions--those are all too familiar to anyone who has ever run a business. Rather, it is that managers frequently don't focus on the tension that matters most to their company. Even when they do identify the right tension, they usually make the mistake of prioritizing a "lead" objective within it-for example, profitability over growth. As a result, companies often end up moving first in this direction, then in that, and then back again, never quite resolving the tension. The companies that performed best adopted a very different approach. Instead of setting a lead objective, they looked at how best to strengthen what the two sides of each tension have in common: For profitability and growth,the common bond is customer benefit; for the short term and the long, it is sustainable earnings; and for the whole and its parts, it is particular organizational resources and capabilities. The authors describe how companies can select the right tension, what traps they may fall into when they focus on one side over the other, and how to escape these traps by managing to the bonds between objectives.     

The path of kyosei

Many global companies believe they have a moral duty to respond to the world's problems but are unsure how to do that and still pursue a reasonable profit for their shareholders. Ryuzaburo Kaku, honorary chairman of Canon, the Japanese technology company, suggests that companies consider kyosei, a business credo that he defines as a "spirit of cooperation" in which individuals and organizations work together for the common good. Kyosei, Kaku claims, has helped Canon make a significant and positive impact on many world problems as the company has grown to become one of the world's preeminent innovators and manufacturers of technology. The implementation of kyosei can be divided into five stages, with each stage building on the preceding one. In the first stage, companies must work to secure a predictable stream of profits and to establish strong market positions. From this foundation, they move on to the second stage, in which managers and workers resolve to cooperate with each other, recognizing that both groups are vital to the company's success. In the third stage, this sense of cooperation is extended beyond the company to encompass customers, suppliers, community groups, and even competitors. At the fourth stage, a company takes the cooperative spirit beyond national boundaries and addresses some of the global imbalances that plague the world. In the fifth stage, which companies rarely achieve, a company urges its national government to work toward rectifying global imbalances. For each stage, Kaku provides detailed examples from Cannon's own experience in putting the ideas of kyosei into practice.     

Evidence-based management

For the most part, managers looking to cure their organizational ills rely on obsolete knowledge they picked up in school, long-standing but never proven traditions, patterns gleaned from experience, methods they happen to be skilled in applying, and information from vendors. They could learn a thing or two from practitioners of evidence-based medicine, a movement that has taken the medical establishment by storm over the past decade. A growing number of physicians are eschewing the usual, flawed resources and are instead identifying, disseminating, and applying research that is soundly conducted and clinically relevant. It's time for managers to do the same. The challenge is, quite simply, to ground decisions in the latest and best knowledge of what actually works. In some ways, that's more difficult to do in business than in medicine. The evidence is weaker in business; almost anyone can (and many people do) claim to be a management expert; and a motley crew of sources--Shakespeare, Billy Graham,Jack Welch, Attila the Hunare used to generate management advice. Still, it makes sense that when managers act on better logic and strong evidence, their companies will beat the competition. Like medicine, management is learned through practice and experience. Yet managers (like doctors) can practice their craft more effectively if they relentlessly seek new knowledge and insight, from both inside and outside their companies, so they can keep updating their assumptions, skills, and knowledge.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

The business against case revolution. An interview with Nestlé's Peter Brabeck. Interview by Sue Wetlaufer

One of the world's most enduring companies, Nestle epitomizes everything that today's high-flying, headline-grabbing companies are not. It respects technology but doesn't consider it central to strategy. It values growth but prefers it controlled. It seeks talented professionals but wants only those who are modest in word and deed. Nestle CEO Peter Brabeck is skeptical of the relentless push for radical transformation heard from every quarter. He believes, instead, in continuous improvement through slow and steady change. Big, dramatic change is fine for a crisis, Brabeck says, but not every company is in crisis all the time. Many companies are like Nestle--performing well, growing and innovating, without frenzy, without bloodshed. While he acknowledges that every company must change in order to compete in today's turbulent marketplace, Brabeck makes the focus of his work identifying and strengthening those aspects of Nestle that should stay the same. For example, Nestle eschews the noise and energy swirling around technology. Many companies make technology the focal point of strategy, Brabeck says, but Nestle is about people, products, and brands. The company uses technology to create better products but keeps it in its right place--the background. Brabeck also talks candidly about how to fight complacency in a successful company, how to institutionalize collaboration in a decentralized organization, and how to resist pressure from analysts and money managers and focus on long-term, sustainable and profitable growth--in short, how to win the war without the revolution.     

M&A needn't be a loser's game

Three out of four acquisitions fail; they destroy wealth for the buyer's shareholders, who end up worse off than they would have been had the deal not been done. But it doesn't have to be that way, argue the authors. In evaluating acquisitions, companies must look beyond the lure of profits the income statement promises and examine the balance sheet, where the company keeps track of capital. It's ignoring the balance sheet that causes so many acquisitions to destroy shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, most executives focus only on sales and profits going up, never realizing that they've put in motion a plan to destroy their company's true profitability--its return on invested capital. M&A, like other aspects of running a company, works best when seen as a way to create shareholder value through customers. Some deals are sought to help create better value propositions for the business or to better execute current strategies--or to block competitors from doing these things. But most deals are about customers and should start with an analysis of customer profitability. Some customers are deliciously profitable; others are dismal money losers. The better an acquirer understands the profitability of its own customers, the better positioned it will be to perform such analyses on other companies. In this article, the authors show that customer profitability varies far more dramatically than most managers suspect. They also describe how to measure the profitability of customers. By understanding the economics of customer profitability, companies can avoid making deals that hurt their shareholders, they can identify surprising deals that do create wealth, and they can salvage deals that would otherwise be losers.     

Surviving your new CEO

Almost 50% of the largest American firms will have a new CEO within the next four years; your company could very well be next. Senior executives know that a CEO transition means they're in for a round of firings, organizational reshuffles, and other unwelcome career changes. When your career suddenly depends on the views of a person you may not know, how worried should you be? According to the authors--very. They investigated the 2002-2004 CEO turnover rates of the top 1,000 U.S. companies and interviewed more than a dozen CEOs, each of whom had taken over at least one very large organization. Their study reveals that when a new CEO takes charge, remaining top managers are more likely than not to be shown the door. Those who leave often land in a lower position at a new company, work in a much smaller firm, or retire altogether. The news is not all grim, however. The interviewees offer some pointers on how to create a good impression and maximize your chances of survival and success under the new regime. Some of that advice may surprise you. One CEO pointed out, for instance, that "managers do not realize how much the CEO is looking for teammates on day one. I am amazed at how few people come through the door and say, 'I want to help. I may not be perfect, but I buy into your vision:" Other recommendations are more intuitive, such as learning the new CEO's working style, understanding her agenda, and helping her look good in her new position by achieving positive operating results--and soon. Along with the inevitable stresses, the authors point out, CEO transitions can provide opportunities. Whether you reinvigorate your career within your company or find fulfillment elsewhere, the key lies in deciding what you want to do--and then doing it right.