Alan Gillie,Input-Output Economics.

Turnovsky observes that “the rational expectations hypothesis has had a profound impact on macroeconomic theory and policy during the past decade.” Tracing briefly the evolution of the ideas involved, he concludes that “… a consensus view is emerging that in fact under quite plausible conditions the policy neutrality proposition does not hold; therefore, there is still scope for policy rules to play an important role in stabilizing output.”

The mathematics used in the article is expository rather than analytical, requiring of the reader only somewhat more than the usual amount of persistence, faith in the author's interpretation of the literature, and a willingness to accept the integrity of economic models as representative of the real world. This is “required” reading for those teaching macroeconomics.     

排污权价格形成机制及其优化分析

构建有效的排污权价格形成与运行机制是排污权交易制度建设的关键环节。本文分析了排污权的初始分配机制以及不同市场条件下排污权交易的价格形成机制。在完全竞争市场条件下,排污权的市场价格等于各企业的边际治理成本。经济增长、污染治理技术进步、政府环境目标以及预期因素等将对排污权价格变动产生影响。在不完全竞争条件下,市场势力和交易费用的存在降低了排污权价格机制的效率。文章最后提出了优化排污权价格形成和运行机制的政策建议。     

The welfare cost of imperfect competition and distortionary taxation

The welfare cost of imperfect competition in the product and labor markets in the United States is quantified in a dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that the welfare cost of imperfect competition in the product market is 3.62 percent while it is 0.58 percent in the labor market, taking the transition path from the distorted to the optimal steady state into account. If we also take into account that the US economy is characterized by distortionary taxation, the welfare cost of the product market distortion increases to 13.51 percent and the labor market distortion to 4.35 percent.     

依法治税和纳税服务——基于国家税收和公共税收的视角

依法治税和纳税服务是现阶段税收的两大任务。对两者的认识,不能孤立地或对立地看,而是要在社会主义市场经济下的税收应是国家税收和公共税收的统一的视角下加以把握。从这一认识出发,我们就能真正做到坚持依法治税,优化纳税服务,服务科学发展,就能探索出一条中国特色社会主义市场经济条件下的纳税服务新路。     

环境信息披露机制与企业发展——以日常耐用品生产企业为例

日常耐用消费品与人们的生活息息相关,其环保程度,对大众的身体健康有着重要影响。企业通过信息披露机制反映自身关于企业污染、治理方面的信息,可反映企业产品的环保程度,有利于消费者更好地了解企业,更好地反映产品的品质信息。企业披露高质量的环境信息,有利于建立良好的社会形象,有利于发展与消费者、政府间的互信机制,有利于强化企业产品的差异化程度,增强产品市场竞争力。     

扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据

文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。     

我国出口补贴转变为技改补贴的有效性分析

文章探讨了本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业技改投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业技改投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业技改投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一政策可接替在未来实施中具有不确定性的出口补贴政策。     

Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.     

Exchange rates and perfect competition

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the commonly held belief that incomplete and perverse pass-through are incompatible with perfect competition is wrong! To this end, we consider two types of firms both operating in two countries. The demand sides of the markets of the two countries are separated and each type of firm produces its good in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange-rate change on the competitive equilibrium prices in each country. When producing for the foreign market causes the same costs as producing for the home market then the law of one price holds and an exchange-rate change is completely offset by price changes. Furthermore, when cost functions neither exhibit economies nor diseconomies of scope between producing for the home and producing for the foreign market then prices move in the right directions in response to an exchange-rate change. However, with general cost structures, even in this simple perfectly competitive model, perverse directions of price changes can result from an exchange-rate change.     

The Welfare State, Budgetary Pressure and Labour Market Shifts

Public debate about the welfare state in OECD countries has emphasized the need for reform to meet a twofold set of shocks: budgetary pressure and a labour market shift against unskilled workers. The aim of the paper is to set out a framework for examining the implications of these shocks for the optimal scale of social transfers and, in particular, the impact on different societies, distinguishing a restricted welfare state, labelled the United States and a more extensive welfare state, labelled Continental Europe.     

Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing?

In this paper a model of taxation of foreign source corporate income is developed when the output market is not perfectly competitive. Profit shifting policies, similar to those in the new trade literature, are also present in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI). There are, however, important differences to the new trade theory since in case of FDI, (i) corporate taxation and double taxation relief are the policy instruments rather than output or revenue taxes, (ii) countries are not symmetric in the sense that the host country has the first right to tax the multinational's profit and the home country reacts by providing double taxation relief, and (iii) output but not corporate taxation is specific to imperfectly competitive industries. It is argued that (a) variants of a tax credit are analogous to export subsidies, (b) when the home country operates a tax credit system the host country's incentive to capture the multinational's profit is bounded under imperfect competition, (c) when the host country offers a tax holiday the home country should imitate this policy, and (d) in the presence of perfect competitive industries, double taxation relief is a good instrument to target imperfectly competitive industries.     

A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

This note shows that per unit taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation in an oligopoly model, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high compared to the number of oligopolists. It aims to provide an alternative perspective to existing literature arguing instead the dominance of ad valorem over per unit taxation in oligopoly frameworks. Our result is obtained in a simple example which uses a strategic market game formulation to study strategic behavior at a general equilibrium level.     

隐性合约理论及其新发展

本首先阐述了早期隐性合约理论的基本思想,然后进一步分析了隐性合约理论在近期的发展和完善情况,最后在上述分析的基础上评价了隐性合约理论的创新及局限性。     

Optimal Emissions Taxation under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry

This paper investigates optimal emissions taxation under imperfect competition in a durable good industry where products are sold (instead of rented). As a benchmark, attention is paid to the special case of monopoly with exogenously given product durability. In line with previous literature, the optimal emission tax in this benchmark model falls short of marginal damage (underinternalization). Extending the benchmark model either to the case of an oligopolistic market structure and/or to the case of endogenous product durability then provides two cases in which the optimal emission tax overinternalizes marginal damage.     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.