Economic growth,corruption and tax evasion

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.     

Redistribution,trade and corruption: an empirical assessment

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of institutional quality in the trade and inequality nexus. Does corruption shape the relationship between trade and inequality through its impact on redistribution? Our answer to this question builds on the hypothesis that trade raises inequality and that governments may want to intervene through appropriate redistribution schemes that aim at taxing the gains from trade in a way that offsets the negative effects of trade on inequality. Moreover, we argue that this mechanism may be distorted by corruption and bad institutions in general. Quite to the contrary to common wisdom, we find that trade reduces inequality in countries with high institutional standards by means of a low level of corruption but increases inequality in countries with low levels of institutional quality.     

Tariff liberalization and trade specialization: Lessons from India

This paper analyzes the effects of policy reform on the structure of India’s trade in manufactures, from 1990 to 2006. It computes comparative advantage indicators on the basis of disaggregated trade flow data and assesses the effects of trade liberalization on the evolution of India’s pattern of trade specialization. Industries where import tariffs have been reduced the most have experienced the highest increase in specialization. Moreover, trade liberalization has helped India improve its comparative advantage in industries with medium- to high-technology content, as well as in some of the industries enjoying the most robust growth in global demand. Liberalization policies have been instrumental in enhancing the international competitiveness of industries.     

Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Abstract.  Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a 'disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two‐country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country. JEL classification: F18, F13, D72     

Reducing tariff evasion: The role of trade facilitation

Can simplifying customs procedures reduce tariff evasion? We measure tariff evasion as the mis-representation of import values in response to increasing tariffs. In a dataset covering 121 countries and the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, we show that simplifying border procedures, that is trade facilitation, reduces tariff evasion. Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, improving a country’s overall trade facilitation performance from the 25th percentile to the median reduces tariff evasion by almost 20%. The moderating effect is especially due to improving the pre-shipment legal certainty of customs procedures. Among the potential mechanisms, improving trade facilitation performance is effective in reducing tariff evasion due to under-reporting of import prices, as well as in countries with weaker control of corruption. The results suggest that countries can gradually implement trade facilitation reforms to cost-effectively minimize tariff evasion.     

Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist

This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered. A third externality – that between firms and inspectors – is the source of the perverse effect; more cheating by firms is good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking inspectors are good for cheating firms.     

Tariff pass-through and the distributional effects of trade liberalization

This paper estimates the distribution of welfare gains due to the trade reforms in India by simultaneously considering the effect on prices of tradable goods and wages. The cost of consumption for each household is affected by the domestic price changes, while wage incomes adjust to these price changes in equilibrium. Three rounds of the Indian Employment and Consumption Surveys are used for the analysis. The price transmission mechanisms are estimated for both rural and urban areas to understand the extent to which the trade reforms are able to affect the domestic prices. In order to assess the distributional effects, a series of nonparametric local linear regressions are estimated. The findings show that households at all per capita expenditure levels had experienced gains as a result of the trade liberalization, while the average effect was generally pro-poor and varied significantly across the per capita expenditure spectrum.     

Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corruption?

Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have undergone reform. However, there has been no study of whether different combinations of reforms cause an increase in corruption. Theory provides some guidance as to the direction of causality—on the one hand, reforms make politicians accountable to voters as well as introducing more competition, which should decrease corruption. On the other hand, reforms may not be credible, which provides for an incentive for corruption. This paper uses the numerous cases of political and economic liberalizations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s to examine this issue. The findings are that undertaking both types of reforms in rapid succession leads to a decrease in corruption, while countries that liberalized more than 5 years after democratizing experienced an increase in corruption.     

Strategic interoperability standards and trade taxes

In a two-country international trade framework, the paper considers the interplay between the governments' incentives for conducting traditional trade policies and their incentives for the policies toward compatibility between the products of the firms competing in the international market. The model assumes that one domestic and one foreign firm supply partially incompatible products for the home country market while consumers value both variety and a network externality. Motivated by the benefits of the network externality, the home government sets a standard requiring the foreign firm to guarantee a minimum level of compatibility between its own product and the product of the domestic rival. The paper analyzes the home country standard setting and import tariff policies as well as the incentives of the foreign country for imposing the export tax and conducting a policy which enhances the degree of compatibility between the rival products in the export market.     

Tariff rate quotas and the economic impact of agricultural trade liberalization in the world trade organization

Since their implementation at the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have become a widely used instrument of trade policy in agricultural trade. With almost 1,300 TRQs scheduled at the World Trade Organization, this paper will examine their economic effects more closely. First, the theoretical background of TRQs is examined. Then, a short overview of the Uruguay Round and their institutional background is given. We demonstrate that official statistics, which do not count TRQs as nontariff barriers, are at least highly misleading. Very often, their effects are the same as those of regular quotas, including redistributive effects. The prominent example of the European banana regime is used to illustrate all of these points.A first draft of this paper was presented at the International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 14–21, 2000, Munich, Germany. The results are part of the research project "The Influence of the Institutional Design on the Actual Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization after GATT." Financial support by Volkswagen Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.     

Tariff effects on MNC decisions to engage in intra-firm and arm's-length trade

Abstract .  Using confidential firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on activities of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and their Canadian affiliates, we study the dramatic growth of intra-firm and arm's-length U.S.-Canada trade over the 198495 period. We find that decisions to engage in intra-firm and arm's-length trade are essentially unrelated to tariff and transport cost reductions over this sample period. Thus, we find that the increase in trade occurred almost entirely on the  intensive  rather than the  extensive  margin. This is consistent with case study evidence in Keane and Feinberg (2006), where MNC executives consistently indicate that the modest tariff reductions of the 198495 period were not sufficient to justify fixed costs of overhauling international supply chains. Our results have important implications for recent influential models of international trade that rely on sensitivity of intra-firm trade to tariffs at the  extensive  margin to explain how small tariff declines could have led to the explosion of intra-firm trade since the 1980s. We also find that initial conditions (i.e., 1983 tariffs) are uncorrelated with whether firms engaged in intra-firm or arm's-length trade activity at the start of the sample period. This result is surprising as it implies that firms/industries with a greater propensity to engage in trade were not, in general, successful at lobbying for more favourable tariff treatment.     

Regionalism in standards: good or bad for trade?

Abstract.  Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and blessed by multilateral trade rules. Using a constructed panel data that identifies the different types of agreements at the industry level, we find that such agreements increase the trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Harmonization of standards may reduce the exports of excluded countries, especially in markets that have raised the stringency of standards. Mutual recognition agreements are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from other countries.     

Tariff,Growth, and Welfare

We develop a two‐country (Home and Foreign) by two‐good (consumption good and investment good) by one factor (capital) endogenous growth model with international knowledge spillover to study the relationship between an import tariff and economic growth and welfare. First, unlike the past literature, we do not need to make an assumption such that the growth rates between countries are identical in a balanced growth path (BGP). Second, we show that there exists a unique and saddle‐point BGP with both countries being incompletely specialized. Third, a higher import tariff on the consumption good in the domestic country may boost (reduce) the rate of economic growth when the foreign (domestic) country has an absolute advantage in the investment good. Finally, a rise in the tariff rate by one country may improve world welfare under some parameter spaces.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: reply

Saha [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. (2003)] has raised some points about our paper [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 16 (2000) 75]. We herewith reply to these points.     

Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards

Using a two‐country, two‐good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady‐state utility to decrease in a resource‐good importing country and increase in a resource‐good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady‐state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade.     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.