Trade Creation Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: Tariff Reduction versus Non‐tariff Barrier Removal

This study uses the most disaggregated tariff line‐level trade data in a large number of countries in the world to empirically decompose the trade creation effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) into those owing to tariff reduction and those owing to non‐tariff barrier (NTB) removal. Specifically, utilizing our detailed dataset, we employ the standard gravity equation and identify those effects by estimating the trade creation effects of RTAs for ineligible and eligible products for RTA preferential schemes separately. Our major findings are as follows. First, for the whole sample, there are significantly positive trade creation effects owing to tariff reduction while the effects for NTB removal are weak. Second, the trade creation effects of tariff reduction and NTB removal are substantially large in the case of trade among low‐income countries but weak among high‐income countries.     

Can a Regional Trade Agreement Benefit a Nonmember Country without Compensating It?

RTAs are generally formed without any tariff concessions or transfers to nonmember countries. Can such an RTA benefit nonmembers' welfare? In a two‐good three‐country competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, an RTA without concessions to a nonmember will hurt nonmembers' welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves nonmembers' welfare. In a three‐good three‐country model, an RTA without concessions damages the nonmember's welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.     

The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the USA. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US grants immediate duty free access (IDA) to its RTA partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US grants IDA status especially on goods for which it has cut the multilateral most favored nation (MFN) tariff during the Uruguay Round the most. Our results suggest that the Uruguay Round multilateral “concessions” have elicited subsequent preferential trade liberalization.     

Does a Regional Trade Agreement Lessen or Worsen Growth Volatility? An Empirical Investigation

This paper assesses how regional trade agreements (RTAs) impact on growth volatility for a sample of 170 countries over the period 1978–2012. Notwithstanding concerns that trade openness through RTAs might heighten exposure to shocks, RTAs through enhanced policy credibility, improved policy coordination and reduced risk of conflicts can also ease growth volatility. Empirical estimations suggest the benefits outweigh the costs as RTAs are consistently associated with lower growth volatility. In addition, smaller economies benefit more from the reduced growth volatility associated with RTAs than larger ones. The nature of the RTA also matters as shallow agreements such as partial‐scope preferential trade agreements do not appear to have a significant effect on growth volatility, whereas free trade areas and customs unions do. Finally, in investigating the drivers of RTAs, the regression results confirm that countries that are more prone to shocks are more likely to join an RTA, in particular with countries with relatively less volatile growth.     

Determinants of successful regional trade agreements

This paper investigates the determinants of the effectiveness of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in enhancing bilateral trade. Characteristics of both the country pair and other RTA members are found to significantly influence the trade creation effect of RTAs. However, North/North, North/South and South/South RTAs are found to have similar effects on trade.     

REFORM CREATING REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: APPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIA

Abstract. We estimate the investment creation and diversion effects of RTAs by using an extended gravity equation focusing on domestic reform as a commitment device for RTA membership. As a case study, we estimate the impact of proposed East Asian RTAs on inward FDI. We find that: (i) reform creating RTA membership, larger market size, better skilled labour and lower trade costs all contribute positively and significantly to inward FDI; and (ii) most of the proposed East Asian RTAs promote intra‐bloc FDI. In particular, both South–North and North–North RTAs prove to be more preferable membership combinations to South–South RTAs in East Asia.     

亚太区域贸易协定的经济增长效应*——基于RTAs数量与质量的对比研究

21世纪以来，亚太地区区域贸易协定（RTA）签署的数量激增，学术界理论与现实出现悖论，引发学者思考各国热衷于建立RTAs背后的原因并探索新的研究方法。本文首次从RTAs数量和质量的影响效应哪个更为重要的视角，将发达国家和发展中国家进行对比分析，深入探究发达国家在新时期推进新一代贸易协定规则的原因。通过比对RTA协议的每一条条款，测算出涉及传统WTO+和新一代WTO-X领域的条款覆盖率和法定承诺率指标来衡量RTA的质量，实证分析得出，签署高质量的区域贸易协定能更有效地推动亚太地区的经济增长和人民福利水平的提高，该影响效应在发达国家中更为明显，而发展中国家受限于执行能力在新一代规则下签订RTA对经济增长的作用不显著。     

Migration and Regional Trade Agreements: A (New) Gravity Estimation

This paper investigates the role of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on bilateral international migration. Building on a gravity model for migration, our econometric strategy controls for the multilateral resistance to migration and solves the zero migration flows problem by using a censored quantile regression approach. Further, the endogeneity problem of RTAs in migration settlement is addressed by using instrumental variable censored quantile regression. Our results suggest that the presence of a RTA stimulates the migration stocks among member countries. The pro‐migration effect of RTAs is magnified if the agreement includes also provisions easing bureaucratic procedures for visa and asylum among member countries. Finally, we find an asymmetric effect of RTAs across the quantiles of the distribution of migration settlements.     

Regional Integration Agreements,Trade Flows and Economic Crisis: A Static and Dynamic Gravity Model

Regional trade agreements (RTA) strengthening is a crucial component of the contemporary global economy. These agreements are considered beneficial in many senses (economics: trade, FDI, growth, etc.) and are a stabilizing factor in international relations (politics). In this paper, I study the effects of RTAs on exports between members and non-members taking into account the Viner specification. I also try to estimate the effect of the recent economic crisis on the export flows and achievement of RTAs. I use a static and dynamic gravity model to 40 countries belonging to 6 heterogeneous RTAs for the period 1980–2011. This model is estimated taking into account the latest estimation techniques that treats endogeneity effects of integration and the existence of dynamic effect.     

Technological Upgrading under Tariffs and Equivalent Quotas*

This paper compares the effect of tariffs and that of equivalent quotas on the domestic firm’s production technology choice when it competes with a foreign firm in the domestic market. It is shown that under Bertrand price competition, the ranking of technology under tariff protection and quota protection is ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the strategic vs output effects. The equivalent quota regime can generate a higher‐technology (implying a lower production cost) choice than the tariff regime if the strategic effect dominates the output effect. In contrast, the technology level is necessarily higher under the tariff regime than under the equivalent quota regime when the firms engage in Cournot quantity competition.     

Sign here,please! On developing countries’ market access conditions in regional trade agreements

Have regional trade agreements (RTAs) improved market access conditions for developing countries? Employing a measure expressing effective tariff margins and using disaggregated panel data for a sample of 45 developing country exporters, 60 export destinations, and the period between 1991 and 2015, it is shown that this question can generally be answered in the affirmative. Although the effect is estimated to be moderate, RTAs might thus be an important long‐run building block in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in order to increase developing countries’ participation in world trade. On closer inspection, however, for the countries included in the sample, there is considerable variation depending on the choice of integration partners and economic sectors. More specifically, market access improvements cannot be found for African economies in South–South agreements and developing countries engaging formally with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or the Republic of Korea, while leading industrialized nations are reluctant to grant improved market access to developing countries in RTAs especially in capital‐intensive (high‐productivity) manufacturing sectors.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

EAST ASIAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: DO THEY PROMOTE GLOBAL FREE TRADE?

Abstract.  We quantitatively evaluate the effects different paths have on East Asian Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), which include expansionary, duplicate and overlapping RTAs. By applying a computable general equilibrium model analysis, we find that the static effect of existing, proposed and negotiating East Asian RTAs on world and members' welfare is sufficiently positive. It will lead to non-discriminatory global free trade, by triggering the domino effect of regionalism if the RTAs take an expansionary path by cooperating with each other, in contrast to competing to achieve the first mover advantage, or hub self-interest.     

Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and International Competition: A Welfare Analysis

This paper examines the welfare implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in international markets under imperfect competition. Based on a stylized model of an import‐competing duopolistic market, we show the feasibility of moving toward tariff reductions when both domestic and foreign firms launch CSR initiatives in that their payoffs include not only individual profits, but also the benefits of consumers. For the case where the foreign exporter unilaterally adopts the consumer‐oriented CSR as a strategy, there is a rent‐shifting effect because the foreign firm's payoff increases whereas the domestic firm's profit decreases. In response, the importing country's government raises its tariff on the foreign product. If, instead, the domestic firm adopts the CSR strategy unilaterally, the rent‐shifting effect disappears and both the competing firms’ payoffs increase. We further identify the conditions under which the CSR initiatives of the firms constitute the dominant strategy, leading to a Pareto efficient outcome at which the firms’ payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfare are at their maximum levels.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

The puzzle of quality upgrading of Chinese exports from the trade liberalization perspective

Trade liberalization could accelerate the process of quality upgrading through the competition effect. However, that the quality of Chinese exports exhibits an opposite performance pattern is puzzling. The present paper uses a framework based on multiproduct firms to analyse the mechanism of how the product quality of exports is affected by trade liberalization to explain this puzzle. The model includes two major mechanisms: the competition effect and the market effect. There is a huge gap in the influence on the product quality of exports between a decrease in tariff barriers and non‐tariff barriers: firms' product quality increases (decreases) when non‐tariff barriers (tariff barriers) fall. The data of Chinese firms from 2001 to 2011 supports this conclusion. Further research reveals that the influence of trade liberalization on the product quality of exports in China varies among different types of firms.     

Trade Structure, Transboundary Pollution and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Effects on Environmental Taxes and Welfare

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy maker levies pollution taxes on the polluting firms and a tariff on imports in order to correct that distortion. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effect of a reduction in the tariff on equilibrium pollution taxes and welfare. The existing literature has investigated this problem for trade between two identical countries. This paper analyzes the problem in the more realistic context where countries are not necessarily identical and trade can be multilateral. It becomes possible to show what bias is introduced when those two realities are neglected. I find that a tariff reduction can actually lower output; it can also lower welfare even if pollution is purely local.     

Non-tariff measures: What's tariffs got to do with it?

After successive rounds of tariff reductions by GATT/WTO members, non-tariff measures (NTMs) have increasingly become the focal point of multilateral trade negotiations. It remains an open question whether the liberalization in tariff rates has subsequently been weakened or even erased by increases in NTMs. Using a product-level global panel of WTO members over the period 1996–2019, this paper systematically examines the empirical link between various tariff measures and the imposition of NTMs. I find that bound or applied tariff reductions do not correlate much on their own with NTM incidence. The relevant trade policy margin for detecting a tariff–NTM nexus is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO members' bound and applied tariff rates. Countries impose more NTMs when their sectoral applied tariffs are close to their respective bound rates, indicating that small tariff overhangs signal limited legal trade policy flexibility.