Insurance Tips System to Be Launched in June

From June 1 on, the system of Insurance Tips will be implemented, which requires insurance companies or agencies to perform their obligations for informing in their sales and service activities, and tips will be given to the consumers for purchasing insurance policy. According to the requirements of Beijing Insurance Supervision Bureau, the current insurance for automobiles, and life insurance, dividends life insurance, joint life insurance and omnipotent life insurance will adopt this system first. It is disclosed by an insider of Beijing Insurance Supervision Bureau that this system is mainly to advise insurance consumers to be careful in buying an insurance policy to avoid risks caused by carelessness.     

Are Territorial Rating Models Outdated in Residential Property Insurance Markets? Evidence From the Florida Property Insurance Market

The fundamental shift in rating methodology from historical loss costs to catastrophe modeling for windstorm coverage calls into question the accuracy of rates developed using rating territories. Using premiums and modeled average annual loss (AAL) estimates from Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens) in Florida, this article analyzes the use of distance to coast (DtC) as a rating variable in providing coverage for the windstorm peril in homeowners insurance. Catastrophe models used to generate AAL costs do not rely on the same application of the law of large numbers as using historical loss costs and thus allows for more granular pricing of the windstorm peril. The results show that DtC, a rating variable that is property specific, more closely aligns premiums and AALs than territorial rating, and allows more granular pricing of the windstorm peril. More granular risk based pricing provides better incentives for homeowners regarding location and mitigation choices and may help reduce aggregate exposure to windstorm damages in the long run.     

Insurance and Endogenous Bankruptcy Risk: When is it Rational to Choose Gambling,Insurance, and Potential Bankruptcy?

We examine the coexistence of insurance and gambling in the context of limited liability. We develop a model where actuarially fair insurance is available to a risk-averse decision maker for a liability risk with non-bankrupting severity. The remaining wealth may be invested in a zero expected value risky project (i.e., gambled). The risk of bankruptcy is endogenous since either fully insuring or forgoing the project will guarantee solvency. We show that, for a range of parameters, it is optimal to both insure and gamble. The amounts insured and invested are chosen to create the potential for bankruptcy. Our results are robust to the cases where the risky project can cause bankruptcy without a liability loss and where the risky project’s expected return is nonzero.     

Genetics and Insurance: What have we Learned So Far?

Genetics and insurance is an area unusually exposed to rapid scientific advance, close public and political scrutiny, and popular myth. It may be leading the way towards evidence-based underwriting. This survey paper describes some of the experience gained since actuarial involvement began in the mid-1990s, particularly the vital link with genetic epidemiology. We survey the relevant aims and outputs of genetic epidemiology, mainly relating to single-gene disorders, and the use of genetic epidemiology in actuarial models. The part that actuarial models might play in evidence-based approaches to underwriting and policy-making is discussed.     

Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?

Introduced in 1971 as a response to the intensification in competition in the deposit-taking sector induced by the adoption of a program of liberalization and globalization, the deposit insurance system in Japan has since undergone a number of significant changes to accommodate developments in the local financial sector. The pace of such reform accelerated markedly in recent years to help stabilize the Japanese financial system in the face of systemic risk, be it due to the failure of the housing loan companies (the jusen) or other major institutions, such as Yamaichi Securities and the city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The evolution of local deposit insurance arrangements to cope with such events is explained here and an assessment of the policy responses is provided. The part played by deposit insurance in alleviating the pressures currently experienced by the Japanese banking sector also is addressed. Finally, the extent to which the Japanese authorities have learned from the U.S. experience with deposit insurance is examined.     

Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines

Do remittances sent by overseas migrants serve as insurancefor recipient households? In a study of how remittances fromoverseas respond to income shocks experienced by Philippinehouseholds, changes in income are found to lead to changes inremittances in the opposite direction, consistent with an insurancemotivation. Roughly 60 percent of declines in household incomeare replaced by remittance inflows from overseas. Because householdincome and remittances are jointly determined, rainfall shocksare used as instrumental variables for income changes. The hypothesiscannot be rejected that consumption in households with migrantmembers is unchanged in response to income shocks, whereas consumptionresponds strongly to income shocks in households without migrants.     

Zur bedeutung einer Ausfallbedrohtheit von Versicherungskontrakten — ein Beitrag zur Behavioral Insurance

Kahneman / Tversky 1979 introduced the notion of so-called probabilistic insurance contracts. These are insurance policies involving a small probability that the consumer is not reimbursed because of a possible default of the insurance company. Extending the study ofWakker / Thaler / Tversky 1997, the present study contains an experimental analysis of the willingness of potential policyholders to pay for probabilistic insurance in dependency on the rating of the insurance company. It can be shown that people dislike probabilistic insurance and demand a substantial reduction in the premium to compensate for default risk. This reduction is rising with the default risk of the company. In addition, the results show a new phenomenon. The more an insurance company is threatened by default risk the less people are willing to accept contracts of this company at all. Finally the paper discusses implications for the control of insurance companies.     

Can the Life Insurance Market Provide Evidence for a Bequest Motive?

Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of participation in the life insurance market. We find that term insurance demand is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives like being married, having children, and/or subjective measures of strong bequest motives. We then show that a life‐cycle model of life insurance demand, saving, and portfolio choice can rationalize quantitatively the data in the presence of a bequest motive. These findings provide evidence supporting the presence of a bequest motive.     

Der Exposure Draft „Insurance Contracts“ – Eine kritische Analyse aus theoretischer Sicht

The Exposure Draft “Insurance Contracts”, issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in July 2010, contains the IASB’s latest proposals regarding accounting on insurance contracts by insurance enterprises and is the basis for the planned International Financial Reporting Standard “Insurance Contracts” which shall be finished in 2011. The paper follows a presentation with the same title at the Annual Congress of the German Insurance Science Association in Berlin on March 17th, 2011 and mainly aims at a comparison of the IASB’s proposals with the solutions derived from different accounting theories for the most important accounting problems concerning insurance contracts, namely the treatment of premiums, losses, and acquisition costs. The IASB’s proposals do not follow one of these theories homogeneously and contain several additional inconsistencies. Irrespective of their pros and cons in the light of other criteria they, therefore, have to be criticized as highly problematic.     

Captives zur Absicherung von Extremrisiken? Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der OIL Insurance Limited

The use of captive insurance companies (captives) is quite common among big and international companies. Generally, captives are used to insure against high frequency/low severity risks. However, we can find captives which have been founded to deal with extreme risks as well. An example is the OIL Insurance Limited (OIL Insurance). In this context, we examine from a theoretical perspective whether captives are suitable for insurance against catastrophe risks. We show that regarding actuarial aspects captives have advantages in comparison to internal self-insurance and disadvantages in comparison to external insurance. The foundation of industry captives through the association of several companies can solve some of the problems, but further criteria especially costs have to be considered. Based on the developed arguments, we analyse whether our case example OIL Insurance is an appropriate instrument to transfer extreme risks.     

Insurance and the public–private management of risk at US commercial nuclear power plants

This article examines the public–private partnership between the federal government, private insurers, and power companies that enabled the development of commercial nuclear power generation during the 1950s and its evolution to the present day. The public–private process of nuclear insurance development and its impact on nuclear safety is examined through the lens of the Price–Anderson Act enactment and subsequent renewals. The purpose is to show how commercial nuclear insurance evolved over time, and how the indemnification of potentially catastrophic losses influenced the safety behavior of operators, regulators, and other institutions. Evidence is presented demonstrating the relationship between nuclear insurance and safety, using insurance liability and property premiums, and key measures of nuclear safety.     

Risk,Capital, and Operating Efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan’s Life Insurance Market

ABSTRACT

In this article, we investigate the relationships among risk, capital, and operating efficiency for Taiwanese life insurance companies from 2004 to 2009 by using the two-stage least-square approach. We find a positive relation between inefficiency and product risk. At the same time, efficient insurers are seen as taking higher asset risk than inefficient insurers. A contrasting finding also shows that the relationship between capital and product risk is positive, while the relationship between capital and asset risk is negative. Moreover, we present a negative relationship between inefficiency and capital level, indicating that well-capitalized insurers operate more efficiently than poorly capitalized insurers.     

How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

ABSTRACT

This article establishes a dynamic game with incomplete information to theoretically analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure on systemic risk in the presence of a deposit insurance system. To verify the mechanism, we use panel data on 247 global banks in 41 countries during the period 2006 to 2015 in an empirical analysis. Our article finds that a high degree of information disclosure can reduce deposit insurance premiums and weaken the negative incentive from a bailout by regulatory authorities. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on financial stability is not apparent, but the synergistic effect of deposit insurance and information disclosure reduces bank systemic risk. Furthermore, different deposit insurance designs affect bank behavior, so it is crucial for bank supervisors to create proper deposit insurance systems, which are helpful in strengthening market discipline and preventing moral hazard thus contributing to a stable financial environment. Therefore, under the deposit insurance system, regulatory authorities should strive to improve the standard of information disclosure to ensure systemic stability.     

Can Insurance Activity Act as a Stimulus of Economic Growth? Evidence from Time-Varying Causality in China

This article investigates the nexus between insurance and economic growth in China with a dynamic interactive mechanism to study different time periods. Using quarterly data from 1999 to 2015, the rolling-window causality test provides evidence of bidirectional causality between insurance activity and economic growth. However, the “supply-leading” pattern tends to dominate the “demand-following” pattern, which implies that in China insurance acts as a stimulus of economic growth during most of the period. Property insurance is more effective than life insurance in stimulating economic growth. Some temporary negative impacts from the development of the insurance sector show that China is in the midst of a transition from a closed economy to a more open economy and policy interventions by the government to liberalize the insurance sector. These findings offer several useful insights for policy makers in transition economies and developing countries.     

Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare?

We analyze the effects of mandatory unisex tariffs in insurance contracts, such as those required by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, on equilibrium insurance premia and equilibrium welfare. In a unified framework, we provide a quantitative analysis of the associated insurance market equilibria in both monopolistic and competitive insurance markets. We investigate the welfare loss caused by regulatory adverse selection and show that unisex tariffs may cause market distortions that significantly reduce overall social welfare.     

Does Social Capital Reduce Moral Hazard? A Network Model for Non‐Life Insurance Demand*

We study the effect of social capital in an environment in which formal, marketed insurance contracts coexist with informal agreements. We show that in the absence of peer monitoring and social pressure, non‐marketed contracts crowd out formal ones due to moral hazard. We prove, by means of an equilibrium concept typical of the network literature, that social capital can reduce moral hazard in informal agreements. We then show that under certain conditions, social capital increases the demand for marketed insurance contracts. The theoretical model we outline provides us clear guidance to measure social capital in a provincial‐level data set. The empirical model, which is estimated controlling for panel and spatial structure, supports our claim that social capital increases the demand for non‐life insurance.