Do Publicly Traded Property–Casualty Insurers Cater to the Stock Market?

This article examines the catering theory in the insurance industry. We investigate whether managers of publicly traded insurers pursue a growth strategy catering to the stock market's preference. Two hypotheses are tested in this study: (1) an insurer will devote more efforts to increasing premium growth when the stock market places greater values on growth, and (2) this catering effect will be more pronounced at firms where managers have greater incentives to maximize short‐term stock prices. We find evidence supporting both hypotheses. Our study discovers a new channel through which the stock market and executive compensation affect insurance companies’ business strategies and the insurance market. The implication of the interplay between insurers and the stock market is significant and deserves future research.     

Do U.S. Insurance Firms Offer the “Wrong” Incentives to Their Executives?

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis.     

Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.     

When Do International Operations Lead to Improved Performance? An Analysis of Property‐Liability Insurers

In recent decades, insurers have been increasing their exposure to international markets. This article seeks to investigate the relationship between property-liability insurers' international operations and their risk-adjusted returns using cross-section and time-series data for the years 1992 through 2000. Our findings indicate that the relationship between international operations and performance is contingent upon the degree of product diversification. Insurance companies with focused operations in terms of product lines achieve higher risk-adjusted performance as they increase their exposures to international markets. However, insurers who are highly diversified across product lines face declining returns with greater exposure to international markets.     

Do Firms Use M&A Business to Pay for Analyst Coverage?

We find that acquirers in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are more likely to hire as advisors investment banks that provided analyst coverage for the acquirer prior to the transaction. We also find that compared to a matched control group of banks, the advisor banks are less likely to terminate and more likely to initiate analyst coverage of the acquirer after the transaction. Finally, the advisor banks that initiate coverage after the transaction collect higher fees. These findings suggest that firms value analyst coverage and use M&A advisor appointments and advisor fees to compensate for it.     

Do Goodwill Impairments by European Firms Provide Useful Information to Investors?

In 2004 International Accounting Standards Board. (2004). International Accounting Standard (IAS) N°36: Impairment of assets. London: Author. [Google Scholar], the IASB adopted the mandatory annual impairment-test-only of goodwill (IAS 36) instead of amortization of goodwill. We present and discuss the academic literature regarding the association between the goodwill impairment, under this new standard, and the revision of investors’ expectations about a company’s future cash flows. The academic literature highlights that, in some specific cases, IAS 36 may help investors to revise their expectations. More precisely, goodwill impairment seems relevant when: (a) there is strong asymmetry of information between managers and investors, (b) managers disclose detailed information in the notes regarding their own assumptions about future cash flows, and (c) managers do not manage earnings and provide reliable information to investors. In many cases, goodwill impairment is probably useless for investors because they are able to revise their expectations based on public information, or because they cannot trust the accounting numbers and additional information in the notes about the impairment test, which are provided by (undisciplined) managers. More research is, however, needed to understand in which circumstances impairment-test-only is more useful, as well in which cases it is less adequate. Our analysis relates to the current post-implementation review and should be useful to standard-setters. Before any modification, we argue that standard-setters should carefully consider the economic and the institutional contexts when issuing a new accounting standard.     

Why Do European Firms Go Public?

We survey chief financial officers (CFOs) from 12 European countries regarding the determinants of going public and exchange listing decisions. Most CFOs identify enhanced visibility and financing for growth as the most important benefits of an IPO, but other motivations for IPOs differ significantly across firms, countries, and legal systems. We find strong support for the IPO theories that emphasise financial and strategic considerations, such as enhanced reputation and credibility, and financial flexibility as a major advantage of an IPO. At the same time, we find moderate support for theories that focus on exit strategy, balance of power with creditors, external monitoring, and merger and acquisition motivations. European CFOs' views on the major benefits of an IPO are generally similar to those of US managers as reported in Brau and Fawcett (2006) , but differ significantly on outside monitoring; outside monitoring is considered a major benefit by European CFOs but a major cost by US CFOs. Our evidence suggests that the decision to go public is a complex one, and cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple benefits in going public. These motivations are influenced by the firm's ownership structure, size and age as well as by the home country's institutional and regulatory environment.     

Do Transparent Firms Pay out More Cash to Shareholders? Evidence from International Cross‐Listings

This paper examines the relation between agency costs and payout policy using a sample of 755 firms that cross‐list shares abroad. Firms increase cash payouts to shareholders by about 9% of earnings after cross‐listing on exchanges with high standards of transparency and shareholder protection. The shift in payout policy is more pronounced in firms controlled by management. No shift is observed if shareholder protection in the country of incorporation is already strong, or if the host exchange does not mandate additional disclosure. The findings support the theory that high corporate payouts are the outcome of transparency and shareholder protection.     

Do Firms Use Time‐Vested Stock‐Based Pay to Keep Research and Development Investments Secret?

I find that executives’ unvested equity holdings are larger when executives are employed by R&D‐intensive firms in industries that rely more on secrecy to profit from R&D. Moreover, I find that this relation is more pronounced for executives with a greater ability to exploit R&D‐related information and also holds for nonexecutive employees. In addition, I find that these firms use option grants with longer vesting periods and that unvested equity holdings reduce the likelihood that their executives leave to find employment elsewhere. Overall, my findings are consistent with firms using time‐vested stock‐based pay to reduce the leakage of R&D‐related information to competitors through employee mobility.     

Do Small‐Group Health Insurance Regulations Influence Small Business Size?

State small‐group health insurance reforms, implemented in the 1990s, aimed at controlling the variability of health insurance premiums and to improve access to health insurance. These reforms only affected firms within a specific size range, and as a result, they may have affected the size of small firms around the legislative threshold and may also have affected the propensity of small firms to offer health insurance. We examine the relationship between small‐group reform and firm size and find evidence that small firms just below the regulatory threshold that were offering health insurance grew in order to bypass reforms.     

Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?

We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms' financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70%.     

Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms

This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.     

How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?

This study seeks first to examine how firms implement impairment tests as required by IAS 36, and second, to explore factors which may explain why some firms are not entirely in compliance with IAS 36. It is based on a survey which includes 58 completed questionnaires representing 73% of the firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that recognize goodwill on the balance sheet. The findings imply a variety in the application of IAS 36. Based on our analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this simply indicates that firms adopt an approach suited to their organizational and economic structures, or if it reveals that firms are uncertain as how to apply the standard. Our analysis further indicates inconsistencies in the implementation of IAS 36. This includes both how firms define a CGU and how they estimate the recoverable amount. Further, multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected here are less likely in firms that systematize the procedures for impairment testing and use persons with considerable valuation experience. The findings should be of interest to a number of parties including firms, financial advisers, auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements.     

Do Firms Decouple Corporate Governance Policy and Practice?

We test whether Thai listed firms with higher levels of good governance policy adoption are less likely to violate listing rules and laws designed to protect shareholders. Our results suggest that firms on average implement, substantively as opposed to symbolically, recommended governance policies, as violations occur less frequently among firms with higher governance policy adoption scores. However, we also find evidence of symbolic governance among a small group of ‘talk‐only’ firms that issue statements about governance while lagging in the adoption of policies related to shareholder rights and the board of directors.     

Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China

This article uses a sample of matched firms-banks data in China over the period 1999–2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behavior from one bank relationship to another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm. The binding force of the Communist Party in state-owned banks and enterprises would suggest that switching should be a rare phenomenon in Chinese commercial relations. But switching occurs. The findings support the extant literature that transparent firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers and that firms tend to switch from state-owned banks to smaller non-state owned banks. However, in other areas switching does not conform with the mainstream explanations.     

Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms

We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual‐class firms is significantly lower than it is in single‐class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual‐class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long‐term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short‐term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual‐class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions.     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.