Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures

Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production, and proposes an efficient criterion for the allocation of tradable rights among firms with market power and competitive fringe firms. The suggested criterion maximizes efficiency of the market based regulation. A simple numerical example illustrates the theoretical discussion.I am very grateful to Richard J. Sexton for useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Giacomo F. Bonanno, the editor, anonymous referees, and participants at the CORE workshop “Industrial Economics and the Environment” (2004) for helpful discussions and comments that improved the paper.     

Efficiency in large markets with firm heterogeneity

Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within industries, and its role in resource allocation. In a benchmark monopolistically competitive economy, productivity differences introduce two new margins for allocational inefficiency. When markups vary across firms, laissez faire markets do not select the right distribution of firms and the market-determined quantities are inefficient. We show that these considerations determine when increased competition from market expansion takes the economy closer to the socially efficient allocation of resources. As market size grow large, differences in market power across firms converge and the market allocation approaches the efficient allocation of an economy with constant markups.     

Efficient regulation of a labor managed monopolistic firm

Labor managed firms are known to be inefficient in two respects. They produce an output which is too small from the social point of view and this output is produced inefficiently. More specifically, labor managed firms overcapitalize. We suggest a regulatory measure to be implemented through a ‘wage’ control. This kind of regulation has the advantage that it forces the firm to increase output and to use a more efficient input mix.     

ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION OF SERVICES IN TANZANIAN SAVINGS AND CREDITS CO‐OPERATIVE SOCIETIES: LEARNING FROM ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Savings and Credit Co‐operative Societies (SACCOS) increasingly recognized as the valuable tool for economic development in low‐income countries. However, recently researchers reported that one of their primary challenges to their expansion is the high level of inefficient. In this study, we analyzed the relationship between growth and efficiency of SACCOS using economies of scale concept. Then we address the role of management of the capital structure and allocation of resources in the expansion of SACCOS. The study used financial statement data from 60 SACCOS in Tanzania for the period of 2004–2011. The findings supports that most of SACCOS are small and cost inefficient because the industry is young, but, the efficiency increases as SACCOS expand. Second the allocation of resources in liquid, financial and non‐financial investment leads to no expansion in SACCOS. Thus, the growth of SACCOS via increasing loan to members, members’ savings, shares, and institutional capital should be encouraged as it increases the efficiency of SACCOS. Also, SACCOS should minimize the allocation of assets in other investments which are different from credit to members.     

Human capital and firms’ innovation: evidence from emerging economies

ABSTRACT

We explore the relationship between human capital and firms’ innovation in emerging economies. Most papers consider the formal knowledge developed in R&D laboratories as a major source of innovation. However, a critical portion of knowledge required for innovation resides in human resources and is created outside any formalised R&D activity. We consider that, to improve their technological capabilities, firms should invest in different forms of human capital, namely highly educated workforce and experienced managers, but also in strategic human resource (HR) practices aimed at developing human capital by increasing employees’ firm-specific technical skills and competences. Besides looking at the type of innovation outcomes, we place greater emphasis on the strategies of innovation development, as these should signal an improved firms’ ability, not just to innovate, but to put their own creative effort in the development of innovation. Our results contrast with the traditional view of firms in emerging economies as mainly relying on the external acquisition of innovations, by showing their actual ability to develop new technologies. In this respect, HR practices aimed at fostering employees’ learning and autonomy at work appear more important than the educational attainment of workers, whilst the experience of managers does not seem effective.     

Has the ECB’s monetary policy prompted companies to invest,or pay dividends?

This paper focuses on the influence of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies on non-financial firms. It sheds light on non-financial firms’ decisions regarding leverage, and on how the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies may have affected them. The paper also examines how these policies influenced non-financial firms’ decisions on capital allocation – primarily capital spending and shareholder distribution (for example, dividends and share repurchases). We use an exhaustive and unique dataset comprised of income statements and balance sheets of leading non-financial firms operating in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The main results suggest that ECB’s monetary policies have encouraged firms to raise their debt burden, especially after the global recession of 2008. Finally, the ECB’s policies, especially after 2011, also seem to have led non-financial firms to allocate more resources not just to capital spending but to shareholder distribution as well.     

The determinants of cleaner energy innovations of the world’s largest firms: the impact of firm learning and knowledge capital*

In this paper, we address the determinants of clean energy inventions by 946 large firms. We use a new set of large firms’ patent portfolios and we broaden and deepen existing literature on this issue in two main ways: first, we conduct our study directly at the firm level and not at the industry or national levels and second, we do not focus on a single industry but encompass all industrial sectors. Drawing on firm (internal and external) knowledge and knowledge accumulation, we show there is a robust positive association between the (past) knowledge accumulated capital related to clean technologies and the number of inventions produced in that field, even after controlling for industry and nation fixed effects and other factors. The same relation works for (past) knowledge-accumulated capital in other (non-clean) technologies. However, the relation’s impact on the number of clean inventions produced is much lower. The magnitudes of our coefficient are in line with that obtained previously on firms in the auto-industry or at the sectoral level.     

Quality heterogeneity and global economic growth

This paper develops a fully endogenous, variety-expansion growth model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity, limit pricing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Firms with high-quality products engage in exporting, firms with intermediate-quality products serve the domestic market, and inefficient firms with low-quality products exit the market. Trade liberalization, measured by a reduction in trade costs or a decline in foreign market entry costs, generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality to high-quality products and exit of inefficient firms. However, it has ambiguous effects on the average global quality level, long-run growth, and welfare. An increase in the rate of population growth or in the intensity of trade-related knowledge spillovers accelerates economic growth. The laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient, and this leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.     

MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

Who Gains from Restructuring the Post‐Soviet Transition Economies,and Why?

To explore the mixed economic results and huge distributional changes experienced by post‐Soviet economies, I set up a series of theoretical and numerical simulation models using an approach based upon heterogeneous firms, where ‘reform’ means closure of inefficient capacity. In the presence of significant costs to new firm entry and international capital mobility, restructuring and privatisation can lead to falls in GDP and real wages, while capital is transferred abroad. This situation can occur even under perfect competition, but is worse when industrial production is concentrated and trade costs are high. By contrast, workers can gain when costs of establishing new firms are low, and/or when the inefficient industries are capital‐intensive. For countries with high costs of firm set‐up and of trade, capital controls may be justified to protect wages.     

Firms’ efficiency,exits and government procurement contracts

This study shows that productivity trends in Russia are similar to those in other countries where technology leaders enjoy productivity growth, with a gap increasing between them and other companies. The survival analysis suggests that the most efficient firms quit the market at a faster rate than other companies do. Survival functions of the least efficient firms do not always differ significantly from those of other enterprises. Additional financial support from government contracts helps firms in all efficiency groups survive but this effect is stronger for laggards. The shift of gains from the public procurement system towards low productive firms leads to the distorted allocation of resources in the economy and, in the long run, may undermine economic growth by allowing inefficient companies to stay in the market significantly longer than would be the case in a more competitive environment.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

Asymmetric information about rivals'' types in standard auctions

We study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bidders but not others. This asymmetry in bidders' knowledge about rivals' types has different effects on the two standard auction formats. In a second-price auction, it is weakly dominant to bid one's valuation, so the knowledge of rivals' types has no effect, and the good is allocated efficiently. In a first-price auction, bidders refine their bidding strategies based on their knowledge of rivals' types, which yields an inefficient allocation. We show that the inefficient allocation in the first-price auction translates into a poor revenue performance. Given a standard regularity condition, the seller earns higher expected revenue from the second-price auction than from the first-price auction, whereas the bidders are better off from the latter.     

Information and incentives in labor-managed economies

The incentive problems that result in labor-managed economies from attempting to eliminate the inefficient allocation of labor due to this institutional arrangement are discussed. Games are searched for such that, at an equilibrium, firms have revealed truthful information and labor is allocated efficiently. It is shown that such games do not exist if output is not observable, and even if aggregate deficits or surpluses are permitted. By contrast, if output is observable, balanced games exist in which it is dominant strategy for each firm to be truthful.     

COMPETITIVE SEARCH,EFFICIENCY, AND MULTIWORKER FIRMS*

I study competitive search equilibrium in an environment where firms operate a decreasing‐returns production technology and hire multiple workers simultaneously. Firms post wages, possibly several of them. The equilibrium can feature wage dispersion even though all firms and workers are ex ante identical. Unlike the benchmark where firms hire a single worker, hiring is constrained inefficient. Efficiency requires that firms commit to the number of hires, pay all applicants, or pay wages that depend on the number of applicants. Under wage‐posting, the inefficiency is highest at intermediate levels of labor market tightness.     

Trade liberalization and volatility: Evidence from Indian firms

I look at the impact of trade liberalization on sales growth volatility of firms. Exploiting India’s externally imposed trade reform to identify trade liberalization effects, I find that while a fall in the tariff on the final product produced by the firm is associated with an increase in volatility in Indian manufacturing firms, a fall in the tariff on intermediate inputs is associated with a decrease in volatility, with the latter effect dominating the former. I hence propose an additional channel for gains from trade liberalization to the ones documented in the literature.     

Deregulation with consensus

We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost, and efficiency requires some of them to shut down when the inefficient regulation is eliminated. The government can set up a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies and requiring firms to exit the market at a given time depending on the information collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy prescribes that some inefficient firms remain active and are subsidized. The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at which the firms are allowed to exit. We are very grateful to Matt Mitchell whose comments substantially improved the paper.     

Firms as knowledge repositories

One reason firms exist is to serve as knowledge repositories. Firms compete against other firms and need profits to survive. Firms must be entrepreneurial to discover and act on profit opportunities. Knowledge required to spot profit opportunities is disbursed among economic actors and often is tacit knowledge that can only be obtained by those in close proximity. This gives rise to agglomeration economies, which can be leveraged within firms. In a competitive economy people have an incentive to keep knowledge from people in other firms, but to share it with those in their firm. One role of the firm is to act as a repository of knowledge for those within the firm’s boundaries, and to lower the cost of obtaining knowledge about profit opportunities. Entrepreneurs need firms to contain and capture the profits from their innovations.     

The evolution and use of a policy and research tool: assessing the technological capabilities of firms

Firms differ widely in their technological capabilities. Innovation policies are likely to be more or less successful depending upon the level of such abilities of those firms to which a policy is aimed. Without data on the proficiencies, strengths and weaknesses of firms within the target group(s), the construction and application of innovation or industrial policies are likely to miss salient factors in the ability of firms to benefit from the support that is intended. An in-depth knowledge of firms’ capabilities can allow policy-makers to target support according to the specific needs of firms. This paper describes the Technology capability audit tool (or CAT) that was designed to assist policy-makers in differentiating between firms and in understanding their level of ‘innovation readiness’. Examples of the use of the CAT are presented from South Korea, Thailand, Ireland, Brazil and the UK.     

Knowledge flows through social networks in a cluster: Comparing university and industry links

Knowledge spillovers from a university to the local industry play an important role in high-technology clusters, but we know little about these spillovers. This paper examines empirically the extent of informal contacts between employees in firms and local university researchers in a wireless communications cluster. Furthermore, it analyses the features of an engineer who acquires knowledge from these informal contacts. The university–industry contacts are compared to results for informal contacts between employees in firms. The research shows that the interfirm informal contacts are more numerous than university informal contacts. Likewise, knowledge is more frequently acquired from engineers in other firms than through university–industry contacts. However, not all engineers in the cluster have informal contacts or acquire knowledge through these. Engineers who have participated in formal projects with university researchers and engineers who are educated at the local university have a higher likelihood of acquiring knowledge from informal contacts with university researchers.