Interaction of human and physical capital in a model of endogenous growth

A model of development is presented where growth is initially driven by physical capital accumulation, as in the neoclassical model. After a critical level of physical capital is reached, the economy takes off and enters a stage of sustained growth driven by human capital accumulation. The link between these two stages is provided by the assumption that private incentives for human capital accumulation increase with the average levels of human and physical capital. At the early stages of development, these incentives are low so the level of human capital stays stagnant until sufficient physical capital is accumulated. Other results are that some economies may reach a steady state of physical capital before a take-off is possible. This is especially likely for economies in which agents have low savings propensities. Such economies remain stuck in a no-growth equilibrium forever. Economies that do grow may experience endogenous cycles if the return to investment in human capital is sufficiently increasing in the level of physical capital.     

Deciphering the UK's business investment performance

• ? Absent June 2016's Brexit vote, growth in business investment would have been much faster and the UK would be sharing in a global “investment boom”. Or so the Bank of England claims. But the reality is more complicated. What is striking is just how subdued investment growth has been across countries.
• ? Survey evidence presented by the Bank suggests that recent business investment growth has been less than a third of what might have been achieved absent Brexit. The UK has also been highlighted as an investment laggard among major economies.
• ? Headline investment growth has certainly been relatively weak since 2016. Uncertainty around future UK‐EU trading arrangements may have resulted in some investment being deferred or cancelled. And the Brexit‐related fall in sterling will have pushed up the cost of imported capital equipment, cutting demand.
• ? But a collapse in investment in the North Sea sector has had a significant effect on headline investment growth. On an excluding‐extraction basis, UK business investment rose at the same pace as the US (ex‐extraction) and faster than Japan in 2016 and 2017, while average annual growth rises from 1.0% to 2.4%.
• ? What is striking about the recent performance of business investment in the UK and other G7 members is how subdued growth has been across economies. Despite a favourable environment, no major advanced economy has seen investment rise at the type of rates that the Bank predicts the UK, but for Brexit, should be now enjoying.
• ? Sectoral shifts, the rise of intangible investment and the consequences of technooptimism offer some reasons as to why measured investment may have become less sensitive to economic upswings. These same factors suggest that 1990s‐style growth in private investment is unlikely in the UK (or elsewhere) even once Brexit uncertainty has cleared. Indeed, our own medium‐term forecasts see business investment growth across major economies continuing to run at a relatively subdued pace.

     

An extension of the monocentric urban spatial equilibrium model to a multicenter setting: The case of the two-center city

Firms in a monocentric city conforming in substance to the “new urban economics” produce an export commodity under agglomeration economies and employ homogeneous labor and capital. Workers reside about the CBD in decreasing densities with distance. A developer establishes a second export production center within the city's residential area. Conditions for economic viability and growth of the subcenter are examined, and its impacts on short-run and long-run city location patterns are discussed. A limiting condition on subcenter employment size is provided.     

Does the opening of high-speed rail enhance urban entrepreneurial activity? Evidence from China

Entrepreneurship plays a critical role in contributing to the realization of full employment in all countries around the world. By improving the efficiency of the flow of production factors, high-speed rail (HSR) has an important impact on regional economic development. However, little is known about whether HSR has improved urban entrepreneurial activity. This paper takes the opening of HSR as a quasi-natural experiment and constructs a difference-in-differences (DID) model, using panel data on 284 prefecture-level cities in China for the period from 2005 to 2019, to systematically evaluate the impact of HSR openings on urban entrepreneurial activity. We find that the opening of HSR has increased the urban entrepreneurial activity, and that this effect is more obvious in cities at high administrative levels, with locational advantages, and highly developed economies, including service industries. HSR can enhance urban entrepreneurial activity by improving the level of talent aggregation and venture capital. These findings provide fresh perspectives on the connection between HSR and urban entrepreneurial activity.     

Evidence on agglomeration economies,diseconomies, and growth

Conventional urban economic analysis suggests that a local economy's size is closely related to a number of features, including levels of human capital and the availability of specialized inputs, which are likely to influence positively the rate at which it accumulates further economic activity. At the same time, urban theory also suggests that once cities reach a certain level of size, these agglomeration benefits begin to peter out, while diseconomies rise rapidly. Consequently, we should see an ‘inverted U‐shaped’ pattern of growth with respect to economic size—rates of growth first rise, then fall as size increases. This paper shows that, while such a pattern is largely absent from recent data on growth in metropolitan area population and employment, it emerges strikingly in county‐level data. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technology catching-up and regulation in European regions

This paper analyses the effects of the intensity of regulations in the product and labour markets on the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) for 121 European regions. A technological catch-up model is estimated for the period 1995–2007. We use the spatial lag of X (SLX) model to capture possible spatial interactions across spatial units. Our empirical findings show that lower levels of regulation are associated with higher TFP growth. Lower barriers to entrepreneurship and lower bureaucratic costs have a positive effect on productivity growth. Corruption raises operational costs, distorts the allocation of resources and negatively affects innovation activities, thereby reducing TFP growth. Further liberalization in the labour market (in terms of hiring and firing regulation, working hours regulation and employment protection legislation) has a significant positive effect on the growth of TFP. In addition, both regional technological and regional human capital have a positive impact on the TFP growth in European regional economies.     

AN EMPIRICAL GROWTH MODEL FOR MAJOR OIL EXPORTERS

This paper develops a long‐run output relation for a major oil‐exporting economy where the oil income‐to‐output ratio remains sufficiently high over a prolonged period. It extends the stochastic growth model developed in Binder and Pesaran (1999) by including oil exports as an additional factor in the capital accumulation process. The paper distinguishes between the two cases where the growth of oil income, g^o, is less than the natural growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and the growth of technical progress, g), and when g^o ≥ g + n. Under the former, the effects of oil income on the economy's steady growth rate will vanish eventually, while under the latter oil income enters the long‐run output equation with a coefficient which is equal to the share of capital if it is further assumed that the underlying production technology can be represented by a Cobb–Douglas production function. The long‐run theory is tested using quarterly data on nine major oil economies. Overall, the test results support the long‐run theory, with the existence of long‐run relations between real output, foreign output and real oil income established for six of the nine economies considered. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating an Environment for Economic Growth: Creativity,Entrepreneurship or Human Capital?

Scholars and policymakers interested in the growth and prosperity of regions have long recognized that talent and knowledge are fundamental. Yet the question is what types of talent are needed in a growing twenty‐first‐century economy: human capital, creativity and innovation, or entrepreneurship? The latter we define broadly to include any type of risk taking, and not only radical innovation. The literature does not clearly point to one factor as being the most essential. This study assesses this question separately for rural and urban United States (US) counties. We find that human capital––measured by educational attainment––is considerably more conducive to employment growth than the share of creative occupations. Likewise, the share of small and medium businesses is also very conducive to local growth, although this does not apply to the self‐employment share. Rural and urban areas experience similar patterns, although the magnitude thereof tends to be larger for urban counties, whereas high‐technology employment share has had a positive effect in rural areas. Policy conclusions suggest that enhancing small business development and increasing educational attainment are the two strategies that are most likely to succeed.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Dollar surge brings mixed consequences

• The strengthening dollar is now becoming a significant factor for global growth and our forecasts. The tradeweighted dollar is up 2.5% over the last month and over 12% on a year ago.
• Driving the latest rise are growing expectations of US rate hikes while monetary policy in many other major economies is headed in the opposite direction.
• The beginning of ECB QE has prompted a further slide in bond yields and the euro – which at 1.06/US$ is on course to fulfill our forecast of near‐parity by year‐end. Weak data in Japan also raises the chance of a further expansion of QE there later this year.
• We remain relatively positive about the advanced economies: we forecast G7 GDP growth at 2.2% for 2015 and 2.3% next. This month we have revised up German growth for 2015 to 2.4% – a four‐year high.
• Robust US growth and a strong dollar are good news for the advanced economies. US import volume growth firmed to over 5% on the year in January, while the dollar surge potentially boosts the share of other advanced countries in this growing market.
• But for the emerging economies the picture is mixed. A stronger US may boost exports, but rising US rates are pulling capital away: there has been a slump in portfolio inflows into emergers in recent months. Emerging growth may also suffer from higher costs of dollar funding and a rising burden of dollar debt as currencies soften – the more so if US rates rise faster than markets expect.
• Moreover, emergers are also under pressure from a slowing China. Chinese import growth has been weak of late and commodity prices remain under downward pressure. A notable casualty has been Brazil, which we have downgraded again this month – GDP is expected to slump 1.1% this year.
• Emerging GDP growth overall is expected to slip to 3.7% this year, the lowest since 2009. And excluding China, emerging growth will be only 2.2% – the same as the G7 and the worst performance relative to the advanced economies since 1999.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: US acceleration brings a positive start to 2014

• A series of positive data releases in the US has led us to revise upwards our growth forecasts for 2014. We now expect US GDP to rise by over 3% this year, compared to 2.7% forecast a month ago.
• A key factor changing the US outlook is a more confident consumer. In the three months to November, real consumption rose at an annualised pace of 5%, the strongest in four years. This has been partly financed by a reduced saving rate – but the saving rate has been much lower in the recent past and steady employment gains should support both income and consumer sentiment in the year ahead.
• Also supporting growth this year in the US and the broader global economy will be wealth gains. In recent years, global stock prices at the end of a given year have been a reasonable predictor of economic growth in the following year, and global equities were up over 20% on the year at the end of 2013.
• Nevertheless, the global growth outlook remains patchy. An optimistic picture in the US, UK and Japan contrasts with a rather mixed picture the Eurozone – where some economies are still contracting and where there is a risk of deflation.
• The picture is also subdued in the key emergers. In contrast to the developed economies, emerging market stocks are down 10% on the year as higher US yields draw capital away. Weak currencies, inflation and high interest rates are weighing on growth in markets such as India, Brazil and Turkey.
• These factors are likely to wane only slowly as the year proceeds and could even worsen if tapering in the US is faster than expected. A stronger US economy may not fully offset this – the US's strong competitive position could direct more of rising US demand to US products than in previous upturns.
• As a result, we expect emerging growth to firm only modestly this year, to 4.5% from 4.1% in 2013 – well below pre‐crisis levels of around 7%. Global growth too will remain below par at 2.9%, from 2.2% in 2013, but improving to over 3% next year.

     

What Was Driving the 1982–88 Boom In Temporary Employment?

Abstract . The level of temporary help employment rose two-and-a-half fold between 1982 and 1988, was quite variable and had a disproportionately larger effect on employment flows. One conventional explanation suggests that changing demographic composition of the labor force in favor of groups preferring nontraditional employment arrangements fueled the temporary help boom. Demand-side views emphasize the volatility in labor demand, intensified price competition and the absence of employee benefit contributions. Empirical estimation confirms that demand-side forces predominate. Yet no labor supply variable is found to be positively associated with the extent of temporary employment. Cyclical fluctuation in output, intensified foreign competition and the magnitude of nonwage labor costs are all positively associated with temporary employment levels. The diminishing bargaining power of labor unions allows employers to exploit the labor cost savings of temporary hires, and the extent of paid time-off and the lack of flexibility in weekly hours of work play a weak role. The findings suggest why temporary job growth accelerated in the 1980s, as more firms employed a “core-periphery” human resource strategy. Public policy should adopt measures that attempt to limit the creation of temporary jobs to a level that accommodates the worker need for flexible annual work schedules.     

Urban Wages and Labor Market Agglomeration

Using the 5% public use micro sample of the 1990 U.S. census, we find that observationally equivalent workers in the manufacturing sector earn higher wages when they are in urban labor markets that have a larger share of national or metropolitan employment in their same occupation and industry groups. Quantitatively, the effect is large, with an elasticity (measured at the means) of between 1.2 and 3.6 for these effects. We interpret the willingness of firms to pay more for equivalent workers in dense markets as evidence of an agglomeration economy in urban labor.     

Technological Change and Transition: Relative Contributions to Worldwide Growth During the 1990s*

In this paper we use the Kumar and Russell [American Economic Review (2002) Vol. 92, pp. 527–548] growth‐accounting procedure to examine cross‐country growth during the 1990s. Using a data set comprising developed, newly industrialized, developing and transitional economies, we decompose the growth of output per worker into components attributable to technological catch‐up, technological change and capital accumulation. In contrast to the study by Kumar and Russell, which concludes that capital deepening is the major force of growth and change in the world income per worker distribution over the 1965–90 period, our analysis shows that, during the 1990s, the major force in the further divergence of the rich and the poor is due to technological change, whereas capital accumulation plays a lesser and opposite role. Finally, although on average we find that transitional economies perform similar to the rest of the world, the procedure is able to discover some interesting patterns within the set of transitional countries.     

Growth vs. level effect of population change on economic development: An inspection into human-capital-related mechanisms

This paper studies the different mechanisms and the dynamics through which demography is channeled to the economy. We analyze the role of demographic changes in the economic development process by studying the transitional and the long-run impact of both the rate of population growth and the initial population size on the levels of per capita human capital and income. We do that in an enlarged Lucas–Uzawa model with intergenerational altruism. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature, the long-run level effects of demographic changes, i.e. their impact on the levels of the variables along the balanced growth path, are deeply characterized in addition to the more standard long-run growth effects. We prove that the level effect of the population rate of growth is non-negative (positive in the empirically most relevant case) for the average level of human capital, but a priori ambiguous for the level of per capita income due to the interaction of three transmission mechanisms of demographic shocks, a standard one (dilution) and two non-standard (altruism and human capital accumulation). Overall, the sign of the level effects of population growth depends on preference and technology parameters, but numerically we show that the joint negative effect of dilution and altruism is always stronger than the induced positive human capital effect. The growth effect of population growth depends basically on the attitude to intergenerational altruism and intertemporal substitution. Moreover, we also prove that the long-run level effects of population size on per capita human capital and income may be negative, nil, or positive, depending on the relationship between preferences and technology, while its growth effect is zero. Finally, we show that the model is able to replicate complicated time relationships between economic and demographic changes. In particular, it entails a negative effect of population growth on per capita income, which dominates in the initial periods, and a positive effect which restores a positive correlation between population growth and economic performance in the long term.     

Productivity – your countries need you!

• Increased global productivity could boost real wages, consumption, fiscal positions and alleviate fears of secular stagnation. But will it? Puzzles relate to the longer term global slowdown and to some countries' recent productivity‐less recoveries in jobs. We assess various explanations including mismeasurement, secular stagnation, financial sector malfunction and increased labour market flexibility. Our baseline forecast is for a moderate pro‐cyclical recovery in productivity but we show how downside risks imply it could be anaemic.
• Sustained weak productivity is a secular issue. Eight years after 2007, median productivity growth in OECD economies is less than Japan's was eight years into its lost decade. Aspects of secular stagnation and balance sheet adjustment have contributed. Measurement error may have played a role over the longer term.
• Recent experience divides recoveries into “haves” and “have nots” in terms of productivity and employment. The UK may finally be emerging from a “productivity‐less” recovery in employment after 2011; Spain and the Netherlands have experienced jobless recoveries in productivity; others, such as Canada and Sweden, have experienced pro‐cyclical (typically weak) recoveries in productivity; Italy hardly got going in either direction.
• Most theories provide, at best, a limited explanation for recent weak productivity performance. These include data mis‐measurement, increased labour market flexibility, financial sector malfunction and supply side secular stagnation.
• On balance, we think that a modest productivity bounce‐back could be imminent, caused by some demand recovery, tighter labour markets in major economies, higher real wages and firms deciding to invest more in capital, which enhances productivity and points the global economy towards normality.
• We also illustrate how global risk scenarios could dampen recovery. Negative skews imply mean G7 productivity growth across the scenarios would be an anaemic 1.1% in 2016, 0.5 percentage points (pp) lower than the baseline.

     

中国出口波动对经济增长的风险分析

出口可以通过需求、投资、就业、经济结构、知识传播、资本流入、规模经济效应等多种途径影响经济增长,即出口波动会带来经济增长的风险。实证表明,中国的出口波动对经济增长波动的风险很大,但这种影响是潜在的,实际上往往不会发生,因为出口波动对经济增长的影响会被稳定经济的相反力量所抵消。但如果经济增长有潜在风险累积的时候,出口的突然下降也许会成为经济风险发生并放大的导火线。     

影响中国城市增长的因素:地级及以上城市的实证检验

论文以国内外相关城市增长理论为基础,构建了分析中国城市增长的系统模型,并利用206个城市1990年与2005年的社会经济统计数据进行了实证研究.研究结果表明:(1)中国城市的经济增长主要是由劳动生产率提高而非人口规模增长推动的;(2)政府财政支出和城市人力资本积累是目前中国城市经济增长的主要驱动力;(3)人力资本积累并没有在工资增长上得到体现;(4)城市公共设施和环境的改善引致了城市人口增长,但对城市经济发展却没有明显的作用.在以上研究结果基础上,论文提出了保持城市可持续发展的一些政策建议.     

How much does a single graduation cohort from further education colleges contribute to an open regional economy?

How much does a single graduation cohort from further education colleges contribute to an open regional economy? Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper combines elements of growth accounting and numerical general equilibrium analysis to produce an alternative micro-to-macro modelling approach. This is used to evaluate the macroeconomic impact on the Scottish economy of the human capital generated by a single graduation cohort from further education colleges. The macroeconomic impact is found to be significant and larger than growth accounting would suggest due to the associated endogenous investment, employment and competitiveness effects. From a policy perspective this identifies the importance of the conventional teaching role of education institutions and the key function played by further education colleges in this process.     

Public infrastructure,input efficiency and productivity growth in the Canadian food processing industry

Canadian food processing is an important manufacturing industry, accounting for 13 percent of shipments. By its nature food processing depends on infrastructure capital. Our objective is to estimate infrastructure’s effects on input requirements, cost and productivity. The increase in capital and decrease in materials were respectively 2.5 and 3 times greater than the −0.07 infrastructure elasticity of labor. Infrastructure investment was cost-reducing by inducing reductions in employment and intermediate inputs. A 1 percent increase caused cost to decline by 0.16 percent. Infrastructure capital was a major contributor to productivity, annually contributing 0.5 percentage points. This was nearly double TFP growth.      

The role of MNCs in balancing the human capital 'books' between African and developed countries

The economic imbalance that exists between Western developed economies and African economies has resulted in retardation of human capital development in the African countries. The foreign direct investments that have freely flowed into Western economies have been the stimulus for the creation of jobs and the resulting educational infrastructure to generate qualified employees. Without this increase in human capital stock (i.e. in African countries) the ability of these economies to compete in the global, high tech, information economy of the twenty-first century is severely constrained. The paper examines the development of a human capital encompassing societal, organizational, and individual levels that can be stimulated by multinational organizations. The resulting positive impact on human capital in turn supports the growth not only of the African countries but also of the multinationals doing business in Africa.