Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*

In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Optimal Social Insurance with Linear Income Taxation*

We study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation. Optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings. Optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent. Imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more, thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings.     

Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation

I develop a model in which altruistic agents vote over quadratic income tax schedules. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and productivities, and the model incorporates the incentive effects of taxation. The main result of the paper establishes the existence of a self-confirming majority rule equilibrium in which agents' labor supply decisions are optimal given their tax liabilities and the tax policy is a majority rule equilibrium given the labor supply decisions. In equilibrium the actions by all agents confirm their expectations, but such expectations may be incorrect out of equilibrium. The model generates majority rule voting equilibria that involve progressive taxation.     

On the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies with Many Consumer Goods*

In this paper, we study the time consistency of optimal policies in an environment where agents use cash to purchase many consumer goods and where those goods might be taxed at differential rates. Our main result is that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are, in general, time‐inconsistent, because the number of bond instruments is insufficient to influence all future fiscal decisions. However, there is one special case where optimal policies are time‐consistent, which is when differential tax rates across cash goods are optimally zero.     

Environmental Goods and the Distribution of Income

The paper presents a (theoretical) investigation of the distributional impacts of environmental commodities. It introduces an appropriate framework, defines concepts for measuring benefits and examines the determinants of benefit incidence within this setup. Its emphasis is on methodology and on recognizing the relevant economic variables and information. It turns out that in an equal-preference model the magnitude of the income elasticity of marginal willingness to pay for an environmental good is the crucial variable determining progressivity. It is related to a number of other elasticities which are more easily accessible to an empirical estimation.     

Moral Hazard,Income Taxation and Prospect Theory*

The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximise expected utility. However, prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are modified in interesting ways. The first‐order approach for solving the optimisation problem is not valid over the domain of losses, and the marginal tax schedule offers full insurance around the reference consumption level. The implications of non‐welfarist objectives under income uncertainty are also examined.     

The Political Economy of Clientelism*

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.     

Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy

In this paper, we analyze how international capital mobility affects the optimal labor and capital income tax policy in a small open economy when consumers care about relative consumption. The main results crucially depend on whether the government can tax returns on savings abroad. If the government can use flexible residence‐based capital income taxes, then the optimal policy rules from a closed economy largely carry over to the case of a small open economy. If it cannot, then capital income taxes become completely ineffective. The labor income taxes must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would have had.     

The Distributional Impact of Public Goods Provision: A Veil of Ignorance Approach

The "veil of ignorance" approach is used to consider the redistribution implied by different tax-benefit systems. Assuming a (hypothetical) ex-ante situation in which individuals lack any knowledge about their future income, redistribution from rich to poor can be seen as a form of insurance. Taking redistribution and insurance as synonymous, the analysis derives cases of redistributionally neutral systems of taxation and public good provision.
JEL classification : H 23; D 30;, H 41     

Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance

This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.     

The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

依法治税和纳税服务——基于国家税收和公共税收的视角

依法治税和纳税服务是现阶段税收的两大任务。对两者的认识,不能孤立地或对立地看,而是要在社会主义市场经济下的税收应是国家税收和公共税收的统一的视角下加以把握。从这一认识出发,我们就能真正做到坚持依法治税,优化纳税服务,服务科学发展,就能探索出一条中国特色社会主义市场经济条件下的纳税服务新路。     

中国扩大进口中高档消费品可行性分析

目前中高档消费品已成为消费升级的重要对象",十二五"规划纲要首次提出要适当扩大消费品进口。基于科学发展观、全球新竞争理念及全新开放战略的"顶层设计",通过对扩大进口中高档消费品的理念、福利及条件等研究与分析后发现,中国具备扩大进口中高档消费品的条件,扩大进口中高档消费品是关乎国民福利的重要举措。     

Capital Income Taxation,Economic Growth and Heterogeneity in the Motivation to Give

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy‐of‐giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.     

试论调控个人收入分配的财税政策选择

根据实际情况，我国政府调控个人收入分配，在财政政策方面，应加快完善社会保障制度，加大转移支付力度，缩小地区经济差距，加大扶贫投入的力度；在税收政策方面，应进一步完善个人所得税制度，适时开征遗产税与赠与税，加强特别消费税的作用，建立个人财产税制，适时开征社会保障税。     

推动民营经济发展的财税政策

民营经济在国民经济发展中起到了重要作用,是中国社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分。民营经济的发展受着外部环境的制约,仍然存在很多需要克服的障碍。国家应采取适当的财税政策,推进民营经济的健康持续发展。     

Democracy Evolving: A Diversity of Institutional Contradictions Transforming Political Economy

I analyze democracy as an evolving socio-historical process of autonomy, participative governance, social learning, and institutionalization. I discuss a variety of institutional contradictions, ranging from protective versus developmental democracy, socialist versus capitalist democracy, transcendental versus comparative institutionalism, and utilitarian versus pragmatist democracy. I argue that these contradictions are inherent in the agonistic nature of democracy that is transforming political economy along with the antagonistic interests of its members and institutions. I also present a basic synthesis of some dynamic aspects of democracy that enable and enhance social emancipation and transformation.     

关于税收司法改革思路的设想

目前理论界对税收司法的研究一直主要集中在如何建立和完善税收司法保卫体系上。而本文认为当前税收司法的核心问题在于：税收司法审判不足和税收司法审查范围太窄而由此带来的税收司法的虚置。笔者认为，要充分发挥税收司法的作用，必须从司法权是行政权和公民权之间的平衡器的作用这一认识基点出发，在扩大司法审查领域、规范税收执法、提高税收立法质量、改革现行司法制度等多方面作出努力 。     

国有垄断性资源产业与竞争性消费产业企业价值比较

本文构建了股权结构、市场结构和企业价值模型,分析十年横截面数据,证实了我国垄断和竞争两极并存、国有企业向资源产业集中的市场结构特征;得出资源产业的企业价值十年来迅速增加,并超过消费产业;发现股权和企业价值存在理论上的倒U型曲线,但资源产业的股权结构超过理论上的最优企业价值股权区间,而消费产业的股权结构低于最优企业价值区间,市场结构对企业价值存在负影响。本文政策建议是：政府降低对资源产业的垄断程度同时引入竞争机制、加强对消费产业的监管时增加集中度,促使我国的市场结构由垄断与竞争两极并存格局向垄断竞争市场结构转化,为技术创新提供最佳的产业组织形式。