Here today,gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?

This paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives, in the form of access to additional loans, to discourage borrowers from strategic default, or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized. We propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by endogenizing the default penalty, while constraining the MFI to maintain sustainable lending operations. Furthermore, accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock, we show that under certain circumstances, the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans.     

Are microfinance institutions resilient to economic slowdown? Evidence from their capital ratio adjustment over the business cycle

Prior studies using pre-crisis data concluded that microfinance institutions are resilient to economic crises. However, some recent studies indicate that the microfinance sector is becoming part of the global financial system and microfinance lending activities are now vulnerable to economic and financial crises. Capital being a key resource to support lending, this paper analyzes the cyclical behaviour of capital ratio using an international sample of microfinance institutions from 2001 to 2014. We uncover a negative relationship between their capital-to-assets ratios and business cycle indicators. This relationship mainly concerns regulated institutions, comprised mostly of profit-oriented MFIs, and is driven by both asset-side and capital level adjustments. We identify the lending channel (loan-to-assets ratio) as the main mechanism to explain these cyclical variations. Our findings are consistent with the “procyclicality” of capital regulation documented extensively in the banking literature. Hence, macro-prudential regulation for MFIs should target regulated and profit-oriented MFIs.     

Total factor productivity change of MENA microfinance institutions: A Malmquist productivity index approach

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate productivity changes of 33 Middle East and North Africa microfinance institutions over the period of 2006–2011 by using the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) method and a balanced panel dataset of 198 observations. The empirical findings indicate that the microfinance industry has reported overall productivity regress in the study period even though all the MENA MFIs have positive TFP growth with the exception of the year 2010–2011. In addition, our study indicates that over the period the Malmquist productivity change experienced by the MENA microfinance industry as a whole has averaged 4.9% annually which was mainly attributed to technical efficiency change. The study reveals also that the industry as a whole has exhibited a decline in technological change (2.9% decrease over the period) and suggested that there has been a deterioration in the performance of the best practicing MFIs. By decomposing the Malmquist index, the result showed that during the study period the MENA MFIs have experienced mainly an increment of pure technical efficiency (improvement in management practices) rather than an improvement in optimum size. Overall, an essential strategic implication for the MENA microfinance industry is that they need to pursue a technological progress in order to meet the dual objectives of reaching many poor people and financial sustainability.     

Microcredit market structure and financing obstacles for micro firms

Using rich survey data of micro firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, I analze the effect of recent changes in microcredit market structure on perceived financing obstacles. Controlling for country, time and firm characteristics, lower microcredit market concentration is associated with firms reporting financing as a more severe obstacle to their operations. This indicates that rising competition between microfinance institutions may have led to reduced financial access. The results are consistent with information‐based theoretical predictions that lenders with less market power have weaker incentives to invest in lending relationships with opaque firms and that greater competition aggravates borrower screening.     

National culture and national savings: is there a link?

We study the effect of national culture on economic decisions, focusing on GLOBE cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and future orientation. Specifically, we study the effect of divergence between cultural values and practices (societal aspirations), on the aggregate savings decision. Using the life-cycle model of savings as our basic model, we find that societal aspirations are important in explaining national savings behavior. In particular, we show that societal aspirations relating to future orientation and uncertainty avoidance have a positive effect on the rate of savings. We interpret our findings to indicate that such societal aspirations lead to mistrust in the societal arrangements and institutions, and induce savings as a means of securing the future and reducing uncertainty. To substantiate this interpretation, we utilize the microfinance industry; showing that high societal aspirations are associated with preference for savings through member-owned microfinance institutions (MFIs) over savings through non-member-owned MFIs.     

Outreach and performance of microfinance institutions: the importance of portfolio yield

In this paper, we examine the interaction between social outreach and financial return in microfinance. Running multivariate regression models and using 1,805 observations of microfinance institutions between 2004 and 2013, we find strong evidence suggesting that institutions with more social engagement – in terms of outreach to the poor – earn higher portfolio yields. We also find that measures of outreach are associated with increased operating expenses. As return figures are influenced by both costs and yield, and because both increase to a similar degree with the depth of outreach, these two effects lead to a zero sum result on return measures. This finding could explain why existing studies assessing the interaction between social outreach and different measures of financial performance in microfinance (such as return on assets/equity, operating expenses, operational self-sufficiency) have not produced consistent results.     

MICROFINANCE REGULATION AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF NIGERIA AND ZAMBIA

This study examines the effect of regulations on microfinance institutions in Nigeria and Zambia by focusing on the post‐regulation experiences and reflections of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their regulators. Based on in‐depth interviews with the Central Banks as regulators, MFI managers, practitioners and apex microfinance associations, the study finds that regulations in both countries have managed to professionalize the sector, but their effectiveness in augmenting the centrality of social goals to microfinance and MFIs remains doubtful. The poorly designed regulations are not only undermining social goals but also sending wrong signals to would be social investors, with implications for the social image of the industry. The study further finds that regulations have neither speeded the emergence of sustainable MFIs (especially in Zambia) nor accelerated the sectors’ outreach to the poor and the financially excluded. Additionally, considerable levels of political interference and poor regulation have led to unintended consequences to the sector, further frustrating the ultimate goal of extending financial services to the poor. These findings have policy and practical implications for how microfinance engages with the regulatory logic and continues to serve those at the bottom of the pyramid.     

Measuring competition in microfinance markets: a new approach

This paper employs a relatively new method of competition measurement, the Boone indicator, for data on 521 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in ten vibrant microfinance markets: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Peru. This approach is able to measure competition on a yearly basis in market segments without considering the entire market, as other well-known methods – for instance, the Panzar-Rosse model – require. Stochastic frontier (SF) models have been employed to estimate the translog cost function (TCF) and then marginal costs are computed. The potential endogeneity of performance and costs are overcome by utilising a two-step GMM estimator. Results show that competition levels vary from country to country, and over the period 2003–2010 India and Nicaragua had the most competitive microfinance loan markets. Competition among the microfinance institutions in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over time, which may be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these countries. Competition in other countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the consolidation and revitalisation of respective microfinance markets.     

Non-grant microfinance,incentives and efficiency

I show that charging interest on funds provided by donors or investors to microfinance institutions (MFIs) can increase efficiency, the total number of loans and borrower welfare, compared to grant or concessionary funding. In a setting in which MFIs supply costly non-contractible effort, putting a price or raising the price of loanable funds strengthens the MFIs’ incentives to put effort in credit administration or monitoring, to extend more loans, and/or reduce overhead costs. This theoretical result is robust to several variations of the benchmark model allowing for an endogenous lending rate, motivated MFIs and endogenous overhead costs.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

Microfinance Control Fraud in Latin America

Over the past three decades, the global microfinance industry has witnessed phenomenal growth in terms of the numbers of borrowers and the total gross loan portfolio outstanding. An application of the criminologists' perspective and Black's theory of control fraud to the global microfinance industry reveals a high degree of overlap between the common characteristics of control frauds and the characteristics of the microfinance industry and suggests that the sector provides a criminogenic environment suitable to Ponzi-type dynamics, including an imperative of growth, misrepresentation of financial and operating performance, a reputation for integrity and innovativeness, concentration in unregulated markets and areas most conducive to accounting fraud, non-transparency and secrecy, dubious accounting methods, lobbying in favor of deregulation, attempts to suborn controls such as accountants, lawyers, regulators, and rating agencies, executive use of the company for personal gain, excessive risk taking at the expense of investors' capital, warnings raised but ignored, and, finally, inevitable collapse. Regulatory interventions are needed to prevent predatory lending and over-indebtedness of poor microfinance borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. Such regulation, while necessary to protect the poor, is not well liked by the investment community as it places microfinance institutions under local scrutiny, reduces the profitability of the sector, and limits opportunities for control fraud.     

Convergence of the performance of microfinance institutions: A decomposition analysis

In this paper, we focus on investigating whether and to what extent patterns of performance microfinance institutions converge over time. In particular, we analyze whether patterns of performance are related to changes in operating efficiency, capital deepening, and/or technological change for a large international sample of microfinance institutions for the period 2003–2012. We apply intertemporal Data Envelopment Analysis, a methodology that has been used extensively in the literature explaining patterns of economic growth, but has not been applied yet in microfinance research. We decompose performance changes into operating efficiency changes, changes in capital intensity and/or technological change and find that capital deepening is the most important source of improved performance, especially during the first half, while capital deepening and technological innovations are important during the second half of the period. We also find strong evidence for convergence of performance between microfinance institutions. These trends concur with important changes in microfinance, such as increased commercialization, competition with commercial banks, and involvement of private investors.     

Individual versus Village Lending: Evidence from Montenegro

This paper analyzes differences in loan performance across two Montenegrin microfinance institutions with different lending techniques using a sample of individuals borrowing from both institutions. We make use of administrative data from both institutions over the period 2004–2013. While one institution relies on village associations for screening and monitoring of borrowers, the other institution uses the individual liability approach. We find that the likelihood to go into arrears is higher for the institution with a strictly individual lending technique, while the likelihood of going into arrears over 30 days is higher for the institution working with village associations. These results are robust to a variety of additional tests, including different definitions of arrears and subsamples. Our findings suggest that the institution using an individual lending technique provides certain flexibility to its clients, while the village‐based microfinance institution might face more strategic default behavior. We provide evidence that once a borrower is in arrears, (s)he is more likely to stay in arrears for more than 30 days in branches with a higher share of borrowers in arrears and in the village‐based lender. Our findings provide evidence that a village‐ or group‐based lending technique is not necessarily superior to the individual lending technique in terms of loan performance.     

Microfinance and households access to credit: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire

Evidence on microfinance services these days ironically shows a great preference for savings products rather than credit products by households. For some authors, this phenomenon is explained by the fact that microfinance products, and especially loans, from formal microfinance institutions do not fit the households demand. This paper first presents evidence on the observed phenomenon in the Ivorian microfinance sector. Second, it analyses the Ivorian credit market so as to understand the determinants of the choice for credits from formal sources versus informal sources. The results reveal the size of the loan, agricultural purpose, the geographical area where households live and ethnicity as factors influencing the choice for formal sources.     

Determinants of margin in microfinance institutions

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) lend to the poor. However, microfinance clients suffer from high interest rates, a type of poverty penalty. This article analyses the margin determinants in MFIs. A banking model has been adapted to microfinance. This model has been tested using 9-year panel data. Some factors explaining bank margin also explain MFI margin, with operating costs being the most important factor. Specific microfinance factors are donations and legal status, as regulated MFIs can collect deposits. It has also been found that MFIs operating in countries with a high level of financial inclusion have low margins.     

Misaligned Expectations and Non-Cooperative Behavior in Indian Microfinance: Evidence from a Survey

This study examined the causalities of non-performance of self-help groups (SHGs) in the context of polarised institutional expectations in the microfinance ecosystem in India. Institutional approach and stakeholder approach were followed for the investigation. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and semi-structured interviews (SIs) were conducted to collect data from various institutional stakeholders. It was found that the institutional expectations of each institution from other institutions in the microfinance ecosystem were polarized, misaligned and were antagonistic in nature. Institutional behaviours were governed by their expectations from the microfinance ecosystem. Therefore, the polarized and antagonistic expectations created non-cooperative behaviours and attitudes in the key institutions, which further created a weak performance of the microfinance programs.     

Effect of board gender diversity on the financial performance of microfinance institutions: Does judicial efficiency matter?

The impact of board gender diversity on the financial performance of firms is not known. This is because empirical investigations have yielded inconclusive outcomes. This study engages data from 408 microfinance institutions (MFIs) covering the period 2010–2018 from the six microfinance regions to investigate this impact using the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) and the System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) estimation techniques. The study also explores whether judicial efficiency exerts any significant effect on the board gender diversity–financial performance nexus. The study observes that board gender diversity exhibits a strong negative effect on the financial performance of MFIs. The study also observes that the effect of board gender diversity on the financial performance of MFIs escalates in the presence of judicial inefficiency. The study, therefore, unveils the judicial system as a channel through which gender diversity drives the financial performance of MFIs negatively.     

Does capital and financing structure have any relevance to the performance of microfinance institutions?

This paper aims to explore the impact of capital and financing structure on the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) from an agency theoretic standpoint. GMM and IV estimations with instruments have been performed using a panel dataset of 782 MFIs in 92 countries for the period 2000–2007. Results confirm the agency theoretic claim that an increase in leverage raises profit-efficiency in MFIs. The study also finds that cost efficiency deteriorates with decreasing leverage. Likewise, the negative significant impact of leverage on depth of outreach can also be explained. However, the study finds that capital structure does not have any noticeable impact on breadth of outreach and neither is it significantly related with women’s participation as loan clients.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

The empirics of microfinance: what do we know?

Microfinance has received a lot of attention recently, both from policy makers as well as in academic circles. Two of the main topics that have been hotly debated are explaining joint liability group lending and its implications for reducing information asymmetries, and the trade-off between the financial sustainability and outreach of microfinance programmes. This Feature contains three novel empirical contributions providing new insights with respect to why and how joint liability group lending works. It also contains the first large-scale systematic analysis of the trade-off between financial performance and outreach of microfinance institutions.