工作搜寻博弈

本文为"求职决策"提出有关概念,并加以博弈模型化;利用博弈论中的逆推归纳法给出的另一解,同时获得"搜寻模型"的一个相同结果.     

工作搜寻搏弈

本文为“求职决策”提出有关概念，并加以博弈模型化；利用博弈论中的逆推归纳法给出的另一解，同时获得“搜寻模型”的一个相同结果。     

RJVs吸引跨国公司FDI的博弈分析

本文提出一种有效的吸引跨国公司FDI的新取向—建立RJVs,基于R&D合作双寡头模型,建立了R&D投资水平和产品生产两阶段的博弈模型,运用逆推归纳法分析了与跨国公司建立RJVs对母国吸引跨国公司FDI的积极作用。     

基于动态博弈的易逝性产品收入管理问题

本文通过易逝性产品及其市场特性的分析,不仅指出它符合使用收入管理方法的条件,还将动态博弈思想引入其定价销售过程.文章运用最优控制理论和动态博弈理论,探讨易逝品销售商在收入管理过程中根据对消费者效用函数的判断来进行动态定价的方法,并用逆推归纳法分析了完全信息动态博弈情况下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡.最后,对于不完全信息动态博弈情况下的诱导策略也进行了分类建模,得出了有益的结论.     

企业税务筹划行为的博弈分析

博弈论是研究决策主体间的行为发生直接相互作用时的决策以及这种决策的均衡问题。也就是说,博弈论是研究当一个主体、一个人或一个企业的选择受到其他人、其他企业选择的影响,而且反过来影响到对方选择时的决策和均衡问题。博弈论的基本要素包括博弈的参与人,博弈时对弈者可利用的信息、行动、策略,以及博弈的结果、支付。其中参与者、策略和支付函数是博弈论必不可少的三个基本要素。博弈论的基本假设有两个:一是强调个人的理性,假设当事人在进行决策时能够充分考虑到人们之间行为的相互作用及其可能影响,能够作出合乎理性的选择;二是假设…     

我国封闭式基金IPO后溢价交易的实证研究及行为金融理论解释

尽管封闭式基金首次发行(IPO)后溢价交易一般只持续约20周,但实证表明此20周内短线投机交易异常活跃且多头方有利,原因是基金经理人在封闭式基金发行时的宣传对投资者有锚定效应,加上投资者的代表性经验推断和赌博心理,结果就使得投资者对新发行基金的预期偏离了理性。     

浅谈心理因素对投资行为的影响

经济系统中,由于人们精力、能力、信息等方面的局限性,在面临投资选择问题时很难达到经济上所说的理性人假设,而往往是"主观上是理性的,但客观上做不到",因而经常会出现与传统金融理论相悖的金融异象。如果引入心理变量,放宽理性人的假设条件,就能很好地解释金融市场中频繁出现的热点问题。本文从投资需要的角度出发,论述了资本市场和货币市场常见的几种心理现象并分析其是如何影响投资者的投资决策的。     

基于涉他偏好的集体行动博弈分析——以保险代理行业协会为例

集体行动理论以传统经济学的自利偏好假设为前提,得到集体行动难以实现的结果,然而现实中存在大量集体行动的情况。文章引入行为经济学和心理博弈的涉他偏好观点,弱化理性假设前提,讨论当个体在关注自身收益的同时也关注收入分配状况下时,涉他偏好对集体中个体行为的影响。以保险代理行业为例,研究表明涉他偏好是集体行动成功的关键,而涉他心理轻度和惩罚力度是确保集体合作持续的主要因素。     

中国企业经理人是自利和理性的吗?——一个实验经济学研究

"经济人自利和理性"假设是经济学的最核心假设.西方实验经济学家通过一系列博弈试验,证实了人们完全"自利"、"理性"的假设并不成立.但实验参与人群及其文化历史背景的变化对实验结果的影响一直是人们关注的焦点.因此,本文利用精心设计的"信任博弈"实验,对中国的企业经理人的"自利"、"理性"假设进行了实验研究,并且将企业经理人的实验结果与学生身份的实验参与者的实验结果做了对比研究.实验结果证实了西方实验经济学家的结论,发现中国的企业经理人并不是完全"自利"、"理性"的机会主义者,同时,本实验还揭示了被标准的委托代理理论忽视了的激励手段所带来的隐含成本和隐含收益.在此基础上,本文提出了企业经理人激励约束的政策建议.     

浅谈心理因素对投资行为的影响

经济系统中，由于人们精力、能力、信息等方面的局限性，在面临投资选择问题时很难达到经济上所说的理性人假设，而往往是“主观上是理性的，但客观上做不到”，因而经常会出现与传统金融理论相悖的金融异象。如果引入心理变量，放宽理性人的假设条件，就能很好地解释金融市场中频繁出现的热点问题。本文从投资需要的角度出发，论述了资本市场和货币市场常见的几种心理现象并分析其是如何影响投资者的投资决策的。     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE THREE‐LEGGED CENTIPEDE GAME?

Abstract.  In the last two decades, several frameworks have been proposed to analyze the question of whether common knowledge of rationality is sufficient to justify the play of backward induction (BI) in games of perfect information. Three strands of literature have addressed this issue: the literature on equilibrium refinements, the literature on knowledge-based epistemology and the literature on interactive epistemology. This paper surveys seminal frameworks within the first two strands of research and assesses the extent to which they provide a satisfactory solution to the problem. These approaches are illustrated using a three-legged version of Rosenthal's centipede game, which is the classical example in the literature. The paper argues that some of these frameworks provide sensible answers to the riddle of BI or, at least, succeed in bringing the paradox to another level. The paper also points at consistency problems in the body of refinements of Nash equilibrium revealed by the surveyed literature.     

Subgame perfection and the ethics of competition

This paper integrates economics and business ethics through the use of the subgame perfection/backward induction decision rule. It is shown that textbook examples of subgame perfection differ in their ethical complexity. Specifically, predatory pricing is difficult to justify on both game‐theoretic and ethical grounds, whereas ‘poison pill’ takeover defenses have complex economic and ethical ramifications. Further, I employ backward induction to examine two additional areas of ethics and management decision‐making: product recall (the Ford Explorer and Firestone tires), and price versus advertising competition. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Stopping with anticipated regret

This paper analyzes a stopping problem where the decision maker is driven by anticipated ex-post regret. There are two sources of potential dynamic inconsistency, one is arrival of information and the other is changing choice opportunities over time—discarding the current stopping option may change how she stops the game in the future.First we consider a naive planner who prescribes a commitment solution, and illustrate the nature of the inconsistency problem. Then we consider a sophisticated planner who plays backward induction against her ‘successive selves’. The resolution of dynamic inconsistency does not in general allow the use of standard dynamic programming technique. We provide, however, a simple characterization of the backward induction strategy, which is given in a recursive formula.We also provide a behavioral implication, that larger indeterminacy of belief may lead to a more aggressive behavior, that is, continuing the gamble longer, which contrasts to the implication of ambiguity aversion.     

Uncertain information structures and backward induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether each agent’s sequential choices are visible to other participants or not: agents might be deluded about others’ ability to acquire, interpret or keep track of data. Following this idea, this paper introduces uncertainty about players’ ability to observe each others’ past choices in extensive-form games. In this context, we show that monitoring opponents’ choices does not affect the outcome of the interaction when every player expects their opponents indeed to be monitoring. Specifically, we prove that if players are rational and there is common strong belief in opponents being rational, having perfect information and believing in their own perfect information, then, the backward induction outcome is obtained regardless of which of her opponents’ choices each player observes. The paper examines the constraints on the rationalization process under which reasoning according to Battigalli’s (1996) best rationalization principle yields the same outcome irrespective of whether players observe their opponents’ choices or not. To this respect we find that the obtention of the backward induction outcome crucially depends on tight higher-order restrictions on beliefs about opponents’ perfect information. The analysis provides a new framework for the study of uncertainty about information structures and generalizes the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) in this direction.     

浅谈美中两国学校心理学的职业化方向

面对21世纪社会、教育和个人发展的更高要求,我国学校心理学的职业化方向整体水平还比较落后。学习借鉴美国有益的经验与做法,更加科学、有效地促进我国学校心理学的职业化方向,是当前我国学校心理教育的一项重要课题。本文作者根据美国学校心理学的特点和当前中国学校心理学的发展实际,提出了中国学校心理学发展的职业化方向。     

基于混合策略博弈的上市公司信息披露监管研究

证券市场是一个信息高度集约化的市场,但我国证券市场由于信息披露制度不完善、监管不到位等原因,内幕交易、操纵市场等事件不断发生,严重扰乱了市场秩序和损害了投资者利益。根据经济学中理性人假设,上市公司和监管机构都追求自身利益的最优化,相互作用过程中形成了博弈关系。     

The Savanna Principle

Why do microeconomic theories (such as decision theory and game theory) often fail to predict human behavior despite their mathematical elegance and deductive rigor? I suggest that such empirical failures stem from the theory's misconception of how the human brain functions. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, I propose the Savanna Principle, which posits that a hypothesis about human behavior fails to the extent that its scope conditions and assumptions are inconsistent with the ancestral environment, and its experimental corollary, that the Savanna Principle holds (and the hypothesis fails) to the extent that the conditions of the experiment resemble the ancestral environment. I suggest that the Savanna Principle and its corollary might together explain the relative empirical failure of noncooperative game theory and public choice theory, and the relative success of network exchange theory and competitive price theory tested in double auction markets in experimental economics. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game

This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender–receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm's income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability (strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure-strategy play but will switch to mixed-strategy play. There is one exception, though: when the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch to mixed-strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager's choice of whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed information sharing.     

业余足球裁判员赛前心理状态分析

足球裁判员赛前存在着充分准备状态和过分激动、盲目自信及轻视淡漠等心理状态。影响业余足球裁判员进入良好赛前心理状态有主观和客观方面的原因。思想重视,克服认识上的偏差,确立良好的工作动机,形成最佳的情绪状态是进入良好赛前心理状态的有效手段。