Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit Demand

This paper investigates the effects of bank loan availability on the trade credit and credit card demand of small firms, using firm‐level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. We find that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit card debt when facing credit constraints imposed by banks. These results provide evidence of a pecking order of debt financing, where firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds when bank loans are not available.     

Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default

Using a sample of distressed firms with information about suppliers, we document an average fall in the use of trade credit as firms approach bankruptcy compared to a control sample of nonbankrupt firms. However, we uncover a large degree of heterogeneity across suppliers. Suppliers facing high switching costs maintain their business ties with the distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, and provide them more trade credit. Suppliers in concentrated markets provide temporary support to their clients. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that switching costs are fundamental to explain whether suppliers provide liquidity to their distressed clients or not.     

Interenterprise Credit and Adjustment during Financial Crises: The Role of Firm Size

Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) suffered a sharp contraction in their borrowing from banks during the Great Recession. Analyzing a large firm‐level database for European countries, the paper shows that trade credit amplified the liquidity squeeze on SMEs, with adverse effects on their real activity. SMEs sharply increased their net trade credit and thus transferred financial resources to larger firms. Given the large weight of SMEs in the economy of European countries, the liquidity squeeze of SMEs likely contributed to the depth of the output fall and the slow recovery in Europe during the Great Recession.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

Founder CEO management and the long-run investment performance of IPO firms

This study provides a comparative analysis of the long-run investment performance of founder and non-founder CEO led IPO firms in high and low technology environments. We find weak evidence of superior long-run investment performance on the part of founder CEO led IPO firms, since the significance of the results are sensitive to choice of benchmark, portfolio weighting method, and factor regression model. However, in the context of high technology IPO firms, we find consistent evidence to indicate that founder CEO led firms provide significantly higher long-run returns relative to non-founder CEO led firms. Our results suggest that the unique nature of founder CEO leadership is particularly beneficial to IPO firms in high technology environments.     

Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target.     

Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Deviations from optimal CEO ownership and firm value

The transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value predicts that deviations from optimal managerial ownership reduce firm value. This paper empirically tests the transaction cost theory by studying the relation between deviations on either side of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. We find that both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value. We find that a change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher (lower) abnormal return if it moves the ownership towards (away from) the optimal level. These findings are consistent with the transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value.     

FOUNDING FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND CASH HOLDINGS

I investigate the relation between founding family ownership and firm cash holdings. I find that cash holdings are significantly lower at family firms than nonfamily firms. I also examine the marginal value of cash and report a smaller value of cash for family firms. Combined, the findings are consistent with the spending hypothesis that family firms tend to deploy cash quickly and the market discounts the quality of their spending.     

Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.     

Understanding seasoned equity offerings of Chinese firms

We examine the empirical relevance of standard theories explaining the motivation of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the Chinese context. Analyzing Chinese SEOs during 1994-2008 and controlling for other factors reflecting features of Chinese corporate finance, we find that Chinese SEOs are mostly motivated by timing the market. Financing for investment and growth receives weak empirical support. We do not obtain any consistent evidence supporting both the tradeoff and the agency theories. In addition, we find that the firm’s SEOs behavior varies between rights issues and public offerings and across different periods along with the progress of China’s market transition. Our results show that Chinese listed firms in general behave similarly as their counterparts in other countries concerning SEOs decisions in that they issue SEOs when there are opportunities to take advantage of market overvaluation. These results are consistent with the well-documented convergence trend of corporate SEOs behavior of firms around the world. In addition, our findings challenge the conventional perception on Chinese SEOs that controlling shareholders use SEOs as a means to expropriate minority shareholders.