Does financial connectedness predict crises?

The global financial crisis has reignited interest in models of crisis prediction. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnectedness—a possible source of systemic risk—can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In this paper, we examine the ability of connectedness in the global network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during the 1978–2010 period. Our results indicate that increases in a country’s own connectedness and decreases in its neighbours’ connectedness are associated with a higher probability of banking crises after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings suggest that financial interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007–2010 wave of systemic banking crises.     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

Fragility,stress, and market returns

We propose a novel risk measure that relates to subsequent negative conditional stock market returns. Our risk measure considers both the fragility and stress of the market. Fragility is measured by the Fragility Index developed by Berger and Pukthuanthong (2012) and market stress is based on several economic variables. Results show that incorporating both market stress and fragility improves the information content of a risk measure. Our risk measure relates to poor subsequent monthly market returns. We show the risk measure contains predictive information in a purely ex-ante specification.     

Interbank contagion and resolution procedures: inspecting the mechanism

This paper develops a network model of a stylized banking system in which banks are connected to one another through interbank claims, which allows us to study the diffusion of default avalanches triggered by an exogenous shock under a number of different assumptions on the degree of interconnectedness, level of capitalization, liquidity buffers, the size of the interbank market and fire-sales. We expand upon the existing literature by comparing two alternative resolution mechanisms: (i) liquidations triggered by either illiquidity or insolvency-related distress implying asset sales and compensation of creditors; and (ii) a bail-in mechanism avoiding bank closure by forcing a recapitalization provided by bank creditors. Our model speaks to how contagion dynamics unravel via illiquidity-driven defaults in the first case and higher-order losses in the latter one. Within this framework, we show how the liquidity risk externality can be resolved, and we put forward a macro-criterion to assess the adequacy of the liquidity ratio introduced with Basel III.     

Has the financial system become safer after the crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk

Six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the question of whether the U.S. financial system has become less risky remains unanswered. On the one side, new regulations including Dodd-Frank and Basel III have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital, and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk-taking activities. On the other side, it has been argued that “the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.” (Baily and Elliott, 2013) This paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011. It finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis, the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion. The causal inference that the crisis and the post-crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi-experimental design. This finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises, providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter-bank collective regulation of banks by Acharya (2009) in addition to the intra-bank collective regulations as in Froot and Stein (1998) and BIS (1996, 1999).     

The stability–concentration relationship in the Brazilian banking system

In this article, the relation between non-performing loans (NPL) of the Brazilian banking system and macroeconomic factors, systemic risk, and banking concentration is empirically tested. In evaluating this relation, we use a dynamic specification with fixed effects, while using a panel data approach. The empirical results suggest that the banking concentration has a statistically significant impact on NPL, suggesting that more concentrated banking systems may improve financial stability. These results are important for the design of banking regulation policies.     

Systemic risk in the European sovereign and banking system

We investigate the systemic risk of the European sovereign and banking system during 2008–2013. We utilize a conditional measure of systemic risk that reflects market perceptions and can be intuitively interpreted as an entity’s conditional joint probability of default, given the hypothetical default of other entities. The measure of systemic risk is applicable to high dimensions and not only incorporates individual default risk characteristics but also captures the underlying interdependent relations between sovereigns and banks in a multivariate setting. In empirical applications, our results reveal significant time variation in systemic risk spillover effects for the sovereign and banking system. We find that systemic risk is mainly driven by risk premiums coupled with a steady increase in physical default risk.     

Econometric measures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors

We propose several econometric measures of connectedness based on principal-components analysis and Granger-causality networks, and apply them to the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies. We find that all four sectors have become highly interrelated over the past decade, likely increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries through a complex and time-varying network of relationships. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem to contain predictive power in out-of-sample tests. Our results show an asymmetry in the degree of connectedness among the four sectors, with banks playing a much more important role in transmitting shocks than other financial institutions.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

Measurement and prediction of systemic risk in China’s banking industry

This research uses a hybrid systemic risk indicator (rSYR) to measure the systemic financial risk of China’s banking industry from 2009 to 2019 and combines rSYR with sSYR (new standardized rSYR) to more accurately determine systemic important banks. We also forecast systemic risk in the next period, finding that large-scale banks (such as ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Merchants Bank) have high systemic importance. After eliminating the impact of scale, we then pay attention to the possibility of systemic risk brought by some smaller banks (such as Huaxia Bank and Everbright Bank). Through the prediction of systemic risk in the next six months, we also find out that the possibility of systemic risk caused by possible capital shortage brought by Agricultural Bank of China, Ping An Bank, Bank of China and Everbright Bank is more obvious, which is worth paying greater attention.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

The concentration–stability controversy in banking: New evidence from the EU-25

This study explores whether the concentration–stability relation is affected by the level of analysis; i.e., bank-level versus country-level stability. The diverging results in the literature suggest that we may indeed expect differences between the two levels. With the z-score as the measure of financial stability, our theoretical analysis confirms that we may find such differences. Yet our empirical analysis for the EU-25 during the 1998–2014 period finds no economically significant effect of concentration on either the bank-level or the country-level z-score. The finding that concentration hardly affects stability at both levels of analysis is an indication of robustness in the empirical concentration–stability relation not previously established in the literature. This finding further suggests that neither supervisory restructuring, nor normal market-driven mergers, are likely to be substantially harmful to financial stability.     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.