Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.     

Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms

This paper examines the role of affiliation with the ruling Communist Party in the operation of private enterprises in China. Using a nationwide survey of private firms, we find that the Party membership of private entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the performance of their firms when human capital and other relevant variables are controlled. We further find that Party membership helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions, and affords them more confidence in the legal system. Finally, we find Party membership to be more important to firm performance in regions with weaker market institutions and weaker legal protection.     

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

Incentives and group identity

This paper investigates in a principal–agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principals' behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.     

Correlated Equilibrium,Conformity, and Stereotyping in Social Groups

We argue that a social norm and the coordination of behavior within social groups can be expressed by a correlated equilibrium. Given a social group structure (a partition of individuals into social groups), we propose four conditions that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social norms. These are: (1) within‐group anonymity (conformity within groups), (2) group independence (no conformity between groups), (3) homophily (individuals in the same group have similar attributes), and (4) predictable group behavior (ex post stability). We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium satisfying (1)–(3) exist very generally and equilibrium satisfying (1)–(4) exist in games with many players. We also consider stereotyped beliefs—beliefs that all individuals in a social group can be expected to behave in the same way—and show that stereotyping is not costly to the person who stereotypes but may or may not be beneficial to society.     

Does education promote social capital? Evidence from IV analysis and nonparametric-bound analysis

This study uses the British National Child Development Study to examine the effect of educational attainment on social capital at the individual level. Social trust and membership of voluntary groups are considered as two basic indicators of social capital. We employ the IV analysis and nonparametric bound analysis to tackle the problem of education endogeneity. Both the approaches reveal that the OLS estimator of the educational effect suffers from an upward bias in the study of group membership. We do not observe any significant bias in the educational effect on social trust. Our empirical findings indicate that education has a positive influence in promoting social trust and membership of voluntary groups.     

Identity, morals, and taboos: beliefs as assets

We develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer their own values from past choices. The model sheds light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches. Identity investments respond nonmonotonically to acts or threats, and taboos on mere thoughts arise to protect beliefs about the “priceless” value of certain social assets. High endowments trigger escalating commitment and a treadmill effect, while competing identities can cause dysfunctional capital destruction. Social interactions induce both social and antisocial norms of contribution, sustained by respectively shunning free riders or do-gooders.     

Birth,death and public good provision

We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel experimental design, we modify the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) by periodically replacing old members of a group with new members over time. Under this dynamic, overlapping generations matching protocol we find that average contributions experience significantly less decay over time relative to a traditional VCM environment with fixed group membership and a common termination date. These findings suggest that the traditional pattern of contribution and decay seen in many public goods experiments may not accurately reflect behavior in groups with changing membership, as is the case in many real-world environments.     

Endogenous formation of multiple social groups

This paper explores a model of group membership formation in which agents decide to join or not multiple social groups. The membership formation process induces a bipartite graph structure with social groups listed on one side and agents listed on the other side. Among members of multiple social groups, we consider two decisive types of agents: the grand star and the mini star. The former type is the unique agent in a society who participates in all social groups. The latter type includes agents who participate in more than one, but not all, social groups such that every social group pair has one and only one common member. We analyze the efficiency and stability conditions of group membership formation, and we establish sufficient conditions under which a connected graph that contains either a grand star or a set of mini stars becomes the unique strongly efficient and stable graph.     

Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the other group members is centrally sanctioned and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being audited, both before and after audits are permanently withdrawn. We find that when individuals have initially experienced systematic audits, they decrease both their beliefs and their contributions almost immediately after audits are withdrawn. In contrast, when audits were initially less frequent and more irregular, they maintain high beliefs and continue cooperating long after audits have been withdrawn. This identifies the compliance effect of irregularity and uncertainty due to learning difficulties. By increasing both the frequency of audits and the severity of sanctions, we also identify an educative effect of frequent and high sanctions on further cooperation.     

The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment

Recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision-making. This line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision-making environment potentially miss critical features. This study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally. Our experimental laboratory is large open air markets, where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller׳s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations. This permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition. Empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions, and show that deviations from Nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership.     

Investment in identity in the field-Nudging refugees’ integration effort

Social identity greatly affects behavior. However, less is known about an individual’s investment in identification, i.e., in belonging to a social group. Using a language-learning platform utilized by refugees to learn the host country’s language, we design a field experiment that allows us to make effort as an investment in a new group identity salient. The social identity in our treatment is a refugee’s identification with the host society. We modified a mailing to 5600 refugees who use an online language-learning platform to learn the host country’s language. These treatment emails make salient that improving the host country’s language ability increases the belonging to the host society. Our analysis reveals that the treatment has a significant positive effect on the effort exerted on the language-learning platform, leading to more completed exercises and more time spent learning the host country’s language. This suggests that refugees invest in becoming part of the host country’s society for its social identity component. Our findings can inform policy considerations on the use of nudges for other integration measures intended for refugees and immigrants in general.     

宗教信仰、政治身份与企业投资偏好

文章运用企业家宗教信仰的直接调查数据,考察了企业家的个人宗教信仰对企业投资活动的影响。研究发现,相对于研发型投资,有宗教信仰的企业家偏好于风险相对较小的关系型投资;不同类型的宗教信仰对企业投资偏好具有不同的影响,笃信东方宗教的企业家相对于笃信西方宗教的企业家更加偏好于关系型投资;企业家的宗教信仰对投资偏好的影响因企业家是否具有政治身份而有所不同,相对于有政治身份的企业家,没有政治身份的企业家的宗教信仰会更加显著地正向影响关系型投资,表明政治身份可能会弱化宗教信仰在关系型投资中的作用。     

Social identity and preferences over redistribution

We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes and vote over alternative redistributive tax regimes, where the regime is chosen by majority rule. We find that a significant subset of the subjects systematically deviate from monetary payoff maximization towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of doing so is not too high. These deviations cannot be explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or conformity. Finally, we show that behavior in the lab helps explain the relationship between reported income and stated preferences over redistribution observed in survey data.     

International migration and informal social protection in rural Mozambique

This paper uses a unique household survey from two southern regions in Mozambique to examine the extent to which dispatching family labour abroad is a source of informal social protection for households left behind. We do so by studying the relation between migration, remittances and participation in groups that provide informal social services to migrant-sending communities. We distinguish between a range of community associations related to insurance, credit and production provision and we further correct for the endogenous choice of group membership. Results show that migration associated with remittances increase community group participation. In particular, while there is no significant relationship with group membership related to credit or self-help activities, remittance recipients are more likely to join groups that provide insurance. These findings point to the role of migration as a source of social protection for migrant-sending communities at origin.     

Impact of institutions on social network formation: communist party membership and social network investment in China

Using the 2003 wave of China General Social Survey (2003CGSS), we study the influence of the communist party on individual’s social networks in urban China and, thereby, present a case of socio-political institutions being an important ingredient in social network formation. We adopt a counterfactual framework and estimate the effect of communist party membership on social network investment as an average treatment effect. We find the treatment to be significant.     

Social capital and snake oil

This paper argues that the social capital that comes from group identification has a mixture of effects on welfare. In this sense, this form of social capital is neither snake oil nor elixir but something in between. Strong group distinction and identification reduce the adverse impact that relative comparisons can have on happiness, and they probably help with existential anxieties. However, strong groups in this sense can also plausibly heighten inter-group animosity to the detriment of all. Whether they do, however, is likely to depend on the character of the beliefs that give identity to each group. The paper further argues that an ‘open’ set of beliefs in the Austrian or Hayekian sense are the ones least likely to spawn such animosity. In this way, the paper points public policy away from the encouragement to group formation to the character of the groups that are formed.      

农民工社会认同的形成——基于建筑业农民工的考察

农民工的社会认同关系到这个群体城市融入的问题。依据对建筑业农民工群体实地考察和问卷调查,探讨社会结构和制度安排如何建构了农民工群体的归属感问题。对社会认同的研究不仅要关注宏观制度结构因素对群体的身份地位的作用和影响,还应从微观的角度,分析制度设置是如何建构成员对群体的依附、归属并建构出群体边界的问题。只有改善农民工的劳动条件,提高他们的保障水平,这个群体才有可能融入城市。     

Wage premium of Communist Party membership: Evidence from China

Social status and political connections may confer large economic benefits on an individual. Previous studies focused on China have examined the relationship between Communist Party membership and earnings and have revealed a positive correlation. However, the correlation could be partly or totally spurious. Using data from three surveys spanning three decades, we estimate the causal effect of Chinese Communist Party membership on monthly earnings in China. We find that, on average, membership in the Communist Party of China increases monthly earnings and the wage premium has grown in the last three decades. We explore potential causes and discover evidence that improvements in social networks and social rank, acquisition of job‐related qualifications and greater life satisfaction play important roles in increased earnings.