The Law of One Price—A Case Study

We use retail transaction prices for a multinational retailer to examine the extent and permanence of violations of the law of one price. For identical products, we find typical deviations of 20–50 percent, with some evidence for convergence over time. Such differences might be due to differences in local costs. If so, relative prices of similar products (round versus square mirrors) should be equal across countries. In fact, relative prices vary significantly across very similar goods within a product group. The finding suggests that differences in local distribution costs, local taxes, and probably tariffs do not explain the price pattern, leaving strategic pricing or other factors resulting in varying markups as alternative explanations.
JEL classification : F 41; L 11     

Commitment in regulation: Defense contracting and extensions to price caps

Department of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice.     

Price bounds on bond options,swaptions, caps,and floors assuming only nonnegative interest rates

This paper derives bounds on the prices of European and American bond options, caps, floors, and European swaptions assuming only absence of arbitrage and nonnegative interest rates. The bounds are considerably tighter than Merton's bounds on stock option prices, especially for options on short-term bonds or swaps and short-term caps and floors. For American bond options, it is important to distinguish between options on the quoted (“clean”) bond price and options on the actual (“dirty”) bond price. For example, it is shown that it may be optimal to exercise an American call on the quoted bond price early even if the underlying bond makes no payments in the remaining life of the option.     

The relationship among enterprise clustering,prices, and productivity in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector

We use census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing firms to analyze how enterprise clustering in local markets covaries with firm‐level output prices and physical productivity. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the density of firms that produce a given product in a given location and the local price of that product. We also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the density of firms that produce a given product in a location and the physical productivity of same‐product firms in the location. These results are consistent with the notion that increased clustering of firms generates higher competitive pressure and positive externalities. Across firms that produce different products, we find no statistically significant relationship between enterprise clustering and firm‐level output prices and productivity. We also find no clustering effects across towns. Our results suggest that while clustering can impact firm performance, the advantages are narrow in scope.     

Dumping,antidumping duties,and price undertakings

This paper examines which types of firms, from a developed country (DC) or a less developed country (LDC), tend to practice dumping, using a two-market equilibrium analysis of trade in similar products. Specifically, we present a vertical product differentiation model of duopolistic competition between a DC firm and an LDC firm under free trade to show that the DC firm sells a higher-quality product without dumping. In contrast, the LDC firm sells a lower-quality product and practices dumping in the DC market by charging a price lower than the product's price in the LDC's local market. In response to the LDC dumping, the DC government's use of an optimal antidumping duty increases its domestic welfare. The LDC's social welfare may increase if its exporting firm accepts price undertaking rather than dumping. From the perspective of world welfare, defined by aggregating the welfare of the trading countries (DC and LDC), the trade damage measure through imposing antidumping fines on LDC dumping is Pareto-improving compared to free trade (under which dumping takes place) and price undertakings.     

Segmentation of consumer markets in the US: What do intercity price differences tell us?

We quantify the magnitude of market segmentation in US consumer market and explore the underlying factors behind this segmentation, using a quarterly panel of retail prices for 45 products in 48 US cities from 1985 to 2009. The extent of market segmentation is estimated using city‐pair price differences within the framework of both linear autoregressive (AR) and nonlinear threshold autoregressive (TAR) models. We find that the magnitude of market segmentation varies from one product to another, but even more across city pairs in each product. Contrary to a widespread perception, market segmentation within the US is not necessarily larger for non‐tradable services compared to tradable goods. We identify potential drivers of market segmentation by relating the cross‐city and cross‐product variations of market segmentation to location‐specific and product‐specific characteristics—distance, relative city sizes, differences in wage and rent, type of product and proximity to marketplace. Distance, which captures more than transport costs, turns out to be the most salient factor even after controlling for a range of other potential factors. The effect of distance, however, varies substantially across products, with perishable products and locally produced products showing larger distance effect on market segmentation. We find that the magnitude of market segmentation has been somewhat stable during the sample period, but intercity price differences have become more sensitive to distance over time in many products under study.     

Non-grant microfinance,incentives and efficiency

I show that charging interest on funds provided by donors or investors to microfinance institutions (MFIs) can increase efficiency, the total number of loans and borrower welfare, compared to grant or concessionary funding. In a setting in which MFIs supply costly non-contractible effort, putting a price or raising the price of loanable funds strengthens the MFIs’ incentives to put effort in credit administration or monitoring, to extend more loans, and/or reduce overhead costs. This theoretical result is robust to several variations of the benchmark model allowing for an endogenous lending rate, motivated MFIs and endogenous overhead costs.     

Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products

We study the optimal ( i.e. revenue maximizing) auction of multiple products. We make three major points. First, we extend the relationship between price discrimination and optimal auctions from the single-product case to the multiple-product case. A monopolist setting prices for multiple products may offer discounts on purchases of bundles of products; similarly, the optimal auction of multiple products facilitates price discrimination by allocating products inefficiently to customers who are willing to purchase both products. Second, we demonstrate that optimal auctions are qualitatively distinct from monopoly sales of multiple products. Because of uncertainty about the values of other consumers, two products are bundled probabilistically in an optimal auction for a customer who is willing to buy both of them. A customer may then receive a discount on a lower-valued product without receiving a higher-valued product. Third, we show that in an optimal auction of two products the allocation of one product may vary with the amount of competition for the other product.     

Assessing the efficacy of borrower-based macroprudential policy using an integrated micro-macro model for European households

We develop an integrated micro-macro model framework that is based on household survey data for a subset of the EU countries that the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) contains. We use the model for the purpose of assessing the efficacy of borrower-based macroprudential instruments, namely loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and debt service to income (DSTI) ratio caps, and illustrate its outcome for four European countries. The simulation results from the model can be attached to bank balance sheets and their risk parameters to derive the impact of the policy measures on their capital position. The model framework also allows quantifying the macroeconomic feedback effects that would result from the policy-induced reduction of demand for mortgage loans. An assessment as to the comparative efficacy of LTV- versus DSTI-based policy suggests that DSTI caps may be more effective in containing household risk.     

The effect of distance and road quality on food collection, marketing margins, and traders' wages: evidence from the former Zaire

Food price variation is typical of the food economies of many low income countries. The presence or absence of road infrastructure is perceived to be one of the main determinants of this variation. This analysis shows that in the case of the former Zaire, food price dispersion is significant both across products and across regions. It is demonstrated that transportation costs explain most of the differences in food prices between producer regions and that road quality is an important factor in the transportation costs. However, food prices decrease relatively faster than transportation costs increase and traders' wages are higher on bad roads.     

Price and quality competition

This study considers an oligopoly model with simultaneous price and quality choice. Ex-ante homogeneous sellers compete by offering products at one of two quality levels. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality: for some consumers it is efficient to buy a high quality product, while for others it is efficient to buy a low quality product. In the symmetric equilibrium firms use mixed strategies that randomize both price and quality, and obtain strictly positive profits. This framework highlights trade-offs which determine the impact of consumer protection policy in the form of quality standards.     

Domestic market integration and the law of one price in Brazil

This article presents the first assessment of domestic market integration in Brazil using the law of one price. The law of one price is tested using two panel unit root methodologies and a unique data set comprising price indices for 51 products across 11 metro-areas. We find that the law holds for most tradable products and, not surprisingly, nontradable products are found to be less likely to satisfy the law of one price. While these findings are consistent with evidence found for other countries, price convergence occurs very slowly in Brazil, suggesting relatively limited domestic market integration.     

On Price Caps Under Uncertainty

This paper shows how standard arguments supporting the imposition of price caps break down in the presence of demand uncertainty. In particular, though in the deterministic case the introduction or lowering of a price cap (above marginal cost) results in increased production, increased total welfare, decreased prices, and increased consumer welfare, we show that all of the above comparative statics predictions fail for generic uncertain demand functions. For example, for price caps sufficiently close to marginal cost, a decrease in the price cap always leads to a decrease in production and total welfare under certain mild conditions. Under stronger regularity assumptions, all of the monotone comparative statics predictions from the deterministic case also do not hold for a generic uncertain demand if we restrict attention to price caps in an arbitrary fixed interval (as long as the price caps are binding for some values in that interval).     

Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective

Over the last 20 years, incentives in general and price caps in particular have breathed new life into public utility regulation. Price caps successfully combine incentives for cost reduction with incentives for more efficient pricing. These properties also facilitate opening public utility sectors to competition. Relatively tight price caps likely imply the right amount of competition, when the underlying natural market structure is unknown. While price caps make a regulated incumbent competitively more aggressive, this aggression is likely to improve on the unregulated outcome. Potentially anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent has led to regulation of essential inputs on the basis of benchmarked costs. Benchmarked costs should evolve into price caps for essential inputs and eventually lead to partial deregulation of end-user prices.     

Patterns and Determinants of Price Changes: Analysing Individual Consumer Prices in Austria

Abstract. We provide empirical evidence on the degree and characteristics of price stickiness in Austria by estimating the average frequency of price changes and the duration of price spells from a large dataset of individual price records collected for the computation of the Austrian consumer price index. The mean (median) duration of price spells in Austria amounts to 14 (11) months, but there is considerable heterogeneity across sectors and products. We find that price increases occur only slightly more often than price decreases. For both directions, the average magnitude of price changes is quite large (11% and 14%, respectively). The introduction of the euro cash in January 2002 led to more frequent but, on average, smaller price adjustments than usual. Estimating the probability of a price change in a panel probit model, we find a small but positive effect of the price spell duration on the incidence of price changes. Furthermore, product‐specific inflation, the size and the sign of the last price change and the period of the euro introduction significantly affect the probability of a price change.     

International trade,technological change and wage inequality in the UK economy

This paper examines the joint impact of international trade and technological change on UK wages across different skill groups. International trade is measured as changes in product prices and technological change as total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We take account of a multi-sector and multi-factor of production economy and use mandated wage methodology in order to create an well-balanced approach in terms of theoretical and empirical cohesion. We use data from the EU KLEMS database and analyse the impact of both product price changes and TFP changes of 11 UK manufacturing sectors on factor rewards of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers. Results show that real wages of skill groups are significantly driven by the sector bias of price change and TFP growth of several sectors of production. Furthermore, we estimate the share of the three different skill groups on added value for each year from 1970 to 2005. The shares indicate structural change in the UK economy. Results show a structural change owing to decreasing shares of low-skilled workers and increasing shares of medium-skilled and high-skilled workers over the years.     

Micro-responses to shocks: pricing,promotion, and entry*

We study the market response to firm-specific demand shocks in a natural experiment setting. In 2006, a boycott of Danish products in several Arab countries was devastating for Danish cheese products firms. In Saudi Arabia, their market share collapsed from 16.5 percent in January to below 1 percent in March, and never fully recovered; by 2009, it was 6.3 percent. By analyzing micro-level (scanner) price and sales data, we find the following. (i) Danish firms lowered prices but kept the product mix the same. (ii) Non-Danish firms kept prices constant but changed their product mix by introducing new products and new product bundles. (iii) Non-Danish firms chose to introduce products that were similar to the Danish products in characteristic space in order to compete head-to-head. We complement the analysis with a theoretical framework that helps to account for our main findings.     

Technical efficiency,allocative efficiency,and the impact of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers (LECs). After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. The results indicate that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the forin of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation. A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning in 1985. It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation. It is more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.JEL classification: L51, L96     

The lack of loan aversion among Canadian high school students

Evidence is presented on the factors that influence take‐up for postsecondary education financing (loans or grants) for high school students. Results show several factors influence the students' decisions about taking loans or grants but the most prominent influence was the price of educational subsidy. A total of 1,248 high school students across Canada participated. Prices for the grants and loans overlapped substantially in order to more clearly distinguish the impact of loan aversion on the decision to take up financial assistance to pursue PSE. The study featured paid experimental decisions (ranging from $25 to $700 in cash and from $500 to $4,000 in education financing), a numeracy assessment, a student survey and a parental telephone survey. The targeted sample included at‐risk high school students: low SES levels, First Nations and first generation students. Participants were marginally sensitive to the form of financing (grant or loan), with no evidence of systematic loan aversion being detected.     

Price Dispersion and the Role of Stores*

In this paper, we study price dispersion in the Norwegian retail market for 766 products across 4,297 stores over 60 months. Price dispersion for homogeneous products is significant and persistent, with a coefficient of variation of 37 percent for the median product. Price dispersion differs between product categories and over time. Store heterogeneity accounts for 30 percent of the observed variation in prices for the median product–month, and for around 50 percent for the sample as a whole. Price dispersion is still prevalent after correcting for store heterogeneity.