俄罗斯产权制度变迁中公平缺失的原因探索

俄罗斯的产权制度变迁的目标并不否认通过创造机会公平，寻求结果公平。然而，在产权制度变迁中却背离了初衷的目标。俄罗斯的产权制度变迁中机会公平和结果公平背离的重要原因，在于产权制度变迁中的过程不公平，即没有向每一个成员提供通过自身的努力获得平等的权利和机会，并免受其他社会集团和个人干扰和限制的制度环境。     

落地生根:阳江苗族代耕农的土地交易与家园重建北大核心CSSCI

在传统农业社会,村落是一个稳定的人群共同体。为独享村落资源,村落成员严格限制外来群体的进入。20世纪八九十年代,沉重的公购粮任务使作为生存资源的土地沦为农民的负担,田地富余而又缺少劳动力的村落通过招徕外部劳动力来缓解生产压力。在这一背景下,云南山区的苗族人迁移到阳江农村代耕。他们取得异乡土地的耕作权,并通过购置土地和旧宅的形式实现定居。本文认为,在城镇化进程和当前土地政策的合力作用下,村落社会的定居权已成为可交易的商品,进而为外来群体在异乡定居提供了机会。来自异乡的苗族代耕农并非生存压力下的被动行动者,他们在定居的过程中重新建构着自身的社会网络和生存空间。     

利他性惩罚的演化

实验和现实数据均显示,即使在一次性的交往过程中人类也会惩罚非合作者.即使这种"利他性惩罚"可以解释人类社会较高水平的合作行为,但是它也会产生一个演化悖论:现有模型认为非亲缘个体之间的利他性合作只有在小规模群体中才可以稳定地演化,因而用这一模型来解释利他性惩罚的演化时就会产生一个结果,即人们不会自己承担成本去惩罚别人,并为大量非亲缘的成员提供利益.然而,本文认为,利他性合作与利他性惩罚之间是不对称的,这就使得利他性惩罚可以在一次性和匿名交往中演化,并使利他性惩罚和利他性合作都得以维持.     

城镇化进程中农村集体成员资格研究——以征地补偿纠纷为视角

城镇化导致了农村集体成员身份的模糊,成员资格纠纷成为了近年来农村社会主要纠纷之一。地方法规在界定集体成员资格上存在瑕疵:户籍标准难以界定特殊成员的资格;村民自治往往侵犯弱势群体利益;户籍和经常居住地混合标准严重限制人口流动;与集体存在权利义务关系标准倒置了因果关系。上述标准忽视了成员资格存在的意义,在城乡二元福利结构下,成员资格的意义在于成员依赖土地为根本的生存保障,现行司法实践的主流意见已采取了以农地为生存保障的标准。     

多样化团队群体断裂带研究综述北大核心CSSCI

群体断裂带是基于多样化团队中组织成员的若干特征而形成的,将团队划分为若干相对同质子群的潜在分割线。它不同于传统异质性研究中同一时间关注成员单一特征,而是同一时间考察多样化团队成员的多个特征及其动态聚合,进而演变为"群体断裂带",为组织多样化及其行为研究提供了一个全新的视角。因此,这一概念的提出,立刻激发了学界的研究热情。通过多样化团队中群体断裂带的现实表现,聚焦于断裂带理论的内涵、测度以及作用机理,梳理已有研究,为将行为研究引入到公司治理的研究核心提供理论借鉴。     

读者来函

农民在城镇化过程中最失意的还是土地问题，政府强制征用城镇郊区的农村土地，但有些地方并没有给农民足够的补偿，部分农民也就丧失了在城镇化过程中通过出售土地而得到原始积累的机会，这些无地无业的农民可以说是“被城镇化”了。与土地相关的问题就是住房问题，这其实是一个问题的两面。政府在城镇化中通过征地再出售获益最大，但“被城镇化”的农民和城镇中原有的低收入群体却要承担城镇化过程中的巨大成本。     

我国家族企业职位开放的模式选择

职位开放是指在家族企业中,家族成员让渡部分或全部中、高层职位给非家族成员。它包括内部开放和外部开放。内部开放主要是指家族企业给予全体员工以公平竞争的机会和成长的空间,无论是否是家族成员,所有有能力的人都能够升迁到他最能够发挥作用的职位上;外部开放则是指从企业以外引进人才。职位开放是家族企业整合管理资源,实现企业持续发展的重要手段。     

利益分歧、有成本交流与内生权威

本文试图为内生权威问题提供一个可资参考的初步的模型,分析组织在什么条件下采用权威决策规则,在什么条件下采用多数制决策规则。我们发现:权威均衡要求群体成员间的利益分歧足够小,还要求存在一定的交流成本;同时拥有认知优势的一方获得权威。多数制均衡要求群体成员间的利益分歧足够大,交流成本较小。此外,如果权威决策规则是唯一的纳什均衡,那么它是有效率的,而多数制决策规则未必是有效率的。     

我是大V——陈坤：行走的力量

大V,是指在网络上具有较高人气、经过微博实名认证而获得贵宾资格（即VIP）、拥有众多粉丝的微博名人,以学者、艺人、企业家为主,也包括因某些因素而受到网民追捧的普通人士。2013年,是大V群体经受严峻考验的一年。在公安机关集中打击网络有组织制造传播谣言等违法犯罪过程中,一些拥有大V身份的网络名人被追究刑事责任,使这个群体在公众心目中的形象大打折扣,有人为此发出＂中国大V近黄昏＂的嗟叹。作为大V群体的代表人物,著名学者于建嵘也说：大V已成令人讨厌的符号。但是,这些感叹和担忧,显然都是错误的,因为在大V世界,绝大多数成员依然深得粉丝喜爱,他们以各自不同的优长或行动,     

群体决策中的投票规则研究述评

投票规则是群体决策研究的一个重要方面，常见的投票规则有一致同意规则和多数规则。这两种规则都有各自优缺点：一致同意保护了成员的利益但损害了决策的效率；多数规则刚好相反。群体成员能力、群体规模、成员之间的相关性和具体决策过程是权衡两者孰优孰劣的关键因素。     

Endogenous formation of multiple social groups

This paper explores a model of group membership formation in which agents decide to join or not multiple social groups. The membership formation process induces a bipartite graph structure with social groups listed on one side and agents listed on the other side. Among members of multiple social groups, we consider two decisive types of agents: the grand star and the mini star. The former type is the unique agent in a society who participates in all social groups. The latter type includes agents who participate in more than one, but not all, social groups such that every social group pair has one and only one common member. We analyze the efficiency and stability conditions of group membership formation, and we establish sufficient conditions under which a connected graph that contains either a grand star or a set of mini stars becomes the unique strongly efficient and stable graph.     

Which type of producer organization is (more) inclusive? Dynamics of farmers’ membership and participation in the decision‐making process

Producer organizations (POs) provide benefits to smallholders by alleviating market access challenges. However, whether all farmers benefit from a PO is still a question. Limited evidence is available on whether POs are inclusive of poor farmers. Even if the poor join, do they participate in decision‐making? We conducted interviews with 595 smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya. We distinguish three groups; members of a bargaining PO, members of a processing PO and non‐members. We show that membership is related to the structural characteristics of the organization: processing POs favor membership of farmers that are wealthier, more educated and more innovative. As to participation in the decision‐making process: older, male and specialized farmers have a higher chance of being involved than poor farmers. Factors distinguishing farmer participation in decision‐making between bargaining and processing POs are highlighted. We find that a bargaining PO is more inclusive of all groups of farmers, while women and poor farmers are excluded from decision‐making in a processing PO. Our findings contribute to policymaking on inclusive development.     

Assessing the convergence and mobility of nations without artificially specified class boundaries

There is a long-established practice in the empirical growth and convergence literature of classifying countries into groups or clubs by arbitrarily specifying group boundaries. A problem with this approach is that determining boundaries in a particular fashion also determines the nature of the group in a way that is often prejudicial for analysis ultimately affecting the way transition and class mobility behavior is evaluated. Here a semi-parametric technique for class categorization without resort to arbitrarily specified frontiers is proposed and the convergence of classes and mobility between them is studied in the context of the size distribution of per capita GDP of nations. Category membership is partially determined by the commonality of observed behavior of category members: partial in the sense that only the probability of category membership in each category is determined for each country. Such an approach does not inhibit the size of classes or the nature of transitions between them. A study of the world distribution over the 40 years preceding 2010 reveals substantial changes in class sizes and mobility patterns between them which are very different from those observed in a fixed class size analysis.     

Group identification

I study a model of group identification in which individuals' opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of group members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. I introduce two axioms, meet separability and join separability, each of which requires the list of members generated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. I use these axioms to characterize a class of one-vote rules, in which one opinion determines whether an individual is considered to be a member of a group. I then show that the only anonymous one-vote rule is self-identification, in which each individual determines for himself whether he is a member of the group.     

Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis

This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decide whether to join an agreement and pay a deposit prior to making their contribution decisions. If an agreement receives sufficient membership to form, members then make their contribution decisions and compliant members are refunded their deposits. If an agreement does not form, then deposits are immediately refunded and a standard voluntary contribution game is played. We find that the deposit-refund mechanism achieves nearly full efficiency when agreements require full participation, but is far less effective, and in some cases disruptive, when agreements require only partial participation. As the mechanism does not require the existence of strong sanctioning institutions, it is particularly suited for enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements.     

Membership in citizen groups

We analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group. However, in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously (returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members), we show that, in the ex-ante optimal contract, offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group, despite the heterogeneity in valuations created.     

Does Communist party membership pay? Estimating the economic returns to party membership in the labor market in China

Many studies have found that Chinese Communist party membership brings economic benefits to party members, but some studies also argue that the premium associated with party membership is merely due to members’ higher levels of ability and advantageous family backgrounds. The lack of consensus on the economic returns of party membership implies that the role of party membership is not well understood. This study estimates the economic returns to Chinese Communist party membership using complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of party membership status: propensity score matching and instrumental variable. Although the magnitudes of these estimates vary across estimators, all the estimates show positive economic returns to party membership. This paper also examines possible mechanisms for how party membership may bring benefits to members and provides evidence that party membership may generate political capital, but not social capital in the labor market in China.     

Integration of FSU/economies in transition into the World Trade Organization1

Membership of the World Trade Organization is a goal for many transition economies. This paper discusses what is involved in WTO membership, the information required and the commitments imposed upon members. After reviewing the accession process in general, the topic is illustrated by the recent example of Bulgaira and Mongolia.     

SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY

This paper develops conjectures regarding the process by which the President as a principal selects Federal Reserve Governors and Bank Presidents as his agents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It first establishes that FOMC members can be grouped into sets which are marked by ease and tightness biases in voting behavior. It then identifies certain career characteristics of FOMC members which are correlated with each of these biases. The paper goes on to isolate reliable partisan subsets within the ease and tightness sets and identifies a career characteristic which is highly correlated with membership in these subsets; that characteristic is a career as an economist.     

Birth,death and public good provision

We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel experimental design, we modify the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) by periodically replacing old members of a group with new members over time. Under this dynamic, overlapping generations matching protocol we find that average contributions experience significantly less decay over time relative to a traditional VCM environment with fixed group membership and a common termination date. These findings suggest that the traditional pattern of contribution and decay seen in many public goods experiments may not accurately reflect behavior in groups with changing membership, as is the case in many real-world environments.