Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill at Making Private Equity Investments

Using a large sample of institutional investors’ investments in private equity funds raised between 1991 and 2011, we estimate the extent to which investors’ skill affects their returns. Bootstrap analyses show that the variance of actual performance is higher than would be expected by chance, suggesting that some investors consistently outperform. Extending the Bayesian approach of Korteweg and Sorensen, we estimate that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in skill leads to an increase in annual returns of between one and two percentage points. These results are stronger in the earlier part of the sample period and for venture funds.     

Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around the World*

This paper introduces a new dataset from 50 private investment funds from 17 countries around the world. We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations and limitations on liability. While the data indicate a role for country legality in affecting the frequency of use of fund covenants, the data further indicate that the presence of legally trained managers has a more pronounced role in affecting the use of covenants. As private equity and venture capital investment increases across Europe and elsewhere, our results indicate that legal practice factors will matter more than the legal setting for the establishment of covenants governing new funds.     

Performance differentiation: cutting losses and maximizing profits of private equity and venture capital investments

Recent research has pointed out the need to differentiate between good versus poor performance of venture capital and private equity investments and to analyze the factors that determine the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a fund. This study examines the different contractual and behavioral characteristics and their influence on the positive and negative performances of private equity investments. Specifically, we analyze how fund managers apply tools and investment behavior to mitigate risks and maximize returns. The empirical investigation of these questions is based on a merged dataset, which combines the Venture Economics and CEPRES databases. It includes a total of 1,011 investments made by 137 different funds that belong to 54 private equity and venture capital firms worldwide over the period from 1979 to 2003. Our results confirm that the reduction of losses and the maximization of investment profits have different antecedents. Although losses are minimized by the use of convertibles and by increasing the venture capital firms’ accumulated experience, profits are increased by the potential of the fund’s management to allocate resources to portfolio companies. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the determinants of venture capital and private equity returns by differentiating between the mitigation of risks and the maximization of profits.      

Can investors time their exposure to private equity?

Private equity performance, both for buyouts and venture capital, has been highly cyclical: periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance. Despite this seemingly predictable variation, we find modest gains, at best, to pursuing realistic, investable strategies that time capital commitments to private equity. This occurs, in part, because investors can only time their commitments to funds; they cannot time when commitments are called or when investments are exited. There is a high degree of time-series correlation in net cash flows even across commitment strategies that allocate capital in a very different manner over time.     

University of Texas Roundtable on LP Perspectives on the State of Private Equity

In this wide‐ranging discussion among four limited partner investors in private equity, the LPs commented on the rates of return they expect from PE, the fees they pay their general partners, and the length of their time commitments to PE investments. After noting the enormous growth in the value of assets under private management, and the reduction in public equity investment by many large institutional investors, each of the four LPs said that their institutions expected to maintain or continue to increase their proportion of portfolio investment in PE. The LP panelists were virtually unanimous in expecting PE rates of return in the 9%‐11% range, as compared to 7%‐8% for public equities. The panelists also seemed to agree that although committing to PE investments for terms longer than the traditional seven to ten years could result in higher returns and lower costs, they were reluctant to make such commitments because they valued the financial flexibility afforded by shorter holding periods. Several LPs claimed that their institutions were scrutinizing the explicit and implicit fees charged by the GPs, and the level of fees was encouraging LPs to co‐invest in deals alongside the GPs. And in response to a closing suggestion that the recent flurry of IPOs could signify the beginning of a major reversal away from private capital, another LP expressed strong doubt, noting that “the private ownership model has clearly shown superior governance, and greater ability to manage leveraged capital structures and create value than public companies over the long term.”     

Fee Variation in Private Equity

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net-of-fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management- and performance-based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.     

The Return to Direct Investment in Private Firms: New Evidence on the Private Equity Premium Puzzle*

This paper uses a novel dataset to analyze the return to direct investments in private firms by pension funds. We have two key findings. First, direct investments in private firms have underperformed public equity by 392 basis points per annum under conservative risk adjustments. Second, initial mispricing, due to over‐optimism or misperceived risk, and subsequent low capital gains seem to explain the gap in returns to private firms. Overall, these findings complement the finding of Moskowitz and Vissing‐Jørgensen (2002) of low returns on entrepreneurial investments and provide new insight into the existence of what they call the private equity premium puzzle: Even professional investors with well‐diversified portfolios like pension funds seem to get a poor risk‐return tradeoff from investing directly in private firms.     

The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following:

• • Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds?
• • What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties?

Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following:

• • Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics?
• • Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses?

For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development.     

Monitoring via staging: Evidence from Private investments in public equity

I study the causes and consequences of staging in the setting of private investments in public equities (PIPEs). I find that, in PIPE investments, as in venture capital staging, the staging strategy is used by investors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Moreover, strategic investors and investors investing alone are more likely to utilize staging. I show also that staging reduces the cost of financing and has positive implications for PIPE issuers’ long-run stock performance.     

Government venture capital and cross-border investment

We use data on venture capital investments from 26 countries from 1998–2013. We investigate the following questions: Do domestic government sponsored venture capital funds augment or curtail domestic private venture capital funds from cross-border investment? Do government sponsored venture capital funds attract or repel foreign private venture capital investment? The results show that a preponderance of mixed-structured over pure-structured government venture capital investment has a crowding-in effect overall: it attracts domestic and international private venture capital to the domestic venture capital market while simultaneously increasing total private venture capital investment. In contrast, a preponderance of pure-government over mixed-government venture capital fund investment repels foreign private venture capital investment (has a crowding out effect). We find that both these effects are more pronounced for domestic rather than foreign private venture capital and that the attraction effect is stronger than the repulsion effect.     

Does investor identity matter? An empirical examination of investments by venture capital funds and hedge funds in PIPEs

I examine the emerging phenomenon of PIPEs (private investments in public equity) invested by venture capital funds (VCs) and hedge funds (HFs) and analyze whether and how these investors add value to firms by comparing a sample of 113 VC-invested PIPEs to a sample of 397 PIPEs with HFs. I find that VCs gain substantial ownership, request board seats, and often keep their stake after the PIPEs. In contrast, HFs rarely join the board of directors and typically cash out their positions shortly after the PIPE. The stock performance of VC-invested firms is significantly better than HF-invested firms both in the short run and in the long run. The positive valuation effect of having VCs as PIPE investors appears to be a certification effect rather than a monitoring effect. A key implication from these findings is that investor identity matters.     

Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.     

The impact of the Arab Spring and the Ebola outbreak on African equity mutual fund investor decisions

Financial development and stock markets have been widely considered to be key factors in economic growth. Among institutional investors, mutual funds play a key role in providing financial resources to stock markets, particularly in developing countries. Different from other investments, mutual fund flows could be affected by retail investors’ behavior and their overreaction to specific events. We considered 78 equity mutual funds that are geographically specialized in African countries and observed monthly flows and performance for the period of 2006–2015. We find that two major events, Ebola and the Arab Spring, significantly affected the fund flows, controlling for fund performance, expenses and market returns. Retail investors over-reacted to these major events, withdrawing their savings from the African mutual funds. This result is particularly strong when connected to the media coverage of these events: the higher the number of articles about Arab Spring and Ebola, the higher the withdrawals. These irrational investors’ behavior damaged the funds’ managers market timing ability, and reduced the equity capital injection into African stock markets. Our results have several implications for both holders of frontier market mutual funds and the overall asset management industry.     

How persistent is private equity performance? Evidence from deal-level data

The persistence of returns is a critical issue for investors in their choice of private equity managers. In this paper, we analyse buyout performance persistence in new ways, using a unique database containing cash flow data on 13,523 portfolio company investments by 865 buyout funds. We focus on unique realized deals and find that persistence of fund managers has substantially declined as the private equity sector has matured and become more competitive. Private equity has, therefore, largely conformed to the pattern found in most other asset classes in which past performance is a poor predictor of the future.     

Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey

We review the theory and evidence on venture capital (VC) and other private equity: why professional private equity exists, what private equity managers do with their portfolio companies, what returns they earn, who earns more and why, what determines the design of contracts signed between (i) private equity managers and their portfolio companies and (ii) private equity managers and their investors (limited partners), and how/whether these contractual designs affect outcomes. Findings highlight the importance of private ownership, and information asymmetry and illiquidity associated with it, as a key explanatory factor of what makes private equity different from other asset classes.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Liquidity shocks,size and the relative performance of hedge fund strategies

We examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994–2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds, and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Further, funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. We also find evidence that hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.     

Venture capital funds: Flow-performance relationship and performance persistence

This paper finds that venture capital funds that are expected to be backed by more skilled investors show no performance persistence but a significant flow-performance relationship. In contrast, funds that are expected to be backed by less skilled investors show performance predictability and have a non-significant flow-performance relationship. These results suggest that only skilled investors use all available information to adjust their capital allocation and, as a result, eliminate performance predictability as argued theoretically by Berk and Green (2004). Results also show that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) overstate the persistence in fund performance by not using an ex ante measure of the performance of earlier funds. Whether or not an ex ante measure is used, however, the persistence is largely due to unsophisticated investors. When investors are sophisticated, the performance of earlier funds, sequence and fund size do not help predict the performance of the focal fund.     

The investment strategies of publicly sponsored venture capital funds

This paper investigates the effects of public ownership on the investment strategy of hybrid VC funds. We exploit a unique dataset containing data for all of the venture capital funds in Europe that received financial support from the European Investment Fund (EIF) during the years 1998–2007. The dataset includes 179 VC funds that invested in 2482 companies. We find that the level of public ownership shows a weak negative correlation with the likelihood of observing a write-off and that a higher public share is associated with a longer duration for the investment. The latter effect is more relevant for those investments that generate intermediate financial returns. The results are robust to the introduction of controls at the target firm level and for financial market conditions.