Trader see,trader do: How do (small) FX traders react to large counterparties’ trades?

We show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future trading decisions of individual traders. The effect is such that traders tend to reverse their order flow in line with the better-informed counterparties. Informed traders primarily incorporate their own private as well as publicly available information into prices, whereas uninformed traders mainly magnify the effect of the informed. This pattern of interaction among traders extends to different order types: traders treat their own and others’ market orders as more informative than limit orders.     

SLIPPAGE AND THE CHOICE OF MARKET OR LIMIT ORDERS IN FUTURES TRADING

Retail futures traders face uncertainty regarding the price they will obtain when trading. This price "surprise," known as slippage, can be substantial. Using unique data from an introducing brokerage for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, corn, and soybean futures contracts, we quantify time-to-clear and the magnitude of slippage. We then identify factors that affect these trade quality measures. Finally, we analyze individual trader choice between market and limit orders and find that the likelihood of placing limit orders, where regulations protect traders from slippage, is greater when order and market characteristic indicate that adverse slippage is likely.     

Order aggressiveness as a metric to assess the usefulness of accounting information

Motivated by the availability of high-frequency data on trading activity, this paper proposes the use of order aggressiveness as a metric to evaluate the usefulness of accounting information. I test, through an analysis of order aggressiveness, whether earnings announcements of firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange limit order book have information content. I estimate an ordered probit relating order aggressiveness to unexpected earnings and to three market determinants of aggressiveness. Consistent with the theory on the choice between limit and market orders, I find that order aggressiveness increases with the absolute value of unexpected earnings. The results provide evidence on the extent to which the information contained in earnings is used by traders.     

Undisclosed orders and optimal submission strategies in a limit order market

Reserve orders enable traders to hide a portion of their orders and now appear in most electronic limit order markets. This paper outlines a theory to determine an optimal submission strategy in a limit order book, in which traders choose among limit, market, and reserve orders and simultaneously set price, quantity, and exposure. We show that reserve orders help traders compete for the provision of liquidity and reduce the friction generated by exposure costs. Therefore, total gains from trade increase. Large traders always benefit from reserve orders, whereas small traders benefit only when the tick size is large.     

Informed trading and order type

Each trader must choose between a limit order, a market order, or using a floor broker. We hypothesize that informed investors will: (1) concentrate their trading in floor broker orders and (2) sometimes trade patiently. Consistent with our hypotheses, empirical results suggest that most informed trading occurs through orders executed by floor brokers and that informed floor brokers are sometimes patient. Regardless of their patience, however, quote revisions following trade executions are consistent with the hypothesis that markets recognize that floor traders are more likely to be informed than other traders. As a result, informed trading moves equilibrium security values.     

Specialist participation and limit orders

We present a market microstructure model to examine specialist's strategic participation decisions in a security market where there are noise traders, limit order traders, an insider and a specialist. We argue that the specialist's participation rate depends on the depth of the limit book and its uncertainty. In particular, the specialist has incentives to trade against the market trend when the limit book depth is low and to trade with the market trend when the depth is high. Moreover, the specialist's participation rate is positively related to the limit book depth uncertainty and the asset price volatility, but is negative related to the average trading volume. We also discuss the specialist's participation strategies under the NYSE regulation that prohibits the specialist from trading with the market trend.     

Fuzzy logic,trading uncertainty and technical trading

From the market microstructure perspective, technical analysis can be profitable when informed traders make systematic mistakes or when uninformed traders have predictable impacts on price. However, chartists face a considerable degree of trading uncertainty because technical indicators such as moving averages are essentially imperfect filters with a nonzero phase shift. Consequently, technical trading may result in erroneous trading recommendations and substantial losses. This paper presents an uncertainty reduction approach based on fuzzy logic that addresses two problems related to the uncertainty embedded in technical trading strategies: market timing and order size. The results of our high-frequency exercises show that ‘fuzzy technical indicators’ dominate standard moving average technical indicators and filter rules for the Euro-US dollar (EUR-USD) exchange rates, especially on high-volatility days.     

Day Trader Behavior and Performance: Evidence from Taiwan Futures Market

By using a unique data from the Taiwan futures market to identify each trader’s trading records and focusing on the high-frequency day traders who trade at least 90 days over the sample year, this study closely examines their behaviors and performance. Day traders’ performances are “risk-adjusted” and analyzed to identify behavioral biases and the resulting impact on performance. There is no evidence found that trading too much is detrimental to investment performance. The high-frequency day traders are more aware of the danger of behavioral biases and are as a result less prone to the disposition effect. Contrary to expectations, day traders in my study are shown to be non-loss averse. Most of our sample except for the highest performance quintile follow a momentum strategy.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

Competition,signaling and non-walking through the book: Effects on order choice

We investigate the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and examine the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not allowed. Our results suggest that the variables capturing the cost of a large market order are not informative for an impatient trader under this market mechanism. We also document that the competition effect is not present only at the top of the book but persistent beyond the best quotes. Moreover, it dominates the signaling effect for both a limit order and a market order trader. Finally, we show that institutional investors’ order submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the limit order book information. This is consistent with informed traders placing orders based on their own private valuations rather than the state of the book.     

Liquidity distribution in the limit order book on the stock exchange of Thailand

The liquidity distribution, or the shape of the limit order book, influences trading behavior and choice of order submission by public liquidity suppliers. The present study seeks to discover whether liquidity providers are concerned about being picked off by informed traders, and whether they are less willing to supply liquidity at the market or demand higher price spreads. The results show that liquidity at the market is a small portion of total liquidity, and that firm size, minimum tick size, volatility, and trading volume play significant roles in determining the liquidity distribution within an order book.     

Low-latency trading

We define low-latency activity as strategies that respond to market events in the millisecond environment, the hallmark of proprietary trading by high-frequency traders though it could include other algorithmic activity as well. We propose a new measure of low-latency activity to investigate the impact of high-frequency trading on the market environment. Our measure is highly correlated with NASDAQ-constructed estimates of high-frequency trading, but it can be computed from widely-available message data. We use this measure to study how low-latency activity affects market quality both during normal market conditions and during a period of declining prices and heightened economic uncertainty. Our analysis suggests that increased low-latency activity improves traditional market quality measures—decreasing spreads, increasing displayed depth in the limit order book, and lowering short-term volatility. Our findings suggest that given the current market structure for U.S. equities, increased low-latency activity need not work to the detriment of long-term investors.     

High-frequency trading and stock liquidity: An intraday analysis

This paper studies the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on intraday liquidity of CAC40 stocks listed on Euronext. Spreads display an intraday L-shaped pattern, while quoted depth follows an inverse pattern: low at the open and increasing towards the end of the trading day. When liquidity demand is particularly high, there is a high rate of order cancellations attributable to high-frequency traders who use frequent order cancellations to strategically manage their limit orders and close positions near the market close. Using the generalized method of moments estimator, we generate strong evidence that greater intensity of HFT is associated with lower spreads and higher depth. The positive effect of HFT on liquidity is due mainly to decreased adverse selection costs arising from asymmetric information among market participants.     

Price Movers on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: Evidence from a Fully Automated Order‐Driven Market

This study examines which trade sizes move stock prices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), a pure limit order market, over two distinct market conditions of bull and bear. Using intraday data, the study finds that large‐sized trades (i.e., those larger than the 75th percentile) account for a disproportionately large impact on changes in traded and quoted prices. The finding remains even after it has been subjected to a battery of robustness checks. In contrast, the results of studies conducted in the United States show that informed traders employ trade sizes falling between the 40th and 95th percentiles ( Barclay and Warner, 1993 ; Chakravarty, 2001 ). Our results support the hypothesis that informed traders in a pure limit order market, such as the SET, where there are no market makers, also use larger‐size trades than those employed by informed traders in the United States.     

A market-clearing role for inefficiency on a limit order book

Limit order markets with stationary dynamics attract equal volumes of market orders and uncanceled limit orders, equalizing the supply and demand for liquidity and immediacy. To maintain this balance, market orders must share any benefit obtained by limit order traders from more efficient trading conditions, such as better order queuing policies. Therefore an efficient market places a low price on immediacy, producing small bid–ask spreads. Furthermore, when price-discreteness leads to a mainly constant spread, cutting the price tick raises surplus. This is modeled with a stochastic sequential game, using stationarity considerations to bypass direct analysis of traders’ intricate market forecasts.     

Lifting the Veil: An Analysis of Pre-trade Transparency at the NYSE

We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.     

Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

Who is the more overconfident trader? Individual vs. institutional investors

Guided by the Gervais and Odean (2001) overconfident trading hypothesis, we comprehensively investigate the trading behavior of individual vs. institutional investors in Taiwan in an attempt to identify who is the more overconfident trader. Conditional on the various states of the market, on market volatility, and on the risk level of the securities they trade, we find that both individual and institutional investors trade more aggressively following market gains in bull markets, in up-market states, in up-momentum market states, and in low-volatility market states and that only individual investors trade more in riskier securities following market gains. More importantly, we find that individual investors trade more aggressively following market gains in the three conditional states of the market and in high-volatility market states than institutional investors. Also, individual investors trade more in relatively riskier securities following gains than institutional investors. These findings provide evidence that individual investors are more overconfident traders than institutional investors.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.     

Trade Size Preference of Informed Traders in Indian Equity Markets

This study utilized high frequency transactions data to analyze the trade size preference of informed traders in Indian equity markets. It is observed that informed traders at an aggregate level adopt stealth trading strategy, wherein they prefer medium sized trades over large sized trades in order to camouflage their private information. However, the stealth trading behavior varies across stocks, wherein informed traders prefer more large sized trades on firms that are part of an index compared to non-index firms. Trading behavior also varies across other market conditions. It has been noted that informed traders prefer large sized trades during periods of high market thickness, negative returns, and low volatility. This study also provides a rationale for such varied behavior of informed traders.