Opinion Divergence Among Professional Investment Managers

Abstract:  We find that opinion divergence among professional investment managers is commonplace, using a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data. When managers trade together, future returns are similar regardless if they are all buying or selling, inconsistent with the notion that professional investment managers possess stock picking ability or private information that is of investment value. However, when managers trade against each other, subsequent returns are low, especially for stocks that are difficult to short. This U-shaped disagreement-return relationship is consistent with Miller's (1977) hypothesis that, in the presence of short-sale constraints, opinion divergence can cause an upward bias in prices.     

Corporate bond credit spreads and forecast dispersion

Recent research establishes a negative relation between stock returns and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, arguing that asset prices more reflect the views of optimistic investors because of short-sale constraints in equity markets. In this article, we examine whether a similar effect prevails in corporate bond markets. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, we find evidence that bonds of firms with higher dispersion demand significantly higher credit spreads than otherwise similar bonds and that changes in dispersion reliably predict changes in credit spreads. This evidence suggests a limited role of short-sale constraints in our corporate bond data sets. Consistent with a rational explanation, dispersion appears to proxy largely for future cash flow uncertainty in corporate bond markets.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and credit rating

This paper shows that the puzzling negative cross-sectional relation between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and future stock returns may be explained by financial distress, as proxied by credit rating downgrades. Focusing on a sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor's (S&P), we show that the profitability of dispersion-based trading strategies concentrates in a small number of the worst-rated firms and is significant only during periods of deteriorating credit conditions. In such periods, the negative dispersion–return relation emerges as low-rated firms experience substantial price drop along with considerable increase in forecast dispersion. Moreover, even for this small universe of worst-rated firms, the dispersion–return relation is non-existent when either the dispersion measure or return is adjusted by credit risk. The results are robust to previously proposed explanations for the dispersion effect such as short-sale constraints and leverage.     

Constraints on short-selling and asset price adjustment to private information

This paper models effects of short-sale constraints on the speed of adjustment (to private information) of security prices. Constraints eliminate some informative trades, but do not bias prices upward. Prohibiting traders from shorting reduces the adjustment speed of prices to private information, especially to bad news. Non-prohibitive costs can have the reverse effect, but this is unlikely. Implications are developed about return distributions on information announcement dates. Periods of inactive trade are shown to impart a downward bias to measured returns. An unexpected increase in the short-interest of a stock is shown to be bad news.     

Idiosyncratic risk and the cross-section of stock returns: Merton (1987) meets Miller (1977)

Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] predicts that idiosyncratic risk should be priced when investors hold sub-optimally diversified portfolios, and cross-sectional stock returns should be positively related to their idiosyncratic risk. However, the literature generally finds a negative relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risk, which is more consistent with Miller's [1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] analysis of asset pricing under short-sale constraints. We examine the cross-sectional effects of idiosyncratic risk while explicitly recognizing the confounding effects that dispersion of beliefs and short-sale constraints produce in the Merton framework. We find strong support for Merton's [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] model among stocks that have low levels of investor recognition and for which short selling is limited. For these stocks, the relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns is positive, as predicted by Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510].     

Follow the leader: fund managers trading in signal‐strength sequence*

When fund managers trade sequentially in the same direction, the information confirmation hypothesis predicts the long‐term profitability of the leader trade to be increasing in the number of subsequent trades. The information cascade hypothesis predicts a non‐positive relationship. Using active equity funds’ daily trading data, we document a transition from information confirmation to information cascades as the number of followers increase. We find that highly disguised multiple‐broker packages exhibit higher market impact, higher long‐term returns and are associated with fewer followers. Our study also documents that lead fund managers face portfolio risk constraints in trading on private information.     

The value of shorting

This paper assesses the effects of short-sale constraints on asset prices. The analysis focuses on a particular period in Sweden during which shorting stocks was impossible but stock options were traded. Firstly, the effect on both stock options and the underlying stock was investigated jointly by considering deviations from put-call-parity. Secondly, the effects on only the derivatives were investigated by considering their implied volatilites. The main findings are: (i) the impact on pricing are consistent with a short-sale constraint, (ii) these effects are much more pronounced when shorting is not possible, (iii) these effects are not solely attributable to the mispricing of the stock, as previous research indicates, and (iv) access to international shorting markets can alleviate local short-sale constraints.     

Institutional stock trading on loan market information

One of the most important developments in the corporate loan market over the past decade has been the growing participation of institutional investors. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: Do institutional investors use private information acquired in the loan market to trade in public securities? This paper examines the stock trading of institutional investors whose portfolios also hold loans. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of loan amendments, we identify institutional investors with access to private information disclosed during loan amendments. We then look at abnormal returns on subsequent stock trades. We find that institutional participants in loan renegotiations subsequently trade in the stock of the same company and outperform trades by other managers and trades in other stocks by approximately 5.4% in annualized terms.     

Short selling of ADRs and foreign market short-sale constraints

We examine the effect of home market short-sale constraints on securities that also trade in other countries that have more liberal short-sale rules. In particular, we focus on the case of ADRs traded in the US, as in some cases, the home markets of these ADRs prohibit short selling. We find that short sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited than from markets where short selling is allowed. Furthermore, we find that the greater levels of short selling in ADRs with binding home-market constraints is driven by stocks with greater dispersion of investors’ opinion, low fundamentals-to-price ratios, and recent price increases. Our results support the hypothesis that short sellers target ADRs with home market short-sale constraints because these ADRs are more often subject to temporary misvaluation.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.     

Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

Options, short-sale constraints and market efficiency: A new perspective

This paper undertakes a new investigation of the potential for options to mitigate short-sale constraints. I find that option introduction alleviates 79% of the price adjustment efficiency disparity between short-sale constrained and unconstrained stocks in relation to negative news. No significant improvement in adjustment efficiency is found in response to positive information. These results are robust to controls for endogeneity biases associated with the option introduction selection process. Further, I find evidence that post-option improvement in efficiency is similar in relation to private and public information. This suggests that short-sale constraint effects stem, at least in part, from an irrational, optimism bias or another behavioral source as suggested theoretically by Miller (1977). Collectively, these results suggest that options act as an effective substitute to short-sales, significantly contributing to the informational efficiency of the market.     

Short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk: Causal evidence from a natural experiment

We examine the relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk. To establish causality, we take advantage of a regulatory change from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO pilot program, which temporarily lifted short-sale constraints for randomly designated stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the lifting of short-sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash risk. We further investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which short-sale constraints affect stock price crash risk. We provide evidence suggesting that lifting of short-sale constraints reduces crash risk by constraining managerial bad news hoarding and improving corporate investment efficiency. The results of our study shed new light on the cause of stock price crash risk as well as the roles that short sellers play in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.     

Shorting flows,public disclosure,and market efficiency

Shorting flows remain a significant predictor of negative future stock returns during 2010–2015, when daily short-sale volume data are published in real time. This predictability decays slowly and lasts for a year. Long-term shorting flows are more informative than short-term shorting flows. Indeed, abnormal short-term shorting flows do not predict future returns or anticipate bad news. We find that short sellers exploit prominent anomalies. A comparison with the Regulation SHO data indicates that the predictability is much shorter-term during 2005–2007. Short sellers appear to have shifted from trading on short-term private information to trading on long-term public information that is gradually incorporated into prices.     

Are there monitoring benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We find that announcement returns are positively and significantly related to total and active institutional ownership levels and concentration. Post-issue stock returns are positively and significantly related to the contemporaneous post-issue changes in total and active institutional ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings. Operating performance improvements are also related to institutional monitoring in the one, two, and three years following the equity issue. Our results continue to hold even after accounting for the possibility that institutional investors have an informational advantage that enables them to identify and invest in subsequently better performing firms. We also empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by institutions buying past winners and selling past losers as a way to window-dress their portfolio holdings.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey

We review the theory and evidence on venture capital (VC) and other private equity: why professional private equity exists, what private equity managers do with their portfolio companies, what returns they earn, who earns more and why, what determines the design of contracts signed between (i) private equity managers and their portfolio companies and (ii) private equity managers and their investors (limited partners), and how/whether these contractual designs affect outcomes. Findings highlight the importance of private ownership, and information asymmetry and illiquidity associated with it, as a key explanatory factor of what makes private equity different from other asset classes.     

The big picture: The industry effect of short interest

We examine whether industry-level short interest predicts industry stock returns and find that the former is negatively associated with the latter. Furthermore, this predictive ability is more pronounced in industries with higher information asymmetry surrounding firms, suggesting that either short sellers' access to private information or their superior information processing skills are important. We also find that this predictive ability is stronger when the short-sale constraint is more binding and when the economic condition is challenging. Overall, our results imply that short sellers' collective activities convey important industry information, leading to predictable and profitable industry portfolios.