Liquidity risk of corporate bond returns: conditional approach

We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973–2007 in a regime-switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008–2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.     

The determinants of recovery rates in the US corporate bond market

We examine recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market, based on a complete set of traded prices and volumes. A study of the trading microstructure around various types of default events is provided. We document temporary price pressure with high trading volumes on the default day and the following 30 days, and low trading activity thereafter. Based on this analysis, we determine market-based recovery rates and quantify various liquidity measures. We study the relation between the recovery rates and these measures, considering additionally a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, and macroeconomic variables.     

A reduced form model of default spreads with Markov-switching macroeconomic factors

We examine the ability of observed macroeconomic factors and the possibility of changes in regime to explain the proportion of yield spreads caused by the risk of default in the context of a reduced form model. For this purpose, we extend the Markov-switching risk-free term structure model of Bansal and Zhou (2002) to the corporate bond setting and develop recursive formulas for default probabilities, risk-free and risky zero-coupon bond yields as well as credit default swap premia. The model is calibrated with consumption, inflation, risk-free yields and default data for Aa, A and Baa bonds from the 1987 to 2008 period. We find that our macroeconomic factors are linked with two out of three sharp increases in the spreads during this sample period, indicating that the spread variations can be related to macroeconomic undiversifiable risk.     

How much of the corporate bond spread is due to personal taxes?

Existing term structure models of defaultable bonds have often underestimated corporate bond spreads. A potential problem is that investors’ taxes are ignored in these models. We propose a pricing model that accounts for stochastic default probability and differential tax treatments for discount and premium bonds. By estimating parameters directly from bond data, we obtain significantly positive estimates for the income tax rate of a marginal corporate bond investor after 1986. This contrasts sharply with the previous finding that the implied tax rates for Treasury bonds are close to zero. Results show that taxes explain a substantial portion of corporate bond spreads.     

The effects of default and call risk on bond duration

This paper examines the effects of default risk, call risk, and their interactions on bond duration. We find that call risk decreases durations of default-free bonds, while default risk alone generally decreases durations for risky bonds with only a few exceptions. The joint effect of default and call risk always results in shorter durations for corporate bonds. Controlling for the effect of default risk, call risk has a negative effect on duration, which diminishes as bond ratings decline. Finally, the effect of call risk on duration depends on bond characteristics. Empirical evidence shows that the effect of call risk is smaller for discount bonds and for deep-discount fallen angels.     

Liquidity risk and expected corporate bond returns

This paper studies the pricing of liquidity risk in the cross section of corporate bonds for the period from January 1994 to March 2009. The average return on bonds with high sensitivities to aggregate liquidity exceeds that for bonds with low sensitivities by about 4% annually. The positive relation between expected corporate bond returns and liquidity beta is robust to the effects of default and term betas, liquidity level, and other bond characteristics, as well as to different model specifications, test methodologies, and a variety of liquidity measures. The results suggest that liquidity risk is an important determinant of expected corporate bond returns.     

Corporate bond credit spreads and forecast dispersion

Recent research establishes a negative relation between stock returns and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, arguing that asset prices more reflect the views of optimistic investors because of short-sale constraints in equity markets. In this article, we examine whether a similar effect prevails in corporate bond markets. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, we find evidence that bonds of firms with higher dispersion demand significantly higher credit spreads than otherwise similar bonds and that changes in dispersion reliably predict changes in credit spreads. This evidence suggests a limited role of short-sale constraints in our corporate bond data sets. Consistent with a rational explanation, dispersion appears to proxy largely for future cash flow uncertainty in corporate bond markets.     

The delivery option in credit default swaps

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity.     

Macroeconomic imbalances,financial stress and fiscal vulnerability in the euro area before the debt crises: A market view

This paper tries to identify the macro-financial imbalances that exposed the euro area countries to fiscal stress before the outbreak of the European debt crises. Contrary to conventional wisdom that interprets fiscal stress in terms of fiscal sustainability, we focus on short-term fiscal vulnerability as reflected by the conditions of debt refinancing in the sovereign bond markets. We find that market-based indicators capturing risk perceptions of sovereign debts have been influenced by the indicators defined in the European Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and by variables of financial vulnerability. When pricing the risk of sovereign bonds, the holders of government debts take into account not only the macroeconomic imbalances but also factors such as banking distress, corporate bond risk, liquidity risks in the interbank market or the volatility of stock prices.     

Financial crisis,structure and reform

In this study, we examine the relationship between the structure of financial systems and financial crises. Using cross-country data on financial structures and crises, we find that there is a significant short-term reversal in development of the banking sector and the stock market during both bank crises and market crashes, with the corporate bond market moving in the same direction as bank credit. However, the results are significant for countries with market-based financial systems but not for countries with bank-based financial systems. Emerging markets have mainly bank-based financial systems, which may explain why these markets require more time to recover from economic downturns after a financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that governments should emphasize a balanced financial system structure as it helps countries to recover from financial crises more quickly compared with countries that lack such balanced structures.     

Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity

We find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of liquidity measures covering over 4,000 corporate bonds and spanning both investment grade and speculative categories, we find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads, and an improvement in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond‐specific, firm‐specific, and macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuers' fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Our findings justify the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants.     

The Default Premium and Corporate Bond Experience

The development of organized markets for speculative-grade corporate debt has provided financial researchers with an opportunity to examine the pricing of default risk. By incorporating previous work on the default experience of low-rated corporate debt, this paper presents an introduction to risk-neutral models of risky-bond pricing and uses these to examine the relationship between the default premium embodied in bond yields and actual default rates. The contribution of macroeconomic information to the default premium is also examined. The author finds that holders of low-grade bonds have, on average, been compensated for losses due to default.     

Turn-of-the-month and intramonth effects in government bond markets: Is there a role for macroeconomic news?

This paper focuses on the turn-of-the-month (TOM) and intramonth anomalies in government bond returns. In particular, we examine whether the TOM and intramonth effects exist in government bond markets, and moreover, whether these anomalies are related to the release of macroeconomic news as suggested in recent stock market studies. Using data on the 2-year and 10-year US Treasury Notes and German government bonds, we document a modest TOM effect in government bond returns. This effect does not disappear after controlling for the release of macroeconomic announcements, thereby suggesting that the origin of the TOM effect is not necessarily the same across asset classes.     

Illiquidity or credit deterioration: A study of liquidity in the US corporate bond market during financial crises

We investigate whether liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market. In particular, we focus on whether liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial crises, especially for bonds with high credit risk, using a unique data set covering more than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 2008. We employ a wide range of liquidity measures and find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14% of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. We conclude that the economic impact of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in periods of crisis, and for speculative grade bonds.     

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.     

Relative default rates on corporate loans and bonds

We use two alternative matched-set methodologies to examine for differences in loan and bond default rates among US non-financial corporate issuers. Under both methodologies, the data indicate that loan default rates are roughly 20% lower than the bond default rates due to issuers that default on their bonds but avoid bankruptcy and avoid defaulting on their loans. For a small number of European issuers, the data suggest a similar reduction in loan default rates relative to bond default rates. However, the European results differ qualitatively from the US results, due likely to differences in US and European bankruptcy regimes, as well as the larger role of bank debt on most European issuers’ balance sheets. These results have important implications for investors, bank supervisors, and rating agencies that assess the relative expected credit losses on loans versus bonds.     

The effects of systemic banking crises in the inter-war period

This paper examines the time-profile of the impact of systemic banking crises on GDP and industrial production using a panel of 24 countries over the inter-war period and compares this to the post-war experience of these countries. We show that banking crises have effects that induce medium-term adjustments on economies. Focussing on an eight-year horizon, it is clear that the negative effects of systemic banking crises last over the entirety of this time-horizon. The effect has been identified for GDP and industrial production. The adverse effect on the industrial sector stands out as being substantially larger in magnitude relative to the macroeconomic effect. Comparing the results across long-run historical periods for the same selection of countries and variables identifies some differences that stand out: the short term macroeconomic impact effects are much larger in the post-war period, suggesting that the propagation channels of shocks operate at a faster pace in the more recent period. Moreover, the time-profile of effects differs, suggesting that modern policies may be modulating the temporal shape of the response to banking crises shocks. However, the broad magnitude of the adverse effect of banking crises remains comparable across these time periods.     

Multi-period corporate default prediction with stochastic covariates

We provide maximum likelihood estimators of term structures of conditional probabilities of corporate default, incorporating the dynamics of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. For US Industrial firms, based on over 390,000 firm-months of data spanning 1980 to 2004, the term structure of conditional future default probabilities depends on a firm's distance to default (a volatility-adjusted measure of leverage), on the firm's trailing stock return, on trailing S&P 500 returns, and on US interest rates. The out-of-sample predictive performance of the model is an improvement over that of other available models.     

What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market

This article studies the economic factors behind corporate default risk premia in Europe during the period 2006–2010. We employ information embedded in Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts to quantify expected excess returns from the underlying bonds in market-wide default circumstances. We disentangle the compensation to investors for unexpected changes in the creditworthiness of the bond issuer from their remuneration for the risk that the bond's price will drop in the event of default. Our results show that the risk premia associated with systematic factors influencing default arrivals represent approximately 40% of total CDS spread (on median). These premia also exhibit a strong source of commonality; a single principal component explains approximately 88% of their joint variability. This factor significantly covaries with aggregate illiquidity and sovereign risk variables. Empirical evidence suggests a public-to-private risk transfer between sovereign credit spread and corporate risk premia. Finally, the compensation in the event of default is approximately 14 basis points of the total CDS spread, and a significant amount of jump-at-default risk may not be diversifiable.     

Liquidity,default, taxes,and yields on municipal bonds

We examine the effects of liquidity, default and personal taxes on the relative yields of Treasuries and municipals using a generalized model with liquidity risk. The municipal yield model includes liquidity as a state factor. Using a unique transaction dataset, we estimate the liquidity risk of municipals and its effect on bond yields. Empirical evidence shows that municipal bond yields are strongly affected by all three factors. The effects of default and liquidity risk on municipal yields increase with maturity and credit risk. Liquidity premium accounts for about 9–13% of municipal yields for AAA bonds, 9–15% for AA/A bonds and 8–19% for BBB bonds. A substantial portion of the maturity spread between long- and short-maturity municipal bonds is attributed to the liquidity premium. Ignoring the liquidity risk effect thus results in a severe underestimation of municipal bond yields. Conditional on the effects of default and liquidity risk, we obtain implicit tax rates very close to the statutory tax rates of high-income individuals and institutional investors. Furthermore, these implicit income tax rates are quite stable across bonds of different maturities. Results show that including liquidity risk in the municipal bond pricing model helps explain the muni puzzle.