Beyond postnormal times: The future of creativity and the creativity of the future

Creativity and imagination are the most important ingredients for coping with post-normal times, according to Sardar. This paper looks at the way creativity itself is being transformed in the West, from the individualistic/atomistic view of Modernity towards a more contextual, collaborative, complex approach. It explores the potential and possibilities for this more participatory creativity to help go beyond the “crisis of the future,” and argues that the centrality of creativity must go beyond the mythology of genius and inspiration to inform philosophy, ethics, and action. Philosophical reflection and the imagination of desirable futures can emerge from a creative ethic that stresses the value of generative interactions and contexts that support creativity.     

The biosphere rules

Sustainability, defined by natural scientists as the capacity of healthy ecosystems to function indefinitely, has become a clarion call for business. Leading companies have taken high-profile steps toward achieving it: Wal-Mart, for example, with its efforts to reduce packaging waste, and Nike, which has removed toxic chemicals from its shoes. But, says Unruh, the director of Thunderbird's Lincoln Center for Ethics in Global Management, sustainability is more than an endless journey of incremental steps. It is a destination, for which the biosphere of planet Earth--refined through billions of years of trial and error--is a perfect model. Unruh distills some lessons from the biosphere into three rules: Use a parsimonious palette. Managers can rethink their sourcing strategies and dramatically simplify the number and types of materials their companies use in production, making recycling cost-effective. After the furniture manufacturer Herman Miller discovered that its leading desk chair had 200 components made from more than 800 chemical compounds, it designed an award-winning successor whose far more limited materials palette is 96% recyclable. Cycle up, virtuously. Manufacturers should design recovery value into their products at the outset. Shaw Industries, for example, recycles the nylon fiber from its worn-out carpet into brand-new carpet tile. Exploit the power of platforms. Platform design in industry tends to occur at the component level--but the materials in those components constitute a more fundamental platform. Patagonia, by recycling Capilene brand performance underwear, has achieved energy costs 76% below those for virgin sourcing. Biosphere rules can teach companies how to build ecologically friendly products that both reduce manufacturing costs and prove highly attractive to consumers. And managers need not wait for a green technological revolution to implement them.     

Managing for creativity

A company's most important asset isn't raw materials, transportation systems, or political influence. It's creative capital--simply put, an arsenal of creative thinkers whose ideas can be turned into valuable products and services. Creative employees pioneer new technologies, birth new industries, and power economic growth. If you want your company to succeed, these are the people you entrust it to. But how do you accommodate the complex and chaotic nature of the creative process while increasing efficiency, improving quality, and raising productivity? Most businesses haven't figured this out. A notable exception is SAS Institute, the world's largest privately held software company. SAS makes Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For list every year. The company has enjoyed low employee turnover, high customer satisfaction, and 28 straight years of revenue growth. What's the secret to all this success? The authors, an academic and a CEO, approach this question differently, but they've come to the same conclusion: SAS has learned how to harness the creative energies of all its stakeholders, including its customers, software developers, managers, and support staff. Its framework for managing creativity rests on three guiding principles. First, help employees do their best work by keeping them intellectually engaged and by removing distractions. Second, make managers responsible for sparking creativity and eliminate arbitrary distinctions between "suits" and "creatives". And third, engage customers as creative partners so you can deliver superior products. Underlying all three principles is a mandate to foster interaction--not just to collect individuals' ideas. By nurturing relationships among developers, salespeople, and customers, SAS is investing in its future creative capital. Within a management framework like SAS's, creativity and productivity flourish, flexibility and profitability go hand in hand, and work/life balance and hard work aren't mutually exclusive.     

The Eurozone needs exit rules

This study argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by a threat game with complete but imperfect information. To get close to the essence of the current EZ sovereign debt crisis we analyse to what extent a ‘troubled’ periphery member can negotiate a bailout from the centre due to the existence of a negative externality arising from its potential default. Secondly, we analyse how establishing ‘exit rules’ would shift the centre-periphery relationship in a way that safeguards the stability of the EZ. We demonstrate that such rules may help limit the scope for brinkmanship whereby fiscal problems in one member state create a negative externality for the rest of the EZ. We then discuss key policy implications concerning financial aspects of the centre-periphery relationship within the EZ.     

The term structure of policy rules

A formula is derived that links the coefficients of the monetary policy rule for the short-term interest rate to the coefficients of the implied affine equations for long-term interest rates. The formula predicts that an increase in the coefficients in the monetary policy rule will lead to an increase in the coefficients in the affine equations. Empirical evidence for such a prediction is provided. The curve of the response coefficients by maturity is also predicted by the formula. The formula's predictive accuracy and its closed form make it a useful tool for studying the policy implications of embedding no-arbitrage affine theories into macro models.     

How to kill creativity

In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever. But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it. How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions. Managers don't kill creativity on purpose. Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity. It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile. Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity. But managers will have to change their thinking first. Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation. Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow. It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation. To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support. Take challenge as an example. Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work. The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments. Consider also freedom. Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve. Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity. The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives.     

Combining creativity and control: Understanding individual motivation in large-scale collaborative creativity

Recent research has shown that management control systems (MCS) can improve performance in contexts characterized by high levels of task uncertainty. This seems to conflict with a second stream of research, which argues that MCSs risk undermining the intrinsic motivation needed for effective performance in such settings. To solve this puzzle, we build on theories of perceived locus of causality and self-construal and develop an integrative model summarized in 15 propositions. To explicate our proposed solution and to show its robustness, we focus on the class of activities we call large-scale collaborative creativity (LSCC) - contexts where individuals face a dual challenge of demonstrating creativity and embracing the formal controls that coordinate their creative activities with others’. We argue that LSCC requires the simultaneous activation of intrinsic and identified forms of motivation, and simultaneously independent and interdependent self-construals. Against some scholarship that argues or assumes that such simultaneous combinations are infeasible, we argue that they can be fostered through appropriate attraction-selection-attrition policies and management control systems design. We also show how our propositions can enrich our understanding of motivation in other settings, where creativity and/or coordination demands are less pressing.     

America's looming creativity crisis

The strength of the American economy does not rest on its manufacturing prowess, its natural resources, or the size of its market. It turns on one factor--the country's openness to new ideas, which has allowed it to attract the brightest minds from around the world and harness their creative energies. But the United States is on the verge of losing that competitive edge. As the nation tightens its borders to students and scientists and subjects federal research funding to ideological and religious litmus tests, many other countries are stepping in to lure that creative capital away. Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, and others are spending more on research and development and shoring up their universities in an effort to attract the world's best--including Americans. If even a few of these nations draw away just a small percentage of the creative workers from the U.S., the effect on its economy will be enormous. In this article, the author introduces a quantitative measure of the migration of creative capital called the Global Creative-Class Index. It shows that, far from leading the world, the United States doesn't even rank in the top ten in the percentage of its workforce engaged in creative occupations. What's more, the baby boomers will soon retire. And data showing large drops in foreign student applications to U.S. universities and in the number of visas issued to knowledge workers, along with concomitant increases in immigration in other countries, suggest that the erosion of talent from the United States will only intensify. To defend the U.S. economy, the business community must take the lead in ensuring that global talent can move efficiently across borders, that education and research are funded at radically higher levels, and that we tap into the creative potential of more and more workers. Because wherever creativity goes, economic growth is sure to follow.     

国际银行卡成员遵循的限制性规则

银行卡支付网络有时被认为是银行间合营,银行卡支付网络中的反托拉斯问题在银行间协作的反托拉斯问题中很有代表性,比如银行卡网络成员规则中的限制性条款受到频繁质疑问题,又如交换费问题。其中限制性规则问题包括:排他性规则、承兑所有银行卡规则、无附加费规则或不歧视规则等方面。     

The ultimate creativity machine. How BMW turns art into profit

Many companies face the challenge of balancing art with commerce. The conflict between corporate pragmatism and artistic passion and quality is persistent: designers chafe under corporate requirements, budgets, and deadlines, and nondesigners struggle to understand the business value of artistic choices. At German carmaker BMW, the fanaticism about design excellence is matched only by the company's driving desire to remain profitable. Global design director Chris Bangle presides over the intersection of art and commerce at BMW, managing the often-strained relationships among the designers, engineers, and business managers. Bangle goes to great lengths to protect his designers from the unproductive commentary of others in the company, literally posting "Stop: No Entry" signs on the design studio doors. He also protects the design process, making sure that time-to-market pressures do not harm the designs by shifting the focus to engineering too soon. As a mediator, Bangle appeals to the core values of the company and a deeply held sense about BMW-ness--a pride of product shared by everyone in the company that expresses itself in the classic quality of the cars. Every employee, designer and nondesigner alike, understands that if a car doesn't meet this standard of excellence, it's simply not a BMW--and customers won't buy it. Managing at the intersection of art and commerce means translating the language of art into the language of the corporation. In this First Person account, the author describes his inventive techniques for getting the best from his artists--and getting his ideas across to corporate managers.     

Marketing rules

New research shows that the top-performing dot-coms aren't necessarily the ones with the best business models--they're the ones with the quickest, most responsive marketing.     

The new rules for bringing innovations to market

It's tough to get consumers to adopt innovations--and it's getting tougher all the time. That's because more and more markets are taking on the characteristics of networks. The interconnections among today's companies are so plentiful that often a new product's adoption by one player depends on its systematic adoption by other players. Consider the disparate companies involved with the popularization of digital photography: software vendors, camera manufacturers, broadband communications companies, printer manufacturers, and so on. By contrast, Kodak was pretty much the sole player involved with popularizing film photography. The traditional levers executives use to launch products--such as targeting unique customer segments or developing compelling value propositions--don't work as well in this new environment. Instead, innovators must orchestrate a change of behaviors across the market, unraveling the status quo so that a large number of players adopt their offerings and believe they are better off for having done so. In this article, Monitor Group's Bhaskar Chakravorti outlines a four-part framework for doing just that. The innovator must reason back from a target endgame, implementing only those strategies that maximize its chances of getting to its goal. It must complement power players, positioning its innovation as an enhancement to their products or services. The innovator must offer coordinated switching incentives to three core groups: the players that add to the innovation's benefits, the players that act as channels to adopters, and the adopters themselves. And it must preserve flexibility in case its initial strategy fails. Chakravorti uses Adobe's introduction of its Acrobat software as an example of an innovator that took into account other players in the network--and succeeded because of it.     

The predictability of security returns with simple technical trading rules

Technical traders base their analysis on the premise that the patterns in market prices are assumed to recur in the future, and thus, these patterns can be used for predictive purposes. This paper uses the daily Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from 1897 to 1988 to examine the linear and nonlinear predictability of stock market returns with simple technical trading rules. The nonlinear specification of returns are modelled by single layer feedforward networks. The results indicate strong evidence of nonlinear predictability in the stock market returns by using the past buy and sell signals of the moving average rules.     

Taylor rules, McCallum rules and the term structure of interest rates

Recent empirical research shows that a reasonable characterization of federal-funds-rate targeting behavior is that the change in the target rate depends on the maturity structure of interest rates and exhibits little dependence on lagged target rates. See, for example, Cochrane and Piazzesi [2002. The Fed and interest rates—a high-frequency identification. American Economic Review 92, 90-95.]. The result echoes the policy rule used by McCallum [1994a. Monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates. NBER Working Paper No. 4938.] to rationalize the empirical failure of the ‘expectations hypothesis’ applied to the term structure of interest rates. That is, rather than forward rates acting as unbiased predictors of future short rates, the historical evidence suggests that the correlation between forward rates and future short rates is surprisingly low. McCallum showed that a desire by the monetary authority to adjust short rates in response to exogenous shocks to the term premiums imbedded in long rates (i.e. “yield-curve smoothing”), along with a desire for smoothing interest rates across time, can generate term structures that account for the puzzling regression results of Fama and Bliss [1987. The information in long-maturity forward rates. The American Economic Review 77, 680-392.]. McCallum also clearly pointed out that this reduced-form approach to the policy rule, although naturally forward looking, needed to be studied further in the context of other response functions such as the now standard Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.] Rule. We explore both the robustness of McCallum's result to endogenous models of the term premium and also its connections to the Taylor Rule. We model the term premium endogenously using two different models in the class of affine term-structure models studied in Duffie and Kan [1996. A yield-factor model of interest rates. Mathematical Finance 57, 405-443.]: a stochastic volatility model and a stochastic price-of-risk model. We then solve for equilibrium term structures in environments in which interest rate targeting follows a rule such as the one suggested by McCallum (i.e., the “McCallum Rule”). We demonstrate that McCallum's original result generalizes in a natural way to this broader class of models. To understand the connection to the Taylor Rule, we then consider two structural macroeconomic models which have reduced forms that correspond to the two affine models and provide a macroeconomic interpretation of abstract state variables (as in Ang and Piazzessi [2003. A no-arbitrage vector autoregression of term structure dynamics with macroeconomic and latent variables. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 745-787.]). Moreover, such structural models allow us to interpret the parameters of the term-structure model in terms of the parameters governing preferences, technologies, and policy rules. We show how a monetary policy rule will manifest itself in the equilibrium asset-pricing kernel and, hence, the equilibrium term structure. We then show how this policy can be implemented with an interest-rate targeting rule. This provides us with a set of restrictions under which the Taylor and McCallum Rules are equivalent in the sense if implementing the same monetary policy. We conclude with some numerical examples that explore the quantitative link between these two models of monetary policy.     

The influence of culture on accountants' application of financial reporting rules

The objective of this study is to examine the influence of national culture on accountants' application of accounting rules. Based on a refinement of Gray's (1988 ) framework, this study hypothesizes Greek accountants will be more likely (less likely) to recognize contingent liabilities (assets) than U.S. accountants (H1). It also hypothesizes that Greek accountants will be less likely to disclose the existence of both contingent assets and liabilities than U.S. accountants (H2). The results do not support H1. No significant differences are found between Greek and U.S. accountants' recognition decisions involving both contingent assets and liabilities. However, supplemental analyses show that U.S. accountants consistently exhibited more conservatism than Greek accountants. In line with expectations, Greek accountants are less likely to disclose information (i.e., were more secretive) than U.S. accountants, providing strong support for H2. Implications for both research and practice also are discussed.     

The profitability of regression-based trading rules for the Shanghai stock market

This paper uses daily Shanghai A share data to evaluate the profitability of trading rules based on the predictability found in the return series. We find that the value of the trading-rule-based portfolio at the end of our sample is between 2 and 11 times that of an equity-buy-and-hold portfolio. We assess the robustness of the results in various ways: by carrying out various statistical tests, by varying the period over which the evaluation is carried out, by using a recursive estimation procedure for the forecasting equation, by incorporating transactions costs, and by considering weekly and monthly data.     

The Feller diffusion,filter rules and abnormal stock returns

We determine the conditional expected logarithmic (i.e. continuously compounded) return on a stock whose price evolves in terms of the Feller diffusion and then use it to demonstrate how one must know the exact probability density that describes a stock’s return before one can determine the correct way to calculate the abnormal returns that accrue on the stock. We show in particular that misspecification of the stochastic process which generates a stock’s price will lead to systematic biases in the abnormal returns calculated on the stock. We examine the implications this has for the proper conduct of empirical work and for the evaluation of stock and portfolio performance.     

Seven rules of international distribution

A multinational entering a new market in a developing country knows that on its own, it cannot master local business practices, meet regulatory requirements, hire and manage local personnel, and gain access to potential customers. So it partners with a local distributor. At first, sales take off, revenues grow, and the entry seems like a smart move. But when sales plateau, the corporation begins blaming the distributor for not investing sufficiently in business growth or expanding markets, and the distributor claims that it hasn't received enough support and that the corporation's expectations are too high. The key to solving such problems lies in recognizing that the phases are predictable and can be planned for. As a new business grows in an emerging market, its marketing strategy needs to evolve, and each sequential phase requires different skills, financial investments, and management resources. The author offers seven strategies to manage the multinational-distributor partnership. He discusses what to consider when choosing a distributor, how to structure the relationship between the two partners, what resources the multinational should commit, and what can be expected in return. He states that a successful distributor must risk investing in training, information services, and advertising and promotion in order to implement the company's marketing strategy and grow the business. Paying attention at the start of a partnership can result in a better working relationship between a multinational and a distributor, along with more consistent sales and growth for the corporation.     

Strategy as simple rules

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how- to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones. In stable markets, managers rely on complicated strategies built on detailed predictions of the future. But when business is complicated, strategy should be simple.