Restraints of trade by durable good producers

Whether they face competition or not, durable good producers may have an incentive to impose vertical restraints on their customers in order to protect quasi-rents in the aftermarkets for maintenance and repair. In this paper, we show that these vertical restraints have little to do with the usual antitrust concerns regarding tying arrangements. Nonetheless, imposing such restraints involves antitrust risks. We examine these risks and the associated antitrust policy questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent Kodak decision. We also offer some suggestions for the appropriate antitrust policy.     

The efficiencies defense and commercial bank merger regulation

A binomial probit model is used to estimate the Board of Governors' commercial bank merger policy during the pre-deregulation era from 1963 to 1980. The Board's merger policy is shown to be consistent with a ‘Williamsonian’ efficiencies policy. This contrasts with the merger antitrust environment of the time in which merger-induced efficiencies were not considered. The results also suggest that the Board was influenced by the empirical cost studies of the time.     

Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact

The Supreme Court in 1911, on the occasion of the first major test of the Sherman Act, ordered the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust. In his 1958 paper John McGee argued that predatory pricing is, in general, irrational and, relying solely on the information in the Trial Record related to that decision, concluded that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing. His paper has had an extraordinary influence on both antitrust policy in the United States and economic lore. This paper documents the breadth and scope of the influence of McGee’s paper and offers several possible explanations for it. We suggest four reasons: (1) the lack of a theoretical challenge for 25 years, (2) the failure of scholars to replicate McGee’s empirical findings, (3) the unique status of the Standard Oil case in the history of American antitrust and (4) the influence of the Chicago School on economic and legal thinking.     

Efficiency and competition: The reagan administration's legacy in merger policy

The full effects of the latest merger wave will not be evident for a number of years. Further, many forces other than the Reagan administration's permissive policy contributed to the surge in asset redeployment that characterized the 1980s. Nevertheless, the rationale for this policy should be evaluated as promptly as possible, since antitrust remains the nation's primary policy instrument for dealing with untoward effects of merger. Both empirical evidence and underlying theory contradict beliefs in the efficiency-enhancing character of most mergers and of the market for control. Several emerging and potential harmful effects are noted.     

企业集团引发的反垄断难题

本文从企业集团的界定、性质和域外管辖权三个角度提出了其所引发的反垄断难题。本文的主要观点是企业集团作为一种企业间组织。兼有“企业性”与“市场性”二重属性：企业集团的“二重性”是导致企业集团垄断行为隐蔽性和复杂性的根本原因；处理企业集团的反垄断问题需要准确判断企业集团行为属性。本文通过案例研究．分析了美国和欧盟处理企业集团反垄断难题时的一些典型做法：提出了处理企业集团反垄断难题的基本原则。     

Antitrust in the Reagan administration: A report from the Belly of the beast

This paper is a report on selected aspects of antitrust policy in the Reagan administration. It was written while the author was Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. The topics covered include: merger guidelines, the general drift of antitrust policy, deregulatory initiatives, consumer protection policy, and the stronger emphasis on economic analysis in the conduct of antitrust policy. The conclusions drawn are not very sanguine in a normative sense. perhaps our solace lies in the positive study of why the antitrust bureaucracies behave as they do.     

Comment on “Merger Policy in the United States”

This paper comments briefly on a merger policy article by Dennis Mueller. It concurs with Mueller's judgment that X-efficiency consequences are of crucial relevance in developing a sound antitrust policy toward mergers. It agrees also that firms proposing mergers overstepping structural guidelines should be permitted an efficiencies defense, but it stresses the difficulties of making ex ante efficiency predictions.     

Introduction to the RIO Special Issue on Antitrust and the Platform Economy

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

     

Still Seeking Common Ground: A Response to Keyes

This response affirms that the author alone is responsible for what he “built on Keyes” and that Dr. Lucile Keyes bears no responsibility whatever for his conclusions. It reiterates the author's view that the history of antitrust shows that, in actual operation, the major purpose of the policy has always been the promotion of decentralization of ownership and control in the large-firm sector of the economy and not consumer protection. It is urged that no productive exchange of ideas between friends and critics of antitrust can take place until this fact is recognized. It is suggested that the search for common ground might begin by confining federal surveillance of mergers solely to a set of the largest firms; and that none should be allowed that did not promise a clear, non-negligible gain in efficiency.     

Predatory Pricing and the Speed of Antitrust Enforcement

A common complaint is that in certain industries antitrust action against predation istoo slow to ensure that a true victim can survive until the antitrust process has beenconcluded. This paper discusses, in the context of two recent antitrust cases, the sources of delay in the antitrust process, and different policy reforms aimed at speeding up the process or otherwise protecting a true victim.     

Delusions Regarding the Proper Role of Markets and Antitrust Policy

William Curran and Donald Wellington have criticized capitalism,neoclassical economics and antitrust policy. This article defendscapitalistic institutions against both the strong forms ofsocialism as practiced in the former Soviet Union and againstits milder forms as practiced in the welfare states of Europe.The article endorses some of Curran's and Wellington's concernsabout neoclassical economics, but recommends that neoclassicaleconomics be adapted to make it more useful for scientificresearch rather than abandoned outright. Some suggestions areoffered in this direction. The article totally rejects the notionthat antitrust policy can be a tool for correcting the ills ofcapitalism as Curran and Wellington see them, and argues that thegoal of antitrust policy should be to improve capitalism not todestroy it.     

Merger policy greatly simplified: Building on keyes

This comment urges a recognition of the fact that the main goal of antitrust, as revealed in a century of consequences, is not economic efficiency or consumer protection but the dispersion of power and decision-making in the business world. Building on Lucile S. Keyes' proposal for improving merger guidelines, it argues that the “true” aims of merger policy can be more efficiently pursued by disallowing all mergers involving very large firms that cannot be justified on efficiency grounds and ignoring mergers involving all other firms.     

The Tenacity of Antitrust Mythology: Dissenting from Mueller

This comment registers the author's reservations about Professor D.C. Mueller's proposals for revising federal merger policy and about the arguments that he advances in support of them. The comment especially questions the validity of the practice of using concentration data as the basis for inferring the presence or absence of monopoly power. It is argued that the analytical foundation for this practice is non-existent and that the purely statistical foundation is weak. The author finds persuasive Mueller's argument that, in recent decades, the merger activity of large firms has done little or nothing to increase the efficiency of the American economy. He believes that, right or wrong, what drives antitrust is fear of corporate size and power, not fear of textbook monopoly. Therefore, he believes consideration should be given to Mueller's proposal that the ambitious merger projects of large firms should not be allowed to go forward unless they promise some gain in efficiency.     

International aspects of merger policy: A survey

This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities.     

On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm's Valuation

EU antitrust investigations involve a sequence of events which affect the investigated firm's market value. We model these relationships and estimate their impact on firms' share prices. On average, a surprise inspection reduces a firm's share price by 2.89%, an infringement decision reduces it by 3.57%. The Court judgments do not have a statistically significant effect. Overall, we find that the total effect of the antitrust action ranges from ?3.03% to ?4.55% of a firm's market value. Fines account for no more than 8.9% of this loss, and we conjecture that most of the loss is due to the cessation of illegal activities.     

Guess who came to dinner

This paper highlights the trends in antitrust enforcement for 1963–84. It is based upon an update by the author's of Posner's study and follows his methodology, format, and operational definitions. The specific data examined include number of antitrust cases instituted, the duration of cases, DOJ and FTC won-loss records, nature of cases, fines and imprisonment and violations alleged. Since 1890, the number of multiple cases instituted by the DOJ resulting from the investigation of a single conspiracy has increased. Consolidating cases to reflect this pattern shows the apparent increase in DOJ cases represent fewer conspiracies of more limited nature that are being prosecuted under the Reagan administration. It is an intense cultivation of a well-known terrain rather than exploration of new frontiers in antitrust. The Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act of 1974 has increased the size of fines and the use of jail sentences. Structural relief is less frequent.     

Impact of deregulation on marketplace diversity in the USA

The current deregulatory mood sweeping Washington has changed the policy approach from one of government enforced diversity to one of marketplace-facilitated diversity. This is evidenced in the recent bills to revise the Communications Act of 1934, and the settlement of the AT&T antitrust suit. This article explores these public policy shifts as they relate to the information industries and suggests some impacts on the concept of diversity.     

Transaction costs and competition policy

This paper evaluates current antitrust policy in light of our current understanding of how transaction costs influence the ability of firms and consumers to deal with market power. The paper shows how the failure to consider transaction costs can lead to erroneous policy decisions. Many models employed today make simplifying assumptions about transaction costs that can lead to biased results in analyzing vertical and horizontal issues. The increased ability to monitor the effect of promotional behavior should cause us to reexamine whether free riding justifications, previously accepted as justifications for various vertical restrictions, still hold. Nash bargaining and Nash-in-Nash models raise concerns about the simplified assumptions assumed in which supposedly high transaction costs restrict the choice and form of the assumed competitive alternatives. The increasing importance of two-sided markets together with an understanding of transaction costs is needed to understand antitrust conduct in those markets. The recent Amex case is likely to lead to confused litigation in these types of markets. Finally, the establishment of property rights for a consumer to his or her data could fail to remedy antitrust concerns that certain dominant firms are immune to competition because consumers do not own their data unless that property right is limited so that consumers cannot exclusively sell their data to one firm.