Do Female Executives Prioritize Corporate Social Responsibility?

How do female executives view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Previous studies have reported mixed findings on the relationship between female executives and CSR. We select a sample of Chinese listed firms and use propensity score matching to construct a new sample of firms and evaluate the gender transition (from male to female) of chief executive officers or board chairpersons (executives) who are randomly assigned to firms (i.e., the gender transition of executives is regarded as an exogenous event). Subsequently, we use a difference-in-differences approach to identify the pure effect of female executives on CSR. Our results indicate that female executives are more likely to encourage CSR reporting. Moreover, we suggest that the mechanism behind female executives prioritizing CSR is altruism preference rather than risk aversion preference.     

Some Evidence on Executives’ views of Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper draws upon the concepts of organizational legitimacy, political economy of accounting and agency theory, and subsequently combines these with stakeholder analysis, in an attempt to analyse the attitudes towards their perceived social responsibility on the part of the executives of a small sample of large, UK companies.In the conceptual model developed, organizational legitimacy is perceived as a way of examining corporate behaviour, whereby a business is visualized as operating under a mandate from society, withdrawable were the organization be seen not to be doing the things society expects of it. There is, however, an alternative political economy of accounting view, suggesting corporate behaviour might be perceived as more proactive, with company directors attempting to ‘set the agenda’, such as to manipulate societal opinion towards a favourable view of corporate activity.Agency theory is then utilized in an attempt to establish the connection between organizations and the various interest groups with whom they interact, whilst, finally,stakeholder analysis is resorted to as a way of establishing the relevant societal interest groups to which businesses might either be considered ‘accountable’, or alternatively whose views they might wish to ‘manipulate’ favourably regarding their (i.e. corporate) actions.The underpinning theory, as delineated, is then examined for validity via interviews with executives representing eight prominent UK companies in four business sectors. The model outlined enables the nature of perceived accountability/influence by the company to be linked to perceived/manipulated stakeholder expectations of the company, with the tentative conclusion being reached that support can be found for both organizational legitimacy and political economy of accounting perspectives, although which predominates is impossible to determine.     

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? Evidence from China

This article examines the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and cost of bank loans (CBL) in China. We find that there exists an inverse U-shape relationship between CSR and CBL. In addition, CSR threshold for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is higher than for non-SOEs. In particular, CSR threshold for SOEs is lower in regions with high degree of marketization than in regions with low degree of marketization. The findings indicate that value-destroying effect occurs during CSR underinvestment phase, which is different from the overinvestment view. Moreover, the effect of CSR on CBL also depends on contextual factors such as firm ownership and marketization level.     

Do Financial Markets Care about Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? Further Evidence from China

Corporations increasingly define their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as a part of their business. However, is this trend beneficial to investors? Based on an event study methodology and a sample of Chinese listed companies, we extend the literature on voluntary disclosure by exploring the role of CSR disclosure in reducing stock market information asymmetry, as proxied by share price volatility and liquidity. Our results show that the share price volatility after CSR disclosure is lower than before CSR disclosure; however, the trend is that it decreases first and then increases for three months following disclosure. Stock liquidity also significantly improves after CSR disclosure; however, it increases first and then decreases. Additionally, by dividing CSR disclosure into economic (hard) disclosure and generic (soft) disclosure, we find that the reduction in information asymmetry is higher for hard disclosure than soft disclosure, suggesting that although CSR disclosure does indeed have an impact on investors’ behaviour in China, an economic‐based disclosure contributes more substantially. Finally, to better understand the characteristics of the Chinese financial market, we also explore the role of marketisation with results that show that the effect in reducing information asymmetry is greater for companies located in a region with a higher degree of marketisation.     

Do Economic Incentives of Controlling Shareholders Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? A Natural Experiment

We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.     

Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Improve Credit Ratings? Evidence from Geographic Identification

We show that a firm's CSR policy is significantly influenced by the CSR policies of firms in the same three‐digit zip code, an effect possibly due to investor clienteles, local competition, and/or social interactions. We then exploit the variation in CSR across the zip codes to estimate the effect of CSR on credit ratings under the assumption that zip code assignments are exogenous. We find that more socially responsible firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings. In particular, an increase in CSR by one standard deviation improves the firm's credit rating by as much as 4.5%.     

Can Investors Identify Managerial Discretion in Corporate Social Responsibility Practices? The Moderate Role of Investor Protection

This paper analyses investors’ ability to identify if managers use corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment practice to conceal the risk of dismissal associated with managerial discretion and if this detection is determined by the level of investor protection orientation. Results based on an international database of 1949 companies show that investors and markets do not identify managerial entrenchment based on the promotion of sustainable practices, except when such entrenchment is developed by companies located in countries with strong investor protection. In these countries, investors identify and penalise such companies with lower financial performance.     

Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Create Shareholder Value? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013

In 2013, a new law required Indian firms, which satisfy certain profitability, net worth, and size thresholds, to spend at least 2% of their net income on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We exploit this regulatory change to isolate the shareholder value implications of CSR activities. Using an event study approach coupled with a regression discontinuity design, we find that the law, on average, caused a 4.1% drop in the stock price of firms forced to spend money on CSR. However, firms that spend more on advertising are not negatively affected by the mandatory CSR rule. These results suggest that firms voluntarily choose CSR to maximize shareholder value. Therefore, forcing a firm to spend on CSR is likely to be sub‐optimal for the firm with a consequent negative impact on shareholder value.     

Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance

We investigate whether the levels of social capital in U.S. counties, as captured by strength of civic norms and density of social networks in the counties, are systematically related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in the counties. We find strong negative associations between social capital and corporate tax avoidance, as captured by effective tax rates and book‐tax differences. These results are incremental to the effects of local religiosity and firm culture toward socially irresponsible activities. They are robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital proxy and fixed effect regressions. They extend to aggressive tax avoidance practices. Additionally, we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarters relocation that changes the exposure to social capital. We conclude that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters provides environmental influences constraining corporate tax avoidance.     

EFA Keynote Speech: “Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do Investors Care about? What Should Investors Care about?”

This article is the keynote address from the Eastern Finance Association meeting in New Orleans in March 2007 with updated references and examples. In this keynote address, I discuss what we can learn about institutional investors' views on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility from research and surveys.     

Corporate governance, expropriation of minority shareholders�� rights, and performance of Latin American enterprises

This study empirically exams whether the internal corporate governance mechanisms of the firms represented in Latin American equity markets lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights; and whether such expropriation leads to economic underperformance. The data is a sample of 97 companies from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, for a 3-year period (2000–2002). The results suggest a relationship between the characteristics of a firm’s board of directors and the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. Finally, the study provides evidence that expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights may lead to under performance in emerging economies.     

Operative Social Undertaking

It is a kind of social undertaking, which, through independent management, makes the market configuration resource and market subjects provide services, meet residents' various demand.     

How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?

Leverage cross‐sections more than a few years apart differ markedly, with similarities evaporating as the time between them lengthens. Many firms have high and low leverage at different times, but few keep debt‐to‐assets ratios consistently above 0.500. Capital structure stability is the exception, not the rule, occurs primarily at low leverage, and is virtually always temporary, with many firms abandoning low leverage during the post‐war boom. Industry‐median leverage varies widely over time. Target‐leverage models that place little or no weight on maintaining a particular ratio do a good job replicating the substantial instability of the actual leverage cross‐section.     

Chief Financial Officers’ Power,Institutional Environment,and Corporate Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from China

Abstract

In this study, we investigate how chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) power and institutional environment influence corporate effective tax rates (ETRs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2010, we find that firms with expert power or political power CFOs enjoy a low effective tax rate. Furthermore, CFOs’ expert power plays a more important function in reducing ETR in regions with a better institutional environment compared to those with less-developed institutions. CFOs’ political power is the most important factor in reducing ETR in regions with a less developed institutional environment than in those regions with a better institutional environment.     

Corporate Governance Reform,Board Structure,and Its Determinants in the Banking Industry—Evidence from Taiwan

This study employs the data of twenty-seven banks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2000–11 to examine the determinants of board structure, e.g., board size and the independent directors ratio. The evidence shows that bank size, the degree of revenue diversification, and the CEO’s shareholding are positively associated with the independent directors ratio. A higher outside block shareholding is correlated with a larger board size and a higher independent directors ratio. As the creditors’ stake decreases, a larger board and greater board independence are required to maintain internal corporate governance. Finally, banks with M&A activity tend to downsize their board sizes and reduce board independence in the subsequent period.     

Studies in Convergence? Post‐Crisis Effects on Corporate Rescue and the Influence of Social Policy: The EU and the USA

The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that it precipitated in a number of peripheral EU Member States heralded massive changes in insolvency, corporate rescue and employment protection policies. The US and the EU both suffered greatly in the wake of the crisis, but their recoveries have occurred along very different tracks. The US has managed to regain much of its position in terms of relative growth and the UK has outpaced the recoveries of those European countries that are members of the European Monetary Union. The purpose of this treatise is to explore the context of the 2007–2008 financial crisis in the US and in the EU and its impact on legal reform in corporate rescue and restructuring as well as those aspects of social policy implicated within insolvency systems (notably collective redundancy and transfers of undertakings). It will also consider whether or not the corporate rescue and employee protection systems can be seen to be converging, and whether, in view of the different socio‐economic, political and cultural aspects of the US and the EU, such convergence might be beneficial. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.     

How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation?

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium.JEL Code: F21, H25, H87     

Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?

We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms' financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70%.     

Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing and Investment?

We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.