Group Affiliation and Ownership Concentration as Determinants of Capital Structure Decisions: Contextualizing the Facts for an Emerging Economy

This study considers the firm’s affiliation with business groups and the ownership structure as determinants of leverage decisions in Chilean firms. The major findings show that group-affiliated firms take advantage of internal capital markets and transactions with related parties (e.g., low transference price or loans at competitive interest rates) that reduces the demand for external debt. Majority shareholders in affiliated firms behave as controllers of managers, on the one hand, and avoid the supervisory role of debt, on the other hand. In stand-alone firms, supervision led by majority shareholders is complemented by the monitoring role of debt through higher levels of leverage. We conclude that further developments in capital structure theories adjusted to the particularities of the different institutional contexts are needed.     

Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationships between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study to provide large‐scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family‐controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U‐shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non‐family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.     

Debt Financing and Earnings Management: An Internal Capital Market Perspective

This paper investigates the role internal capital markets play in mitigating earnings management of group firms. We predict that the funding advantages of internal capital markets from business affiliates obscure solvency problems resulting from higher leverage for individual firms within a group, which in turn mitigates their incentives for earnings management. Using Taiwanese firms as a sample, we provide evidence that is consistent with such a prediction. In particular, we show that higher group profitability reduces its member firms’ sensitivity of earnings management to debt levels. Among business groups, earnings management in pyramidal groups is less sensitive to debt levels. We also find that the debt‐abnormal accrual curve becomes smoother as group profitability increases when considering the non‐monotonic relationship between firm leverage and earnings management.     

Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure: Evidence from Korean Business Groups

We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30     

Profitability in Banks Affiliated to a Business Group: Evidence from Mexico

In certain institutional contexts, where there are business groups, banks affiliated to these business networks are faced by incentives that might condition their profitability. The objective of this article is to test whether there is a difference between the performance of affiliated banks and that of banks not affiliated to groups, in the context of an emerging market. In particular, a study is made of the case of Mexico in the period 2007–11. Findings suggest that banks affiliated to business groups show less profitability than non-affiliated banks, which may be a consequence of the provision of loans in an internal capital market.     

The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe

We investigate the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Continental Europe, using data from 675 publicly traded corporations in 11 countries. Although family‐controlled corporations exhibit larger separation between control and cash‐flow rights, our results do not support the hypothesis that family control hampers firm performance. Valuation and operating performance are significantly higher in founder‐controlled corporations and in corporations controlled by descendants who sit on the board as non‐executive directors. When a descendant takes the position of CEO, family‐controlled companies are not statistically distinguishable from non‐family firms in terms of valuation and performance.     

Determinants of Capital Structure in Emerging European Economies: Evidence from Slovenian Firms

Although empirical research has shown that some capital structure differences can be explained by modern capital structure theory in mature market economies, the forces behind capital structure decisions in emerging European economies remain a puzzle. We assume that, in these countries, the change in economic system, and therefore corporate governance, has been only gradual; other forces must be at work when firms decide on their capital structures compared to those of mature market economies. After identifying possible relevant factors in Slovenian firms, we show that throughout the period from 1999 to 2006, these factors explained the greatest part of capital structure differences. However, the explanatory power of the proposed factors is changing, which implies changing corporate governance and financial behavior of Slovenian firms during transition.     

Disclosure Practices by Family Firms: Evidence from Swedish Publicly Listed Firms

Abstract

I investigate the effect of family ownership on firms’ disclosure practices in their annual reports. In specific, I study Swedish publicly listed firms, which are typically characterized by controlling owners that have a strong influence in the corporate governance decisions of the firm, including corporate disclosures. To measure disclosure, I construct a comprehensive disclosure index covering information on (1) corporate governance, (2) strategic and financial targets and (3) notes to the financial statements. The results reveal that overall, family firms provide less disclosure in annual reports than non-family firms do. The finding is consistent with the premise that through their management positions, family owners can directly monitor managers and avoid costly public disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that ownership structure of firms is important to consider in understanding firms’ disclosure incentives, particularly in settings where controlling owners play a significant role in the governance of the firm.     

Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms

Using a sample of 988 newly privatized Czech firms, with part of the ownership structure exogenously determined prior to voucher privatization, we find that share values are positively related with the ownership stakes of foreigners, insiders, and restituents. While the findings for foreigners and insiders can be attributed to their superior ability to identify more profitable firms, we interpret the findings on restituents as evidence of the beneficial effect of blockholdings. On the other hand, we find that the ownership of the fund with the largest stake is not significantly related with share value, suggesting that the value of external blocks depends on the identity of the owner. However, when the fund is also the largest blockholder in the firm, it has an adverse effect on share value. The negative effect of the dominant block owned by a fund is mitigated when a bank sponsors the fund. Although funds are legally separated from their sponsoring institutions, bank‐sponsored funds may nevertheless have inherited a better access to the innards of these firms, and may be in a better position to monitor them.     

The Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation: Evidence From Korean Business Groups

Abstract:  We investigate the quality of two primary accounting summary measures, i.e., earnings and book value, provided by firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols). We find that the value-relevance of earnings and book value is significantly smaller for firms affiliated with business groups. We also find that cross-equity ownership (a proxy for the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders) negatively affects value-relevance, while foreign equity ownership (a proxy for the monitoring effect) positively affects value-relevance. This evidence is consistent with the view that the poor quality of earnings and book value provided by chaebol-affiliated firms is due to the inherently poor governance structure of chaebols.     

Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China

This study examines the relations between leverage and investment in China's listed firms, where corporate debt is principally provided by state-owned banks. We obtain three major findings. First, there is a negative relation between leverage and investment. Second, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance than in firms with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. Third, the negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with a higher level of state shareholding than in firms with a lower level of state shareholding. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the capital expenditures of low growth and poorly performing firms and also firms with greater state ownership. This creates an overinvestment bias in these firms.     

Affiliates’ Bank Debt Policy: Does Parent Firm Nationality Matter?

This paper examines whether and how bank debt is affected by foreign group affiliation. Ceteris paribus, affiliates of foreign business groups only use about half as much bank debt compared to affiliates of domestic groups. Further, the results indicate that geographical and cultural distance between parent and affiliate countries raise barriers when accessing bank financing. The bank debt usage decreases even further if affiliates and parent firms depend on different legal systems or the degree of legal enforcement in the parent firm's country is low.     

Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada

Abstract:   This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases.     

The Effect of a Complex Ownership Structure and Judicial Efficiency on Leverage: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Companies

We explore the impact of complex ownership structure and judicial efficiency on firm leverage at Pakistani pyramid firms. Ratio of controlling to ownership rights is much higher at Pakistani firms than in other economies, which motivates us to study its impact on leverage. Our results reveal that complex internal structure at Pakistani pyramid firms is positively related to leverage. We find that the presence of efficient courts weaken the impact of complex ownership structure on leverage at pyramid firms. Contrary to the literature, we find that the political connections of pyramid firms in Pakistan are not related to corporate leverage.     

Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from Belgian Firms

In Belgium, financial and industrial groupings play a crucial role in the accumulation and allocation of capital in the economy. In this paper, it is hypothesized that Belgian firms for which investment is partly financed on an internal capital market, will not be subject to financing constraints to the same extent as firms which have to borrow from banks. Moreover, it is hypothesized that firms belonging to a group, transfer internal surpluses of funds to other group members by investing in financial assets. An empirical analysis confirms the first hypothesis, but rejects the second hypothesis.     

Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed Toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China

We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast?     

Board Independence,Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), mandatory distribution of income limits free cash flow. But, restrictions on source of income and asset structure result in widely dispersed stock ownership, which makes external monitoring through the takeover market less likely. As such, alternative monitoring mechanisms, including external directors, must be in place to discourage deviant managerial behavior. Using a simultaneous equation system, we conclude that while independent directors enhance REIT performance, the effect is weak. Higher CEO stock ownership and control through tenure and chairmanship of the board reduce the representation by outside directors, and adversely affect REIT performance. Institutional ownership or blockownership fails to serve as alternate disciplining mechanism to (inadequate) monitoring by outside board members, although their presence seems to enhance performance.     

The impact of family-CEOs and their demographic characteristics on dividend payouts: Evidence from Latin America

We investigate the effect of family-CEOs and CEO demographic characteristics on firms’ dividend policy in Latin America. We show that family-CEO firms pay less amount of dividends and invest more in capital expenditures than nonfamily-CEO firms do. Direct family ownership (ownership concentration) negatively (positively) affects dividend payouts. Among the CEO demographic characteristics, CEO tenure has a consistent and significant negative effect on the dividend payout. Firms in a strong corporate governance environment pay more dividends and are less likely to appoint family members as CEOs, suggesting that strong corporate governance forces firms to pay more dividends and restrains firms from appointing CEOs based on family ties.     

The Impact of Ownership Structure On Corporate Debt Policy: a Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis

This study examines the influence of agency costs and ownership concentration on the capital structure of the firm. Of particular interest is the composition of equity ownership as a determinant of overall capital structure and the dynamic adjustment of capital structure to changes in the equity ownership. Results indicate that the distribution of equity ownership is important in explaining overall capital structure and that managers do reduce the level of debt as their own wealth is increasingly tied to the firm. It is also noted that the time-series component is important in resolving the conflicting results reported in prior research.