Fiscal policy rules,budget deficits,and forecasting biases

In this paper, we analyze the impact fiscal policy rules have on budget deficits and forecasting biases in official budget outlooks. Persistent budget deficits and over-optimistic budget forecasts have been observed in many countries in the past, especially in the euro area. To prevent such developments from happening in the future, fiscal rules have been revised or implemented with the aim to strengthen both preventive (ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) elements of fiscal rules frameworks. Do such ex-ante and ex-post rules differ in their effects? In an attempt to answer this question, we build a two-period model and distinguish between ex-ante rules that apply to budget forecasts and ex-post rules that apply to realized budget deficits. Our model indicates that effectively enforced ex-post rules are more effective than ex-ante rules at reducing budget deficits. Interestingly, ex-ante rules differ from ex-post rules in their effects on forecasting biases. Only ex-post sanctions reduce forecasting biases, while ex-ante rules have no impact on such biases. In addition, we show that political stability and the size of government increase the effectiveness of fiscal rules. If, however, financial markets have a disciplining effect on governments, the effectiveness of fiscal rules is reduced. Our results imply that if fiscal policy rules cannot be effectively enforced, reforming other areas such as electoral rules or financial market regulations might be a more promising approach to ensuring sound public finances than fiscal policy rules.     

Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency

New indices of fiscal rule strength are constructed and, using a dynamic panel econometric model for 27 EU countries over the period 1990–2012, we assess whether national fiscal rules alone help to promote sustainable public finances in the EU or whether they must be supported by good governance in order to be effective. We find that fiscal rules are effective in reducing structural primary deficits at all levels of government efficiency. However, the effect is smaller as government efficiency increases, indicating that fiscal rules and government efficiency are institutional substitutes in terms of promoting fiscal sustainability. We also find that balanced budget rules are the most effective form of fiscal rules. Multiple fiscal rules are found to enhance fiscal solvency. Other institutional features that enhance the effectiveness of fiscal rules are transparency of policies and commitment to implementation of fiscal programs. Supranational rules, however, do not affect the effectiveness of national fiscal rules in reducing the deficit bias. Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods and endogeneity assumptions.     

Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition

Rules exert an important influence on rational individual behaviour. In economic analyses, two different types of rules occur that both induce rule-following behaviour. However, they are rarely distinguished. The differentiation of institutions (as interpersonal rules) and cognitive rules (as intrapersonal rules) allows for a clarification of substantial differences between the two types of rules, for example, concerning the incorporated knowledge and rule-persistence. Furthermore, the analysis of the interrelation of the two types of rules offers fruitful insights that still are not much explored in economics. The important dimensions to be considered are rule-harmony that stabilises institutional arrangements, and rule-conflict that induces pressure on persistent institutions. In this context, competition can be seen as a medium of interaction that allows individual agents to learn both about the behaviour of interacting agents and the nature and effects of the institutional framework. The integration of competition - as the core concept of economics - into the interplay of institutions and cognitive rules explores a missing point within the analysis of the economics of rules.     

Choices and Constraints over Retirement Income Streams: Comparing Rules and Regulations*

The new Simplified Superannuation regulations for Australian superannuation provide tax concessions to retirement income streams which comply with legislated minimum drawdown rules. We evaluate these new drawdown rules against four alternatives, including three formula‐based ‘rules of thumb’ used by financial planners. We find that the new regulations are a substantial improvement on the previous rules for allocated pensions and, when compared with the formula‐based rules, are a good compromise in terms of simplicity, adequacy and risk. We also find that welfare is lower for most individuals who follow the Simplified Superannuation rules compared with welfare under an optimal path or a simple fixed percentage drawdown rule, but that outcomes could be improved through a further simplification of the new rules.     

Wicksellian Rules and the Taylor Principle: Some Practical Implications*

In this paper, we derive and compare the determinacy regions of price-level targeting rules (Wicksellian rules) and Taylor rules in a standard New Keynesian model. We conclude that Wicksellian rules do not require the Taylor principle to hold in order to induce determinacy. Our results have two implications. First, in a univariate setting, the estimation of simple Taylor rules when the true rule is Wicksellian can lead to the erroneous conclusion that the equilibrium is indeterminate. Second, indeterminacy is ruled out when using system-based methods, but it can be concluded that the central bank is less averse to inflation movements than it actually is.     

The rules of abstraction

Friedrich Hayek’s work on spontaneous order suggests that the emergence of a spontaneous order requires the existence of abstract rules of conduct. But how much abstraction is required? Abstraction exists on a gradient, from the highest specificity (pertaining to particular persons and narrowly defined circumstances) to the highest generality (pertaining to all persons in all circumstances). If rules create order by coordinating expectations, either end of the spectrum is undesirable; the most specific and the most abstract rules fail to provide decision makers with useful guidance. This article argues that rules that foster coordination must be characterized by an intermediate degree of abstraction. This conclusion will be explained and applied to law, language, and etiquette in order to draw out the similar character of rules across various contexts. The article concludes by discussing four properties that rules of intermediate abstraction must also possess to foster spontaneous order.     

Price distortions,financing constraints and second-best investment rules in the transportation industries

This paper analyzes the second-best pricing and investment rules to be followed in the transportation industries in the presence of intermodal competition, exogenous price distortions, and financing constraints, using both theoretical and simulation analysis. It shows that price distortions and financing constraints in one mode will not only affect the investment rules in that mode, but will also affect the pricing rules and investment decisions in all other modes. While the theoretical discussion indicates that the second-best pricing and investment rules are quite complex, the simulation analysis indicates that the benefit function is relatively flat, suggesting that the costs of using simpler first-best rules may be relatively small.     

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.     

The performance and robustness of simple monetary policy rules in models of the Canadian economy

Abstract.  In this paper, we evaluate seven simple monetary policy rules in a wide range of models of the Canadian economy. Our results indicate that none of the seven simple policy rules we examined is robust to model uncertainty, in that no single rule performs well in all models. In fact, our results show that the performance of some of the simple rules, particularly rules with interest rate smoothing and rules with a high coefficient on the inflation gap, can substantially deviate from that of the optimal rule and can even be unstable in some models. Furthermore, we find that "open‐economy" rules do not perform well in many models. We find that adding an exchange rate term to a simple policy rule often increases the value of the policy‐maker's loss function. Although it is not robust, we find that a simple nominal Taylor‐type rule that has a coefficient of 2 on the inflation gap and 0.5 on the output gap outperforms the other simple rules in a certain class of models. However, even in those models, the loss‐function value of this simple rule can be substantially higher than that of the optimal or base‐case rule. JEL classification: E52, E58     

Between liberalism and democracy

We study and characterize axiomatically a class of voting rules, called consent rules, that incorporate aspects of majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. Consent rules are parameterized by the weights given to individuals in determining their own qualification. In one of these rules, the liberal rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In other rules, an individual's qualification requires social consent in various degrees. We also show the relation between self-determination and the liberal rule.     

货币政策组合规则

本文建议在泡沫高涨时将货币政策由利率规则转为货币量规则。在本文设定的CIA模型经济中，外生泡沫通过金融渠道对经济发生影响。本文证实，即使是遵循了泰勒原则的利率规则也会因为对融资活动的增长提供相应的货币支持而实际上起到助长泡沫经济的作用；而货币量规则由于对货币供应的控制而能起到缩短并稳定泡沫经济影响的效果。本文的模拟实验表明，在大型泡沫经济中将利率规则与货币量规则组合使用能取得更好的宏观经济成果。同时，将不同规则进行组合使用的思想在货币政策的研究中是新颖的，本文还发展了模型对接的技术处理方法。     

How quorum rules distort referendum outcomes: Evidence from a pivotal voter model

In many jurisdictions, whether referendum results are binding depends on legally defined quorum requirements. We use a pivotal voter model to examine the consequences of such requirements. We find that, although quorum rules differ in consequences, a status quo bias that is usually attributed need not be present and that quorum rules may work against the status quo. The rules can also both favor minorities and reduce voter turnout. Because quorum rules can create situations in which the secrecy of the vote is compromised, the door is opened to undemocratic forms of social and political pressure.     

Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to provide a transparent characterization of the family of metrizable social decision rules. Second, to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a reasonable metric rationalization. Theorem 1 establishes that the class of metrizable social decision rules is uniquely characterized by a variant of the well-known Pareto condition. Theorem 2 establishes that positional rules can be characterized in terms of a special class of additively decomposable quasi-metric rationalizations. Theorem 3 characterizes strong positional rules in terms of reasonable metric rationalizations.     

Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.     

Do fiscal rules cause better fiscal balances? A new instrumental variable strategy

This paper estimates the causal effect of fiscal rules on fiscal balances in a panel of 142 countries over the period 1985–2015. Our instrumental variable strategy exploits the geographical diffusion of fiscal rules across countries. The intuition is that reforms in neighboring countries may affect the adoption of domestic reforms through peer pressure and imitational effects. We find that the mere existence of fiscal rules correlates with lower deficits, but the positive link disappears when endogeneity is correctly addressed. However, when considering the strength of rules through a continuous index of fiscal rules’ design, we show that well-designed rules have a statistically significant impact on fiscal balances. We conduct several robustness tests and show that our results are generally robust and not affected by weak instrument problems.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting under model uncertainty

It has recently been suggested that price‐level targeting (PLT) may be a superior approach to monetary policy than inflation targeting (IT) due to its ability to automatically influence inflation expectations to stabilize the economy. In this paper, I analyze whether PLT dominates IT if the ability of the central bank to influence expectations is limited by model uncertainty. Specifically, I analyze how the characterization and performance of PLT and IT rules are impacted if private agents form expectations according to a model that deviates from the policy‐maker's reference model. Using robust control to derive robust rules in such a situation, I find that the performance of PLT rules deteriorate faster than that of IT rules as the degree of misspecification increases. Nevertheless, the absolute decline in performance of the PLT rules is relatively small across alternative models that are statistically plausible.     

National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with,but still effective?

This paper investigates the effects of (non-)compliance with national numerical fiscal rules on fiscal policy in 11 EU member states with 23 fiscal rules in place from 1994 to 2012. Introducing a new dataset of legal texts constituting the fiscal rules, allows a joint empirical analysis of different types and designs of numerical fiscal rules. In various empirical exercises the change in the difference between the exact variable constrained by the fiscal rule and its numerical limit is analysed. Statistics show that countries comply with their fiscal rules only in about 50% of the years. Nevertheless, various econometric exercises demonstrate that the introduction of fiscal rules does significantly change the behaviour of fiscal policy. If countries do not comply with their fiscal rule in the year or forecast before, there is a strong downward tendency of the constrained variable towards the numerical limit. The results show that fiscal rules act as kind of a benchmark for policy makers and the public, and even though they might be complied with only in half of the years, they still tilt fiscal policy towards the numerical limit in times of non-compliance.     

Constant scoring rules,condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences

Summary A constant scoring rule asks each individual to vote for a given (and constant) number of alternatives and the alternative with the most votes is elected. A sequential constant scoring rule applies this principle in a process of sequential elimination. Constant scoring rules as well as sequential constant scoring rules fail to satisfy Condorcet criteria when individual preferences are unrestricted. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if we assume that preferences are single-peaked, then some constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion and some sequential constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The results we provide make possible the identification of these rules.I thank Maurice Salles and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.     

An inventory of simple monetary policy rules in a New Keynesian macroeconomic model

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for simple monetary policy rules that guarantee equilibrium determinacy in the New Keynesian monetary model. Our modeling framework is derived from a fully specified optimization model that is amenable to analytical characterisation. The monetary rules analyzed are variants of the basic Taylor rules ranging from simple inflation targeting (current, forward, backward) to canonical Taylor rules with and without inertial nominal interest rates. We establish that determinacy obtains for a wide range of policy parameters, especially when the monetary authority targets output and smoothes interest rates. Contrary to other results in the literature, we do not find a case for super-inertial interest rate policy.