Déjà Vu: The Effect of Executives and Directors with Prior Banking Crisis Experience on Bank Outcomes around the Global Financial Crisis

We investigate the effect of executives and directors with prior banking crisis experience on bank outcomes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Executives and directors with previous experience leading banks through a bank crisis may have been uniquely able to understand the risks, recognize the warnings signs early, and thus respond more effectively to the GFC. Controlling for other executive, director, and bank‐level characteristics, we examine whether bank performance, risk taking, and accounting quality in the period immediately before and during the GFC are affected by having executives or directors who previously served as bank executives or directors during the 1980s/1990s banking crisis (80s/90s crisis). Overall, we find that banks led by these crisis‐experienced executives and directors exhibit stronger performance, lower risk taking, and higher accounting quality in the period around the GFC. These effects are strongest among bank leaders for whom the 80s/90s crisis was most salient. Results are robust to propensity‐matched samples and other analyses performed to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest these individuals were able to learn from prior crisis experience.     

Indonesia's new deposit guarantee law

The blanket guarantee introduced in 1998 in response to the emerging banking and economic crisis resulted in $50?billion of losses to the general public. The government has now introduced a law that allows the phasing out of this blanket guarantee, but also allows its reinstatement in the event of a threatened collapse of the banking system. Rather than eliminating the possibility of any repetition of the previous banking disaster, the new law effectively mandates an almost identical approach to handling system-wide banking collapses in the future, suggesting that the authorities and their advisers learned very little from the recent bitter experience. It is argued here that the crucial starting point for formulating policy in this field is to specify correctly the exact purpose that government intervention is intended to serve: namely, the avoidance of major macroeconomic disruption as a result of bank failures.     

Dealing with bank system failure: Indonesia, 1997–2003

Indonesia's crisis recovery program has failed badly in relation to the two key objectives of development economics policy making: efficiency and equity. The economy went into severe recession within a few months of the IMF appearing on the scene, and six years later output was little higher than before the crisis. The collapse of the banking system and the associated government bailout of depositors has imposed a loss on the public of at least 40% of GDP. This paper describes that collapse and the government's policy response to it, under advice from the IMF. It goes on to propose an alternative scheme that might have been followed—and that could be followed in future banking crises. Its twin objectives are to maintain the integrity of the payments system and to avoid inequitable wealth transfers that result from government bailouts of banks and their depositors.     

A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand

We integrate a banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework, which then provides new insights on developments around the Global Financial Crisis. The analysis shows that growth of banking sector money supply may help explain the secular decline in long-term interest rates before the crisis. A new bank funding channel of monetary transmission clarifies why increases in central bank policy rates could not reverse this trend. Our analysis highlights the distinction between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap, and shows that bank recapitalizations can be more effective than fiscal expansions in restoring aggregate demand after a banking crisis.     

银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验及启示——以成都市为例

本文立足银行信贷视角,结合全球金融危机以及成都市西部金融中心建设背景,分析成都市中小企业面临的金融环境;然后总结成都市银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验;最后,本文从政策性银行作用的发挥、信贷风险控制、金融机构市场定位、银行业发展战略等四方面提出了启示。     

Twin Banking and Currency Crises and Monetary Policy

Currency crises are found to be strongly associated with banking crises. This paper constructs a twin banking and currency crisis model by introducing the banking sector into the currency crisis model and examining the case in which the exchange rate risk is located in the banking system. The model shows that an unanticipated shock caused by the shift of investors’ expectations and/or a negative productivity shock can trigger a twin banking and currency crisis. To achieve both financial stability and economic stability, the central bank uses multiple monetary policy instruments. In contrast to the conventional policy recommendation in response to a currency crisis, i.e., interest rate hike, we find that when the exchange rate risk is located in the banking sector, the monetary policy option to prevent a twin crisis is to lower the policy interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio and raise the interest rate on reserves. Our results show that the location of the exchange rate risk matters for the choice of an appropriate monetary policy response during a crisis.     

Banking and the Macroeconomy in China: A Banking Crisis Deferred?

The downturn in the world economy following the global banking crisis has left the Chinese economy relatively unscathed. This paper develops a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework with a banking sector to shed light on this episode. It differs from other applications in the use of indirect inference procedure to test the fitted model. The model finds that the main shocks hitting China in the crisis were international and that domestic banking shocks were unimportant. However, directed bank lending and direct government spending was used to supplement monetary policy to aggressively offset shocks to demand. The model finds that government expenditure feedback reduces the frequency of a business cycle crisis but that any feedback effect on investment creates excess capacity and instability in output.     

推进我国开展银行业务外包的探索

银行业务外包是指银行通过契约将原内部工作交由他人完成,是银行应对日益激烈的市场竞争的重要工具,也是银行主动调整战略,实现核心价值的有效手段。随着国际银行外包业务范围扩大化、专业化、全球化趋势的发展,关于中国银行业务外包的研究越来越引起国内理论界和实务界的关注。本文在对国际国内银行业务外包进行比较分析的基础上,针对我国银行外包业务刚刚起步、业务范围狭隘、外包服务尚不成熟、法律监管制度不健全等问题,提出了相应的政策建议。     

The “exorbitant privilege” and “exorbitant duty” of the United States in the international monetary system: implications for developing countries

The international monetary system may be viewed as a global insurance system, where the United States enjoys the “exorbitant privilege” of a positive yield differential on its external assets and liabilities during normal times, in exchange for the “exorbitant duty” of valuation losses in the form of wealth transfers to the rest of the world during crisis periods. Evidence for 76 economies and 1995–2019 indicates that some other major developed economies also enjoy an exorbitant privilege, though without suffering an exorbitant duty. By contrast, most developing economies neither have an exorbitant privilege nor benefit from wealth transfers. Developing economies as a group recorded negative return differentials and valuation losses during 2010–2019, implying a total return differential of about minus three percentage points between developing and developed economies and an annual average resource transfer from developing economies of about $800bn, or 3.3 per cent of their GDP. Econometric analysis linking crisis insurance strategies and yield differentials indicates that permanent swap arrangements, reserve holdings and regional monetary arrangements can contain negative yield differentials. Developed economies could make part of past resource transfers available to developing economies to finance recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

     

Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan

This paper investigates whether firms are able to substitute bank loans for public debt when the latter become less available to firms. To do so, this paper utilizes the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on Japanese markets as a natural experiment. Because the Japanese banking sector remained functional while the corporate bond markets were paralyzed, the data from Japan during this period provide us with an ideal environment to examine this hypothesis. I specifically examined whether firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 were financially constrained, by comparing the changes in their capital investment expenditures and borrowing conditions with those of bank-dependent firms. The main empirical results indicate that (1) firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 did not reduce investment expenditures; (2) instead, they exhibited higher increments in bank loans; and (3) firms that maintained relatively close bank-firm relationships had greater access to bank loans with low borrowing costs. These findings demonstrate that Japanese firms were able to substitute bank loans for public debt during the crisis and imply that the Japanese banking sector worked efficiently to replace public debt markets during the crisis.     

Consumption,financial wealth and labor income in Korea

By examining the relationship between consumption, financial wealth and labor income in Korea, this paper presents three key findings. First, we find evidence that Korean households hold a larger proportion of their wealth in human capital instead of financial wealth, compared to households in other countries. Potentially, this finding appears consistent with Koreans’ enthusiasm for human development through education despite low government funding. Another important finding is that only financial wealth fluctuations contain a large portion of temporary components. Hence, financial wealth is mainly responsible for adjustments to restore the long-run relationship between consumption, financial wealth and labor income during the examined period. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, this paper finds that before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, households in Korea had difficulty smoothing their consumption over time. This finding may be at least partly attributable to households’ limited access to bank loans and their low level of financial wealth accumulation prior to the crisis. In contrast, we find little evidence that households’ consumption behavior has changed during the recent global financial crisis.     

Developing ASEAN‐5 bond markets: what needs to be done?

This paper examines development challenges facing bond markets in the ASEAN‐5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). It first assesses their level of development, finding that bond market frameworks—that is, the quality of the physical infrastructure, monitoring, and regulation—compare favourably with those in other emerging markets. The paper then considers possible further enhancements, including changes in disclosure practices as well as reforms of ratings agencies, central bank liquidity management, and taxation. It also considers steps to develop derivatives markets, which in some countries remain quite small. Finally, the article draws lessons from the global financial crisis in developed markets for the future development of ASEAN‐5 markets.     

Does Fair Value Accounting Contribute to Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry?

I investigate whether fair value accounting can contribute to the banking industry's systemic risk. I focus on the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 115 (SFAS No. 115), which required available‐for‐sale (AFS) securities to be recognized at fair value with unrealized gains and losses included in equity through accumulated other comprehensive income. SFAS No. 115 increased banks' regulatory risk because, at the time, calculation of regulatory capital closely conformed with GAAP equity. I find that systemic risk increased following the adoption of SFAS No. 115. Furthermore, following a subsequent regulatory amendment—which excluded unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities from regulatory capital but did not change their GAAP treatment—systemic risk decreased. Taken together, the evidence suggests that fair value accounting has the potential to increase systemic risk through the explicit inclusion of volatile fair value estimates in regulatory bank capital adequacy assessments. I do not, however, find evidence of fair value accounting impacting systemic risk in its information role; that is, by providing information to a bank's external stakeholders about its financial position and performance. I also show that higher fair value volatility of investment securities, lower bank capital, and larger AFS security holdings increase banks' marginal contribution to systemic risk. My findings should interest regulators and policymakers, as recent regulatory changes in light of Basel III recommendations require unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities to be included in regulatory capital for advanced approaches banks.     

An International Comparison of Banking Sectors: A DEA Approach

Abstract

This paper presents a novel approach to measure and compare the efficiency of the banking system in several countries and stages of development using the non-parametric?mathematic methodology Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Thus, we expect to broaden the range of studies about banking efficiency. Differently from most studies that use accounting data for measuring efficiency we employed market data, measuring returns and risk (calculated in different ways) in order to build a new measure of efficiency. This approach allows the comparison of different countries, which have different accounting rules and are not comparable using standard models. The main results suggest a downward trend in the average efficiency level of developed countries and a slight upward trend in the efficiency level of emerging market countries during the period. According to this study, efficiency tends to level off emerging and developed countries. It may be partially explained by the increasing globalization and integration processes that markets have been going through in the last years.     

Central bank losses: causes and consequences

This paper seeks to understand the causes and consequences of central banks' losses. Ignorance of this vital issue over a sustained period has led to negative impacts on economies and on central banking and monetary policy effectiveness. Data from developing countries and economies in transition show that central bank losses have reached significant magnitudes. Engaging in quasi‐fiscal activities is responsible for most such losses because it increases central banks' expenditures. The main features of these fiscal activities are their large size and riskiness, and they are difficult to control. Central bank revenues can also be negatively affected because of declines in inflation rates and in the demand for money.     

Strategies for fiscal consolidation in Japan

Japan's key fiscal challenge is to put public finances on a more sustainable footing. This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of alternative fiscal strategies for Japan using the IMF's Global Fiscal Model. The results suggest that (i) an adjustment package that achieves primary balance through lower social transfers and government spending and a higher VAT is the most viable option and has a smaller negative impact on growth than other fiscal measures; (ii) achieving primary balance is not sufficient to stabilize the net debt ratio; (iii) prefunding future aging costs provides greater long-term benefits compared with less front-loaded strategies; (iv) tax reform involving shifting from corporate taxation to consumption taxation could mitigate the short-term output losses associated with fiscal consolidation; (v) the spillovers to the rest of the world from consolidation in Japan are positive in the medium term, but modest.     

Indonesian economic development: Mirage or miracle?

This paper focuses on a few major developments that took place during the three decades from the late 1960s to the Asian financial crisis. The study finds, in retrospect, that many of the Indonesian economy’s weaknesses—now so glaringly apparent—were there all the time. The paper concludes that the Indonesian banking crisis was primarily domestic in nature, more so than the crises in Korea and Thailand. The extent of the failure was much more widespread and probably resulted from a chain of bank runs and bank closings, reinforced by uncertainty and lack of faith in the government’s commitment to the IMF program and IMF fumbling.     

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation,the Gold Standard,and the Banking Panic of 1933

The banking crisis of 1933, which forced a national holiday closing the entire U.S. financial system, is often blamed on either publication of the names of banks borrowing from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a speculative run on the gold-backed dollar due to fears that president-elect Roosevelt would devalue the currency, or both. Evidence presented here indicates that neither factor started the final banking crisis of the depression. The Michigan bank holiday ignited the panic, resulting in a series of bank holidays and a run on the dollar. This chain of events toppled the United States financial system.     

Bank Indonesia and The Recent Crisis

This paper is a personal note describing the crisis as it unfolded while the writer was a key player in Indonesia's macroeconomic management. The crisis is seen as multi-faceted. It originated externally from a shock in the currency market that triggered a downward spiral from currency depreciation to fully-fledged crisis. The currency shock that hit the rupiah in July 1997 exposed in sequence the flaws embedded in the banking sector, the economic system, the social and the political system, flaws that had been obscured by long years of good economic performance. Through a complicated process of contagion and feedback effects—market disturbances, policy responses and market reactions—Indonesia deteriorated from a relatively well managed economy to the “worst case” among the Asian crisis economies. The paper discusses this process, the IMF's role, the bank closure issue, the currency board controversy and the author's dismissal as Governor of Bank Indonesia.     

银行危机持续时间的影响因素研究

文章以l980—2012年间的85次银行危机为样本,以经济增长恢复到危机前水平的所需时间为银行危机持续期的度量标准,综合考虑危机前经济体的经常账户、政府债务、资产价格变化情况以及危机中的财政政策、货币政策实施情况,采用简单线性回归模型对银行危机持续时间的影响因素进行了分析。研究发现,危机前的股票价格指数增长越快,银行危机的持续期越长,危机中货币供应的增长会使银行危机的持续期加长,危机中扩张性的财政政策以及危机中较快的全球经济增长则能在一定程度上缩短银行危机的持续期。