Labor Market Institutions and the Role of Elites in Flexicurity Societies

The paper argues that a process of capital accumulation exhibiting recurrent mass unemployment—due to the conflict over income distribution—does not represent a process that is adequate for a democratic society in the long run. The paper develops a basic macrodynamic framework where this process of cyclical growth is overcome by an ‘employer of first resort’ (an entity that provides employment security but not job security), added to an economic reproduction process that is highly competitive (flexible). Such a flexicurity system is characterized by high labor and capital mobility, with fluctuations of employment in the private sector made socially acceptable through a second labor market where all remaining workers are able to find meaningful occupation and sufficient income. We study on this basis a disaggregation of the labor market into skilled and high-skilled labor, as well as professional and political elites. The stability and sustainability propositions of the homogeneous labor case generalize to this extended situation.     

Transition from unemployment benefits to social assistance in seven European OECD countries

The topic of this paper is the transition from unemployment benefit schemes to social assistance in seven European OECD countries. The unemployment benefit schemes are formally quite different in the seven countries. Most are mandatory but Denmark and Sweden have voluntary unemployment insurance and Finland has a mandatory basic scheme with a voluntary income related component on top of that. Self employed people can join the U.B. schemes in the 3 Scandinavian countries. All the U.B. schemes have working or contribution conditions to be met by the members in order to obtain eligibility for benefits. These conditions are relatively tight in the Netherlands, France and Sweden and relatively easy in Denmark and Great Britain with Germany and Finland in between (based on rules in 1994–95). Recent developments in several countries have been to tighten the access conditions to the U.B. schemes and from 1997 Denmark will be ‘on line’ with Germany. The Netherlands have tightened the access criteria very significantly in 1995. There is a considerable variation as far as the duration of the unemployment benefit period is concerned. Sweden has a benefit period in fact without effective time limitations. The Danish benefit period is also very long, 7 years now being reduced to 5 years. 5 years is also the maximum duration in the Netherlands and in France, but only after many years of work and after a relatively high age has been reached. The maximum period in Germany, 22/3 years, also requires a long work history and a relatively high age. Finland and Great Britain have uniform benefit period (just as in Denmark and Sweden), in Finland it is appr. 2 years (longer for elderly unemployed just as in Sweden and Denmark) and in Great Britain it was 1 year but from October 1996 it was reduced to 1/2 year. The differences in the duration of the benefit periods between the seven countries are very considerable. As already mentioned, there has been a tendency to reduce the benefit period in several countries. Such a change is also being considered for the ‘never ending’ benefit period in the Swedish U.B. scheme. The benefit formula is purely flat rate in Great Britain and income related in the other countries. There is a maximum benefit level in 5 of these countries, but not in Finland, where the compensation is stepwise decreasing with increasing income. In the 5 countries with income related benefits and a maximum benefit level, this maximum level is reached at a relatively low income in Denmark (2/3 APW income) and Sweden (close to APW income) and at a relatively high income in the Netherlands (appr. 1.5 APW income) and Germany (appr. 1.7 APW income) and at a very high income level in France. France is the only country among the 7, where the benefits after an initial period are being reduced regularly (every 4 months) in the benefit period down to a minimum level. Sweden and Germany have reduced the benefit levels in recent years. Denmark has the highest gross compensation percentage, 90, in relation to lost income, but it is only effective over a relatively narrow income interval, from approx. 133,000 DKK to 162,000 DKK (1996), ‘between’ the min. and max. U.B. rates. According to the 3 institutional criteria applied here, access to the schemes, duration of the benefit period and the type of benefit formula, the U.B. schemes of the seven countries studied are very different. The exit scheme from U.B is social assistance in most of the countries, but not in Germany, where it is possible to continue in a scheme with lower compensation but still income related. For Sweden it is hardly meaningful to speak of an ‘exit scheme’ when the U.B. insurance is without effective time limitations. The exit schemes in the other countries are all characterized by having flat rate benefits. All the exit schemes are means tested and this is a crucial difference to the U.B. schemes, and they are without time limitations. Means testing and no effective time limitations are usual characteristics for social assistance and social assistance like schemes. In all the countries, except in Denmark and Sweden, there is ‘topping-up’ from social assistance to a guaranteed minimum level disregarding the income sources. In the two Scandinavian countries mentioned, a ‘social event’, i.e. illness or unemployment, is required in order to be eligible for social assistance benefits. Net replacement rates are used to illustrate the levels of compensation within the U.B. and the S.A. schemes, to identify possible incentives problems, and to illustrate the economic implications of the transition from U.B. to S.A. schemes. The net replacement rates presented are calculated by using the ‘disposable income after net housing costs’ income concept. The calculations include several family types, singles and couples with and without children and for the couples with one or two incomes. A general result but with some modifications, cf. the following, could be that the U.B. based replacement rates usually are higher than the S.A. based, but that the difference is minor when the U.B. scheme is flat rate or income related with a maximum benefit level being reached at a relatively low income, for Great Britain there are in several cases no difference at all. The ‘topping-up’ has the implication that the U.B. and S.A. based replacement rates are often identical at the lower end of the income scale. The very high S.A. based replacement rates (well over 100 per cent) often seen for Denmark and Sweden at low income levels do not necessarily imply, that social assistance in those two countries is more generous than in the other countries, it is very much an effect of not having more or less automatic ‘topping-up’ to a guaranteed minimum income level when earned income is low. The single parent family type seems to have incentives problems at relatively low income levels in most of the countries, especially when receiving U.B., she may temporarily be caught in the ‘unemployment trap’. The one earner couple with children may also be exposed to the ‘unemployment trap’ but on a more permanent basis. The S.A. based replacement rates for this family type are extraordinarily high (and higher than the U.B. based) in Denmark and Sweden, where this family type, however, is very rare. For the two earner family (where one of the spouses always has earned income) the means testing of S.A. makes an impact on the S.A. based net replacement rates, they are in most cases substantially lower than the U.B. based. The results of the net replacement calculations indicate no or only minor economic implications by a transition from U.B. to S.A. in the lower end of the income scale while the effect in most cases will be more substantial in the higher end of the income scale. This is not always the case in Sweden and Denmark where S.A. for some family types are preferable to U.B. and where the difference in other cases may be so small, that it implies incentives problems for joining the voluntary U.B. scheme. The calculation of ‘long term’ (5 years) net replacement rates for families at a low income level (the point in the income distribution where only 5 per cent have lower income) and only including one earner families, reveals that either the long benefit period in the U.B. scheme (Sweden and Denmark) or ‘topping-up’ (Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain) generate ‘constant’ net replacement rates, and quite high ones, at low income levels. Only in France and to some extent in Finland will there be a decrease in net replacement rates over time. Most of the differences concerning the duration of unemployment benefit periods and to some extend the benefit formulas have no effect on the long term net replacement rates. At higher income levels the time limitations in the U.B. schemes will be visible again, except in Great Britain where the U.B. and S.A. benefits are almost identical. It is not possible to point out a ‘worst’ country with respect to ‘incentives’ problems, but the Danish, and to some degree also the Swedish, U.B. schemes with their high net replacement rates at lower income levels and long duration periods ‘stand’ out in many cases, and the S.A. schemes in those two countries may also contribute to permanent ‘unemployment traps’ as well as lack of incentives to join the voluntary insurance schemes. The two Scandinavian countries are, however, not alone with ‘incentives problems’. The section on long term net replacement rates showed that for low income levels the replacement rates were high and constant in most countries. This result is often due to ‘topping-up’ to a guaranteed minimum standard.     

Can income support for part-time workers serve as a stepping-stone to regular jobs? An application to young long-term unemployed women

This article investigates whether income support for low-paid part-time workers in Belgium increases the transition from unemployment to non-subsidised, ‘regular’ employment. Our analysis uses a sample of long-term unemployed young women. Observing their labour market histories from 1998 to 2001, we implement the ‘timing of events’ method to identify the treatment effect. Our results suggest that participation in the policy has a significantly positive effect on the transition to regular employment. Participation reduced the survivor rate in unemployment by 27% points 1 year after the start of the programme. The time spent in the programme did not affect the transition to regular employment.     

Censored quantile regressions and the length of unemployment periods in West Germany

In this paper, we estimate the effect of different macro and micro variables on the distribution of unemployment duration in West Germany using censored quantile regressions. We analyze unemployment periods of more than 91,000 observations from the years 1981 to 1997 drawn from the IAB employment subsample. The latter is an administrative data set that is representative with respect to the socially insured workforce. Surprisingly, we find that the educational degree and variables indicating the macroeconomic environment such as the unemployment rate have a weak effect only. On the other hand, variables reflecting the (un-)employment history of an individual such as the length of tenure, recall to the same employer in the past, recent unemployment, and the position in the population income distribution before unemployment have the strongest effects on unemployment duration. We conclude that work history variables are the ones most suitable in characterizing the unemployment duration of an individual. From a methodological point of view, it is interesting that some regression coefficients have a different sign depending on the quantiles of the unemployment duration distribution. This clearly is a violation of the classical proportional hazard assumption which is very common in unemployment duration analysis.     

Long-term unemployment and labour force participation: a decomposition of unemployment to test for the discouragement and added worker hypotheses

We sharpen tests for ‘discouragement’ and ‘added worker’ effects by splitting the explanatory variable – the unemployment rate – into a short-term component and a long-term component. While short-term unemployment (STU) might not result in additional workers on a large scale, long-term unemployment (LTU) reduces household income more, increasing the need for additional income. On the other hand, it may discourage older workers for psychological and sociological reasons. Applying our model to the German labour market, these hypotheses could be confirmed. Even for men, about whom only a few empirical studies on this issue are available, distinguishing between STU and LTU reveals added worker as well as discouragement effects.     

Employment cycles, low income work and the dynamic impact of wage regulations. A macro perspective

In this paper we investigate, against the background of Goodwin??s (1967) growth cycle model, a dual labor market economy and the consequences of introducing an unemployment benefit system and minimum wages in the second labor market and a maximum wage barrier in the first one. In the framework with free ??hiring?? and firing?? in the both labor markets we show (a) that in fact maximum real wages in the first labor market not only reduce the volatility of this labor market, but also provide global stability to the system dynamics if they are locally explosive, and (b) that larger fluctuations in employment can be made (at least partially) socially acceptable through a (workfare oriented) unemployment benefit system augmented by minimum wage in the low income segment of the labor market.     

THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THE FALLING LABOUR SHARE AND PERSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN

Like in most advanced countries, the labour income share in Japan has been falling since the mid‐1970s. However, in contrast to other advanced economies, Japan experienced an exceptional recessive period in the 1990s and 2000s, with the rate of unemployment rising to a historical maximum of 5.5% in 2002, to persist above 4% in subsequent years. In the present paper, we examine the main causes behind the paths followed by the labour income share and the unemployment rate during the post‐1997 crisis period (1997–2002) and the transition years that followed (2002–2009). We do so by estimating a multi‐equation macro model that allows us to look separately at the various components of this particular labour market: wages, output, and employment. Our main finding is that the fall in the labour share can be attributed to the changes that took place within the labour relations system (the weakening of unions mainly) and that the surge in unemployment can be altogether ascribed to the distorting effects of the sizeable and increasing public debt.     

The Henderson Question? The Melbourne Institute and 50 Years of Welfare Policy

I discuss selected research contributions of the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research to 50 years of welfare policy for those of workforce age and focus particularly on the policy focus of R. F. Henderson, the inaugural director. Following the spirit of his 1960s poverty research, in the mid‐1970s, government doubled unemployment allowances in real terms and increased pensions by approximately 40 per cent. Both income support payments were to be indexed by average wage increases. At the time, unemployment was typically around 1 per cent and the pension take‐up for those of workforce age was also limited. Today, income support take‐up rates have probably increased fivefold. In response, government has adopted a ‘make work pay’ policy over the last two decades and indexed allowances for Consumer Price Index increases and allowances have fallen by 25–35 per cent, relative to community living standards. Pensions continue to be indexed by average wage changes. I address a range of questions arising from this experience, including: Why has government abandoned the Henderson recommendations?; Is there any evidence that a ‘make work pay’ policy is working?

     

Did the German Minimum Wage Reform Influence (Un)employment Growth in 2015? Evidence from Regional Data

Using the variation across space, age and sex and the variation across space and sectors, we analyse the relationship between the minimum wage and (un)employment growth in 2015. We use difference‐in‐differences specifications and instrument the bite of the minimum wage by the lagged bite. The results provide stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a higher growth rate of regular employment. We also find stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a lower growth rate of marginal employment. These results are consistent with a transformation of marginal to regular jobs. The relationship to total employment is slightly positive in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative in others. For unemployment, we find a positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and unemployment growth in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative results in others.     

The portfolio behaviour of pension funds in the US: an econometric analysis of changes since the new regulation of 1974

In most Western countries, the rate of unemployment has shown a rising trend over the last decades. One of the standard explanations for this is that the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment has risen. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a simple demand–supply model of the Finnish labour market was constructed and estimated. It is proposed that if the development of the unemployment rates can be explained is such a traditional model framework, this would suggest that changes in the ‘natural’ rate are not, after all, the crucial reason for the increasing unemployment rates.

According to the results, the simple model was able to account for the changes in the unemployment rate very well. Furthermore, they seem to support a traditional Keynesian view of the problem, emphasizing output level and labour productivity as the main explanatory variables. Indirectly, it can be concluded that there seem to be no clear signs of a rising ‘natural’ rate of unemployment.     

Unemployment and interindustry labour mobility in Canada in the 1980s

The determinants of interindustry mobility of labour, and its relationship to the unemployment rate is examined, using micro-data on Canadian workers from 1980/81, 1982/83 and 1985/86. It contrasts the implications of the ‘dynamic reallocation’ model (Lilien, 1982) in which rising aggregate unemployment is due to in creased dispersion in the net hiring rates of firms (implying positive covariance of interindustry mobility and unemployment rates) with the older ‘Keynesian’ perspective that high unemployment ‘chills’ labour market mobility, implying a neative relationship. Qualified support is obtained for the ‘chilling’ model, as well as standard results on the role of job tenure, hours worked, etc. The general moral is the cyclical sensitivity of labour market behaviour, i.e. individuals appear to react to the aggregate unemployment rate.     

The recession's effect on hospital registered nurse employment growth

Recessions are not uncommon in the United States, but the most recent recession is arguably the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although recessions result in increases in national unemployment in most sectors of the economy, they have resulted in increases in registered nurse (RN) employment as many non-working married RNs re-enter the workforce when their spouses lose their jobs. Over the past decade, hospital RN employment increased by more than 400,000 with virtually all of this growth associated with the two recessions that occurred during this period. The most recent recession led to an increase in hospital RN employment that was not only unprecedented in size, estimated at nearly 250,000, but was marked by the employment of large numbers of RNs over 50 years of age. While national unemployment rates remain high, hospitals should prepare for an eventual jobs recovery when many RNs are likely to leave the workforce.     

Comparing employment estimates using different minimum wage variables: the case of Brazil

Several minimum wage variables have been suggested in the literature to estimate the effect of the minimum wage on employment. The most common ones are the real minimum wage, the ‘Kaitz index’, the ‘fraction affected’, the ‘fraction at’ and the ‘fraction below’. This diversity of variables makes it difficult to compare the associated estimates across studies. One problem is that these estimates are not always calibrated to represent the employment effect of a 1% minimum wage increase. Another problem is that these estimates measure employment effects for different groups of workers. In this paper we critically compare employment effect estimates using these five minimum wage variables and data from a Brazilian monthly household survey panel from 1982 to 2000. Our principal finding is that the sign of this effect is robust across the different minimum wage variables, but that its magnitude and significance are sensitive to the minimum wage variable used.     

Employment gains from minimum‐wage hikes under perfect competition: A simple general‐equilibrium analysis

Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher minimum wages may lead to greater levels of employment under perfect competition. We demonstrate this possibility in a simple general‐equilibrium model of involuntary unemployment, with two goods produced by two factors and consumed by two representative households. Within our model, hiking a minimum wage redistributes income between heterogeneous consumers. This redistribution may create an excess demand for the labor‐intensive good, and hence increase total employment to restore equilibrium, despite the fact that every firm becomes less labor intensive.     

The impact of the net percentage growth rate in the number of small firms on differential state-level employment growth rates in the US: an exploratory empirical note

This brief exploratory empirical note seeks to identify key determinants of geographic differentials in the percentage growth rate of state-level employment in the US, with the primary focus being on the percentage net growth rate in the number of small firms (i.e., those with fewer than 20 employees) in each state, where this variable serves as a de facto reflection of ‘entrepreneurship’. In the interest of identifying other key factors that influence state-level employment growth rates, the effective income tax rate in each state, quality of life elements and labour market considerations are also included in the analysis. The study period runs from the year 2000 to the year 2007, ending just prior to the ‘Great Recession’. The estimation results imply that the state-level employment growth rate in the US was an increasing function of the percentage net growth rate in the number of small firms in each state. Thus, it appears that the small firms growth rate may in fact be a significant source.     

Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages: An Analysis for Germany

Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.     

Subsidized temporary jobs: lock-in and stepping stone effects

This article evaluates the effectiveness of subsidized temporary jobs as stepping stones to regular employment. We study a French program that allows job seekers to work part-time while remaining registered with the unemployment agency. In this program, insured individuals concurrently receive part of their unemployment benefits and wage income. Using administrative data, we find that subsidized temporary jobs have both a significant lock-in effect and a significant positive post-treatment impact on the hazard rate to employment. Since individuals facing a high implicit tax rate have incentives to self-select into better part-time jobs, we also find that a higher tax rate leads to a weaker lock-in effect and a stronger post-treatment effect. Simulations suggest that the lock-in effect first dominates, but that the overall effect eventually becomes positive. They also point to ways of improving the effectiveness of the policy.     

How should a government finance pension benefits?

Based on an earlier report by Ono (2010), this paper presents consideration of a consumption tax and examines how tax reform to maintain the neutrality of pension benefits affects the income growth rate and the employment rate. A decrease in the rate of worker contribution (labour income tax rate) with an increase in a consumption tax raises employment, but the effect on income growth is ambiguous. A decrease in the rate of firm contribution with an increase in the consumption tax decreases employment and facilitates income growth. Therefore, if the unemployment rate must be decreased, then pension reform with a decrease in the rate of worker contribution should be selected. The results derived through the study described in this paper are consistent with the empirical facts. Moreover, for these analyses, we assume the other production function and confirm the robustness of the obtained results.     

Analysis of wage flexibility across the Euro Area: evidence from the process of convergence of the labour income share ratio

This article analyses wage flexibility as a factor in the unemployment rate across 12 Euro Area countries. We use extensive evidence pertaining to the countercyclical behaviour of the labour income share ratio to estimate its equilibrium value in the long run. This measure is calculated using a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. Additionally, by using spatial econometrics, we can incorporate into the study the interdependence in the inflation among the countries. As a result, we identify countries that might see an improvement in their employment rates by improving their wage flexibility. We also identify countries with high unemployment that is not a consequence of a lack of wage flexibility.     

The relationship between production and unemployment in Japan: Okun's law in comparative perspective

This paper studies the question whether the celebrated ‘Okun's law’, a relation between excess capacity and unemployment, applies to the postwar Japanese economy. Though the fitness of estimation is weak, the coefficient that measures the responsiveness of the output gap to the unemployment rate is very large, reaching 28. This large coefficient can be attributed to the elastic response in the female participation ratio, to flexible working hours, to the slow adjustment in employment, and to changes in industrial structures. The results are compared with those in the United States.