On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Resource and Waste Taxation in the Theory of the Firm with Recycling Activities

The management of solid waste has become an urgent problem in nations with a great population density. Accordingly, waste reduction through source reduction and recycling has become increasingly important. Our purpose is to show how prevention, recycling and disposal of waste could be part of a theory of the firm. We first derive efficient production functions from production processes with waste as a by-product. Waste obtained as new scrap can partially be recycled by using additional inputs in order to cut back the purchase of virgin material. Waste not completely recyclable will leave the firm as disposal which also entails cost to the firm. We use the dual cost function approach to develop a theory of the firm under solid residual management.Since the producer does not bear the full cost of disposal, there will be a bias toward virgin materials and away from recycling. The goal of the government is to stimulate the firms to recycle with respect to the preservation of exhaustible resources. An incentive to recycle is a tax on resources or on waste. In order to determine the tax levels the government maximizes welfare subject to the dynamic constraint for decumulation of land fill for waste deposits. This gives the user cost and its time profile for taxing waste disposal or virgin material.In a comparative statics analysis we compare the effect of taxes on waste vs. virgin material on effort to produce in a resource saving manner, on the quantity of recycled material, on output, and on the reduction of waste. Since the impact of environmental regulation on employment is important, our model detects seven effects on labor demand as part of resource conservation policy. We finally carry out a comparative statics analysis of waste intensive firms operating in different market structures. Of interest is the impact of a resource or waste taxation on market volume, on the number of firms, on resource saving effort, and on profit.     

A Comparison of Household Recycling Behaviors in Norway and the United States

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of household recycling in Norway and compares the results with a similar, recently published, study of households in the United States. The comparison focuses on the relative importance of user fees on waste disposal, community recycling programs, and socioeconomic factors. Both data sources are nationwide, material-specific, and at the household level. One major finding is that a disposal fee provides a significant economic incentive to Norwegian households, whereas its effectiveness in the United States is still up for debate. Providing households with convenient recycling options, such as curbside and drop-off recycling, appears generally effective, but less so in Norway than in the United States. Socioeconomic characteristics are less important predictors of behavior in Norway than in the United States. Qualifications on the comparison are provided throughout and two extensions for future research are suggested at the end.     

对我国大城市税收征管效率的思考

随着我国城市化水平的提高,经济税源也加速向城市集中,尤其是向大城市集中。所以,在客观上要求集中管理资源,将税收的管理重心向大城市转移,将税收管理的资源向大城市倾斜,逐步实现以大城市为中心的集约化管理。目前,大城市的税收征管由于存在各种问题而导致征管效率的较大损失。制约大城市税收征管效率的因素有很多,但相对而言,征纳交易费用、征管资源配置、税收服务体系建设应是三大关键因素。节约征纳交易费用、科学配置征管资源和完善税收服务体系是提升大城市税收征管效率的重要途径。     

Optimal Differentiation of International Environmental Taxes in the Presence of National Labor Market Distortions

We explore the implication of the `doubledividend' debate for international environmentaltaxes. In our scenario, small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts. Since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold, a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries. The optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply.     

Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Black Markets

Received November 21, 2000; revised version received May 19, 2001     

The Risk and Incentives Trade-off in the Presence of Heterogeneous Managers

Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incentives, yet recent empirical evidence has not consistently found such a relationship. In fact, some researchers have found a positive relationship. By introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who differ in their degrees of risk aversion, into a standard agency model, this paper demonstrates that a negative or positive relationship is theoretically possible. Which arises depends on the relative risk aversion parameters of the managers and the absolute and relative riskiness of the environments.Acknowledgement I thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

论我国电子废弃物资源化障碍的产生及其原因

我国电子废弃物资源化产业目前还比较薄弱,而电子废弃物的产生高峰已到来。目前我国电子废弃物的总体情况是数量庞大,由于政治、经济、文化等原因,使我国的电子废弃物回收率很低,无法实现电子废弃物回收的产业化、规模化。其中,我国的传统管理体制、粗放型经济增长方式以及大众的传统消费观念、消费意识等都是制约我国实现电子废弃物资源化的重要原因。整体而言,目前我国电子废弃物资源化的状况并不理想,需要更进一步完善。     

浅析我国个人所得税的征管

个人所得税已经成为世界上大多数国家税制结构中最为重要的税种,也是我国最有征收潜力的税种;同时,由于其 征管存在种种问题,也是我国偷税数额最大、漏征数额最多的税种。本文分析了目前我国个人所得税征管的难点,并提出了 严格征管的若干对策。     

个人所得税征管方式的有效选择——强调代扣代缴环节在个税征管中的地位

近年来,我国个人所得税的征管问题成为人们关注的焦点,加强征管能力的建议颇多,建议从代扣代缴环节入手,分析扣缴义务人在个人所得税征管中的重要地位,及扣缴义务人与纳税人的经济关系,并提出以代扣代缴环节为突破口,实行"延期纳税法"来提高个人所得税征管水平.     

基于深圳电子废弃物产生量分析的立法对策

随着现代社会的高速发展,电子废弃物处理和回收已经成为城市环境保护所面临的重要问题。通过对深圳市2011～2015年电子废弃物产生量的分析预测,认为深圳面临着较重的电子废弃物压力。在借鉴国外相关法律法规的基础上,探讨了深圳关于电子废弃物的法规对策。