共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 21 毫秒
1.
David A. Malueg 《Economic Theory》2010,44(2):243-270
In the Nash Demand Game, each of the two players announces the share he demands of an amount of money that may be split between
them. If the demands can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game has many pure-strategy
equilibria. This paper characterizes mixed-strategy equilibria. The condition critical for an equilibrium is that players’
sets of possible demands be balanced. Two sets of demands are balanced if each demand in one set can be matched with a demand
in the other set such that they sum to one. For Nash’s original game, a complete characterization is given of the equilibria
in which both players’ expected payoffs are strictly positive. The findings are applied to the private provision of a discrete
public good. 相似文献
2.
Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish
the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments
may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a
coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that
may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that
investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased,
regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with
simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence.
In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals
is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the
success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin
of attraction.
相似文献
3.
Competition and coordination in experimental minority games 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and
a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which
stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of information
about other players’ past choices and the salience of information regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string
of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing). Our main findings can be summarized as follows: aggregate
efficiency in the game is in most cases significantly higher than the level corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. In addition, providing players with information about individual choices in the group does not improve aggregate
efficiency with respect to when such information is absent. Displaying information about more rounds than just the previous
one, on the other hand, seems to have a positive effect on aggregate efficiency. At the individual level, we find a stronger
statistical relation between players’ current choices and their own past choices than between players’ choices and previous
aggregate outcomes. In addition, the depth of the relation between present and past choices seems to be affected by the prompt
availability of information about the game history. Finally, we detect evidence of a mutual co-adaptation between players’
choices over time that is partly responsible for the high level of efficiency observed.
相似文献
4.
Luciano I. de Castro 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):67-85
Many conditions have been introduced to ensure equilibrium existence in games with discontinuous payoff functions. This paper
introduces a new condition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. Regularity requires that if there is a sequence
of strategies converging to s* such that the players’ payoffs along the sequence converge to the best-reply payoffs at s*, then s* is an equilibrium. We show that regularity is implied both by Reny’s better-reply security and Simon and Zame’s endogenous
sharing rule approach. This allows us to explore a link between these two distinct methods. Although regularity implies that
the limits of e{\epsilon}-equilibria are equilibria, it is in general too weak for implying equilibrium existence. However, we are able to identify
extra conditions that, together with regularity, are sufficient for equilibrium existence. In particular, we show how regularity
allows the technique of approximating games both by payoff functions and space of strategies. 相似文献
5.
We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously
make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the
cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence.
We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if
the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) > 0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private
values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous
equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not
all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined.
The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments. 相似文献
6.
Brian Roberson 《Economic Theory》2006,29(1):1-24
In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across n battlefields. Within each battlefield, the player that allocates the higher level of force wins. The payoff of the game is the proportion of wins on the individual battlefields. An equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto game is a pair of n-variate distributions. This paper characterizes the unique equilibrium payoffs for all (symmetric and asymmetric) configurations of the players’ aggregate levels of force, characterizes the complete set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions for most of these configurations, and constructs entirely new and novel equilibrium n-variate distributions.I am grateful to Jason Abrevaya, Dan Kovenock, James C. Moore, Roger B. Nelsen, and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. A version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Midwest Economic Theory Meetings. This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation 相似文献
7.
The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework
in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is
the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement
on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining
models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes
a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We
embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and
the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise
if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining
impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement
is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original
viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant
examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist
for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at
the same competitive prices. 相似文献
8.
Mike Felgenhauer 《Journal of Economics》2007,90(3):295-312
This paper studies interest group influence on policy making. Lobbying occurs in a first price auction where an interest group
wins with certainty, if her bid exceeds the loser’s bid by the policy maker’s valuation for the socially best policy. Otherwise
the latter implements the privately known best policy. In equilibrium the size of the policy maker’s valuation does not matter for the size of the policy bias. The idea is to construct a “reference game”
and to shift the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies into the original game, without altering the structure of the
densities. 相似文献
9.
Martin Kaae Jensen 《Economic Theory》2010,43(1):45-66
This paper introduces quasi-aggregative games and establishes conditions under which such games admit a best-reply potential.
This implies existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any convexity or quasi-concavity assumptions. It also implies
convergence of best-reply dynamics under some additional assumptions. Most of the existing literature’s aggregation concepts
are special cases of quasi-aggregative games, and many new situations are allowed for. An example is payoff functions that
depend on own strategies as well as a linear combination of the mean and the variance of players’ strategies. 相似文献
10.
We analyze dynastic repeated games. These are repeated games in which the stage game is played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic
preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted
infinitely-repeated game. Individuals live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes place before their birth, but instead create social memory through private messages received from their immediate predecessors. Under mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below the minmax of the stage game) can be sustained by sequential equilibria of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. In
particular, the result applies to any stage game with n ≥ 4 players for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. We are also able to characterize
fully the conditions under which a sequential equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the standard repeated game. For this to be the case it must be that the players’
equilibrium beliefs violate a condition that we term “inter-generational agreement.”
A previous version of this paper was circulated as Anderlini et al. (2005). We are grateful to Jeff Ely, Leonardo Felli, Navin
Kartik, David Levine, Stephen Morris, Michele Piccione, Andrew Postlewaite, Lones Smith and to seminar audiences at Bocconi,
Cambridge, CEPR-Guerzensee, Chicago, Columbia, Edinburgh, Essex, Georgetown, Leicester, LSE, Northwestern, Oxford, Rome (La
Sapienza), Rutgers, SAET-Vigo, Stanford, SUNY-Albany, UCL, UC-San Diego, Venice and Yale for helpful feedback. 相似文献
11.
A simple note on herd behaviour 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows
that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore
his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking
assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be
reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.
相似文献
Andrea MoroneEmail: |
12.
We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The
model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test
the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice.
Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by
asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot
games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims
than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.
相似文献
13.
Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Viktor J. Vanberg 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(3):199-222
The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing
on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market
players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed,
a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing
rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior.
And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative
economic regime.
相似文献
Viktor J. VanbergEmail: |
14.
Refining an algorithm due to Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel, we show how to apply Lemke’s algorithm for solving linear complementarity
programs to compute a quasi-perfect equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player extensive-form game of perfect
recall. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is known to be sequential, and our algorithm thus resolves a conjecture of McKelvey and
McLennan in the positive. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is also known to be normal-form perfect and our algorithm thus provides
an alternative to an algorithm by von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman. For the case of a zero-sum game, we devise variants
of the algorithm that rely on linear programming rather than linear complementarity programming and use the simplex algorithm
or other algorithms for linear programming rather than Lemke’s algorithm. We argue that these latter algorithms are relevant
for recent applications of equilibrium computation to artificial intelligence. 相似文献
15.
Guilherme Carmona 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):31-45
We introduce a new condition, weak better-reply security, and show that every compact, locally convex, metric, quasiconcave
and weakly better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. This result is established using simple generalizations of classical
ideas. Furthermore, we show that, when players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, it implies the existence results
of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009) and that it is equivalent to a recent
result of Barelli and Soza (On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games, University of Rochester,
Rochester, 2009). Our general existence result also implies a new existence result for weakly upper reciprocally semicontinuous
and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy a strong quasiconcavity property. 相似文献
16.
Andrés Perea 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):572-586
We present a theory of rationality in dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents’ utility functions. The theory is based upon the following three principles: (1) the players’ initial beliefs about the opponents’ utilities should agree on some profile u of utility functions, (2) every player should believe, at each of his information sets, that his opponents are carrying out optimal strategies and (3) a player at information set h should not change his belief about an opponent's ranking of strategies a and b if both a and b could have led to h. Scenarios with these properties are called preference conjecture equilibria for the profile u of utility functions. We show that every normal form proper equilibrium for u induces a preference conjecture equilibrium for u, thus implying existence of preference conjecture equilibrium. 相似文献
17.
A cake division mechanism is presented that is equivalent in terms of the size of the pieces of the cake n players’ receive in equilibrium to the quantities that n firms in a Cournot oligopoly supply in equilibrium. This mechanism extends to equivalence between cake division and Nash’s ‘divide the dollar’ game. 相似文献
18.
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models
that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our
experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson
and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash
equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying
coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough
experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this
hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and
prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium
within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently
similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.
相似文献
19.
Hamid Sabourian 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):189-228
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome. 相似文献
20.
Michael Kosfeld 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):321-339
Summary. The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically
adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that
agents follow a rule of ‘switching to better strategies with higher probability’. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay
with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict
Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is
not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with
probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of
these agents.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: June 21, 2001 相似文献