A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.     

A characterization of optimistic weighted Shapley rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems

In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of the weighted Shapley value of the optimistic TU game associated with a minimum cost spanning tree problem. This characterization is based on two monotonicity properties, population monotonicity (if a new agent joint the society nobody is worse off) and the strong cost monotonicity (if the connection cost between any pair of agents increases nobody is better off), and weighted share of extra costs (the extra costs should be divided proportionally to the weights of the agents).      

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties.     

Decentralized pricing in minimum cost spanning trees

In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pricing rules, i.e., rules that cover at least the efficient cost while the price charged to each user only depends upon his own connection costs. We define a canonical pricing rule and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either superadditive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.     

Allocation problems among sharing groups

We deal with allocation problems among sharing groups. There are n agents. The agents are divided into several sharing groups. A homogeneous good is allocated among sharing groups rather than among the agents. The good is a private good for sharing groups, and a public good for the members of each sharing group. That is, all of them in the same sharing group can consume it without rivalry. We introduce some allocation rules and axioms. The utilitarian allocation rule and the egalitarian allocation rule are characterized by some axioms.     

Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?

Both mainstream economics and its critics have focused on models of individual rational agents even though most important decisions are made by small groups. Little systematic work has been done to study the behavior of small groups as decision-making agents in markets and other strategic games. This may limit the relevance of both economics and its critics to the objective of developing an understanding of how most important decisions are made. In order to gain some insight into this issue, this paper compares group and individual economic behavior. The objective of the research is to learn whether there are systematic differences between decisions made by groups and individual agents in market environments characterized by risky outcomes. A quantitative measure of deviation from minimally-rational decisions is used to compare group and individual behavior in common value auctions. JEL Classification D44, C91, C92     

Franchising,agency problems,and the cost of capital

Explanations for franchising are examined in the context of the US hotel industry. The study is distinct from previous research on franchising because it explicitly recognizes the existence of three organizational forms, whereas previous research has focused exclusively on two of these three forms. The two organizational forms examined in previous work are franchising and company ownership. The additional organizational form is company-management/investor-ownership, which involves management by the franchisor and ownership by outside investor groups. A plausible explanation for the existence of the last organizational form is based on the availability of low cost capital from non-chain sources.     

Minimum safety standards with asymmetric safety costs

We explore the welfare effect of minimum safety standards, focusing on the case where duopoly firms are asymmetric in that they have different safety effort costs. If duopoly firms are symmetric, they do not provide enough safety to be socially efficient, and so imposing minimum safety standards can resolve this problem. We show, however, that imposing minimum safety standards may reduce the social welfare when there is a large asymmetry in the safety effort costs. In the unregulated equilibrium, the high-cost firm’s safety effort is smaller than that of the low-cost firm, and the high-cost firm is more likely to provide a larger safety effort than is needed to have a socially efficient level with larger asymmetry in the safety effort costs. If safety standards raise the high-cost firm’s safety effort, both firms’ safety efforts may end up further away from the socially efficient level: the low-cost firm reduces its safety effort when the rival’s effort increases because safety efforts are strategic substitutes.     

Auction design with opportunity cost

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have known positive opportunity cost of bidding. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, there is no loss of generality in deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions within the class of threshold-entry mechanisms. Secondly, for any given set of entry thresholds, a second-price sealed-bid auction with properly set reserve prices and entry subsidy is revenue-maximizing. Thirdly, a variety of auctions are revenue-maximizing within the symmetric threshold-entry class. Two of them involve no entry subsidy (fee). Fourthly, we identify sufficient conditions under which it is in the seller’s interest to limit the number of potential bidders even if the revenue-maximizing symmetric threshold-entry auction is adopted. Lastly, the revenue-maximizing auction implements asymmetric entry across symmetric bidders in many cases. I am grateful to Jean-Jacques Laffont for his advice. I thank Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo, Indranil Chakraborty, Jeff Ely, Jinwoo Kim, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Isabelle Perrigne, Eric Rasmusen, Guofu Tan, Quang Vuong, Joseph Wang for helpful comments and suggestions. Insightful comments and suggestions from the associate editor and two anonymous referees have greatly improved the paper. Earlier versions have been presented at the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2005 Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and the 2007 International Game Theory Conference. All errors are mine. Financial support from National University of Singapore (R-122-000-088-112) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry

Summary This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of different unit costs involves a tractable generalization of the methods used to analyze the case of identical costs. However, the supports of the two firms' equilibrium price distributions need no longer be connected and need not coincide. In addition, the supports of the equilibrium price distributions need no longer be continuous in the underlying parameters of the model.As an application of our characterization, we examine the Kreps-Scheinkman model of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition and show that, unlike in the case of identical costs, Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not arise as subgame-perfect equilibria. The low-cost firm has greater incentive to price its rival out of the market than exists under Cournot behavior.We are grateful to Joseph Harrington, Marie Thursby, Casper de Vries and, especially, William Novshek for helpful discussions and comments. Thomas Faith and Ioannis Tournas provided valuable research assistance. This paper was presented at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in December 1988, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference in April 1989, the Sixteenth Annual Congress of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics in August 1989, the European Meetings of the Econometric Society in September 1989, and in seminars at the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Indiana University, INSEAD, Texas A&M University, Tilburg University, the University of Bonn and the University of Florida. Deneckere acknowledges financial support through National Science Foundation Grant SES-8619012 and the Kellogg Graduate School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. Kovenock acknowledges financial support through Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Purdue Research Foundation, the Ford Motor Company Fund, and an Ameritech Foundation Summer Faculty Research Grant.     

Estimating the trans-log cost function with insufficient observations

If the production technology is non-homothetic, efficient estimation of the trans-log approximation requires joint estimation of the cost and share equations. In this note we adopt the method of extraneous estimation to obtain a method of efficient joint estimation when there are insufficient observations on the cost equation.     

Augmenting travel cost models with contingent behavior data

This paper proposes contingent behavior survey questions as a valuable supplement to observed data in travel cost models of non-market demand for recreational resources. A set of observed and contingent behavior results for each survey respondent allows the researcher to control for individual heterogeneity by taking advantage of panel data methods when exploring the nature of respondent demands. The contingent scenarios also provide opportunities to (a) test for differences between observed and contingent preferences and/or (b) assess likely demands under conditionsbeyond the domain of observed variation in costs or resource attributes. Most importantly, contingent scenarios allow the researcher to imposeexogenously varying travel costs. Exogenous imposition of travel costs together with panel methods reduces the omitted variables bias that plagues observed-data travel cost models of recreational demand. Using a convenience sample of data for illustrative purposes, we show how to estimate the demand for recreational angling by combining observed and contingent behavior data. We begin with simple naive pooled Poisson models and progress to more theoretically appropriate fixed effects panel Poisson specifications.The authors are at the University of Nevada and UCLA, respectively. We gratefully acknowledge the comments of both Scott Shonkwiler and participants in the W133 meetings in Santa Fe, New Mexico and for research material provided by Wayne Gray. The data were provided by Rang Narayanan. Research assistance was provided by Jerry McGraw and Natalie Tucker. Research partially supported by the Nevada Experiment Station. Any errors or omissions remain the authors' responsibility.     

On marginal cost pricing with given tax-subsidy rules

We provide an existence proof for Generalized Marginal Cost Pricing with given tax-subsidy rules. The novelty is that our approach allows for economic environments where all the generalized marginal cost pricing equilibria are inefficient in the aggregate. An example is recalled in order to suggest how non-pathological these environments are.     

Incentive mechanisms for cost revelation with intermodal competition

To set regulated utility prices that are sustainable against uneconomic bypass alternatives, regulators must estimate the costs of the alternative bypass technologies; this entails a series of theoretical and institutional problems that regulators cannot practically resolve. This paper now develops a simple incentive mechanism that effectively solves those problems associated with producing an optimal amount of bypass. In the suggested procedure, regulators use readily available accounting data to specify one two-part tariff that covers the utility's revenue requirements and is deemed fair by regulators and consumers; as long as it offers this fair tariff, the company may subsequently offer as many alternative tariffs as it sees fit, including some particularly aimed to deter bypass. This procedure gives a utility the correct incentive to determine its own and its rivals' cost structures; with accurate cost information, the utility will design a menu of tariffs that would eliminate uneconomic bypass and would be responsive to changing cost conditions in the emerging bypass markets.     

Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups

Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by “leveling the political playing field”. With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise, resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions. In particular, a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo; and even if better policies are chosen, the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs. Regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups, creating costly rent-seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying.     

Contracting with specialty PPOs: new cost containment options

Specialty PPOs are gaining in popularity as health care payers realize they offer many of the same opportunities for cost savings and quality assurance as hospital and physician PPOs. Physical therapy service is an example of a likely candidate for a specialty PPO.     

Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs

In this paper we analyze simple sequencing problems under incomplete information and interdependent costs. We prove the necessity of concave cost function for implementability of such problems. Implementability means that one can achieve aggregate cost minimization in ex-post equilibrium. We also show that simple sequencing problems are implementable if and only if the mechanism is a ‘generalized VCG mechanism.’ We then consider first best implementability, that is implementability with budget balancing transfer. We prove that for implementable n agent simple sequencing problems, with polynomial cost function of order (n−2) or less, one can achieve first best implementability. Finally, for the class of implementable simple sequencing problems with “sufficiently well behaved” cost function, this is the only first best class.     

Knowledge problems associated with creating export zones

Although export processing zones (EPZ) have been a part of India’s development strategy since the 1960s, they have not been as successful at promoting exports and job creation as might have been hoped. Most explanations of their shortcomings focus on the poor infrastructure and bureaucratic inefficiencies that typically plague these zones. By focusing on the knowledge problems that government administrators must overcome if they are to design and manage successful EPZs, and highlighting their inevitable difficulties in overcoming these knowledge problems, this paper offers a more fundamental and compelling explanation of the poor performance of Indian EPZs than is traditionally advanced.