中国债务的福利损失分析

政府债务问题始终是经济学者研究的重要领域,它也为各国政府广泛关注。围绕着巴罗—李嘉图等价定理成立与否展开的最优债务规模引起了经济学者极大的关注,这方面的研究在中国也取得了一定的进展。在现实经济中,究竟国债政策发生变化给中国经济带来多大的福利损失,还没有学者进行相应的讨论,大多数人仅局限于参照国外公债的一些指标讨论中国公债的合理性,而没有从数量上进行福利分析。本文在一个劳动力存在着冲击和消费者受到借贷限制的市场不完善的模型中,从中国的样本经济出发,考虑政府债务政策变化带来的福利损失。     

中国养老保险体系改革的福利经济学分析

本文用一个福利经济学框架推导出在社会福利最大化目标下现收现付制和基金制混合的养老保险体系的最优混合比率 ,模型中考虑了收入分配的因素 ,模型对过往研究中已有的结论进行了扩展 ,显示当一国的工资增长率和人口增长率之和大于投资报酬率 ,或者 ,当收入差距较大时 ,采用现收现付制有益于整个社会福利的改善。用这一框架分析中国的养老保险体系 ,并结合中国养老保险体系改革的特点 ,得出的结论是在当前及今后相当长的时间内 ,以现收现付制为主的体系可以作为中国养老保险体系的选择。文章进一步分析了现收现付制在中国持续运行的空间及其面临的挑战 ,指出这一制度的可持续运行最终取决于劳动生产率和产出的水平及增长     

The Aggregation of Climate Change Damages: a Welfare Theoretic Approach

The economic value of environmental goods is commonly determined using the concepts of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). However, the WTP/WTA observed in different countries (or between individuals) will differ according to socio-economic characteristics, in particular income. This notion of differentiated values for otherwise identical goods (say, a given reduction in mortality risk) has been criticized as unethical, most recently in the context of the 'social cost' chapter of the IPCC Second Assessment Report. These critics argue that, being a function of income, WTP/WTA estimates reflect the unfairness in the current income distribution, and for equity reasons uniform per-unit values should therefore be applied across individuals and countries. This paper analyses the role of equity in the aggregation of climate change damage estimates, using basic tools of welfare economics. It shows one way of how WTP/WTA estimates can be corrected in aggregation if the underlying income distribution is considered unfair. It proposes that in the aggregation process individual estimates be weighted with an equity factor derived from the social welfare and utility functions. Equity weighting can significantly increase aggregate (global) damage figures, although some specifications of weighting functions also imply reduced estimates. The paper also shows that while the postulate of uniform per-unit values is compatible with a wide range of 'reasonable' utility and welfare specifications, there are also cases where the common-value notion is not compatible with defensible welfare concepts.     

From Schumpeter to Stiglitz

This article deals with Stiglitz's recent book Whither Socialism?. It presents a critical evaluation against the background of his earlier publication on the economic theory of the state. The author takes issue with Stiglitz's normative interpretation of welfare economics.     

A Graphical Approach to the Stiglerian Theory of Regulation

Although many authors have drawn on the basic insights of the early founders of the economic theory of regulation, the ability to cogently present the general form of the theory in a readily accessible graphical format has only recently emerged. Although providing a promising approach for illustrating and analyzing regulatory and deregulatory outcomes, the analysis presented to this point appears to require the derivation of several graphs. The result is that, although stemming from a single paradigmatic framework, the graphical approach fails to offer a single unified basis for illustrating the general economic theory of regulation. The authors seek to fill this lacuna by providing a simple yet powerful unifying graphical construct for presenting the myriad implications of that theory.     

Back to the BOG, Austrian-style

Robust political economy begins with assumptions of self-interested planners who lack perfect information. In such a world, the social planner does not necessarily outperform the decentralized outcome. Crampton and Farrant (2005) argue that the inability to engage in economic calculation reduces the ability of social planner to extract consumer surplus. Thus, the lack of calculation improves the welfare of the median citizen which contrasts with conventional wisdom. We argue that they overstate their results. First, the calculation argument fails because of its underdevelopment, not because of the empirical record. Second, the welfare implications cannot be adequately addressed by assuming diminishing marginal utility of income or using the median welfare standard. Third, robust political economy has not developed a model that yields meaningful welfare comparisons. Thus, robust political economy remains in its early stages. JEL Code P0, P16, P50 With apologies to Gordon Tullock     

Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy

We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. We observe significant over-contribution. Our result is similar to those of typical corner-solution experiments.     

2000年以后福利国家养老金体系发展趋势考察——基于“去商品化”的分析框架

文章根据"去商品化"的分析框架,对2000年以后三种福利模式国家的养老金体系发展趋势进行了考察。研究发现,社会民主主义福利模式国家的养老金体系表现出去商品化的趋势,体现了社会民主主义福利模式对社会权利及普惠主义思想的回归;自由主义福利模式国家的养老金体系呈现出继续商品化的趋势,是对1990～2000年间再商品化趋势的继续和发展,体现了自由主义福利模式对市场作用的信奉;保守主义福利模式国家的养老金体系同样表现出一定的商品化趋势,但这是各个社会群体博弈后,选择商品化手段对养老金体系进行调整的过程。     

农户金融抑制及其福利损失的计量分析

本文运用biprobit模型和match模型,采用3000个农户的微观数据,计量分析了农户金融抑制的程度及其福利损失的大小。研究发现,农户金融抑制的程度为70.92%;由于金融抑制,所有样本农户平均所损失的纯收入、净经营收入、消费性支出和非土地性资产分别为9.43%、15.43%、15.57%和14.58%,直接受到金融抑制的样本农户平均所损失的纯收入、净经营收入、消费性支出和非土地性资产分别为9.55%、16.83%、16.46%和14.70%;土地面积、教育和医疗费用支出,对农户资金需求具有正的显著影响,金融资产余额对农户资金需求具有负的显著影响,生产性固定资产原值、受教育水平、交通条件和地理位置对农户资金需求的影响不显著;土地面积、受教育程度、地理位置和“关系”对资金供给具有正的显著影响,固定资产总值、交通条件对资金供给的影响不显著。     

时滞产品生产的经济增长与社会福利分析

时滞产品生产所带来的负外部性 ,使厂商利益与社会利益往往不一致 ,时滞产品的生产导致经济增长率与社会福利的同步下降 ,并可能引致资本向时滞产品生产领域流动从而加剧其影响程度。在生产领域适当的政府调控是保障经济增长目标实现与社会福利提升的必然选择。     

中国经济国民投资率的福利经济学分析

本文首次系统地从福利经济学角度出发,运用前沿计算方法,试图回答中国投资率是否过高这一重要问题。本文首先计算了两个投资率:一是境内投资率;二是国民投资率,即(境内投资+对外投资)/GDP。通过横向的对比,发现无论是境内投资率还是国民投资率,即便考虑高经济增长率,中国经济都远高于世界各国。其次,采用经济增长理论的基准模型,利用中国的参数进行校准,并且进行稳健性检验,运用逆向积分法模拟中国经济福利最大化的投资路径。结果表明,中国经济上世纪90年代平均境内投资率低于福利最大化的投资率6%,国民投资率4%;2002年后,平均境内投资高于福利最大化的投资率5%,国民投资率12%;1990—2008年实际投资相对福利最大化的投资路径总福利损失约为5.9%,相当于每期损失约3.8%的GDP。最后,本文进一步分析,如果适当地降低国民投资率,同时改善投资效率,中国经济的GDP增长率并不会大幅下降。     

最优财政和货币政策及其福利效应分析

本文建立了财政和货币政策协作的最优政策模型,并以中国经济为研究对象,以福利效应为最优政策的评估标准,研究了财政和货币政策协作的最优政策机制。分析表明:在Ramsey最优均衡下,财政和货币政策共同作用于通货膨胀和产出目标,以严格通货膨胀为目标的最优货币规则会使得政策的福利损失最小,但货币政策在产出目标、通货膨胀目标以及政策福利损失三者上不能同时兼顾;最优财政规则是趋向缩小收支差,从而趋近于福利损失最小。本文同时使用贝叶斯分析,对中国经济政策2005年第一季度至2009年第二季度的福利效应进行了评估,实证分析表明:样本期间政策的无条件福利损失处于波动状态,经济增长增加了家庭部门的条件福利损失,即经济增长导致跨期消费成本增加。     

关于开放式基金VaR风险的比较——基于半参数与非参数法

在刻画和估计资产联合损失分布函数的基础上对开放式基金VaR风险进行比较分析。在极值情况下有两种算法：一种是半参数法,采用GPD分布来拟合损失分布的尾部和核密度分布拟合损失分布的中间部分,运用copula函数来刻画资产损失的相依结构;另一种是非参数法,用Bootstrapping和FHS方法对收益率进行抽样和模拟。经过实证分析发现在较低置信水平下,宜于采用非参数法;而在较高置信水平下,采用半参数法则更合适,这也充分说明半参数法适合在更极值情形下对开放式基金估计VaR风险。     

品牌的经济学分析:一个比较静态模型

现有的经济学理论和模型中缺少全面针对品牌的分析,导致品牌理论与实践的双重混乱.在选择爆炸式增长的经济条件下,品牌对消费者的选择行为产生了巨大影响,因此对品牌选择的经济学分析显得更为迫切.品牌的经济学本质是降低消费者的选择成本,进而影响消费者对品牌的选择,而消费者选择又决定了厂商的销售量和利润.我们在经济学的框架下,以品牌为研究对象,建立起一个比较静态模型,对品牌进行经济学分析,得出消费者均衡和厂商均衡的条件.     

环境技术转移的最优社会福利选择——以发展中国家为视角

本文以发展中国家为视角,构建一个基本的双寡头Cournot模型,来分析环境技术从发达国家转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家商品生产和社会福利产生的影响.本文认为环境技术从发达国家无偿转移至发展中国家,对发展中国家社会福利的影响具有不确定性.通过引入福利函数并求解最优的社会福利,发现对发展中国家而言,最优的社会福利选择是:当国内企业生产成本等于国外企业生产成本与环境技术的产量溢出之差时,环境技术的完全转移才是发展中国家的最优社会福利选择.并据此推导出社会福利最优的环境技术转移路径.     

The Italian approach to the theory of public goods *

Abstract

The subject of needs is the centre of attention of Italian public finance scholars. The financial activity of the State is justified by the existence of collective or public needs to whose satisfaction collective or public goods and services are linked. Italian economists have studied the problems of public goods in a general context, taking into consideration concurrently both taxes and public expenditure and giving prominence to positive analysis. Italian theorists have always been far removed from the classical approach, which denies the productivity of public services, and have deemed it necessary to take into account the political context in which fiscal structures operate. Their models include the State as a major factor. Herein lies the main value of the Italian tradition in public finance, which puts in coercion into the market mechanism via State intervention.     

A general approach to the evaluation of nonmarket goods

The paper considers the evaluation of a nonmarket good on the basis of a complete conditional demand system. It introduces two conditions allowing to identify a generally unique underlying preference ordering which can be employed for evaluation. The functional structure of the corresponding expenditure/indirect utility function and the demand system is described. The conditions proposed turn out to be equivalent to the property of base level independence in the equivalence scale literature. The approach is operational.     

实验经济学的兴起与公共产品理论的发展

实验经济学是经济学的一个新的分支,其研究内容主要包括个人决策、市场交易、博弈论、学习理论和方法论。它的兴起对公共财政论的核心理论——公共产品理论产生了影响,加深了搭便车问题的研究,对如何有效提供公共产品从实验角度给出了有益的启示,推动了公共产品理论的研究。     

Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.     

The Political Economy of Tax-Based Incomes Policy: Wealth Effects of Post Keynesian TIP

This paper explores the economics of electoral democracy, an almost entirely neglected subject. Running for office necessitates resources. But students of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates or where that money should come from. As a result, there is a gaping void in the theory of democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter used a market analogy in his discussion of the electoral process, but even he did not discuss how electoral campaigns are to be paid for. In fact, the few citizens who largely fund campaigns for office in the United States purchase non-rivalrous influence. They obtain the ability to shape the policies that affect all citizens. In this way, political equality is undermined. The paper concludes that achieving a more representative political system can best be attained by treating political campaigns as a public good.