Targeted campaign competition,loyal voters,and supermajorities

We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable. Each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter. Each candidate chooses a level of total campaign effort and allocates his effort among the set of voters. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. If the candidates are symmetric ex ante, both types of electoral competition dissipate the rents from office in expectation. However, the equilibria arising under the two electoral objectives qualitatively differ. In majoritarian elections, candidates randomize over their level of total campaign effort, which provides support for the puzzling phenomenon of the emergence of supermajorities in majoritarian systems. Vote-share maximization leads to an equilibrium in which both candidates make deterministic budget choices and reach a precise fifty–fifty split of vote shares. We also study how asymmetry between the candidates affects the equilibrium. If some share of the voters is loyal to one of the candidates, then both candidates expend the same expected efforts in equilibrium, but the advantaged candidate wins with higher probability for majoritarian voting or a higher share of voters for vote-share maximization.     

Affect versus cognition: Wishful thinking on election day: An analysis using exit poll data from Belgium

Citizens tend to overestimate the electoral success of their preferred party. We investigate the extent to which Belgian voters overestimate the result of the party that they vote for and the factors that explain which voters do so more than others. Our focus is on the impact of educational attainment and partisan attachment on the overestimation of one’s party’s result. Previous research in this field has relied on data gathered in the months before the elections, which introduces a substantial amount of uncertainty and variation over time into the measurements of citizens’ vote share estimations. As an alternative, we investigate voters’ estimations of their party’s electoral success by means of data gathered in an exit poll survey. Our results show partisan attachments to have a strong impact on overestimations, which suggests that a wishful thinking mechanism is in play. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which partisan attachments increase citizens’ overestimations depends on a voter’s level of education.     

Strategic participation and the median voter result

In a seminal paper on electoral equilibrium under majority rule, Ledyard (1984) demonstrates that strategic participation by voters results in an electoral equilibrium at the proposal that maximizes the utility of a randomly selected voter. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) limit the usefulness of this result by showing that strategic participation rates are miniscule in large electorates, and that the incentive to participate vanishes completely as the electorate grows without bound. The most reasonable modification of Ledyard’s approach that circumvents these criticisms is to allow for a negative cost of voting. We show that when voters can have even an arbitrarily small negative cost of voting, there is an electorate sufficiently large so that any proposal is defeated or tied by the median proposal. This observation raises questions about the existence of electoral equilibrium under strategic participation, and is relevant to the efficiency of elections.     

Vertical externalities and control of politicians

A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Received: June 30, 2000 / Accepted: April 4, 2001     

Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot

The secret ballot was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral reform to create fair elections and protect democracy. Submitted: May 25, 1999 / Accepted: July 24, 2000     

Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities

I study whether bailouts of local governments carry electoral benefits for state governments with a dataset covering 421 municipalities in the German state of Hesse over the period 1999–2011. I find that past bailouts have no economically significant effect on the municipality-level vote share of the parties that formed the state government in subsequent state elections. On the other hand, bailouts lead to vote increases for the ruling parties in subsequent local elections. On balance, these results suggest that electoral concerns are not the reason why central governments find it difficult to commit to a no-bailout policy.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.     

A methodology for testing a new spatial model of elections

The purpose of this paper is to offer a methodology for testing a new spatial theory of elections. Specifically, it is shown that the new spatial model of elections developed by Enelow and Hinich (1984a) is statistically equivalent to assuming that a classical factor structure underlies the data that voters provide concerning the issue positions of themselves and the candidates. A factor analysis of the sample correlation matrix of candidate variables averaged over voters and issues provides consistent estimates of the candidate locations in the space of predictive dimensions postulated by Enelow and Hinich, and the facor scores assigned to the voters can be used to project the voters onto the same predictive space with the candidates. This new scaling method is used to locate the positions of voters and candidates in the underlying predictive space of the 1980 Presidential election. Internal checks confirm the empirical adequacy of the candidate locations, and probit analysis is used as an external check on the empirical adequacy of the voter locations. For the pre-election data, no loss of accuracy in predicting voter choice was found in moving from the issue data to the estimated factor locations of voters and candidates. For the post-election data, a modest drop in accuracy was discovered. Overall, the empirical adequacy of factor analysis was confirmed as a methodology for testing the new Enelow-Hinich spatial model of elections.     

On the relationship between economic development and political democracy

A politico-economic model is defined, in which consumers, at date 0, decide how much to invest in a firm (and how much of its stock to purchase), whose production possibilities are determined by the outcome of an election, to be held at date 1. At date 1, consumers vote on the level of pollution the firm shall be allowed to emit. There are incomplete markets; the states of the world are the two possible electoral outcomes at date 1, each associated with the victory of a particular party. In turn, the parties represent poor and rich voters; voters’ interests at date 1 are determined by the investments they have made at date 0. Because parties are uncertain about a parameter of voter preferences, the electoral (Nash) equilibrium at date 1 is not median-voter: there are two possible policies (pollution levels), occurring with probabilities that can be calculated. A full equilibrium of the model is an economic equilibrium with incomplete markets at date 0 and a political equilibrium at date 1, each of which induces the other. In a fictional ‘benevolent dictatorship,’ elections are called off, and the dictator announces a pollution policy which is the expected outcome of the would-be elections. By substituting the expected value of a lottery for a lottery, the utilities of citizens, who are risk-averse, increase. There are, however, costs to dictatorship, in the form of the absence of civil liberties. For any economic environment, it is possible to compute the equilibria under democracy and benevolent dictatorship, and to evaluate what coalition of the population prefers one to the other. In this way, the benevolent dictatorship is a benchmark against which to measure the costs of democracy. We examine to what extent the support for democracy, contrasted with benevolent dictatorship, grows among the population as economic development occurs. Development is simulated in five different ways, and it is not unambiguously the case that it induces a growing social preference for democracy. I have benefitted from discussions with A. Alesina and M. Quinzii, from the comments of S. Barbera at the International Economic Association conference on democracy and development (1992), from the comments of Michael Winston at the NBER political economy conference (1992), and from comments by participants at these conferences and at several university seminars.     

The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. This paper benefitted from comments received by participants at the Public Choice Meetings, and from useful comments from Aimee Chin, Janet Kohlhase, an anonymous referee and the editor.     

From plurality rule to proportional representation

I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system from the plurality rule to proportional representation for forthcoming elections. Parties are office-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I examine two different scenarios of how parties in government share the spoils of office: equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election, the electoral rule will never be changed. Therefore, for a change to occur, the government should be formed by a coalition. I find that a change is more likely to occur when there is a larger number of parties and also when the spoils of office are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. These results are extended to analyze the decision to change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.     

Forecasting elections in Turkey

This paper proposes a model for forecasting elections in Turkey. In doing so, this study is based on three theoretical premises: first, that the voters reward or punish parties according to their performances relative to the macroeconomic conditions; second, that the popularity of the political parties in Turkey are closely connected to their performances in local elections; and third, that the centre-periphery distinction affects the fortunes of the political parties in Turkey. The contribution of this analysis is the introduction of an explicit model on which can forecast the impact of economic and political variables on the elections in Turkey by using reliable, public and macro level data. Our findings show that the dynamics of the evaluation of political parties in Turkey follow a similar pattern to those of contemporary democracies, being driven by both economic and political factors.

“…why did AKP win? There cannot be a scientific and sociological explanation of this.”Özdemir ?nce, 17 August 2007, Hürriyet, emphasis added.

     

Forecasting government support in Irish general elections: Opinion polls and structural models

Election forecasting is a cottage industry among pollsters, the media, political scientists, and political anoraks. Here, we plow a fresh field in providing a systematic exploration of election forecasting in Ireland. We develop a structural forecast model for predicting incumbent government support in Irish general elections between 1977 and 2020 (the Iowa model). We contrast this structural model with forecasts from opinion polls, the dominant means of predicting Ireland’s elections to date. Our results show that with appropriate lead-in time, structural models perform similarly to opinion polls in predicting government support when the dependent variable is vote share. Most importantly, however, the Iowa model is superior to opinion polls in predicting government seat share, the ultimate decider of government fate in parliamentary systems, and especially significant in single transferable vote (STV) systems where vote and seat shares are not always in sync. Our results provide cumulative evidence of the potency of structural electoral forecast models globally, with the takeaway that the Iowa model estimating seat share outpaces other prediction approaches in anticipating government performance in Irish general elections.     

Federalism,distributive politics and representative democracy

We analyze federal systems of government in which local public policies are financed by general taxation. In a decentralized political system there is, in each region, a vote to elect a local representative while in a centralized political system a single representative is elected by a federal vote. It is shown that under decentralization, voters strategically elect liberal representatives so as to nullify any element of cooperation between representatives in the decision-making stage. Thus, there is a trade-off between the budgetary externality and a "policy closer to the people", but the democratic choice is biased towards decentralization.     

Estimating floating voters: a comparison between the ecological inference and the survey methods

There are two main approaches to estimating the proportion of the electorate who are floating voters: the survey method and the ecological estimate method. Both the methods have their advantages and their problems. The main difficulties with the survey method are the coverage of the sample and the problems introduced by reliance on the quality of memory of the subjects. Ecological estimates have different problems, the principal of which is known as the ecological fallacy. The aim of this paper is to assess whether the survey and ecological estimates of voter swing between two elections are significantly different. For this purpose I will consider the 2006 and 2008 Italian Parliamentary elections. Given the short temporal gap between these two elections, both the methods should give reliable estimates, as the shorter the time between the two elections, the fewer the problems which will be encountered by subjects recalling the party they voted for in the previous one, and the fewer the changes which will have taken place in the composition of the population between the two elections. The ecological data I will employ comprise all the votes cast in both of the elections under consideration (2006 and 2008), at the polling station level. In Italy there are about 60,000 polling stations, and I will analyse the data from these using the Goodman Model. The survey data has been provided by Italian National Election Studies (ITANES), and consists of a large representative sample, obtained by interviews conducted by CATI.     

Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence

Rent-control policy is modeled as an implicit contract between voters of a community and suppliers of rental housing. It is shown that if residents can make an ex ante commitment to never adopt rent controls they will do so. When precommitment is not possible there are conditions under which a policy of never adopting rent controls is not self-enforcing. Under such circumstances a state-invariant ceiling price is shown to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium rent-control policy. The model is tested using data for New Jersey where local option regarding the choice of rent control policy was declared constitutional in the early 1970s. Probit analysis is used to determine whether predictions of the model are supported by an investigation of factors leading to imposition of rent controls by 64 of the 245 communities in the sample.     

Intended electoral participation in transition countries

This paper examines the determinants of intended electoral participation. We analyze attitudes to both referenda and voting in national elections. Sample survey data are obtained from the Eurobarometer survey of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical results suggest that intended electoral participation increases with age, income and education. But attitudinal variables are also important and in particular confidence in the free market economy and satisfaction with the general development of the country impact positively on intended electoral participation. Received: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, Accepted: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, JEL Classification: H26, K42 We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of CERGE-EI. We are also grateful for the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, the journal editor and R. Filer and L. Squires.     

The “probability of a fit choice”

This paper attempts to model elections by incorporating voter judgments about candidate and leader competence. The proposed model can be linked to Madison’s understanding of the nature of the choice of Chief Magistrate (Madison, James Madison: writings. The Library of America, New York, 1999 [1787]) and Condorcet’s work on the so-called “Jury Theorem” (Condorcet 1994 [1785]). Electoral models use the notion of a Nash Equilibrium. This notion generally depends on a fixed point argument. For deterministic electoral models, there will typically be no equilibrium. Instead we introduce the idea of a preference field, $H,$ for the society. A condition called half-openess of $H$ is sufficient to guarantee existence of a local direction gradient, $d,$ Even when $d$ is not well-defined we can use the idea of the heart for the society. This is an attractor of the set of social moves that can occur. As an application, a stochastic model of elections is considered, and applied to the 2008 presidential election in the United States. In such a stochastic model the electoral origin will satisfy the first order condition for a local Nash equilibrium. We then show how to compute the Hessian of each candidate’s vote share function, and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral origin, suggesting that there will be a social direction gradient. The origin maximizes aggregrate voter utility and can be interpreted as a fit choice for the polity.     

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral model where parties differ in their valences – the electorally perceived, non-policy “quality” of the party leader. It is assumed that valence may either be exogenous, in the sense of being an intrinsic characteristic of the leader, or may be due to the contributions of party activists, who donate time and money and thus enhance electoral support for the party. Theorem 1 shows that vote maximization depends on balancing these two opposed effects. Theorem 2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral mean when activist valence is zero. The paper then examines empirical electoral models for the Netherlands circa 1980 and Britain in 1979, 1992 and 1997 and shows that party divergence from the electoral mean cannot be accounted for by exogenous valence alone. The balance condition suggests that the success of the Labour party in the election of 1997 can be attributed to a combination of high exogenous valence and pro-Europe activist support.