借款费用、长期融资和盈余管理——来自房地产上市公司的经验证据

本文以房地产上市公司为切入点分析借款费用会计准则对企业融资和经营的影响。研究发现,第一,从企业融资活动看,由于新准则拓宽了可资本化借款费用和符合资本化条件资产的范围,因而其实施与房地产企业的长期融资增长显著正相关,但无法决定长期融资实际水平。第二,从企业盈余管理行为看,由于新规定在一般借款费用资本化金额决定方面给予企业选择空间,从而给企业提供了新的盈余管理途径;新准则实施前后房地产企业的应计项目盈余管理和真实项目盈余管理行为有明显不同。     

股份支付并购中存在不同的盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文从收购方的视角,以2008~2010年在并购过程中采用股份支付方式的中国上市公司为样本,实证考察了中国上市公司在股份支付并购中的盈余管理机会主义行为以及对并购绩效的影响。研究结果发现:收购方在并购前半年存在显著正向应计盈余管理机会主义行为;在并购当期存在显著正向真实盈余管理机会主义行为;并购后一年公司业绩的下降程度受到应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的交替影响;股份支付并购是促使公司管理层产生盈余管理的动机之一,并且对并购后一年绩效显著下降具有一定的解释力度。     

独立董事本地化对公司盈余管理的影响——来自2010~2014年A股上市公司经验证据

以2010~2014年 A 股上市公司为研究样本,以修正 Jones 模型估计的操控性应计绝对值作为应计项目盈余管理的衡量指标,探讨上市公司独立董事日常工作所在地和上市公司所在地是否一致对公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,独立董事本地化能抑制公司应计项目盈余管理。此外,研究进一步发现,独立董事本地化还能约束真实活动盈余操控,包括销售操控、生产操控和费用操控等行为。     

创业板上市公司IPO过程中的业绩变化与盈余管理——来自中国创业板上市公司的经验数据

盈余管理是我国财务会计研究领域的一个重要部分,国内外对创业板盈余管理的研究主要集中在盈余管理的动机、手段和方法,较少从盈余管理的程度与公司业绩的关系这一角度进行研究。本文将应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理相对比,分别研究其在创业板IPO中的存在性,并考察其分别对公司业绩的影响。实证结果显示:创业板上市公司为了达到上市的标准,在上市前后都会采用应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的手段来粉饰公司的利润。应计盈余管理与未来公司业绩之间存在显著正相关关系,而真实盈余管理与公司未来的业绩之间则存在显著负相关关系;相对比而言,两种盈余管理的方式都会使公司的未来业绩下降,但真实盈余管理对公司业绩的影响更为深远。     

会计信息可靠性与盈余持续性——来自沪、深股市的经验证据

本文以2001--2004年沪深股市上市公司为样本，考察了会计信息可靠性与盈余持续性。研究发现．更可靠的会计信息具有更高的盈余自相关系数和股票回报，会计信息可靠性与盈余持续性正相关。从盈余自相关角度看，更可靠的会计信息具有更强的盈余持续性。从股票回报角度看，市场符合“幼稚投资者”假说，存在利润“功能锁定”现象，市场不能充分理解会计信息可靠性与盈余相关性的关系，对会计信息可靠性给出了异常定价。本结论有力地支持了新会计准则对真实性和可靠性的强调。     

创业板上市公司IPO过程中的业绩变化与盈余管理——来自中国创业板上市公司的经验数据

盈余管理是我国财务会计研究领域的一个重要部分,国内外对盈余管理的研究主要集中在盈余管理的动机、手段和方法,较少从盈余管理的程度与公司业绩的关系这一角度进行研究。基于这一问题,笔者将应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理相对比,分别研究其在创业板IPO中的存在性,并考察其分别对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:创业板上市公司为了达到上市的标准,在上市前后都会采用应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的手段来粉饰公司的利润。本文选取有代表性的财务指标,运用实证分析的方法建立综合财务指标体系对样本数据进行检验发现:应计盈余管理与未来公司业绩之间存在显著正相关关系,而真实盈余管理与公司未来的业绩之间则存在显著负相关关系,相对比而言,虽然两种盈余管理的方式都会使公司的未来业绩下降,但是真实盈余管理对公司业绩的影响更为深远。     

上市公司真实盈余管理与应计盈余管理动机异同——基于博弈视角

本文在应计盈余管理研究基础上加入真实盈余管理研究进行对比。基于博弈论视角将二者动机进行比较,再根据二者动机的异同分别提出建设性方案,为盈余管理的监管提供新的思路。     

约束条件、IPO盈余管理方式与公司业绩——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的研究

IPO盈余管理问题一直是资本市场研究的热点议题之一,本文考察了IPO企业的盈余管理方式及其对公司业绩的影响,并进一步探讨了在一定约束条件下,不同盈余管理方式对发行定价的作用。研究发现,IPO企业不仅实施了应计盈余管理,而且实施了真实盈余管理;IPO企业对盈余管理方式的选择是在发行价最大化原则下权衡的结果,当公司面临的法律保护水平较低、处于管制行业、审计师为非国际"四大"时,选择真实盈余管理更有利于提高股票发行价。此外,本文发现不同盈余管理方式对公司未来业绩的影响存在一定的差异,应计盈余管理主要影响公司的短期业绩,而真实盈余管理将会对公司的长期业绩产生较大影响。     

海归高管、政治关系与盈余管理

以2009—2013年中国创业板公司为样本,考察海归高管是否显著地降低了公司盈余管理水平,并进一步探讨了海归高管对盈余管理的治理作用是否会因政治关系的建立而减弱.结果显示:无论是应计盈余管理还是真实盈余管理,海归高管都表现出显著的抑制作用,但当其具有政治关系时,对盈余管理的抑制作用会显著被减弱.     

监管者识别盈余管理的实证研究

将盈余管理细分为应计盈余管理、线上真实盈余管理和线下真实盈余管理,基于我国特有的配股管制变迁环境,考察监管者识别盈余管理的能力及其变化。研究发现,监管者对上市公司盈余管理具有一定的识别能力,但是会受到管制环境变迁的影响,存在管制效应和演进效应。具体而言,在审核配股资格过程中,监管者能识别线下真实盈余管理,但是,在管制环境变迁后,由于线下真实盈余管理被纳入管制范围,监管者不再对其进行关注,而是关注应计盈余管理,并能识别。在线上真实盈余管理方面,由于其隐蔽性强,监管者并没有表现出显著的识别能力。     

盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知研究

以2009~2013年沪深两市 A 股上市公司为样本,研究应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理对审计师风险感知的影响,研究结论表明,审计师既能感知到应计盈余管理行为带来的风险,同时还能感知到真实盈余管理行为的风险,并会从审计意见类型和审计费用两个方面采取风险应对措施。相较于有限责任制会计师事务所,特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所的审计师对盈余管理行为的风险感知更敏感。     

The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This paper investigates the earnings management activities in Chinese listed firms and the impact of the split share structure reform (SSSREF). We demonstrate that Chinese listed firms exhibited a long-term positive relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management activities over the 2002–2011 period. This reflects the environment of weak investor protection and lack of effective corporate governance in China. Our results also indicate that the SSSREF in China has not fundamentally improved firms' quality of financial information. This may be because ownership concentration remains high. However, it is of interest that the reform has created an incentive alignment effect exogenously. We find that firms' use of discretionary accruals was constrained, and they have consequently shifted to less detectable and under-scrutinized real earnings activities after the reform. This shift is similar to that seen with the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules on firms' earnings behaviors in developed countries where the investor protection environment is strong. We suggest that firms' shifting between the accrual and real-based earnings methods is an overlooked area for investors to consider in the emerging market context, and may require the attention of regulators.     

Asset Disposal as a Method of Real Earnings Management: Evidence from the UK

We examine asset sales as a method of real earnings management around the benchmarks of loss avoidance and last year's earnings. Evidence is reported of asset sales to boost or reduce earnings near the benchmark of last year's earnings. For the zero earnings benchmark our results are moderated by the opening balance of accruals: only firms with high levels of accruals use asset sales to boost earnings to avoid a loss and only firms with low levels of accruals use asset sales as part of a big bath. We suggest that firms with high accrual balances find it difficult to use additional income-increasing accruals but find it more convenient to write off accruals rather than sell assets to artificially reduce earnings. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are associated with reduced use of asset sales for gains and especially with reduced asset sales for losses. We ascribe this to IFRS introducing additional judgement and estimation in relation to the valuation of both long-lived and current assets on a recurring basis.     

Real Earnings Management,Institutional Environment,and Future Operating Performance: An International Study

This paper investigates the association between firms' engagement in real activities manipulation (hereafter REM) on future firm performance in an international setting, and whether the association is conditional upon country-level institutional factor. Our inquiry is motivated by a paucity of research on the consequences of REM in an international setting. Using a large sample over the period of 2001 to 2015, we find that current-period REM is positively associated with future performance: a finding that is consistent with Gunny (2010) in the US. Importantly, we find that the positive performance effect is driven by firms operating in countries with strong institutional environments. Finally, we find that future operating performance improves when REM is undertaken by firms in strong institutional environments only during a non-economic crisis period, but not during an economic crisis period. The paper adds to the existing REM literature by showing a non-monotonic effect of REM on future performance that is conditional on the strength of a country's institution. We also contribute to the accounting information and crisis literature by documenting a time-variant effect of REM on future performance.     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.