Outsourcing, Foreign Ownership, and Productivity: Evidence from UK Establishment-level Data

The paper presents an empirical analysis of “outsourcing” using establishment‐level data for UK manufacturing industries. The authors analyze an establishment's decision to outsource and the subsequent effects of outsourcing on the establishment's productivity. Outsourcing is compared in domestic with foreign‐owned establishments. The empirical results suggest that high wages are positively related to outsourcing, suggesting that the cost‐saving motive is important. Foreign‐owned firms have higher levels of outsourcing than domestic establishments. In the productivity analysis, an establishment's outsourcing intensity is positively related to its labor productivity and total factor productivity growth, and this effect is more pronounced for foreign establishments.     

Aspects of International Fragmentation

The paper uses a specific‐factors framework to address efficiency and distributional implications of international fragmentation which is driven by a low foreign wage rate. Focusing on the cost‐savings linkage between fragmentation and labor demand in the remaining domestic activities, the author establishes a fragmentation surplus. If capital is an indivisible asset specific to the fragment produced abroad, then fragmentation may cause a domestic welfare loss, because outsourcing takes place in discrete steps where it affords firms “quasi‐market‐power” on the domestic labor market. The regime shift from domestic production to fragmentation is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage one, firms locate indivisible assets at home or abroad; in stage two they choose optimal employment. The share of fragmented firms is endogenously determined. The paper explores conditions under which outsourcing is beneficial for the domestic economy.     

Technology licensing or cost-reducing outsourcing? Game theoretical analysis on consumers' home bias effects and firms' optimal strategies

International cost-reducing outsourcing lowers consumers' perceived quality of products due to home bias. This paper envisages a vertically differentiated Cournot duopoly associated with international, cost-reducing outsourcing and non-outsourcing schemes in both licensing and non-licensing cases. It examines the impacts of home bias effect on the behaviour of firms and welfare. It shows that the optimal strategy of the patent holder varies from situation to situation associated with the home bias effect. In equilibrium, the dominant strategy for the patent holder is licencing and no outsourcing. If a licensee will outsource its inputs after upgrading the quality of its products, then the patent holder will earn higher profits than one in a case where the licensee does not outsource. If both the patent holder and the licensee produce without outsourcing, a welfare-reducing licensing occurs. On the other hand, if the licensee outsources its production inputs but the patent holder does not outsource, then a welfare-improving licensing generates a win-win situation for the patent holder and for society. Furthermore, the smaller the quality gap between two goods prior to implementing licensing, the lower the royalty rate imposed by the patent holder.     

Foreign versus domestic outsourcing: Firm-level evidence on the role of technology

The decision about where to outsource varies across firms and industries. General machinery heavily depends on domestic subcontractors, while outsourcing overseas is prevalent in apparel. Based on firm-level data explicitly distinguishing foreign outsourcing from domestic outsourcing in all manufacturing industries, this paper finds that firms tend to prefer domestic outsourcing to foreign outsourcing when they are R&D-intensive. This finding is consistent with incomplete contracting models, since technologically complex products are likely to require high-quality contracting environment and assembler–supplier proximity. This paper also finds that firms connected with computer networks are actively outsourcing.     

Discrimination and Skill Differences in an Equilibrium Search Model*

We analyze an equilibrium search model with three sources for wage and unemployment differentials among workers with the same (observed) human capital but different appearance (race): unobserved productivity, search intensities, and discrimination due to an appearance‐based employer disutility factor. We show that the structural parameters are identified using labor market survey data. Estimation results for a black and white high school graduate sample imply: black productivity is 3.3% lower than white productivity; the employer's disutility factor is 31% of the white's productivity level; and 56% of firms have a disutility factor toward blacks.     

Asymmetric spiders: Supplier heterogeneity and the organization of firms

We consider a property rights model of a firm with two heterogeneous suppliers and analyze which sourcing mode (outsourcing or vertical integration) is chosen for which of the asymmetric inputs. If components are close substitutes, the firm tends to outsource the technologically more important input while keeping the less important one inside its boundaries. This pattern can be reversed, however, if the two inputs are strongly complementary. The firm also tends to outsource low‐cost inputs and components with low sophistication. These theoretical predictions are consistent with numerous case studies and recent empirical evidence on the internal organization of firms.     

企业的研发外包:一个综述

企业在研发外包的过程中通常会面临着由合同的不完全性、知识的非独占性以及累积性创新的不完全替代性所带来的各类成本,而研发外包之所以能够更多地进行是因为在现实操作中存在着缓解这类成本的治理机制。在此基础上,本文以企业为主要参考点通过文献综述重点考察了作为治理机制的研发外包的最优组织形式,研发外包中的合同设计以及公共政策层面和企业层面的知识产权保护措施。尽管上述不同层面上的知识产权保护措施在一定程度上可以缓解信息泄漏问题,但知识产权保护强度的增加并不一定就能够促进企业更多地进行研发外包。为此,本文还考察了知识产权保护强度与企业研发外包决策的关系。     

Temporary partnership and subcontracting: Pre- vs. post- award outsourcing in public procurement

We empirically compare bids (i.e. prices) from temporary partnerships (TPs), that outsource part of the contract before the auction, and firms that outsource afterwards. Using a comprehensive dataset on procurement auctions for public works in Valle d’Aosta (Italy), we find that the timing of outsourcing affects the bids and the probability of winning the auction. Specifically, TPs bid closer to the payoff maximizing offer and are more likely to win. Hence, the price paid by the public buyer is lower. These results are supported by a simple theoretical setting showing that, by pre-committing to a TP, suppliers have a lower risk of being “held up” by subcontractors than firms that outsource part of the work after the bidding phase. Our results show the advantage for TPs of freely choosing partners, size and boundaries before the auction, highlighting their potential in fostering the effective participation in public procurement procedures of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).     

To outsource or not to outsource in an integrated world

This paper investigates outsourcing decision under certainty and uncertainty. When the production activity can be fragmented into two or more processes, an integrated firm must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. There are gains from outsourcing when factor prices differ between countries. When factor prices are not equalized internationally, a firm may outsource the process which uses its scarce source intensively. If the cost of outsourcing is lower in the foreign country, full outsourcing occurs under certainty. However, even if the outside supplier has a cost advantage, uncertainty in outsourcing cost ensures that partial outsourcing is optimal for risk-averse firms.     

Technology and outsourcing: An explanation to the rising wage gap

The recent phenomenon of widening skilled–unskilled wage gap in both North and South has been either explained by a technological change or by increasing trade or globalization. The paper provides a new explanation and emphasizes that it is neither technology nor trade alone but both that have contributed to the widening wage inequality. It argues, using a two-country occupational choice model, that any technological improvement in North results in a rise in the skilled–unskilled wage gap in North via an increase in the productivity of skilled labor followed by a rise in the same in South via trade or the outsourcing activities of the northern firms. The extent of outsourcing or the number of northern firms that outsource jobs to South is endogenously determined in the model. The paper also analyzes some major economic impacts of such a technological upgradation in North on the southern economy.     

On modeling task,skill and technology upgrading effects of globalization with heterogeneous labor

We adapt Yeaple's (2005) heterogeneous agent framework to model firms in the North as making explicit offshore outsourcing decisions to cheap-labor economies. We highlight how firms' technology transformations due to globalization will induce skill upgrading in the North, increase aggregate productivity, average wages and therefore total welfare at the cost of increased wage inequalities. We analytically derive conditions under which all consumers – including lower-skilled workers – might nevertheless gain from the surge of offshore outsourcing. We also show that extending the model to the more realistic case of multi-product firms tends to boost the potential welfare gains.     

Outsourcing and firm productivity: a production function approach

This paper is aimed at analyzing the relationship between outsourcing and productivity. Specifically, this paper deals with outsourcing at the firm level and focuses on the role of contracting out of manufacturing activities. I obtain new insights on this topic, mainly using a precise measure for outsourcing and analyzing differences across industries. Using an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing firms, I estimate a production function depending on traditional inputs (labor, capital, and materials) and an index of production subcontracting. I find that for manufacturing as a whole, outsourcing intensity has a positive effect on productivity, showing an elasticity of output with respect to outsourcing around 0.15. When analyzing industry level results, I find that outsourcing intensity has a positive effect on productivity, mainly for firms belonging to light industries.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

Determinants of International R&D Outsourcing: The Role of Trade

This paper investigates the determinants of international R&D outsourcing, in particular the role of trade. We sketch a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms where outsourcing increases a firm's fixed transaction costs as well as its productivity. Financial constraints affect the decision to outsource R&D more to nonexporters than to exporters. In contrast, exporters are more sensitive to a lack of information because they have higher losses when there is technology leakage. We test these predictions using a panel database of Spanish companies. The results highlight the relevance of information in competitive markets, and the role of trade to induce companies to engage in other globalization strategies.     

International Outsourcing and Unemployment in a Minimum‐wage Economy

To explore the impact of international outsourcing on unemployment and social welfare, the conventional trade model is extended by including both economies of scale and a minimum‐wage constraint in the unskilled‐labor market. In the paper, the scale economies are linked with the production of the most skill‐intensive good. It is shown that within such a framework, there is a trade‐off between a more socially desirable endowment allocation and a greater level of employment. Therefore, even though outsourcing could raise aggregate employment, this benefit is at the cost of further exacerbating the resource misallocation. In this way, the extensions to the traditional framework explored in the paper generate new insights as to why outsourcing may cause a net welfare loss to the home country.     

Outsourcing under Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property

The paper examines possible reasons behind expanded outsourcing by modeling outsourcing decisions when intellectual property rights are imperfectly protected. Firms in the North develop higher quality levels of existing products and then decide whether to shift some stages of production to the South. Production in the South lowers costs but entails risk of imitation by Southern firms. In this setting, a lower risk of imitation or larger labor supplies can cause increased outsourcing, a higher rate of innovation, and a lower Northern relative wage. Damage due to lower incomes can be offset by gains in terms of better quality products.     

Outsourcing and productivity growth in services

Outsourcing from manufacturing firms has fueled some of the service sector's rapid growth. We model the firm's decision to outsource and show that increases in outsourcing may explain part of the increase in the divergence in productivity growth between manufacturing and services. We also analyze the implications of outsourcing for output and productivity growth of service industries. Our findings indicate that it has reduced service sector productivity in the short run. In contrast to earlier work on services (Baumol, W.J., 1967. American Economic Review 57, 415–426. Baumol, W.J., Blackman, A.B., Wolff, E.N., 1985. American Economic Review 75, 806–817), we project that productivity growth in services is likely to increase, once demand growth from manufacturing due to outsourcing subsides.     

高校扩招背景下大学毕业生就业的经济学分析

本文尝试构建一个分割的劳动力市场模型,对我国高等院校扩招给大学毕业生、非大学毕业求业者、企业和社会在就业和工资等方面所造成的福利效应作一纯理论的分析.通过对模型中扩招前后均衡点的分析,我们发现,尽管高校扩招所带来的大学毕业生大量增加,从长期看为我国经济增长积聚了大量的人力资本,但就个人福利而言,投资于高等教育者其境况变坏,而没有上大学的人却境况变好.我们认为,要想方设法增加大学毕业生就业,使全社会潜在福利的增加变成现实的福利增长,需要进一步深化市场改革以拓宽市场规模,由此改善大学毕业生的就业状况并增加其收入.     

The rise of part-time employment in the great recession: Its causes and macroeconomic effects

During the Great Recession, the U.S. economy witnessed a substantial rise in part-time employment for a sustained period. We extend the New Keynesian unemployment model by Galí et al. (2012) to allow substitutions between full-time and part-time labor, and estimate the model’s parameters by using the Bayesian method. In our model, households and firms can optimally allocate full-time and part-time labor, and disturbances exist in part-time labor supply (household disutility from part-time labor) and part-time labor demand (firms’ efficiency to use part-time labor). As for the Great Recession, the initial increase in part-time employment at the outset of the financial crisis is mostly explained by the rise of the risk premia; the persistently high level of part-time employment in the later period is mainly explained by an exogenous increase in part-time labor supply. A part-time labor supply shock also explains a significant portion of slow recovery in the gross wage during the recession, as the shock lowers the part-time wage and the proportion of full-time workers in total employment. Notably, the results from our model suggest that though the transition from full-time to part-time jobs contributed to mitigating the sharp contraction in total employment and labor force during the Great Recession, it played only a limited role in relieving recessionary pressure.     

The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.