Sterling’s rise: A case of delayed overshooting?

In this article Francis Breedon discusses how sterling’s rise over the last 6 months can be explained in terms of a delayed overshooting reaction to past monetary policy. Although the timing is still hard to judge, it seems that this effect should now begin to wear off, allowing sterling to fall – particularly against the DM. As far as future monetary policy is concerned, this delayed overshoot is another argument for the Treasury and Bank of England undertaking a more activist exchange rate policy, perhaps following the example of another open economy on the fringes of EMU – Switzerland.     

Japanese and U.S. interventions in the yen/U.S. dollar market: estimating the monetary authorities’ reaction functions

This paper uses recently released official data on the foreign exchange market interventions of the Japanese monetary authorities in the yen/U.S. dollar market during the period 1991–2001 to examine the motivation for the intervention policy. We also compare the Japanese intervention policy with the U.S. intervention policy. Our results suggest that the Japanese authorities regularly responded to deviations of the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate from a short-term and a long-term exchange rate target. By contrast, the U.S. authorities intervened only occasionally and seemed to have merely reinforced Japanese interventions.     

Regime switching as a test for exchange rate bubbles

This paper develops a new test for speculative bubbles, which is applied to data for the Japanese yen, the German mark and the Canadian dollar exchange rates from 1977 to 1991. The test assumes that bubbles display a particular kind of regime-switching behaviour, which is shown to imply coefficient restrictions on a simple switching-regression model of exchange rate innovations. Test results are sensitive to the specification of exchange rate fundamentals and other factors. Evidence most consistent with the bubble hypothesis is found using an overshooting model of the Canadian dollar and a PPP model of the Japanese yen.     

Exchange rate determination: Empirical evidence for the Greek drachma

We examine the monetary approach to the exchange rate from several perspectives, using monthly data on five Greek bilateral exchange rates. Using the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique we demonstrate that the monetary model is validate as a long-run relationship. Moreover, upon imposing the long-run monetary model restrictions we find that the proportionality of the exchange rate to relative monetary aggregates is accepted for the bilateral exchange rate of the Greek drachma with respect to the US dollar, the deutschemark, the pound sterling, the French franc and the Italian lira. Finally, using the Hansen-Johansen (1993) testing procedure, we reject the hypothesis of sample independency of the dimension of the cointegration space in all cases, apart from the German one, but we accept the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients do not display instabilities in recursive estimations.     

Forecasting the Real Exchange Rate

This brief examines the historical relationship between exchange rates and relative inflation rates for a group of major industrial countries. It establishes the concept of the ‘real exchange rate’ and the ‘productivity-adjusted real exchange rate’ (PARE) as essential in understanding these relationships and projecting them into the future. It puts the discussion into the context of company decision making, as one important factor in the rate of return likely to accrue from different methods of supplying an overseas market. Differences in productivity between countries explain the divergences in prices of ‘non-traded goods’. To give a simple example, a haircut costs much more in New York than in Madrid since high US wages reflect high productivity which does not apply in many parts of the service sector. These differences rule out the acceptance of the over simple ‘purchasing power parity’ approach which assumes that exchange rates will settle at a point where all prices (in terms of a common currency) are the same everywhere, or move together. Even after account has been taken of differences in productivity growth, productivity-adjusted real exchange rates (PARE) - though reasonably stable - can still show some deviations, or ‘blips’. The ‘blip’ may occur because of rapid changes in the actual exchange rate or in domestic prices, in which case it is likely to prove temporary and the PARE rate will tend to adjust back to its normal level. But it may come from major structural changes, in which case PARE will be altered permanently within definable limits. A way of recognising the different categories of ‘blip’ is suggested in the brief. The PARE framework is then used to provide a guide to UK businesses who are concerned to calculate the future sterling value of foreign currency sales or, more generally, to estimate their competitiveness in supplying specific export markets. (The method used would apply equally well to other countries.) This is done by showing step-by-step the forecasting procedure to compute sterling's effective exchange rate to 1981 on assumptions concerning respective rates of inflation, monetary policy and the impact of North Sea oil. The computation shows that a sustained period of exchange rate stability is possible for the UK, even if UK inflation rates remain significantly above the world level for the next two years.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

Monetary policy in open economies: Practical perspectives for pragmatic central bankers

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented by a Taylor type rule, a rule that in equilibrium is reflected in the exchange rate as an asset price. Optimal monetary policy will not be able deliver a stationary (‘stable’) nominal exchange rate – let alone a fixed exchange rate or one that remains inside a target zone – because, absent a commitment device, optimal monetary can’t deliver a stationary domestic price level. Another feature in the data for inflation targeting countries that is consistent with monetary policy via Taylor type rule is that it will tend push the nominal exchange rate in the opposite direction from PPP in response to an ‘inflation’ shock—the ‘bad news god news’ result of Clarida and Waldman (2008. Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate. In: John Campbell, (Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Clarida and Waldman (2014. Bad News About Inflation is Good News for the Nominal Exchange Rate Under Optimal Monetary Policy: DSGE Theory and a Decade of Empirical Evidence). This is so even though in the long run of these models the nominal exchange rate must in expectation obey PPP.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

Exchange market pressure on the pound–dollar exchange rate: 1925–1931

This is a study of exchange market pressure against the pound sterling during the inter-war period. The main findings are that (a) the behavior of U.K. fundamentals relative to those of the U.S.A. helps to explain exchange market pressure against the pound; (b) during the run-up to devaluation in September 1931 the monetary authorities in the U.K. were acting to reduce domestic credit; but (c) additional pressure was brought against the pound from speculative sources. These findings relate to current thinking on the choice of exchange rate regime as even well-behaved fundamentals may not be sufficient to sustain a currency on its peg.     

Keeping the lid on inflation

James Nixon and Andrew Sentance examine the current monetary policy dilemma: whether to raise interest rates in response to sterling weakness, or pay more attention to subdued consumer demand. They conclude that interest rates should rise (from their rate at the time of writing of 6.75%), but that other changes to the monetary framework would enhance the credibility and effectiveness of current UK anti-inflationary policy.     

货币区建设与货币政策的独立性：一个分析框架

美国次贷危机引发了全球性金融危机,这凸显了以美国为核心的“金融资本主义模式”和以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系的制度性缺陷,改革现行的以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系势在必行,建立货币区是较为现实的选择。但在现行货币政策框架下,货币区不可避免会出现“三元悖论”困境。本文提出的贷款准备金政策框架模型,能够解决货币区在保证其内在要求的资本自由流动和汇率稳定基本前提下,区内各个成员保持货币政策的独立性问题。     

Intraday effect of news on emerging European forex markets: An event study analysis

We analyze the impact of euro zone/German and U.S. macroeconomic news announcements and the communication of the monetary policy settings of the ECB and the Fed on the forex markets of new EU members. We employ an event study methodology to analyze intraday data from 2011–2015. Our comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of macroeconomic information during the post-GFC period shows that: (i) macroeconomic announcements affect the value of the new EU country exchange rates, (ii) the origin of the announcement matters, (iii) the type of announcement matters, (iv) different types of news (good, bad or neutral) result in different reactions, (v) markets react not only after the news release but also before, (vi) when the U.S. dollar is the base currency the impact of the news is larger than in the case of the euro, (vii) announcements on ECB monetary policy result in stronger effects than those of the Fed, (viii) temporary inefficiencies are present in new EU country forex markets, (ix) new EU country exchange rates react differently to positive US news during the EU debt crisis compared to the rest of the period.     

A revisit to economic exposure of U.S. multinational corporations

To shed light on the influence of U.S. major trade partners’ currencies on MNCs’ firm values, this study investigates the asymmetric effects and the determinants of appreciated and depreciated economic exposure of the U.S. MNCs. Our empirical results reveal several findings: (1) The influences of exchange rate fluctuation on stock returns vary enormously for different currencies. (2) During the U.S. dollar appreciating period, MNCs benefit very little from this appreciation against major trade partners’ currencies, but most MNCs see harmful impacts from a U.S. dollar appreciation against the Brazilian real. (3) During the U.S. dollar depreciating period, most U.S. MNCs benefit from this depreciation against the European Monetary Union’s euro, Mexican new peso and Brazilian real; however, they overall suffer losses against the Chinese yuan, Japanese yen, and British pound. (4) The level of foreign sales is the key determinant of economic exposure.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

The effects of U.S. monetary policy on Colombia and Panama (2002–2007)

I study the economies of Colombia (floating exchange rate) and Panama (dollarized) to illustrate how the monetary policy of a large economy can export capital structure distortions to small open economies that follow different exchange rate regimes. The paper contributes to the literature on international business cycles in two ways. First, it adds to recent research that extends the Mises–Hayek business cycle theory to an international context. Second, most current research abstracts from effects on the production structures of emerging market economies when analyzing the transmission of monetary policy shocks. This paper seeks to fill this gap by studying structural effects of U.S. monetary policy on the economies of Colombia (floating exchange rate) and Panama (dollarized).     

Bond market co-movements,expected inflation and the GBP-USD equilibrium real exchange rate

Since the end of the fixed rates in 1973 and after the European Monetary System (EMS) sterling dismissal in 1992, the value of the pound has undergone large cyclical fluctuations on average. Of particular interest to policy makers is the understanding of whether such movements are consistent with the lack or not of a correction mechanism to some long-run equilibrium. The purpose of the present study is to understand those dynamics, how the external value of the British sterling (GBP) relative to the US dollar (USD) evolved during the recent floating experiences, and what have been the driving forces. In this paper we assume the real exchange rate to be determined by forces relating to the goods and capital market in a general equilibrium framework. This entails testing the purchasing power parity (PPP) and the uncovered interest parity (UIP) together. In doing so, we model inflation expectations explicitly. Our findings have two important implications, both for monetary policy. First, we show that some of the observed changes in the bilateral real exchange rate cannot be solely attributed to changes in inflation rates, but, also to capital markets. Secondly, we find a weaker behavior of the US bond rate on international markets, possibly explained by the special US dollar status of World reserve currency.     

Time-frequency co-movements between oil prices and interest rates: Evidence from a wavelet-based approach

This paper investigates time–frequency co-movements between crude oil prices and interest rates. To test this relationship, the study applied a continuous wavelet and cross wavelet approaches to data from West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices and interest rates in the United States (U.S.). Results from the sample period revealed significant relationships, in the intermediate term, between WTI crude oil prices and U.S. interest rates. Moreover, co-movements between oil price and interest rate variables were especially sensitive during abnormal political events and periods of financial ‘meltdown’. We further use Partial Wavelet Coherence (PWC) and Multiple Wavelet Coherence (MWC) methods to investigate the impacts of five major control variables namely GDP growth, unemployment, three-month Treasury bill, CPI index and industrial production index. The results show a powerful impact of control variables on oil-interest rates co-movements under different frequencies. Finally, we show evidence of co-integrating long run relationship between oil markets and control variables. These results have important implications for energy investors and policy makers.     

The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner. In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.     

Monetary policy in deflation: the liquidity trap in history and practice

The experience of the U.S. economy during the mid-1930s, when short-term nominal interest rates were continuously close to zero, is sometimes taken as evidence that monetary policy was ineffective and the economy was in a “liquidity trap.” Close examination of the historical policy record for the period indicates that the evidence does not support such assertions. The incomplete and erratic recovery from the Great Depression can be traced to a failure to pursue consistently expansionary policy resulting from an incorrect understanding of monetary policy in an environment of very low short-term nominal interest rates. Commonalities with the Japanese experience during the late 1990s, and the inadequacy of short-term interest rates as indicators of the stance of monetary policy are discussed and a robust operating procedure for implementing monetary policy in a low-interest-rate environment by adjusting the maturity of targeted interest-rate instruments is described.     

Monetary policy rules for convergence to the Euro

This paper investigates the applicability of open-economy convergence-consistent instrument rules for monetary policies in the economies undergoing monetary convergence to a common currency area. The proposed policy rule is forward-looking, consistent with a monetary framework based on inflation-targeting containing input variables that are relative to the corresponding variables in the common currency area. Robust forms of the policy rule are tested empirically for three inflation-targeting countries converging to the euro, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Empirical tests imply systemic differences in monetary policies among these euro-candidates. The Czech monetary policy seemingly follows the rule prescribed by our model. Both the Czech and the Polish central bank interest rate policies respond predominantly to changes in the inflation gap, while the Hungarian responds mainly to the exchange rate gap. In all three cases, changes in the eurozone short-term interest rates strongly drive adjustments in the central banks’ reference interest rates.