Pioneering advantages in manufacturing and service industries: empirical evidence from nine countries

Although one might expect differences between manufacturing and service firms in pioneering advantages, the extent of these differences has not yet been investigated. This is the first cross‐national study that compares such differences in nine countries/regions: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. We develop several hypotheses concerning the perceptions of managers of manufacturing firms and service firms regarding the benefits and post‐entry risks of pioneering, and the cost and differentiation advantages accruing to the pioneering firm. We test the hypotheses with data from 2,419 firms representing all nine countries and both industrial sectors. We find that: (1) managers from all countries perceive pioneering to be associated with higher market share and/or profitability; (2) manufacturing firm managers perceive pioneering risks to be significantly more important than do service firm managers; (3) cost and differentiation advantages of pioneering are, for the most part, more significant to manufacturing than to service firm managers; (4) Western manufacturing firm managers perceive the cost advantages to be more important than Asian Pacific manufacturing firm managers. We conclude by presenting the managerial implications of our findings. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Give it to us straight (most of the time): Top managers’ use of concrete language and its effect on investor reactions

Research Summary : Building on the communications and linguistics literatures, we explore the language attributes managers use in interactions with investors and the subsequent reactions of investors. Specifically, we hypothesize that top managers’ use of concrete language attributes in communication with investors broadly associates with positive investor reactions. We further posit that this relationship will be moderated by the level of firm risk. Our results support our hypotheses and, thus, offer important insights to the impression management literature. First, subtle elements of managerial communication can have significant impression management consequences. More specifically, language concreteness is a key language attribute that generally induces positive investor responses. Finally, the effectiveness of language concreteness is conditional on the informational environment of the firm. Managerial Summary : How can managers communicate in a way that presents the firm more positively or reduces the negativity associated with perceived firm risks? Our findings indicate that choosing appropriate persuasive language features in interactions with investors can help a firm manage its impressions. Specifically, we find that top managers’ use of concrete language that provides details and specific information in communication with investors, in general, garners positive investor reactions. Further, the effectiveness of top managers’ use of concrete language depends on investor concerns. More specifically, we find that when a firm is seen as having a riskier profile, using concrete language helps induce a more positive investor response; while when a firm is seen as low risk, using abstract language may be more beneficial.     

Who Do Firms Lay Off and Why?

I develop and test a structural–historical account of corporate reductions in force (RIF) to assess whether this widespread process was redistributive or efficient. I argue that changes in the context of restructuring in recent decades, coupled with substantial changes in organizational compensation systems, lead to temporal variation in the likelihood of “broken‐contract” RIF, in which firms terminate highly paid managers, and “trimming the fat” RIF, in which firms terminate low‐performing managers. Analyses of personnel records from a Fortune 500 manufacturing firm indicate that low performance leads to increased risk of separation in each of the two RIF undertaken by the firm, with the effect becoming stronger over time in part because of changes in the firm’s performance management system. By contrast, high wages were a more important factor explaining departure during the firm’s RIF in the 1980s—when competitive pressures to default on bonded contracts were strong—than during its RIF in the 1990s.     

People and process,suits and innovators: the role of individuals in firm performance

Performance differences between firms are generally attributed to organizational factors rather than to differences among the individuals who make up firms. As a result, little is known about the part that individual firm members play in explaining the variance in performance among firms. This paper employs a multiple membership cross‐classified multilevel model to test the degree to which organizational or individual factors explain firm performance. The analysis also examines whether individual differences among middle managers or innovators best explain firm performance variation. The results indicate that variation among individuals matter far more in organizational performance than is generally assumed. Further, variation among middle managers has a particularly large impact on firm performance, much larger than that of those individuals who are assigned innovative roles. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy

Research summary : We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm‐specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely, takeover protection leads to an increase in firm‐specific knowledge. Further, the relationship between takeover protection and firm‐specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long‐tenured managers have already committed to their firms. Using a differences‐in‐differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the mid‐1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments. Managerial summary : We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in mid‐1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward the development of firm‐specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in the level of firm‐specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid‐1990s. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Slack resources,firm performance,and the institutional context: Evidence from privately held European firms

Research summary : Integrating the behavioral and institutional perspectives, we propose that a country's formal institutions, particularly its legal frameworks, affect managers' deployment of slack resources. Specifically, we explore the moderating effects of creditor and employee rights on the performance effects of slack. Using longitudinal data from 162,633 European private firms in 26 countries, we find that financial slack enhances firm performance at diminishing rates, whereas human resource (HR) slack lowers performance at diminishing rates. However, financial slack has a more positive effect on firm performance in countries with weaker creditor rights, whereas HR slack has a more negative effect on performance in countries with stronger employee rights. The results provide a richer view of the relationship between slack and firm performance than currently assumed in the literature. Managerial summary : A key dilemma managers often encounter is whether, on the one hand, they should build in excess resources to buffer their firms from internal and external shocks and to pursue new opportunities or whether, on the other hand, they should develop “lean” firms. Our study suggests that excess cash resources—which are usually viewed as easy to redeploy—benefit firm performance, especially when firms operate in countries with weaker creditor rights. However, excess human resources—which are usually viewed as more difficult to redeploy—hamper firm performance, particularly when firms operate in countries with stronger labor protection laws. Thus, the management of slack resources critically depends on the characteristics of these resources (e.g., redeployability) and the institutional context in which managers operate. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreshadowing as Impression Management: Illuminating the Path for Security Analysts

Research summary: Managers can disclose information to security analysts as a form of impression management, but doing so is problematic because competitors can use that same information at the expense of the firm. We identify an impression management technique we call foreshadowing, which refers to hinting about future potential strategic activity. Foreshadowing provides information of value to analysts that can influence their evaluations of a firm, but not so much information as to put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. We hypothesize and find that managers who foreshadow acquisition announcements receive fewer analyst downgrades following the announcements, especially when there is more analyst uncertainty about the firm. We also hypothesize and find that analysts' responses to foreshadowing positively influence the likelihood that managers eventually acquire other firms. Managerial summary: Security analysts are often suspicious when firms announce acquisitions as those announcements are cumbersome to analyze on short notice and raise questions about managerial motivations that might not represent the best interests of the firm. We find that managers can improve analyst reactions to acquisition announcements by disclosing some information of value to analysts—specifically by hinting that an acquisition could occur in the future. We refer to such hints as foreshadowing. Foreshadowing entails giving analysts information to reduce their suspicions and facilitate their analyses, but not so much information as to degrade the firm's competitive information advantage over other firms. Foreshadowing also allows managers the option to reconsider actually executing the acquisition if analysts respond negatively to its possibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward a theory of intraorganizational attention based on desirability and feasibility factors

Why would managers in the same firm differ in their attention to opportunity versus threat aspects of the same exogenous shock? Drawing on the attention‐based view, strategic issue diagnosis theory, and construal level theory, we propose and test a theoretical model of differentiated attention among managers within a firm driven by desirability (shock distance) and feasibility (capability perception) considerations. Managers more distant from the locus of the shock and managers with stronger ex ante perceptions regarding organizational capabilities to address the shock paid more attention to opportunity aspects and less attention to threat aspects. We also found subordination effects between shock distance and capability perception, and a moderating role of domain‐specific experience on the effects of capability perception.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Strategic Planning Enhance or Impede Innovation and Firm Performance?*

Does strategic planning enhance or impede innovation and firm performance? The current literature provides contradictory views. This study extends the resource‐advantage theory to examine the conditions in which strategic planning increases or decreases the number of new product development projects and firm performance. The authors test the theoretical model by collecting data from 227 firms. The empirical evidence suggests that more strategic planning and more new product development (NPD) projects lead to better firm performance. Firms with organizational redundancy benefit more from strategic planning than firms with less organizational redundancy. Increasing R&D intensity boosts both the number of NPD projects and firm performance. Strategic planning is more effective in larger firms with higher R&D intensity for increasing the number of NPD projects. The results reported in this study also consist of several findings that challenge the traditional views of strategic planning. The evidence suggests that strategic planning impedes, not enhances, the number of NPD projects. Larger firms benefit less, not more, from strategic planning for improving firm performance. Larger firms do not necessarily create more NPD projects. Increasing organizational redundancy has no effect on the number of NPD projects. These empirical results provide important strategic implications. First, managers should be aware that, in general, formal strategic planning decreases the number of NPD projects for innovation management. Improvised rather than planned activities are more conducive to creating NPD project ideas. Moreover, innovations tend to emerge from improvisational processes, during which the impromptu execution of NPD activities without planning spurs “thinking outside the box,” which enhances the process of creating NPD project ideas. Therefore, more flexible strategic plans that accommodate potential improvisation may be needed in NPD management since innovation‐related activities cannot be planned precisely due to the unexpected jolts and contingencies of the NPD process. Second, large firms with high levels of R&D intensity can overcome the negative effect of strategic planning on the number of NPD projects. Specifically, a firm's abundant resources, when allocated and deployed for NPD activities, signal the high priority and importance of the NPD activities and thus motivate employees to acquire, collect, and gather customer and technical knowledge, which leads to creating more NPD projects. Finally, managers must understand that managing strategic planning and generating NPD project ideas are beneficial to the ultimate outcome of firm performance despite the adverse relationship between strategic planning and the number of NPD projects.     

External control,corporate strategy,and firm performance in research-intensive industries

This paper explores the proposition that the divergence of interest between managers and stockholders has implications for corporate strategy and firm profitability. Stockholders prefer strategies which maximize their wealth. Managers prefer strategies which maximize their utility. It is theorized that in research-intensive industries, when stockholders dominate, innovation strategies are favored. When managers dominate, diversification strategies are favored. In addition, innovation is argued to be associated with greater firm profitability than diversification. This theory is tested on 94 Fortune 500 firms drawn from research-intensive industries. The results largely confirm theoretical expectations.     

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivating regulated suppliers to assess alternative technologies,protocols, and capital structures

Regulated firms can be tempted to adopt cost-saving technologies, operating procedures, or capital structures without fully assessing the associated risks. We demonstrate how a regulator can costlessly preclude such behavior if she can impose substantial penalties on the firm in the event of poor realized performance. When these penalties are more limited, the regulated firm secures rent from its privileged ability to assess the riskiness of potential technologies. If these penalties are sufficiently limited, the regulator optimally affords the firm no choice among technologies. Consequently, the regulated firm prefers moderate penalties to very limited penalties.     

Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A path to value creation for foreign entrepreneurs

Research summary : Firms founded by foreign entrepreneurs constitute an influential and growing part of the world economy. Yet, the existing research has given little consideration to the strategies of foreign entrepreneurs beyond their decisions to start a firm. In this article, we address this gap by examining how foreign entrepreneurs may bring value to their firms as firm managers. We argue that foreign owner‐managers may benefit their firms by having access to home‐country resources. We demonstrate that, compared to hired local managers, foreign owner‐managers reduce firms' operating costs by disproportionately hiring home‐country labor when this labor is more cost‐efficient. This effect is larger for labor‐intensive industries and for entrepreneurs from less wealthy countries. Managerial summary : Foreign entrepreneurs represent an important part of the world economy. Yet, we know little of how foreign entrepreneurs manage their firms. In this article, we examine whether foreign entrepreneurs and domestic managers hire different employees. We find that when foreign entrepreneurs manage their firms personally, they hire a larger number of foreign workers, and such workers are cheaper and more productive than the local labor. Conversely, domestic managers tend to hire local employees, despite their higher relative wages. Foreign owner‐managers are particularly valuable in labor‐intensive industries and when their home‐country labor is inexpensive. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Guest Editors' Introduction to Special Issue. Turnaround in Asia: Laying the Foundation for Understanding this Unique Domain

Turnaround is a subject that is receiving increasing attention from researchers, managers and consultants. However, the subject has received minimal examination in Asia, with studies usually focusing more on the external environment or macroeconomic issues and less on the management of Asian firms themselves. This lack of examination has persisted despite the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, which pushed many firms into significant decline. Thus, this special issue will provide a baseline for examining this topic more closely. This introduction presents ten papers of this special issue of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management on firm turnaround in Asia. This paper also suggests key research questions for future examinations of the topic of firm turnaround in and around Asia.     

Speed to Market for Innovative Products: Blessing or Curse?

The relationships among speed to market, quality, and costs are important to managers as they attempt to best establish incentives and set goals for new product development teams, allocate resources for new product development, or create positional advantage in the market. The existing literature suggests that the economic consequences of being late to the market are significant, including higher development and manufacturing costs, lower profit margins, and lessening of the firm's market value. Therefore, traditional logic has held that new product development managers need to manage the trade‐offs among speed to market, quality, and costs. While both scholars and managers have often acquiesced to performance trade‐offs among “faster, better, and cheaper,” this research attempts to improve understanding of the interrelationships between these objectives, and ultimately profit. Based on a survey of 197 managers, faster speed to market is shown to be related to better quality and lower costs; it is not necessary to sacrifice one of these outcomes. Further, the moderating roles of two dimensions of innovativeness (innovativeness to the firm and to the market) are examined on the relationships between speed and quality, as well as speed and profit. Both dimensions of innovativeness positively moderate the relationship between speed to market and quality. For more innovative products (both to the firm and the market), there is a stronger positive relationship between speed and quality than for less innovative products. Further, innovativeness to the firm negatively moderates the relationship between speed and profit. Thus, speed has a less positive impact on profit for highly innovative‐to‐the‐firm products compared with less innovative‐to‐the‐firm products. By being conscious of the projects’ levels of innovativeness (along with prioritizing various performance measures), managers can more rationally decide when to emphasize speed to market based on this study's findings.     

Institutional common ownership and firm value: Evidence from real estate investment trusts

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about whether and how institutional common ownership (ICO) affects firm behavior. Using a sample of equity real estate investment trusts (REITs), which provide significant advantages for isolating a monitoring channel, we find a robust and positive relation between ICO and REIT firm value. The positive relation between ICO and firm value is driven mainly by motivated investors and becomes stronger when we construct our ICO measures using blockholdings. Our difference‐in‐differences analysis, using mergers between institutional investors, suggests a causal relation exists between ICO and firm value. After investigating various channels through which ICO could affect firm behavior, we conclude that asset allocation decisions and performance are the most plausible explanations. Our finding that the monitoring associated with ICO aids managers in their portfolio disposition strategies further supports this conclusion. This enhanced monitoring leads to increased property portfolio returns, as well as more geographic diversification.