Tick size,market structure,and market quality

Large tick sizes imposed on high-priced stocks on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) are significant binding constraints on bid-ask spreads. Nearly 60% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks with the largest tick size and more than 87% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks in the largest size portfolio. We also show that the average spread of KSE stocks with large tick sizes is greater than that of matched NYSE stocks, whereas the average spread of KSE stocks with the smallest tick size is smaller than the corresponding figure for the matched NYSE stocks. We interpret these results as evidence that traders on the KSE are paying large trading costs because of the artificially imposed large tick sizes.     

Tick Size,Spreads, and Liquidity: An Analysis of Nasdaq Securities Trading near Ten Dollars

Quoted and effective bid–ask spreads on Nasdaq are two to four cents per share narrower, ceteris paribus, when stocks trade with a smaller tick size below $10 per share. There is no evidence of a reduction in liquidity with the smaller tick size. The largest spread reductions occur for stocks whose market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes. This finding provides support for models implying that changes in the tick size can affect equilibrium spreads on a dealer market and indicates that the relation between tick size and market quality is more complex than the imposition of a constraint on minimum spread widths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G29, D34, N20.     

Competition between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra

Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the nuclei for further mergers and co‐operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched‐sample approach to compare execution costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. The differences are more pronounced for less liquid stocks. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse selection component. Realised spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.     

Modeling the bid/ask spread: measuring the inventory-holding premium

The need to understand and measure the determinants of market maker bid/ask spreads is crucial in evaluating the merits of competing market structures and the fairness of market maker rents. This study develops a simple, parsimonious model for the market maker's spread that accounts for the effects of price discreteness induced by minimum tick size, order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs, adverse selection, and competition. The inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components of spread are modeled as an option with a stochastic time to expiration. This inventory-holding premium embedded in the spread represents compensation for the price risk borne by the market maker while the security is held in inventory. The premium is partitioned in such a way that the inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components, as well as the probability of an informed trade, are identified. The model is tested empirically using Nasdaq stocks in three distinct minimum tick size regimes and is shown to perform well both in an absolute sense and relative to competing specifications.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality of the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis

We find that option listings are associated with a decrease in the variance of the pricing error, a decrease in the adverse selection component of the spread, and an increase in the relative weight placed by the specialist on public information in revising prices for the underlying stocks. We also find that there is a decrease in the spread and increases in quoted depth, trading volume, trading frequency, and transaction size after option listings. Overall, our results suggest that option listings improve the market quality of the underlying stocks.     

Market microstructure of the Pink Sheets

We study the microstructure of the Pink Sheets and assess the ability of existing theory to capture salient features of this relatively unstructured and unregulated market. Clustering patterns in quotes, quoted spreads, and trade prices indicate that market participants have selected price-dependent tick sizes for different stocks. Clustering intensity varies across stocks as a function of proxies for information availability. Similarly, the bid-ask spread varies as a function of volatility and liquidity. These results suggest (1) microstructure research has established robust predictions of market attributes and (2) unstructured markets are able to develop at least some effective behavioral norms endogenously.     

The dynamics of quote adjustments

Liquidity providers on the NYSE make faster quote adjustments towards equilibrium spreads and depths than they do on NASDAQ. Liquidity providers in both markets make faster spread and depth adjustments for stocks with more frequent trading, greater return volatility, higher prices, smaller market capitalizations, and smaller trade sizes. We find that stocks with greater information-based trading and in more competitive trading environments exhibit faster quote adjustments. The speed of quote adjustment is faster after decimalization in both markets. These results are robust and not driven by differences in stock attributes between the two markets or time periods. Overall, our results indicate that stock attributes, market structure, and tick size exert a significant impact on the speed of quote adjustment.     

Tick Size,Share Prices,and Stock Splits

Minimum price variation rules help explain why stock prices vary substantially across countries, and other curiosities of share prices. Companies tend to split their stock so that the institutionally mandated minimum tick size is optimal relative to the stock price. A large relative tick size provides an incentive for dealers to make markets and for investors to provide liquidity by placing limit orders, despite its placing a high floor on the quoted bid-ask spread. A simple model suggests that idiosyncratic risk, firm size, and visibility of the firm affect the optimal relative tick size and thus the share price.     

Decimalization,adverse selection,and market maker rents

I address the issue of how decimalization impacts the information acquisition decision of traders. I show that traders have less of an incentive to improve the quality of their information and, consequently, trades tend to be less informative following a reduction in the minimum tick. This result is consistent with the empirical finding that reductions in the minimum tick lead to declines in the adverse selection component, a finding counter to the theoretical predictions in the literature. This result also explains how the predicted savings from decimalization can exceed even total market maker profits. In addition, I show that even if market makers are perfectly competitive, a minimum tick can lead to multiple spread equilibria, some of which being more than one tick away from the underlying, or “no-tick”, equilibrium spread. Finally, I discuss the implications of the model for payment for order flow/internalization and the existence of an optimal tick size.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order Market

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov‐perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform comparative dynamics. Conditional on a transaction, the midpoint of the quoted prices is not a good proxy for the true value. Further, transaction costs paid by market order submitters are negative on average, and negatively correlated with the effective spread. Reducing the tick size is not Pareto improving but increases total investor surplus.     

LIQUIDITY AND QUOTE CLUSTERING IN A MARKET WITH MULTIPLE TICK SIZES

We analyze market liquidity (i.e., spreads and depths) and quote clustering using data from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), where the tick size increases with share price in a stepwise fashion. We find that stocks that are subject to larger mandatory tick sizes have wider spreads and less quote clustering. We also find that liquidity providers on the KLSE do not always quote larger depths for stocks with larger tick sizes. Overall, our results suggest that larger tick sizes for higher priced stocks are detrimental to market liquidity, although the adverse effect of larger tick sizes is mitigated by lower negotiation costs (i.e., less quote clustering).     

Minimum price variations, discrete bid-ask spreads, and quotation sizes

Exchange minimum price variation regulation's create discretebid-ask spreads. If the minimum quotable spread exceeds thespread that otherwise would be quoted, spreads will be wideand the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large.A cross-sectional discrete spread model is estimated by usingintraday stock quotation spread frequencies. The results areused to project 1/16 spread usage frequencies given a 1/16-tick.Projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes areobtained from regression models. For stocks priced under 10,the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent, quotationsizes would decrease 16 percent, and daily volume would increase34 percent.     

金融期货最小价格变化单位的市场影响与最优水平

最小价格变化单位是买卖价差的底线，设置过高会人为地提高买卖价差的水平，增加交易费用；过低又会降低市场深度，增加交易谈判成本，影响交易效率。对最优价格升降档位的设定，要综合考虑精度要求、合约乘数、交易谈判成本和实际买卖价差水平等因素；而以实际买卖价差的底线作为最小价格升降档位，能较好地避免人为抬高买卖价差的情况出现。     

Is the Adverse Selection Component Really Higher on the NYSE/Amex than on the Nasdaq?

Affleck–Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is higher for NYSE and Amex stocks than for Nasdaq stocks. Using the model of Huang and Stoll (1997), we revisit their study and find the opposite to be true – the adverse selection component is actually higher for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE and Amex stocks. The economic magnitude of this additional adverse selection cost is very significant. Our results have important implications for the understanding of information production in dealer versus auction markets, and the costs of trading on such markets.     

Adverse selection costs for NASDAQ and NYSE after decimalization

NYSE and NASDAQ completed their decimalization on January 29, 2001 and on April 9, 2001 respectively. In this paper, we compare adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread for NASDAQ and NYSE stocks after decimalization using the data from May 2001 and July 2001. We find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is significantly lower on NASDAQ than on NYSE, and these differences cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the stocks traded in the two markets. In addition, we find that the adverse selection costs increase with trade size on NYSE, however there is no monotonic pattern observed for NASDAQ stocks. Lastly, we report that although the order flows arrived in the two markets are significantly different, they can at best explain a small portion of the observed differences in adverse selection costs.     

The Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread: the Case of the Athens Stock Exchange

We analyse the components of the bid‐ask spread in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), which was recently characterised as a developed market. For large and medium capitalisation stocks, we estimate the adverse selection and the order handling component of the spreads as well as the probability of a trade continuation on the same side of either the bid or the ask price, using the Madhavan et al. (1997) model. We extend it by incorporating the traded volume and we find that the adverse selection component exhibits U‐shape patterns, while the cost component pattern depends on the stock price. For high priced stocks, the usual U‐shape applies, while for low‐priced ones, it is an increasing function of time, mainly due to the order handling spread component. Furthermore, the expected price change and the liquidity adjustment to Value‐at‐Risk that is needed are higher in the low capitalisation stocks, while the most liquid stocks are the high priced ones. Moreover, by estimating the Madhavan et al. (1997) model for two distinct periods we explain why there are differences in the components of the bid‐ask spread.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Adverse Selection and the Opaqueness of Insurers

While adverse selection problems between insureds and insurers are well known to insurance researchers, few explore adverse selection in the insurance industry from a capital markets perspective. This study examines adverse selection in the quoted prices of insurers' common stocks with a particular focus on the opacity of both asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities. We find that more opaque underwriting lines result in greater adverse selection costs for property-casualty (P-C) insurers. A similar effect is not apparent for life-health (L-H) insurers and we find no effect of asset opaqueness on adverse selection for either L-H or P-C insurers.