Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness

It is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost. In this paper, we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem. If the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits, this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents.     

排污权交易的层级市场理论与价格研究

借鉴股票的发行、流通、监管程序,提出排污权交易的层级市场结构理论,并据此对排污权交易进行了系统的研究。研究表明,作为排污权交易一级市场（发行市场）的补充,规范有序的排污权交易二级市场（流通市场）对提高排污权交易的效率是必要的;考虑竞争替代的因素采用双方叫价博弈模型研究二级市场的价格问题;最后分析排污权交易中的政府监督及监管问题,认为中央政府和地方政府的双重代理人特性会使政府监督严重失灵,可替代的选择是引进地方政府代理人竞争,通过“社区监督”以强化“政府监督”。     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

市场估值和过度自信对并购绩效的实证研究

运用事件研究法,以2003—2011年中国的上市公司为样本,针对市场估值和管理者过度自信的相互作用对并购绩效的影响进行多元回归分析。结果发现：不同于过度自信管理者,理性管理者在高估和低估价值时期进行的并购活动都能带来正的超额收益。     

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China

This paper empirically studies the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the market valuation of publicly listed firms in China. The authors construct measures for corporate governance mechanisms and measures of market valuation for all publicly listed firms on the two stock markets in China by using data from the firm’s annual reports. They then investigate how the market-valuation variables are affected by the corporate governance variables while controlling for a number of factors commonly considered in market valuation analysis. A corporate governance index is also constructed to summarize the information contained in the corporate governance variables. The index is found to have statistically and economically significant effects on market valuation. The analysis indicates that investors pay a significant premium for well-governed firms in China, benefiting firms that improve their governance mechanisms. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 2 (in Chinese)     

Intangible Investment and Market Valuation

This study derives performance‐ and expenditure‐based estimates of intangible capital and measures the extent to which intangible capital is captured by the equity market measures of firm value. Intangible capital is evaluated using occupational information available in the Finnish linked employer–employee data for the 1997–2011 period. The performance‐based organizational investment in value added is approximately 3 percent; R&D and ICT investment shares are lower, at 1.5 percent, and all are clustered in intangible‐intensive sectors that represent 40 percent of the private sector. Expenditure‐based organizational capital also exists in clusters other than that intensively investing in managerial and marketing effort, and performance‐based R&D capital is concentrated in the cluster with intensive R&D activity; both increase the market value of firms beyond the level that can be explained by standard economic analysis.     

Addressing Negative Willingness to Pay in Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation

This paper has four purposes. First, we outline the controversy surroundingthe issue of negative willingness to pay (WTP)in contingent valuation (CV) studies. Second,we use Monte Carlo simulation to examine theperformance of alternative distributionalassumptions in estimating WTP in the presenceof varying proportions of the populationholding negative WTP values. We focus ondichotomous choice CV (DC-CV), where negativeWTP values may be especially difficult todetect. Third, we extend the simulation toinvestigate the performance of the mixturemodels that have recently been proposed forhandling/identifying non-positive WTP values. Fourth, we extend the simulation to investigatethe performance of the nonparametric lowerbound Turnbull approach. Results indicate thatthe relative performance of the DC-CV modelingalternatives evaluated here, which assumepositive WTP, varies across the simulationsetting (e.g., proportion of negative WTP); butnone can be said to reasonably ``solve' theproblem ex post. This underscores theimportance of ex ante efforts to identify ifnegative WTP is likely to be prominent in agiven valuation setting. In such cases,appropriately handling negative WTP must beaddressed through ex ante survey design andmodeling choices that allow negative WTP.     

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.     

Combining Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments. A Forestry Application in Spain

When many good variants are to be valued, like in several forest management programs which differ in the attribute levels, the Contingent Valuation Method may not be a practical option, given the cost and time involved to value each variant separately. There are at least three alternative procedures in such situations. One (i) is to apply an attribute based valuation method like a Choice Experiment (CE); another (ii) is to conduct a CVM and a CE exercise and estimate a joint model; a third one (iii) is to use the CVM estimates to value a base scenario, and then use the CE results to adjust the CVM estimates for any new different scenario. A numerical simulation and an empirical application to an afforestation program in Spain show that the latter is the procedure that yields closer values to the CVM estimations, followed by (ii).      

Environmental Valuation – To Use or Not to Use? A Comparative Study of the United States and Europe

Valuation methods have been used for five main purposes in environmental decision-making. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of projects, CBA of new regulations, natural resource damage assessment, environmental costing, and environmental accounting. The relatively lower importance attached to economic efficiency in environmental decision-making in most European countries compared to the U.S.A., both legally and in practice, might account for our general finding that there are very few valuation studies in Europe which have served as a decisive basis for environmental policy and regulations. However, with EU's goal to establish environmentally adjusted national accounts and to apply CBA to environmental policy and regulations, time seems ripe for an increased use of valuation techniques in Europe.     

Taxesversus tradable discharge permits: A review in the light of the U.S. and European experience

The U.S. and West European environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution. The U.S. has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes. The countries of the European Community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits. A review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system.     

Using Choice Experiments to Value the Environment

This paper we outline the “choice experiment” approach to environmental valuation. This approach has its roots in Lancaster's characteristics theory of value, in random utility theory and in experimental design. We show how marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets, such as forests and rivers, can be estimated from pair-wise choices, as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole. These choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient statistical estimation of the underlying utility function, and to minimise required sample size. Choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods, such as contingent valuation and travel cost-type models, although many design issues remain unresolved. Applications to environmental issues have so far been relatively limited. We illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent UK study on public preferences for alternative forest landscapes. This study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

Environmental problems and policy in the Single European Market

The paper analyzes the direct and indirect environmental impacts of the completion of the Single European Market, both internally and with respect to the Rest of the World. Moreover, the principles of environmental policy are described. The main conclusion is that if the European Community and the member states develop effective and efficient policy instruments the positive effects of the completion of the Single Market could substantially outweigh the negative impacts.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment

In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election.     

Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power

We derive an enforcementstrategy for a transferable permit system inthe presence of market power that achievescomplete compliance in a cost-effective manner.We show that the presence of a firm with marketinfluence makes designing an enforcementstrategy more difficult than enforcing aperfectly competitive system. We alsore-consider Hahn's (1984) suggestion that afirm with market influence should be allocatedpermits so that it chooses to not participatein the permit market. When enforcement and itscosts are taken into account, Hahn's suggestiondoes not hold except in a very special case.     

Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation

Self-reporting of compliance status has become a common feature in the enforcement of environmental regulation. In this paper, I generalize existing models of enforcement with self-reporting to include the possibility of private enforcement of regulation through citizen suits. This allows me to identify an additional argument for the efficiency of self-reporting: it can increase the likelihood of a successful suit and thus facilitate private enforcement of regulation. Specifically, if self-reporting sufficiently increases the expected penalty for losing a citizen suit, if the costs of private enforcement are low, and if inspection costs are high enough relative to enforcement costs, self-reporting lowers expected regulatory and social costs by allowing the regulator to rely on private enforcement and decrease his enforcement efforts.

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