Lifetime vs Annual Tax-Transfer Incidence: How Much Less Progressive?

Annual fiscal incidence studies have found that income taxes and cash transfers are highly progressive and that their net effect is to redistribute income from rich to poor. Yet many argue Jhat such studies overstate the redistribution achieved by governments and that lifetime analysis is needed New results suggest that both income taxes and cash transfers are progressive on a lifetime basis, although they are much less progressive than annual studies suggest. The Australian tax-transfer system thus generates some lifetime redistribution from rich to poor, while also enforcing intra-personal redistribution across the life cycle of individuals.     

间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究

使用全国城乡家庭消费和收入微观数据考察间接税对于城乡收入差距和收入分配的影响发现:平均来看,全国居民负担的税收占收入的比例是10.6%;不论在全国范围来看还是分别在城乡内部来看,间接税负担都呈现累退:低收入的负担率高于高收入的负担率。在城乡之间,城镇居民的税收负担率高于农村居民的税收负担率。间接税增加了城乡内部不平等,降低了城乡之间的不平等。间接税主要对低收入群体影响较大,略微恶化了整体收入不平等。     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

EFFECTS OF TAXES AND BENEFITS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KOREA

This paper examines the redistributive effects of Korea's fiscal policies, including consumption taxes and in‐kind benefits. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2007, we find that taxes and transfers reduce income inequality in Korea by 13.8 percent. Contrary to the popular belief that direct taxes are the key tool for redistribution, in‐kind benefits, direct taxes, and social security contributions all decrease the Gini coefficient by 6.7, 4.7, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. The redistributive effect of consumption taxes is small and negative (?0.5 percentage point). Policy simulations indicate that education spending financed by the personal income tax has a positive redistributive effect and that the lower 70 percent of households enjoy positive net benefits. Spending targeting the poor has a strong redistributive effect, which implies low popularity because the majority of households face net losses.     

间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究

使用全国城乡家庭消费和收入微观数据考察间接税对于城乡收入差距和收入分配的影响发现:平均来看,全国居民负担的税收占收入的比例是10.6%;不论在全国范围来看还是分别在城乡内部来看,间接税负担都呈现累退:低收入的负担率高于高收入的负担率。在城乡之间,城镇居民的税收负担率高于农村居民的税收负担率。间接税增加了城乡内部不平等,降低了城乡之间的不平等。间接税主要对低收入群体影响较大,略微恶化了整体收入不平等。     

Redistributive choices and increasing income inequality: experimental evidence for income as a signal of deservingness

We explore the relation between redistribution choices, source of income, and pre-redistribution inequality. Previous studies find that when income is earned through work there is less support for redistribution than when income is determined by luck. Using a lab experiment, we vary both the income-generating process (luck vs. performance) and the level of inequality (low vs. high). We find that an increase in inequality has less impact on redistribution choices when income is earned through performance than when income results from luck. This result is likely explained by individuals using income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness. If people believe income inequality increases as a result of performance rather than luck, then they are likely to believe the poor deserve to stay poor and the rich deserve to stay rich.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.     

Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched

In democratic countries, elected policymakers determine public spending. The level of public spending depends on taxes that are decided by a voting mechanism. Policymakers also decide how to allocate funds among different policies, such as public education and pure redistributive transfers. How are the levels of funding for public education and redistribution determined in the political process? What impacts do votes on these two policies have on inequality, growth and social mobility? We develop a politico-economic model that highlights a novel mechanism: public education provides opportunities for the children of the poor to be recognized for their talent. This reduces the probability of a mismatch, which takes place when individuals with low talent who come from rich families find jobs that should go to people with high talent (and vice versa). Hence, the poor may prefer public spending on education to direct redistribution, while the rich prefer redistribution, as education implies more competition for good jobs from the poor.     

Multidimensional Inequality Across Three Developed Countries

This paper produces comparable estimates of multidimensional inequality for the U.S., Germany, and Australia. Two alternative approaches with differing interpretations are employed. The first method projects all facets of welfare onto a single variable which is then analyzed using standard univariate techniques. The second approach establishes equivalent‐income distributions that would lead to an equalization of welfare, such that the difference between this counterfactual and the true income distribution can be measured. This difference is then interpreted as the degree of income redistribution required to offset welfare inequality. Using data on permanent incomes, health scores, years of education, and leisure times, we observe much higher levels of inequality in the U.S. than in Germany or Australia. Our results are highly statistically significant and hold over a large variety of weighting specifications.     

Income distribution, borrowing constraints and redistributive policies

This paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship. We model a two-period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity. In this context, we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent (class) with median income. In particular, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution. The effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class. Empirical results from a panel of 22 OECD countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications.     

Budget Incidence Reconsidered

The paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing budget incidence. The welfare gain of consuming a public good is determined by the benefit approach. On this basis the incidence of taxation, benefits and net benefits is investigated. Measures of progression are proposed. It is shown that the joint incidence of governmental taxation and expenditure can be related to residual progression and the income elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good. An example demonstrates that progressive taxation can be overcompensated by a distribution of benefits which favors the rich.     

Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms*

To what extent does the welfare state exacerbate the loss of jobs due to offshoring? We consider a model with oligopolistic sectors that are exposed to offshoring, as well as a unionised labour force that is entitled to unemployment benefits. We find that deeper economic integration induces wage moderation to the point that wages become independent of workers' outside options. Because the entire incidence of redistribution falls on net wages, the unions' willingness to moderate wages is constrained by the level of redistribution. Beyond an upper limit of redistribution, extending the welfare state compels unions to oppose wage moderation at the cost of losing jobs to offshoring. Below that upper limit, however, redistribution becomes less rather than more distortive.     

Income Mobility, Inequality and Social Welfare

It is often argued that an observation of rising annual income inequality need not have negative normative implications. The argument is that if there has been a sufficiently large simultaneous increase in mobility, the inequality of income measured over a longer time period can be lower despite the rise in annual inequality. In this paper, it is shown by example that if normative implications are drawn from a standard social welfare function, the set of circumstances put forward in the above argument are not sufficient to guarantee that social welfare will improve. The reason is that even though rising mobility does reduce longer term inequality, it also increases the variability of income profiles over time and the latter has a detrimental social welfare effect. Hence, there are two types of mobility: one which reduces inequality (regression to the mean), but another that increases inequality (relative movements uncorrelated with incomes). Further, if individuals' aversion to income variabiltiy is sufficiently larger than the social welfare judge's aversion to inequality, then an increase in mobility, no matter how large, cannot offset the negative normative effect of rising annual inequality.     

Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: A Demand‐Based Approach*

There is strong evidence suggesting that different income groups consume different bundles of goods. Hence, trade liberalization can affect welfare inequality via changes in the relative prices of goods consumed by different income groups (the price effect). In this paper, I develop a framework that enables us to explore the role of the price effect in determining welfare inequality. I find that trade liberalization does benefit some income classes more than others. In particular, I show that the relative welfare of the rich with respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

Fiscal Incidence in Ghana

We use methods developed by the Commitment to Equity Institute to assess the effects of government taxation, social spending and indirect subsidies on poverty and inequality in Ghana. We also simulate several policy reforms to assess their distributional consequences. Results show that, although the country has some very progressive taxes and well‐targeted expenditures, the extent of fiscal redistribution is small, but about what one would expect given Ghana's income level and relatively low initial inequality. Results for poverty reduction are less encouraging: were it not for the in‐kind benefits from health and education spending, the overall effect of government spending and taxation would actually increase poverty in Ghana. Eliminating energy subsidies and at the same time reallocating part of the savings to well‐targeted transfer programs could lower the fiscal deficit while reducing inequality and protecting the poor.     

Preferences for redistribution and exposure to tax-benefit schemes in Europe

This paper provides evidence that attitudes towards redistribution are associated with the extent of generosity of the redistributive context experienced by the individual, as measured by the likelihood of receiving positive benefit transfers net of fiscal contribution. We estimate reduced form tax-benefit equations with the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), and match the implied parameters to the respondents of the European Social Survey (ESS) on the basis of their characteristics. The period of analysis is 2008–2016. For identification, we exploit exogenous cross-country and time variation in tax rules and market income to disentangle implications of exposure to tax-benefit rules on preferences for redistribution from the effects of changes in income inequality. We find that exposure to positive net benefits increases support for redistribution by 1.4%–3% on baseline models, the effect being robust across a variety of specifications.     

Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel's Law: The Impact of Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth

This article analyzes the impactof inequality on growth when consumers have hierarchic preferencesand technical progress is driven by innovations. With hierarchicpreferences, the poor consume predominantly basic goods, whereasthe rich consume also luxury goods. Inequality has an impacton growth because it affects the level and the dynamics of aninnovator's demand. It is shown that redistribution from veryrich to very poor consumers can be beneficial for growth. Ingeneral, the growth effect depends on the nature of redistribution.Due to a demand externality from R&D activities, multipleequilibria are possible.