The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure

Abstract:  The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.     

Additional Evidence on the Association Between Director Stock Ownership and Incentive Compensation

Governance scholars argue that outside directors have little incentive to monitor managers when their equity stake in the firm is not significant. A sample with a substantial level of outside director shareholdings is examined and a negative relationship between incentive compensation and outside director stock ownership is found. While firms pay higher incentive compensation when they have greater investment opportunities, the compensation contains excess pay due to ineffective corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest more effective corporate governance and lower incentive compensation when outside director stock ownership is higher.     

Ownership Structure and Dividend Preference

Most Chinese listed companies have been transformed from state-owned enterprises; the resulting institutional transformation is characterized by the emergence of highly concentrated ownership and state-owned shares, which may exert an influence on corporate finance. We examine the relationship between ownership structure and cash dividend preference and then reexamine the same relationship with different levels of growth opportunities. The results reveal a positive relationship between cash dividend preference and state ownership, but the same relationship exists only in firms facing lower levels of investment opportunity. However, the ratio of employee shares and tradable shares correlates significantly and negatively with cash dividend preference.     

Ownership Structure and IPO Underpricing

Abstract:   Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that underpricing can be employed to determine post IPO ownership structure, and thereby to influence monitoring and/or control of the company post issue. This paper employs unique data relating to shareholdings of firms listing on the London Stock Exchange, and provides compelling evidence that IPO underpricing does not arise from efforts to determine the ownership structure of the post IPO firm. It is suggested that research is directed elsewhere to find an answer to the underpricing phenomenon, and for means other than IPO underpricing to affect post IPO ownership structure.     

上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的实证分析

股权结构与公司经营绩效之间的关系一直是国内外学者在理论和实践上争论的问题。股权结构是决定公司治理结构的基础,而公司治理效率的高低最终表现在公司经营绩效上。从股权所有制构成和股权集中度两个方面对我国上市公司的股权结构与经营绩效的实证分析表明,股权结构与经营绩效之间存在非常密切的内在联系。     

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.     

The Increasing Use of Non-Executive Directors: Its Impact on UK Board Structure and Governance Arrangements

The last decade has seen a sharp increase in the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the boards of UK listed firms. Using a sample period spanning the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), this paper evaluates the implications of this increase. The main findings can be summarised as follows. First, the increased demand for NEDs has been more pronounced for firms classified as having proportionately too many executive board members in the pre-Cadbury period. Secondly, the probability of compliance with the Cadbury Report's proposal for a minimum of three NEDs is positively related to the magnitude of the expected net benefits of adding further non-executives to the board. Finally, there is little evidence that the increased use of NEDs caused firms to make costly adjustments to other elements of their control systems in an attempt to re-equilibrate their governance portfolios. These findings are consistent with claims that the recent trend towards greater NED representation on UK boards may have helped to raise general governance standards.     

股权结构、动态内生性与公司代理成本

本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。     

The impact of board composition and family ownership on audit committee formation: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study investigates empirically the relationship between three major corporate governance attributes (family shareholding, non-executive directors and independent chairman) and the existence of audit committees across a sample of 397 publicly traded firms in Hong Kong. The results show that at a medium level of family shareholding (between 5% and 25%), the convergence-of-interest effect is dominant and the existence of audit committees decreases. At a high level of family shareholding (more than 25%), the entrenchment effect is dominant and as a result, the existence of audit committees increases. In addition, we show that the response of investors to audit committee existence is not dependent upon family shareholding when there is an independent chairman. The findings of our study also suggest that there is a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the corporate board and audit committee existence. In addition, the results show that the positive association between independent non-executive directors is stronger for firms with an independent chairman. Implications of these findings for regulators are discussed.     

基金管理公司股权结构与基金绩效研究

本研究采用2004～2010年期间的开放式股票型基金为样本,应用Carhart的四因子模型作为衡量基金投资质量与绩效的评价指标,以基金管理公司的股权结构为切入点,研究基金管理公司组织与股权结构对旗下基金绩效的影响。在控制了基金特征和基金经理特征后,我们发现国有控股和中外合资基金管理公司旗下的基金绩效较好。表明我国基金行业存在国有资本的帮助之手效应;此外,外资参股有利于提高基金业绩。     

内部控制对股权结构与盈余质量的传导效应

以2007～2009年我国深沪A股上市公司为研究样本,引入中介变量的研究方法,检验并揭示内部控制对股权结构影响盈余质量的中介传导作用。结果发现:第一大股东持股比例越高,内部控制水平越低,盈余质量水平越低;股权制衡能力越高,内部控制水平越高,更利于提高企业的盈余质量;机构投资者持股比例越高,企业的内部控制水平越高,但盈余质量越低。总体看,内部控制对股权结构与盈余质量具有传导效应,但是显著性存在差异,对股权结构中的第一大股东持股比例、机构投资者持股比例与盈余质量的中介传导效应要显著高于对股权制衡能力与盈余质量的中介传导效应。     

Ownership Structure and Control: Property-Casualty Insurer Conversion to Stock Charter

We examine 98 property-casualty insurance companies that convert to stock charter from a mutual or reciprocal form of organization. Our evidence shows converting firms have low surplus, significant growth in premium income, and draw down on their non-financial assets in years prior to conversion. Following conversion there is significant growth in assets and the number of States licensed. We also show by examining evidence on the riskiness of firms' operations that converting companies began operating like stock companies prior to conversion. Thus, our evidence suggests there can be important costs associated with the operation of a mutual or reciprocal insurance company. These costs can include the opportunity costs associated with foregone investments arising because of higher incremental capital costs inherent in the mutual or reciprocal forms of ownership. There also is a cost disadvantage if a mutual or reciprocal is operating in activities more appropriate for the stock ownership form. These costs can in particular circumstances offset the advantage mutual ownership affords in controlling incentives to transfer wealth from policyholders to equityholders.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

上市公司薪酬委员会有效性与高管薪酬研究——基于“有效契约论”与“管理权力论”的比较分析

"有效契约论"把高管激励契约看成重要的公司治理机制,有效的薪酬激励机制可以协调股东和高管的利益冲突,实现股东财富最大化。"管理权力论"则认为,高管对自己的薪酬安排有很大影响,可以利用自身权力以多种方式进行寻租。本文针对高管激励的上述两种假说,结合我国的制度背景,从上市公司设立薪酬委员会的动因、薪酬委员会对高管薪酬安排的影响两方面展开研究。以2001年至2008年深沪两市的上市公司作为研究样本,通过实证分析,我们发现,如果潜在代理成本越高,公司就越可能设立薪酬委员会,这与有效契约论的预期一致;同时,薪酬委员会的设立增强了薪酬-业绩敏感度。研究结论对健全薪酬委员会制度、有效发挥高管薪酬契约的激励作用以及规范上市公司治理具有借鉴意义。     

公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量

在中国特定的制度和治理背景下探讨企业特征与股权结构对企业现金持有量的影响,并从静态和动态两个角度进行实证研究的结果表明,虽然静态实证结果显示权衡理论、代理理论和融资优序理论都能一定程度上解释中国企业的现金持有行为,但动态实证结果显示中国上市公司的现金持有量具有动态的均值复归趋势。这符合权衡理论和代理理论的预期,但不符合融资优序理论预期。     

国有股权、债务结构与大股东利益侵占

利用2010—2012年我国A股市场国有上市公司数据,研究了债务融资及其不同的组成部分在治理大股东侵占中小股东利益方面的作用。研究发现,债务融资与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著负向关系,即国有企业债务融资行为对大股东利益侵占具有治理作用;短期借款、非公开债务与公开债务均与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著正向关系、长期借款却无法充分发挥其治理作用。其政策含义是,债务融资在治理大股东对国有上市公司利益侵占时,应当关注短期借款以及债务的布置结构所带来的不利影响。     

The Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation: Evidence From Korean Business Groups

Abstract:  We investigate the quality of two primary accounting summary measures, i.e., earnings and book value, provided by firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols). We find that the value-relevance of earnings and book value is significantly smaller for firms affiliated with business groups. We also find that cross-equity ownership (a proxy for the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders) negatively affects value-relevance, while foreign equity ownership (a proxy for the monitoring effect) positively affects value-relevance. This evidence is consistent with the view that the poor quality of earnings and book value provided by chaebol-affiliated firms is due to the inherently poor governance structure of chaebols.     

董事会结构、股权结构与中小企业绩效

以中小企业板2004～2009年数据为基础,分析了中小上市企业董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明,中小上市企业的董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的内生性特征不显著。董事会规模对Tobin’Q具有负向影响,对总资产收益率无显著影响。CEO双重性对Tobin’Q和总资产收益率分别具有负向影响和正向影响。董事会独立性对总资产收益率具有负向影响,对Tobin’Q无显著影响,表明独立董事在中小上市企业中并未起到有效的监督作用。Tobin’Q和股权集中度之间呈现显著的倒W形关系,但总资产收益率和股权集中度之间无显著相关性。Tobin’Q和总资产收益率与管理层持股之间均呈现显著的N形关系。     

优化股权结构:完善上市公司治理结构的突破口

从公司治理结构产生的历史和逻辑来看 ,股权结构和公司治理结构有渊源关系。股权结构是公司治理结构的基础 ,它决定了公司治理的形式和模式。本文对 94 4家上市公司的股权结构进行全面的统计分析 ,并结合各类持股主体的行为特征 ,得出我国公司内、外部治理机制都不能有效发挥作用的结论 ,作者提出了优化我国股权结构进而完善上市公司治理结构的政策建议。     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管...