政府间财政支出竞争性多标准检验及效应传导——兼析财政支出竞争的地区差异效应

本文运用绝对收敛标准、条件收敛标准、空间相关系数标准和变异系数标准对我国政府间财政支出竞争的存在性进行了检验.随后通过地方财政支出行为与地区经济增长的效应传导机制的梳理,实证分析了我国财政支出竞争的地区差异效应.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.     

TAX COMPETITION AS A CAUSE OF FALLING CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Abstract Since the mid 1980s, tax rates on corporate income have declined in most industrialized countries. Tax competition between countries for mobile capital has frequently been mentioned as an explanation for this development. A vast empirical literature dealing with tax competition for mobile capital has emerged. This paper categorizes and summarizes the existing empirical studies on this issue. Particular focus is placed on the isolation of the substantive implications the quantitative study outcomes convey. Given the empirical evidence surveyed, it appears that tax rates indeed decline due to tax competition between countries, and in particular due to competition for profits. In addition to summarizing the substantive implications of the existing empirical literature, the paper addresses the question of whether the existing studies can convincingly isolate tax competition as a driver of falling corporate income tax rates.     

政府竞争:行政区经济运行中的地方政府行为分析

从政府竞争的角度,为行政区经济形成构建了一个政府行为分析框架.通过对政府竞争和博弈三个层面的考察,揭示区域经济发展中的各层级政府间互动关系,对行政区经济形成的深层次原因提供较为系统的解释.     

Local tax interaction and endogenous spatial weights based on quality of life

This paper studied the role of municipal quality of life as a driver of strategic tax interactions among local governments. A number of studies point out the existence of strategic interactions using spatial econometric models in which the spatial weights are mostly based on non-economic criteria or basic economic variables such as per capita gross domestic product (GDP). We propose the more sophisticated well-being indicator of municipal quality of life as the driver for these interactions. To deal with the potential endogeneity, we rely on instrumental variable estimators. The empirical analysis focuses on the main local tax in Spain (property) and on municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, and it confirms the relevance of differentials in quality of life for the understanding of tax choices.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

The Causes of Urban Sprawl in Spanish Urban Areas: A Spatial Approach

This paper explores the presence of local spatial interaction on urban development patterns of Spanish urban areas and whether this interaction might be due to the strategic behaviour of neighbouring local governments. Using remote-sensing data from aerial photography and satellite imaging along with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) techniques, it studies urban development patterns across the country with unprecedented detail. The results confirm the main hypothesis that spatial interaction exists in the levels of sprawl between neighbouring municipalities, suggesting that local governments do indeed compete for the creation of new suburban settlement developments, hence promoting excessive urban sprawl.     

Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

Effect of local government decision‐making competition on carbon emissions: Evidence from China's three urban agglomerations

Analyzing the effect of local government decision‐making competition on regional carbon emissions is important for reducing carbon emissions in rapidly urbanizing areas. Taking the energy rebound effect into account, this study analyzes the effect on carbon emissions of competition between local governments in decision making. Focusing on China's three urban agglomerations, this study further discusses how to avoid this influence. The results show that local government decision‐making competition is one of the main causes of the regional “green paradox”; the effect of local government decision‐making competition on carbon emissions has significant regional heterogeneity and spatial dependence, and the short‐term energy rebound effect is greater than the long‐term energy rebound effect; and local government decision‐making competition has three effects on carbon emissions that also have interaction and substitution effects between them: factor market distortion, investment bias, and the “race to the bottom” of environmental policies. However, four measures can reduce the effect of local government decision‐making competition on carbon emissions: one, improving the performance evaluation system of local governments; two, promoting the marketization of factor prices; three, improving both the energy efficiency and upgrading of industrial structures; and four, introducing macro emission reduction policies that allow the central government to intervene directly.     

A note on tax competition in the presence of agglomeration economies

This paper analyzes tax competition in the presence of agglomeration effects. The obtained results are then compared to the results of the traditional model, without agglomeration effects. As is well known, the presence of a fiscal externality affects the provision of the public good in the standard competitive model of tax competition. In the model with agglomeration effects, in addition to this externality, a new effect shows up. This effect reflects heightened government concern about capital flight, which depresses firm productivity by limiting external economies of scale. As a result, capital tax rates end up being lower than in the case where agglomeration effects are not present, worsening the underprovision of the public good. This conclusion holds in both the competitive and strategic versions of the model.     

Shocks derived from mining windfalls and horizontal transfers: Exploring the permanent income hypothesis in Chilean municipalities from a spatial competition approach

We explore how spatial interaction affects the strategic use of municipal income when deciding between 1) an optimal long-run expenditure strategy versus 2) using the current income to finance current activities, a phenomenon known as the permanent income hypothesis. Even when this hypothesis is grounded in temporal logic, insufficient attention has been given to the impact of spatial dependence on this type of budget decision. Therefore, we present two reasons why spatial interaction adds new insight to this discussion. First, subnational governments located inside larger functional areas have lower average costs due to the population concentration, allowing for coordination between jurisdictions to achieve more power of negotiation and to potentially exploit economies of scale. Second, local government decision-making is not independent of other jurisdictions as municipalities would constantly evaluate the others’ actions regarding local tax effort, spending, and debt. While this spatial consideration remains a challenge for theoretical modeling, we offer empirical evidence to evaluate how robust the permanent income hypothesis is when geography is incorporated. Our empirical approach uses dynamic panel data with spatial dependence on debt, expenditure, and the error term. To evaluate our hypothesis, we exploit panel data from 320 Chilean municipalities between 2008 and 2020 and use two sources of income: non-matched grants via mining windfalls and horizontal fiscal transfers among cities. The evidence indicates that jurisdictions make backward-looking decisions regarding spending; that is, there are no significant differences between the short and long run. The results for debt, however, are not robust. Policy pertaining to the use of public resources should consider the spatial dependence between municipalities which should be a crucial factor in budgetary decision-making.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

中国横向税收竞争如何影响雾霾污染——基于环保支出中介效应的研究

分税制改革以来,省级政府间税收竞争激化带来的环境污染问题正在逐步凸现。在此背景下,首先从理论层面分析了税收竞争、环保支出及雾霾污染的关系,并提出假说;其次建立空间杜宾模型测度了税收竞争对雾霾污染的直接效应、间接效应和总效应,并利用中介效应方法实证检验了税收竞争通过环保支出对雾霾污染的作用路径。研究结果表明,税收竞争显著加剧了本地区雾霾污染,但是其间接效应和总效应并不显著;此外,环保支出是税收竞争影响雾霾污染的一个主要中介变量。     

国家贫困县存在税收竞争吗？

以国家扶贫县为研究对象，考察贫困地区是否存在税收竞争行为。利用空间自回归模型，采用最大似然估计法（MLE），在不同空间权重下分析国家扶贫县的税收竞争行为。研究发现：第一，国家扶贫县之间同样存在税收竞争行为；第二，同一省份国家扶贫县之间的税收竞争要明显强于不同省份国家扶贫县之间的税收竞争；第三，经济实力相仿的国家扶贫县之间税收竞争更加明显。     

Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen

In a common market with costless mobility of all factors regional governments can attract mobile firms by granting subsidies which they must finance out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Firms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, forcing government ‘in the splits’ (double Bertrand-type tax competition). Initially, there is unemployment in the economy. Regional governments then behave like middlemen in the labour market, and the fiscal game takes the form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation are applied to this framework. It is shown that government size may increase rather than decline in a fiscal competition, that industrial clustering may emerge from tax competition, and that tax competition may alleviate the unemployment problem.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

Competition in the public school sector: Evidence on strategic interaction among US school districts

This paper provides evidence on strategic interaction among local school districts. The analysis makes use of a significant change in the institutional environment for school districts in Michigan in 1996, when the state established a voluntary inter-district choice program. The school districts' participation decisions are modelled as discrete choice decisions using a spatial latent variable model. Strong effects are found saying that lagged adoptions of neighbors positively affect the current probability of participation. A simple test exploiting limitations of student mobility in inter-district transfers suggests that the driving force for interdependencies among adoption decisions was competition for students.