The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry*

abstract Syndicates are a form of inter‐firm alliance in which two or more venture capital firms co‐invest in an investee firm and share a joint pay‐off. Syndication is a significant part of the venture capital market yet little research has been conducted into the process of structuring syndicate deals and the management of syndicates following deal completion. This paper analyses the neglected issues concerning the structuring and management of syndicated venture capital investments from the perspectives of both lead and non‐lead syndicate members using two surveys of venture capital firms and examination of syndication documents. Lead investors typically have larger equity stakes and the syndicated investment agreement is a document that enshrines the rights of participants rather than specifying behaviour. Contractual arrangements typically serve as a back drop to relationships as non‐legal sanctions are important and decisions are typically reached following discussion and consensus, but lead venture capital investors’ residual and specific powers are important in ensuring timely decision‐making. The findings extend previous work on alliances by emphasizing the importance of non‐legal sanctions, especially reputation effects, in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by dominant equity holders. The paper also adds to the limited research on the dynamics of alliances by highlighting the role of repeat syndicates.     

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: FAILED FOREIGN POLICY TOOL AND A COST TO AMERICAN BUSINESS

In recent years the US government has increased its use of economic sanctions in order to punish countries, organisations and individuals. This form of foreign policy has become an increasing burden on US business and adversely affects US competitiveness and perceived reliability in the global marketplace. In addition, economic sanctions are generally ineffective in producing the desired changes and often harm the people they were intended to help. This paper argues that economic sanctions are an increasing menace to US business, represent an ineffective tool of foreign policy, and do not meet generally accepted ethical standards.     

A Perfect Impasse? Cuba's Move Towards the Market and the United States' Move Towards Cuba

This article first analyses the internal economic trajectory of the Cuban economic reforms and evaluates their effectiveness in delivering the extensive and intensive development needed to correct Cuba's structural and economic imbalances. It concludes that without the lifting of the US economic sanctions success will at best be only partial, with serious implications for long‐term stability. The article then evaluates the reasons for the US economic sanctions against Cuba and argues that while the embargo policy might have failed to topple the Cuban communist regime, it has served other, largely unacknowledged, purposes that are important in explaining why the policy has persisted. The article concludes by suggesting that the US is not likely to jettison the sanctions regime while Cuba's single‐party, state‐led economic system remains. At the same time, Cuba is not likely to jettison its single‐party system while the sanctions remain.     

DESTROYING A COUNTRY IN ORDER TO SAVE IT: THE FOLLY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST MYANMAR

The government of the United States has imposed economic sanctions on the Union of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, due to the ruling junta's lack of respect for democracy and human rights. This paper proposes that those sanctions, while well intended, are ineffective, unethical and harmful to the people to whom they are intended to help.     

The Impact of Monopolies on Small Business Development in Russia

The imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by other countries has raised interest rates, diminished the working capital of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), and led to the restoration of state‐owned companies in many sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continues to make efforts to develop a market‐oriented economy based on open competition. This article considers the current situation with SMEs in Russia from the standpoint of market competition and the influence of monopolies on this process. It analyzes bottlenecks in the interaction of monopolies with SMEs. For example, the wires and pipelines required to distribute energy, heat, and electricity over large geographic areas are natural monopolies: only one company can provides each service efficiently in a given area. The companies that control those natural monopolies are able to extract payments far in excess of cost from small businesses. In this and other ways, monopolies are able to dominate the Russian economy and restrict competition from SMEs.     

THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

This article examines economic sanctions from an ethical perspective. Utilitarian ethics and rights theory are applied to economic sanctions in general. Special attention is paid to the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq and Cuba. The conclusion is that economic sanctions are very difficult to justify on any grounds and have negative consequences. Sanctions should not be used as a tool of international relations.     

Firms,public good provision and institutional uncertainty: Evidence from Russia

Enterprises in post-socialist and transition economies often participate in providing infrastructure and social services to the surrounding community which in the Russian legal setting should be local authorities’ responsibility. We propose that this bundling of social and infrastructure goods provision with firm's core operations is a fully rational choice in an uncertain institutional environment. A unique survey data suggest that this manifests itself through more reliable infrastructure, stronger employee attachment to the firm and, most interestingly, through better relations with the authorities. Relationship with authorities is a two-way game where the firm gains from the arrangement but on the other faces sanctions if it decided to depart from it. Firm's participation in the arrangement is clearly enhanced by inherited fixed capital assets from the Soviet era.     

Identifying the effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy using newspaper coverage

This paper focuses on the identification and quantitative estimation of sanctions on the Iranian economy over the period 1989–2019. It provides a new time series approach and proposes a novel measure of sanctions intensity based on daily newspaper coverage. In absence of sanctions, Iran's average annual growth could have been around 4–5%, as compared to the 3% realized. Estimates of the proposed sanctions-augmented structural VAR show that sanctions significantly decrease oil export revenues and result in substantial depreciation of Iranian rial, followed by subsequent increases in inflation and falls in output growth. Keeping other shocks fixed, 2 years of sanctions can explain up to 60% of output growth forecast error variance, although a single quarter sanction shock proves to have quantitatively small effects.     

Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REVISITED: ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO WHY THEY FAIL

Economic sanctions have a poor track record in achieving their objectives. In most cases, they are ineffective in bringing about policy change, cause increased suffering in the sanctioned country and reduce opportunities for business. This paper provides additional insights into why sanctions fail by examining two overlooked factors: power–dependency theory and pressure for political stability.     

Workgroup Climates and Employees’ Counterproductive Work Behaviours: A Social‐Cognitive Perspective

This research examines employees' anticipation of social and self‐sanctions as a self‐regulatory mechanism linking workgroup climates and counterproductive work behaviours (CWBs) and personality as a limit to these effects. A cross‐level study with 158 employees from 26 workgroups demonstrated that in groups with a high compliance climate – a climate emphasizing the importance of complying with organizational rules – employees anticipate more social and self‐sanctions, leading those low in conscientiousness and low in agreeableness to engage less frequently in CWBs. In contrast, a high relational climate – a climate emphasizing the importance of positive social relations over self‐interest – indirectly unbridles the CWBs of these employees by alleviating the social and self‐sanctions they anticipate for CWBs. Climates did not have indirect effects for employees high in agreeableness and high in conscientiousness. These findings elucidate why workgroup climates do not affect the CWBs of all members in the same way.     

Is the Public Oversight of Auditors Effective? The Impact of Sanctions on Loss of Clients,Salary and Audit Reporting

This study examines the consequences of sanctions against individual Swedish auditors issued by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA). The results provide no support for individual auditor client loss after receiving a sanction. However, we find that Big 4 auditors have a lower salary after the sanction than before. Finally, we do not find that auditors become more conservative in their reporting after being sanctioned. Collectively, our results support that public oversight sanctions have relatively limited consequences for auditors of private companies.     

The hidden costs of control revisited: Should a sanctioning policy be announced in advance?

Sanctions are widely used to enhance compliance in principal agent relationships. Although there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may reduce compliance by crowding out intrinsic motivation. We add to the literature on the hidden costs of control by showing that these costs are restricted to situations where the principal actively chooses to sanction low performance and where this choice is known to the agent. In such a situation, the principal's commitment to sanction low performance might indicate that she or he is a distrustful “type” and hence conveys a negative signal. To the contrary, if (a) an agent is not informed about whether low performance will be sanctioned or if (b) the computer determines whether low performance will be sanctioned, the principal's “type” is not revealed, and we find no evidence of crowding out.     

Dissent,sabotage, and leader behaviour in contests: Evidence from European football

This paper provides an empirical investigation of misconducts in contests based on data from European football. We extend previous studies by differentiating between dissents with the referee and misconducts directly aimed at sabotaging the competitor. We find that sabotage is more likely committed by teams with lower ability. Dissent is more likely to be shown by teams lagging behind in score and by away teams. We further find that captains engage more in sabotage during important matches and challenge referees' decisions immediately after sanctions of teammates. Finally, we also observe a deterrence effect of sanctions on all types of misconduct.     

Knowledge, trust and recourse: imperfect substitutes as sources of assurance in emerging economies

Uncertainty prevents voluntary interactions, but institutions of trust and/or recourse can substitute for knowledge by making promises relatively credible. Trust and various sources of recourse are imperfect substitutes, however, as demonstrated by consideration of the trade-offs between trust based on repeated dealings, recourse to informal private sanctions such as reputation threats, ostracism sanctions and third-party dispute resolution through formal commercial organizations operating under customary law, and the state's coercive legal system. The problems of knowledge and interest imply that, though not perfect, private sources of trust and recourse are superior in emerging markets to state-provided recourse.     

Leading public service organizations: how to obtain high employee self-efficacy and organizational performance

Concerns are sometimes raised that transactional leadership harms public organizations’ performance because demands thwart employees’ self-efficacy. However, the opposite may be argued – conditional rewards strengthen feelings of competence because they provide positive feedback on performance. We study ninety-two high school principals’ reported use of contingent rewards and sanctions and self-efficacy among their 1,932 teachers. The results indicate that contingent rewards strengthen self-efficacy, and that sanctions are not negatively related with self-efficacy or performance. Furthermore, the teachers’ self-efficacy can be linked positively to organizational performance. This suggests that rewards can be an important tool for managers in the public sector.     

Bank profitability in the Eurasian Economic Union: Do funding liquidity and systemic importance matter?

The post-crisis regulatory architecture targets greater banking stability by imposing additional capital and liquidity requirements. Profit persistence, however, remains an important factor for attaining this goal. Using annual data for 2008–2017, this study analyzes the relationship between funding stability, systemic importance, and the profitability of banks in the three founding states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The results show a strong degree of stability in net interest margin (NIM) and a lack of persistence in return on assets (ROA). Compliance with the minimum level of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) reduces both the funding liquidity risk and the NIM of EAEU banks. Moreover, systemically important banks in the region historically operate at a lower interest spread and less prudent NSFR, which implies a potentially greater adverse effect on their NIM. Bank-specific variables have various impacts depending on the measure of profitability. The results also highlight that greater market concentration protects the NIM and negatively impacts the ROA of EAEU banks. Finally, Western sanctions have a destabilizing effect on the NIM of EAEU banks, but not on systemically important banks.     

The deterrent impact of police: An examination of a locally provided public service

This paper develops and empirically tests a model of crime deterrence in an urban area. There are two important departures from past efforts to study the impact of criminal sanctions. The first is that the provision of sanctions from the local public sector is modeled; this is accomplished by specifying the distributional goals of local government and by specifying the production of safety. The second departure is that actual crime and reported crime are differentiated theoretically and in the empirical work. An empirical test of the model, using a unique neighborhood data set, shows that police deter crime significantly; however, this deterrent impact cannot be demonstrated without the distinction between actual and reported crime.