Articulation-based accruals

We build an articulating financial statements model in which the beginning and ending balance sheet amounts are explicitly linked to accruals. We distinguish accruals based on the source financial statement of the accruals, either the cash flow statement, balance sheet, or statement of owners’ equity. We then examine how the accrual-generating source affects the relations between accruals and future earnings and stock returns. While prior studies document a negative association between accruals and future earnings and returns, we find accruals relating to the current operating section of the balance sheet are positively associated with future earnings. Further, accruals originating from net financial asset via the statement of owners’ equity are positively associated with future returns. We also show that equity investment and discontinued asset accruals differ from operating asset accruals in their association with future earnings.     

Limited attention,statement of cash flow disclosure,and the valuation of accruals

We test for the effect of limited attention on the valuation of accruals by comparing the immediate and long-term market reactions to earnings announcements between a subsample of firms that disclose only the balance sheet with a subsample of firms that disclose both the balance sheet and the statement of cash flows (SCF) in the earnings press release. Information about accruals generally can be inferred from comparative balance sheets, but the availability of the SCF makes accruals more salient and easier to process for investors with limited attention. Controlling for potential additional information and endogeneity of SCF disclosure, we find strong evidence that SCF disclosure enables more efficient pricing of accruals. Further analyses using a proxy for investor sophistication suggest that, when SCF is absent from the earnings press release, less sophisticated investors fail to discount accruals but sophisticated investors do.     

资产负债项目可靠性、盈余持续性及其市场反应

本文将资产负债项目的可靠性和盈余的持续性相联系,并探讨资本市场能否解读这种联系。首先,理论分析表明可靠性更差的资产负债项目导致盈余的持续性更低。其次对应计项目进行分类并评价其可靠性。最后,证据表明,更不可靠的应计项目导致盈余的持续性更低,并且资本市场没有充分预期到这种联系从而作出错误反应。这些结果说明,在财务报表中确认可靠性更低的应计项目会导致更大的成本,相关性的获得不应以牺牲可靠性为代价。     

The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly

We argue that high accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with an income statement perspective, while low accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with a balance sheet perspective, and that this has implications for the properties of earnings. Specifically, earnings persistence is affected both by the magnitude and sign of the accruals. Accruals improve the persistence of earnings relative to cash flows in high accrual firms, but reduce earnings persistence in low accrual firms. We show that the low persistence of earnings in low accrual firms is primarily driven by special items. We then show that special item-low accrual firms have higher future stock returns than other low accrual firms. This is consistent with investors misunderstanding the transitory nature of special items. Further analysis reveals that special item-low accrual firms have poor past performance and declines in investor recognition (analyst coverage and institutional holdings). Special items continue to explain future returns after controlling for these factors.     

Predictive versus opportunistic earnings management,executive compensation,and firm performance

We examine the association between earnings management and an important component of corporate governance, the incentives provided through compensation. We argue that firms with predictive (opportunistic) earnings management, in which discretionary accruals do (do not) relate to future cash flows, provide a more (less) ideal setting for the use of compensation as incentives. Our empirical tests show that CEO compensation levels (measured by salary, bonus, and other forms of compensation) are positively related to predictive earnings management and negatively related to opportunistic earnings management. We also find that predictive earnings management is positively associated with future returns, whereas opportunistic earnings management is negatively associated with future returns. Overall, our results suggest that firms provide more incentives if their earnings are also more informative because of discretionary accruals.     

Asset Disposal as a Method of Real Earnings Management: Evidence from the UK

We examine asset sales as a method of real earnings management around the benchmarks of loss avoidance and last year's earnings. Evidence is reported of asset sales to boost or reduce earnings near the benchmark of last year's earnings. For the zero earnings benchmark our results are moderated by the opening balance of accruals: only firms with high levels of accruals use asset sales to boost earnings to avoid a loss and only firms with low levels of accruals use asset sales as part of a big bath. We suggest that firms with high accrual balances find it difficult to use additional income-increasing accruals but find it more convenient to write off accruals rather than sell assets to artificially reduce earnings. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are associated with reduced use of asset sales for gains and especially with reduced asset sales for losses. We ascribe this to IFRS introducing additional judgement and estimation in relation to the valuation of both long-lived and current assets on a recurring basis.     

The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability

Prior research provides evidence that a higher proportion of accrued relative to cash earnings is associated with lower earnings performance in the subsequent fiscal year. The result has been widely interpreted as indicative of higher levels of operating accruals relative to cash flows foreshadowing a subsequent earnings reversal, and thus signaling earnings management. We note, however, that earnings performance in prior studies is typically defined as one-year-ahead operating income divided by one-year-ahead invested capital, or a measure of profitability. We find that accruals are more highly associated than cash flows with invested capital in the denominator of the profitability measure. In contrast, accruals and cash flows have no differential relation to one-year-ahead operating income. The evidence is not consistent with accruals having a reversal effect on earnings. This suggests that the lower persistence of accruals versus cash flows may not be due to earnings management but may rather be due to the effect of growth on future profitability.     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

The Accrual Effect on Future Earnings

Earnings manipulation has become a widespread practice for US corporations. However, most studies in the literature focus on whether certain incentives would facilitate managers to manipulate earnings and there has been little evidence documenting the consequences of earnings manipulation. This paper fills this gap by examining how current accruals affect future earnings (the accrual effect) and measuring the size of this effect. We find that the aggregate future earnings will decrease by $0.046 and $0.096, respectively, in the next one and three years for a $1 increase of current accruals. Over the very long-term (25 years), 20% of current accruals will reverse. This negative accrual effect is more significant for firms with high price-earnings ratios, high market-to-book ratios and high accruals where earnings management is more likely to occur. We show that incorporating the accrual effect is useful in improving the accuracy of earnings forecasts for these firms. Accordingly, the empirical results are consistent with the notion that earnings management causes the negative relationship between current accruals and future earnings. In addition, this paper shows that one recently developed accrual model has better performance than the popularly cited model in identifying manipulated earnings.     

The effect of alternative goals on earnings management studies: An earnings benchmark examination

Firms’ management manages earnings because they have incentives or goals to do so. Earnings management studies have to account for these different goals as tests of earnings management can be compromised by the effect of conflicting goals. I illustrate this in the setting of Dechow et al. (2003). Their study examines whether firms with small profits and firms with small losses (loss-avoidance benchmark) have differing levels of discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (2003) find that firms just above the loss-avoidance benchmark do not have discretionary accruals that are significantly different than firms just below the benchmark. However, they do not consider firms just below the loss-avoidance benchmark that might be using discretionary accruals to avoid missing an alternative benchmark. I find that after I consider these alternate earnings benchmark goals, firms just above the benchmark have significantly higher discretionary accruals. This provides direct evidence that the ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings arises from earnings management. I find similar results for the earnings changes benchmark. These findings highlight the need to consider alternative earnings benchmark goals when examining firms immediately around benchmarks.     

Accruals Management to Achieve Earnings Benchmarks: A Comparison of Pre-managed Profit and Loss Firms

Abstract:  This study examines whether firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to meet or exceed earnings benchmarks when pre-managed earnings are below those benchmarks. We extend Brown (2001) by documenting that the differential propensity to achieve earnings benchmarks by profitable and nonprofitable firms results from differential accruals management behavior. We find that firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to have pre-managed earnings below both analysts' forecasts and prior period earnings and reported earnings above these benchmarks.     

The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management

This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate 'normal' accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.     

Discussion of “The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability”

Fairfield et al. (2003a, this issue) suggests that the accrual effect in Sloan (1996) is at least partly due to the fact that accruals signify an increase in (less-productive) net operating assets. Thus, the paper is a useful and thought-provoking reminder that accruals have both earnings and balance sheet effects. However, the impact of the empirical results is diminished by the lack of a convincing story that ties and grounds these results to other knowledge in the area.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

Accruals and firm life cycle: Improving regulatory earnings management detection

Regulators have invested considerable energy into developing analytical tools to better detect earnings management. We propose that firms in similar life cycle stages (LCSs) face similar strategic concerns, managerial pressures, growth prospects, etc., and that the commonality in these factors contribute to the “normal” accruals generating process. Consistent with this prediction, we simulate various earnings management conditions and find that accruals models are misspecified in detecting manipulation within particular LCSs; in particular, introduction, shakeout, and decline firms are over-identified as manipulators, while growth and mature firms are under-identified as manipulators when LCS is not used to estimate accruals. Weighted average performance across life cycle stages reveals that LCS estimation of discretionary accruals substantially improves successful detection and reduces Type I errors relative to other grouping alternatives. The combined improvement across both Type I and Type II errors is over 70% for both the modified Jones and discretionary revenue models of accruals-based earnings management.     

Accruals,Investment, and Future Performance

It is well documented that accounting measures of investment, such as working capital and capital expenditures, negatively predict future stock returns. The earnings fixation hypothesis suggests that investors overestimate and overvalue the persistence of the accrual component of earnings. Another stream of the literature argues that since accruals capture growth, the accruals anomaly can be explained by the investment anomaly, which finds that firms that grow their assets tend to have lower future returns. As empirical proxies for accruals and investment are either positively correlated or interchangeably used, it is difficult to distinguish between the competing hypotheses in empirical tests. This study contributes to the debate by identifying two special economic settings in which the two explanations offer diverging predictions. First, investment in research and development (R&D) represents an investment expenditure that reduces earnings but is not subject to accrual accounting. Thus, the earnings fixation hypothesis predicts a positive relation between increases in R&D investments and future returns, whereas the investment anomaly predicts a negative relation. Second, firms operating with negative working capital have working capital accruals that are negatively correlated with other forms of investment and growth. Therefore, while the earnings fixation hypothesis still predicts a negative relation between accruals and future returns in this setting, the investment explanation predicts a positive relation. For both sets of tests, the empirical evidence supports the earnings fixation hypothesis for the accruals anomaly and is inconsistent with the notion that the investment anomaly subsumes earnings fixation in explaining future stock returns.     

Stock Price Reaction to Evidence of Earnings Management: Implications for Supplementary Financial Disclosure

We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.

Accruals Management to Avoid Losses

This study examines whether firms engage in accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark from the perspective of earnings per share (EPS). Based on net income scaled by lagged market value of equity (E/MV) to define just‐miss and just‐beat test bins, previous studies provide no or inconclusive evidence of accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark. I conjecture that because managers focus on shares scaled earnings performance rather than market value scaled earnings performance, forming test bins based on EPS instead of E/MV is a better approach to detect accruals management. As expected, I find evidence of accruals management to beat the zero EPS benchmark. I also find that firms are more likely to manipulate accruals when managers have stronger incentives to beat the zero EPS benchmark. In addition, accruals of firms just beating the zero EPS benchmark are more likely to reverse the next year, resulting in relatively lower future earnings for firms just beating the benchmark compared with firms just missing the benchmark.     

Stock repurchases as an earnings management mechanism: The impact of financing constraints

Our paper provides evidence regarding the use of share repurchases as an earnings management mechanism in the presence of debt-financing constraints as well as the impact of these constraints on the use of accruals and other real earnings management techniques. We document that share repurchases are prevalent as a mechanism to increase earnings per share. Next, we show that the presence of debt-financing constraints discourages the use of repurchase-based earnings management. We also find that for firms more likely to be engaged in earnings management, high financing constraints appear to increase the use of accruals based earnings management and decrease the use of other real earnings management techniques.