农业面源污染控制的制度选择分析

基于国内外相关文献研究和农村实际考察实践基础上,文章以农业面源污染控制的制度选择为切入点,整合国际国内农业面源污染控制的各类制度安排,并对其进行分析,提出了进一步加强我国农业面源污染控制的制度措施：第一,在加强宏观调控的基础上,进一步完善相关法律法规,优化农业环境管理体制。第二,建立多部门合作的农业面源污染监管体制。第三,建立健全农业面源污染控制的支持保障体系,强化经济税收政策对农户农业生产行为的调节作用。第四,农业面源污染控制管理权下放,建立农业面源污染控制的全民参与机制。     

农业非点源污染的外部性及其内部化途径分析

农业非点源污染是典型的负外部行为，但非点源污染的发生与点源污染有着显著不同的特征，这就决定了非点源污染外部性内部化方法的独特性。相比之下，采用政府直接管制和庇古手段的效果更加明显，关键是如何提高政府管制的效率并不断完善税费系统，而科斯手段在这方面难以发挥重要的作用。社会准则约束的方法在控制非点源污染方面也有独到的效果。     

排污权交易应用于农业面源污染研究

农业面源污染正在成为全球水污染的主要因素，对其进行有效控制直接关系到全球农业和社会的可持续发展。本文首先阐述了农业面源污染的来源、特点及危害，并对控制农业面源污染常用的税费、补贴、押金——退款等经济手段进行了分析。通过深入探讨排污权交易应用于农业面源污染的可行性和操作办法，得出点源与农业面源的排污权交易能够减少工业和农业的治污成本，实现社会收益最大化；农业面源之间的排污权交易能够增强农民技术革新的积极性，减少化肥农药的用量，保证农业可持续发展的结论。     

Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study

In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluters individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore, new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments: an input-based tax, an ambient tax/subsidy, an ambient tax, and a group fine. We assume that polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages. A control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the status quo situation. Our experimental data show that the input tax and the ambient tax are very efficient and reliable, and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable. These instruments improve social welfare with respect to the status quo. On the contrary, the ambient tax/subsidy decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo, and its effect is very unreliable.     

Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontieremissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter'sconcern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point forthe negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, itis shown that transfers from the victim induce the polluting country toexaggerate its concern for the environment. As a consequence, in thesecond best solution, abatement of all but the least caring type isdistorted downward and optimal bribes may be such that more caring typesturn them down. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier policyproposals derived for a non-equilibrium starting point. They indicatethat under asymmetric information the binding incentive problem is toprevent the polluting country from claiming not to care about theenvironment and that optimal bribes from the victim should be restrictedto sufficiently environmentally concerned polluters.     

农业面源污染控制的一体化环境经济政策体系研究

农业面源污染由于排放主体的分散性和隐蔽性、污染发生的随机性、污染负荷的时空差异性,使得农业面源污染具有很强的外部性、不确定性和非对称信息,这是农业面源污染控制的理论依据。文章在对农业面源污染控制面临的污染控制成本不确定性、污染者排污水平不确定性进行理论分析后,构建了农业面源污染控制的一体化环境经济政策体系,指出农业面源污染控制须针对各责任主体设计独特化、具体化、精确化、针对性的环境经济政策。     

Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution

Because it is difficult to monitor emissions and to implement differentialtaxes and standards, uniform taxes and standards on agricultural chemicaluse are often proposed and used to control nonpoint-source pollution. Thisarticle analyzes the relative efficiency of these uniform instruments in thepresence of spatial heterogeneity. We show that the relative slopes of themarginal pollution cost and marginal profit of chemical use are only one ofthe factors that affect the relative efficiency. Other factors includecorrelation between marginal pollution costs and marginal profits and theslope and variability of marginal profits. In addition, a uniform tax mayresult in some farmers not using the chemical, and a uniform standard mayhave no effect on low-input land. We show empirically that the presence ofcorner solutions can reverse a conventional finding of tax or standardsuperiority based on the relative-slop rule.     

新制度时期滇池流域农业非点源污染控制对策建议

近年来,农业非点源污染已经成为导致滇池水体富营养化的主要因素之一,控制农业非点源污染已经成为滇池流域水体污染防治工作的重中之重.本文分析了当前滇池流域农业非点污染控制现状及存在的问题,并分析了自2004年起中央连续三年出台一系列扶农、支农政策以来给滇池流域农业非点源污染控制带来的转机.最后结合当前宏观制度背景的变化情况,对滇池流域农业非点源污染控制提出了多项对策建议.     

Administrative Costs and Instrument Choice for Stochastic Non-point Source Pollutants

This paper extends the empiricalanalysis of non-point source pollution to thecase where the pollutant is stochastic andalternative regulatory instruments havedifferent administrative costs. It also appliesa method of stochastic programming whereemissions are log-normally distributed. Forthe Kennet catchment in South West England werank a range of policies in terms of abatementcosts alone, and total costs (abatement andadministrative costs). On the basis ofabatement costs alone, a uniform emission taxis the cost minimising policy, but on the basisof total cost a nitrogen input tax is theleast-cost policy. Furthermore, the policyranking, based on total costs, changes as thereliability standard increases.     

Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed

We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.     

基于农业非点源污染控制的流域综合管理对策

流域综合管理是从整体上控制农业非点源污染、协调流域上下游环境经济社会发展、实现流域农业可持续发展的有效途径。本文以福建九龙江流域为例，通过分析农业非点源污染产生的系统过程、分布特征、控制环节、制约因素、控制步骤等内容，探讨以不同等级汇水区为单位实行流域综合管理的必要性，阐述了组成流域综合管理体系的经济、环境、社会政策措施。     

工业点源-农业面源排污权交易的机制创新研究

当前,农业面源污染已经成为我国水环境污染的主要来源。相比较于大型工业点源,农业面源污染减排成本较低的状况为二者进行排污权交易提供了有利条件。在分析面源污染具有涉及个体多、发生不确定性强、减排结果监测困难等特征的基础上,提出了工业点源与农业面源排污权交易的两种机制:基于污染产生的农户统一行动交易机制和基于污染治理的农业公共治理设施建设交易机制。最后,针对工业点源-农业面源排污权交易中存在的一些问题进行了初步探讨。     

洛杉矶的雾霾治理及其启示

1943年美国发生了著名的"洛杉矶雾霾"事件,直到20世纪70年代,该市区还被称为"美国烟雾城"。洛杉矶雾霾夏天主要起因于臭氧,冬天主要是源于细微颗粒物等。洛杉矶在治理雾霾方面的主要做法包括立法、排污许可证制度、推广先进环保技术、建立排污交易机制和成立跨部门专门机构等,其治理工作取得了明显成效:2012年,加州达到"不健康空气"水平的日子比2000年减少了约74%。我国治理雾霾,应更加重视空气污染的长期性预测分析,引入市场机制,成立跨地区的空气污染治理机构,同时,加强中美间环保科技的国际合作。     

中国近海污染防治中的环境非政府组织参与

当前中国近海污染形势十分严峻。在近海污染防治中,环境非政府组织的参与十分必要。它不仅能够协助政府监督沿海工业企业的排污,而且还能够以其超越“地方主义”和“GDP主义”的优势监督沿海地方政府切实担负起防治职责。此外,在提高公众环保意识,动员社会力量参与防治;促成沿海地方政府在防治中的跨区域合作;筹集防治资金;以及利用专业知识协助政府开展防治等方面它都能够发挥重要的作用。     

基于信息熵的不完备模糊信息系统属性约简

现实世界中广泛存在的信息不完备和模糊现象,限制了粗糙集理论在实际问题中的典型应用,目前在不完备模糊领域中基于分辨矩阵的算法时间复杂度较高,无法满足大规模数据的快速属性约简。针对这个原因,将完备信息系统中基于信息熵的快速属性约简算法推广到不完备模糊信息系统,通过相容关系及基于相容关系的近似集,给出计算条件信息熵的方法;在此基础上,设计出基于信息熵的不完备模糊信息系统的属性约筒算法。理论分析和实例结果表明了该算法的可行性和较好的时间优越性。     

略论对污染的最优控制

本文从经济学的角度阐述了对污染的最优控制，即确定污染控制的最优水平和最优分配，以及实现对污染控制的方法。     

欧洲大气颗粒物污染治理

欧洲历史上曾长期遭受大气颗粒物污染问题的困扰,比如,发生过1930年比利时马斯河谷事件及1952年伦敦烟雾事件。但最近几十年来,经过长期努力,欧洲对大气颗粒物的治理工作取得了显著成绩。目前,我国大气颗粒物来源情况与欧洲存在较大的差异,但欧洲通过在交通和能源等方面对污染源的治理有效减少大气颗粒物排放的经验,对我国治理“雾霾”具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Cost-Effective and Stochastic Dominance Approaches to Stochastic Pollution Control

Most economic studies of pollution externalities focus on the relative efficiency or cost-effectiveness of alternative pollution control instruments. Much less attention has been paid to policy goals and objectives. However, a comprehensive pollution control strategy depends on all of these choices. This paper examines several efficiency properties of cost-effective pollution control strategies in a stochastic setting when economic damages from pollution are unknown. A number of policy goals are considered. In this setting and under a primal approach, it is found that certain stochastic dominance conditions must be satisfied for the strategies to exhibit desirable efficiency properties. A dual approach to cost-effective pollution control, which is based on a stochastic dominance objective, is also considered.     

基于农用化学品施用控制的农田生态补偿标准测算--以大兴安岭南麓科尔沁右翼前旗为例

以大兴安岭南麓科尔沁右翼前旗为例,基于条件价值评估方法(CVM)和机会成本法估算玉米种植户削减化肥、农药施用的补偿额度,并分析了农户受偿意愿的影响因素。结果显示:(1)在合理经济补偿下,削减50%化肥和农药施用量,分别有91.16%和70.41%的农户愿意参与,积极性较高。削减100%化肥和农药施用量,分别有78.68%和62.93%的农户愿意参与,积极性降低。(2)削减50%化肥、农药施用量的补偿标准合理区间分别为3270~6793元/公顷和5025~8456元/公顷;削减100%化肥、农药施用量的补偿标准合理区间分别为6090~9592元/公顷和6810~10803元/公顷。(3)按照产量划分土地等级,根据土地等级制定差异化补偿标准,将提高生态补偿效率。(4)家庭经济状况和农户生态环境认知情况是削减农用化学品受偿额度的主要影响因素。     

美国农业面源污染控制生态补偿机制与政策措施

简要概述农业面源污染控制的环境经济相关理论,回顾了美国农业面源污染治理的历程及＂最佳管理实践措施＂,并分别从财政补偿、政策补偿、技术补偿、项目补偿四个方面分析研究美国生态补偿机制与政策措施的经验,从而提出对中国农业面源污染控制的启示。重视激励促进作用,运用多种有效手段,构建监督执行机制,完善技术保障体系等对中国农业面源污染控制生态补偿机制与政策措施的建立和实施具有重要的现实意义。