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1.
We examine the impact of emission taxes on the pollution level in a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that an increase in emission taxes could trigger a regime switch from joint ventures to Cournot competition, causing the pollution level to increase. Such a phenomenon is likely to happen when the concerned industry is reasonably profitable, and the synergistic gain between joint venture partners is not too strong. Moreover, emission taxes can implement the first best outcome if and only if the industry is not too polluting. In case it is, the second best level of taxes may or may not equal the optimal tax under either joint venture or Cournot competition.  相似文献   

2.
This paper analyzes efficient pollution taxation within a stochastic model of endogenous growth. Pollution is a by-product of production and causes disutility. Furthermore, the productivity which results from environmental quality is uncertain. This reflects e.g. uncertain capital depreciation induced by natural disasters like hurricanes or floods. This uncertainty is shown to raise an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level as well as on optimal environmental taxation. Market equilibrium turns out to be suboptimal, since the households mis-perceive their individual impact on pollution. Conditions for welfare maximizing pollution taxation are stated and it is shown that a direct pollution tax is not appropriate to yield Pareto-optimal growth. Instead, a linear capital income tax together with a linear abatement subsidy build an efficient tax scheme, if secondarily the governmental budget is balanced. Moreover, an increase in the riskiness of environmental productivity may even lead to an increase in the optimal pollution level and to a decrease in optimal environmental taxation, depending predominantly on the preference parameters.   相似文献   

3.
The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.   相似文献   

4.
《Ecological Economics》2001,36(3):461-473
Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter.  相似文献   

5.
The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.   相似文献   

6.
Disutility of pollution and endogenous growth   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
Endogenous growth is generally built on a positive externality hypothesis which is the opposite of a negative externality caused by pollution. We study a linear technology with simple assumption: an aggregate capital stock which represents a learning by doing effect and a pollution flow proportional to production. In this framework, we analyse the precise effects on growth of the disutility of pollution and its interaction with the utility of consumption in an economy without abatement technology. The decentralized equilibrium always leads to unlimited growth, but optimal growth is often limited (the negative effect of pollution dominating the positive effect of learning by doing). In this case, the optimal policy which leads the decentralized economy to follow the optimal growth path is to tax capital; in contrast with the optimal subsidy policy in an economy without pollution. When an abatement technology is introduced, the optimal solution can lead the economy to unlimited growth, whatever the form of the utility function.  相似文献   

7.
This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.  相似文献   

8.
Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information   总被引:1,自引:3,他引:1  
This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.  相似文献   

9.
This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.  相似文献   

10.
This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure and environmental pollution; and analyses the properties of optimal fiscal policy in the steady state growth equilibrium. We consider the level of consumption as the source of pollution. Government allocates its tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. Optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is equal to the competitive output share of the public input, when productive public expenditure is depicted as tax revenue minus abatement expenditure. However, the proportional income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input. There is no conflict between the social welfare maximizing solution and the growth rate maximizing solution in the steady state growth equilibrium. The unique steady state growth equilibrium appears to be a saddle-point when the growth rate is above a critical level and the steady state equilibrium growth rate in the market economy is not necessarily lower than the socially efficient growth rate.  相似文献   

11.
This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint‐source abatement‐cost sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market, participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame‐perfect equilibrium concept is used to model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources' production costs. We characterize ex ante (or second‐best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator chooses cost‐share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates that current EQIP cost‐share rates would likely be lower and more flexibly determined in the presence of water quality trading. (JEL Q53)  相似文献   

12.
Abatement of CO2 emissions will be accompanied by reduced air pollutant emissions such as particulate matter (PM), SO2, and NOx. This, in turn, will reduce the need for end of pipe (EOP) pollution control technologies to meet future air quality targets. This dynamic could put more stringent air quality goals within reach, and increase the political feasibility of climate policy. This paper presents a CGE model that has been modified to include the emissions and EOP abatement of PM, SO2, and NOx from stationary sources in the EU-17. Emissions of pollutants are modeled as fixed-factor complementary inputs to their associated source. Abatement in each sector is modeled as a substitution between the pollutants and discrete abatement technologies, each of which is sector-specific and characterized by a marginal abatement cost and technical capacity constraint. Scenarios are run to 2020, to assess the costs and co-benefits of simultaneous air quality and climate policies. We find that under the Kyoto Protocol in 2010, the welfare cost of pollution control is reduced by 16% compared to the baseline, effectively offsetting the cost of CO2 abatement by 15%. The co-benefit results depend heavily on policy choices, and their magnitude relative to total costs is likely to decline as greenhouse targets become more ambitious. In our scenarios, pollution control cost savings range from 1.3 to 20% in 2020, yielding a climate cost offset range of 0.2 to 3.9%. The CO2 credit imports allowed by the EU via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offer a total savings of $9.7bn in 2020, but only need to be compensated by an additional $0.3–0.4bn in domestic pollution control from stationary sources.  相似文献   

13.
The cornerstones of studies that estimate the effectof environmental regulations on an economy areestimates of the pollution abatement costs incurred bythe manufacturing and electric utility sectors.However, there are concerns regarding the accuracy ofthe surveys used to generate these cost estimates.This paper demonstrates that technical change tends toresult in an increasing share of pollution abatementcosts being impossible to measure. This finding hasimportant implications for estimating the productivityeffects of environmental regulations, developingregulatory budgets, and data collection effortsrelated to environmental accounting.  相似文献   

14.
We investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions. In the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions. Conversely, technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology. It is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach. The optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available; nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period. The usual Pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument. A numerical application to the Greenhouse effect is provided.  相似文献   

15.
We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.  相似文献   

16.
This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.We thank Dominique Bureau, Olivier Godard, Émeric Henry, Nicolas Marchetti, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Anne Perrot, Gilles Rotillon, Katheline Schubert, the editors Michael Crew and Anthony Heyes, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. We also acknowledge valuable comments from seminar audiences at HEC Montréal, the University of Paris I, the University of Toulouse, and the DG-Entreprise of the European Commission in Brussels.  相似文献   

17.
李斌  赵新华 《财经研究》2011,(4):112-122
文章将环境污染的影响分解为规模效应、结构效应、纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应、混合技术效应、结构生产技术效应、结构治理技术效应和综合效应,并运用37个工业行业2001-2009年三种主要废气排放数据实证分析了工业经济结构和技术进步对工业废气减排的贡献,得到如下结论:纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应在减排过程中占据了主导地位;工业经济结构的变化对工业废气减排的作用效果不明显,相对2001年甚至还加剧了环境污染;结构生产技术效应和结构治理技术效应都对废气减排起到了促进作用,环境技术进步在一定程度上弥补了工业结构的不合理。  相似文献   

18.
Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.   相似文献   

19.
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) could arise from the scale effect in abatement technology as emphasized by Andreoni and Levinson (2001) or from the induced policy response as suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995). This paper incorporates these two contrary views into a model and quantitatively evaluates their relative importance in shaping the EKC of U.S. water pollution. Our main findings include: (a) some scale effect in abatement technology must exist, otherwise the turning point of the EKC will be unreasonably high; (b) the scale effect alone is not sufficient to explain the practical occurrence of the turning point of the EKC; and (c) the scale effect features critically in the induced policy response as well. (JEL H41, O40, Q20)  相似文献   

20.
In this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a firm that is subject to environmental regulation. It is assumed that, in order to prevent firms from polluting the environment excessively, the government imposes an emissions tax. We determine how an emissions tax influences the firm's decisions concerning investments and abatement efforts. In the model we incorporate the realistic property that a given abatement expenditure leads to more pollution reduction when pollution is large. This property implies increasing returns to scale with respect to pollution reduction. It turns out that, together with the usual assumption of decreasing returns to scale with respect to production, this property leads to the occurrence of history-dependent equilibria in case the pollution tax rate is sufficiently large. It is possible to derive an explicit formula for the threshold tax rate above which these history-dependent equilibria can occur. We show that an investment grant by the government can influence the firm so as to approach the equilibrium with a higher capital stock. Finally, we compare our results with those of a related model where the firm faces a strict pollution standard rather than an emissions tax. Among other things, we show that growth is more suppressed under a tax than under a standard when the firm is small.  相似文献   

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