Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Equal treatment and socially optimal R&D in duopoly with one‐way spillovers

This paper examines the standard symmetric two‐period R&D model with a deterministic one‐way spillover structure: know‐how flows only from the high R&D firm to the low R&D firm (but not vice versa). Though firms are ex ante identical, one obtains a unique asymmetric equilibrium (pair) in R&D investments, leading to interfirm heterogeneity in the industry. R&D cooperation by means of a joint lab is considered and compared to the non cooperative solution. The main part of the paper provides a second‐best welfare analysis in which we show that the joint lab yields a socially optimal R&D level subject to an equal treatment (of firms) constraint, which also coincides with the noncooperative solution in the absence of spillovers. We also investigate the welfare costs of this equal treatment constraint and find that they can be quite significant.     

New technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly with spillovers

In a two-stage Cournot oligopoly where a subset of firms first make a choice between two alternative production technologies independently and then all firms compete in quantity, the effect of information spillovers is analyzed when the outcome of R&D is uncertain. It is shown that the range of parameter values that support heterogeneous firms in equilibrium will diminish as information spillovers become larger. Particularly, when the spillover effect is so strong that the investment by one firm is beneficial to its R&D active rivals, all active firms will choose the same technology. A similar result can be derived from a socially desirable point of view except that the cut-off magnitude of spillovers is different. By introducing a positive success probability to characterize the uncertainty of the R&D outcome, it is found that when information spillovers are not too small, there will be underinvestment in equilibrium relative to the social optimum.     

Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Unless an active environmental policy exists, firms have no incentive to engage in abatement or environmental R&D so policy design is of paramount importance. This design heavily depends on the way R&D spillovers operate. There are two distinct types of R&D spillover: output spillover and input spillover. An input spillover operates on the expenditure toward pollution reduction, whereas an output spillover manifests as the achieved abatement. Under optimal emissions taxation, significant differences arise due to this distinction, in particular, when the spillover operates on R&D inputs. In an oligopolistic setting, the result is higher R&D expenditure, but also higher aggregate emissions and, consequently, higher emissions taxes. By contrast, when spillovers occur in R&D output, there is a U‐shaped relationship between the optimal tax and the spillover, showing a trade‐off between the optimal tax rate and spillovers when these are low. In terms of the relative effectiveness of different R&D organization setups, combining emissions taxes with R&D cooperation, this paper shows that under low levels of R&D spillover R&D cooperation gives higher emissions reductions, whereas when spillovers are high this is not the case.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

Cooperative R&D and Commitment to A Policy of Know-how Trading

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of adopting a strategy of know-how trading on the degree of research and development (R&D) cooperation. We show that the consequences of cooperation in know-how sharing under the conditions of the model are similar to a policy of cooperation in R&D investments in areas with large spillovers. An industry-wide policy of cooperation among competitors with respect to R&D investment and sharing would simply result in maximal joint profits. This cooperative R&D outcome could be generalized to any degree of spillover other than 100%. In this paper, the commitment to a policy of know-how trading by the participants in an industry is explained by the firm’s attempt to induce the equilibrium of a single industry-wide cooperative research joint venture. In a repeated game framework, we show that pre-commitments by non-cooperative firms to disclose their own know-how to the industry can be effective in inducing cooperative R&D investments by the participants.     

R&D spillovers and employment: evidence from European patent data

In this paper we investigate the role of patents in the relationship between R&D activity, spillovers and employment at the firm level. A reduced-form labour demand equation is estimated. Our analysis is based upon a dataset consisting of 879 R&D-intensive manufacturing firms worldwide for which information was collected for the period 2002–2010. We use data from all EU R&D investment scoreboard editions issued every year until 2011 by the JRC-IPTS (scoreboards). Since the innovation output of the industrial strategy of every firm is the number of patents, the main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate also the impact of patents/R&D ratio and patents/spillovers ratio on employment level. The empirical results suggest a significant impact of R&D spillover effects on company employment although the results differ substantially according to the spillover stock, which may considerably affect policy implications.     

Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.     

DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATION

This paper introduces defection into the strategic R&D model. In defecting, a firm cheats by choosing its R&D expenditures to maximise its own profits, instead of maximising the joint profits of the cooperating firms. Two cooperative environments are considered: R&D cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities; and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities and share information. Under R&D cartelisation, defection entails an increase (decrease) in R&D and effective spillovers for low (high) spillovers; whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in R&D and effective spillovers. Under R&D cartelisation, consumer surplus and total welfare increase (decrease) with defection when spillovers are low (high). Whereas consumer surplus and welfare always decrease with defection under RJV cartelisation. Under R&D cartelisation, the incentives for defection first decrease then increase with spillovers; they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing.     

What drives the choice of the type of partner in R&D cooperation? Evidence for Spanish manufactures and services

We analyse the heterogeneity in firms’ decisions to engage in R&D cooperation, taking into account the type of partner (competitors, suppliers or customers, and research institutions) and the sector to which the firm belongs (manufactures or services). We use information from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for Spanish firms and estimate multivariate probit models corrected for endogeneity which explicitly consider the interrelations between the different R&D cooperation strategies. We find that placing a higher importance to publicly available information (incoming spillovers), receiving public funding and firm size increase the probability of cooperation with all kind of partners but the role is much stronger in the case of cooperative agreements with research institutions and universities. Our results also suggest that R&D intensity and the importance attributed to the lack of qualified personnel as a factor hampering innovation are key factors influencing positively R&D cooperation activities in the service sector but not in manufactures.     

R&D spillover effects on firms’ export behavior: evidence from South Korea

This paper investigates the spillover effects of R&D investments made by foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) and domestic firms on their export activities, using a manufacturing firm-level panel dataset from South Korea. The theoretical framework predicts two conflicting spillover effects: positive technology spillovers and negative market rivalry spillovers. Thus, the net spillover effect is determined by the relative degree of the two conflicting spillovers. The empirical results show that negative intra-industry spillovers exist from the R&D of foreign MNEs on the export performance of firms, which implies that, in general, negative market rivalry spillovers dominate positive technology spillovers. However, notably, in the case of firms equipped with absorptive capacity, the negative spillovers can be alleviated; firms can gain positive spillovers by muting negative ones. Firms without absorptive capacity cannot avoid such negative effects. This paper shows that absorptive capacity is vital in capturing positive spillovers as firms build competency by accumulating their own know-how and improving their ability to capture better external technologies.     

Intensity of R&D competition and the generation of innovations in heterogeneous setting

This paper discusses the role of technological spillovers and technological races in dynamic strategic interactions setup. Two firms invest simultaneously into new products creation and into further development of the quality of these products. Each firm may benefit from the costless technological spillover in case of technological leadership of the other firm. At the same time they cooperate in the joint creation of new products. Three different scenarios emerge: constant technological leadership, the technological leapfrogging and symmetric outcome with or without potential spillovers. R&D is maximal for the first scenario and minimal for the symmetric play under the threat of spillover with endogenous specialization of firms’ activities in cases of constant leadership and leapfrogging. Definition of technological competition intensity as inverse to the technology gap allows to recover inverted-U relationship between those two in a multidimensional context.     

Interdependence and spillovers: is firm performance affected by others’ innovation activities?

The creation of new knowledge is a case in which agents' behaviour can affect the performance of other actors positively, given that new knowledge creates positive externalities in the market. In this context, we investigate the existence of performance spillovers associated with innovation activities by quantifying the innovation produced in surrounding firms and controlling for the fact that a firm is itself an innovation producer. We use data from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS III) that measures innovation in a broad way, not reducing it to R&D and patents, which departs from previous literature on spillovers. Furthermore, to tackle the endogeneity of the innovation variables on the firm production decision, we resort to the firm intellectual property protection methods as an instrument. We found a positive spillover of innovation on firm value added. The results also show that process innovation spillovers are more prevalent than product innovation spillovers.     

Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

In recent years Open Innovation (OI) processes have been receiving growing attention from the empirical and theoretical economic literature, where a debate is taking place on the aspects of complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and OI spillover. By means of a differential game approach, we analyze the case of substitutability in an OI setup in a Cournot duopoly where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival. The technical analysis and the numerical simulations point out that the firm which commits to a higher level of OI absorption produces a smaller output and enjoys higher profits than its rival.     

Absorptive capacity and innovation: when is it better to cooperate?

Cooperation can benefit and hurt firms at the same time. An important question then is: when is it better to cooperate? And, once the decision to cooperate is made, how can an appropriate partner be selected? In this paper we present a model of inter-firm cooperation driven by cognitive distance, appropriability conditions and external knowledge. Absorptive capacity of firms develops as an outcome of the interaction between absorptive R&D and cognitive distance from voluntary and involuntary knowledge spillovers. Thus, we offer a revision of the original model by Cohen and Levinthal (Econ J 99(397):569–596, 1989), accounting for recent empirical findings and explicitly modeling absorptive capacity within the framework of interactive learning. We apply that to the analysis of firms’ cooperation and R&D investment preferences. The results show that cognitive distance and appropriability conditions between a firm and its cooperation partner have an ambiguous effect on the profit generated by the firm. Thus, a firm chooses to cooperate and selects a partner conditional on the investments in absorptive capacity it is willing to make to solve the understandability/novelty trade-off.     

The two ways of FDI R&D spillovers: evidence from the French manufacturing industry

Using French firm-level panel data, this study investigates R&D spillovers from inward foreign direct investment (FDI) with respect to both horizontal and vertical linkages (backward and forward). Using a Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (CDM) model, we estimate an R&D-augmented Cobb–Douglas production function to assess the impact of R&D spillovers on firm performance. The results emphasize that international spillovers (from foreign affiliates to local firms) have a greater effect on firm performance than reverse spillovers (from local firms to foreign affiliates) and are more likely to be backward than forward. Moreover, the effect of backward spillovers depends on a firm’s absorptive capacity and is amplified in the case of outsourcing relationships.     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

Intra-industry spillovers and innovation: An econometric analysis at the firm level

This paper studies spillover effects of innovation at the firm level and the comparability of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators with maximum likelihood estimators of the earlier studies. Two sources of spillovers are identified, i.e. intra-industry R&D expenditure and intra-industry innovation output. This paper estimates a negative R&D spillover effect and a positive output spillover effect. Because of the substitution effect of intra-industry R&D spillovers, the elasticity of patent with respect to firm's own R&D expenditure is greater than those estimated in the earlier studies. With GMM, individual effects are incorporated into the models either by developing proxies for them or attempting to eliminate them.     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

R&D Efficiency Gains Due to Cooperation

A theoretical and widely-quoted finding is that levels of cooperative R&D exceed noncooperative R&D levels when technological spillovers are relatively large, while the opposite holds for relatively small technological spillovers. We qualify this result by showing that for relatively small technological spillovers the comparison is not driven by the extent of technological spillover, but by the increase in technological spillover due to cooperation in R&D. In particular, an agreement to cooperate in R&D always raises R&D efforts if the post-cooperative technological spillover rate is high enough.