Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization.     

Social protection and regional convergence in a European Monetary Union

This paper addresses convergence in social protection and GDP in a European Economic and Monetary Union. We evaluate the impact of recently proposed EC social minimum requirements on regional convergence within the EC. Subsequently, we analyze a system of differentiated social norms as a means of raising social protection in countries with lower social standards.     

The Effects of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on National Fiscal Sustainability

This paper presents a methodology to analyze the responsiveness of fiscal sustainability to the endogenous fiscal discipline that will be strengthened by the EMU. This discipline arises in response to the harmonization of tax systems, the loss of control of current and prospective money financing, and the deepening of financial market-based discipline. The model developed in this paper is a generalization of Blanchard's 1984 model, in which the interest rate is determined endogenously. This provides the framework to analyze more features of the linkage between sustainability and endogenous fiscal discipline. This paper also presents a new intratemporal fiscal sustainability index.     

Global Implications of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

In order to analyze successful strategies for economic policy in a global environment both international interdependencies and the strategic behavior of global players must be considered. We use a global model of the world economy (the MSG2 Model) to show the effects of dynamic policy optimization in the presence of various supply and demand shocks to different world regions. We show that fixed rules are generally superior for supply shocks, while demand shocks call for more active or discretionary policies.     

Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

Fiscal policy in monetary unions: Implications for Europe

This paper analyzes how the feasible mix of government expenditure and financing arrangements may change with the establishment of a monetary union such as that planned by members of the European Community. We find that a monetary union reduces the feasible divergence across countries in their present discounted levels of fiscal spending. Wide differences across countries in their present and future time patterns of spending are still possible, however. Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that the movement toward greater exchange rate fixity associated with the EMS and participation in quasi monetary unions havenot been accompanied by significant fiscal convergence. The experience of member states of several existing monetary unions, however, suggests that a more effective constraint to budgetary discipline arises within full-fledged unions in operation over long periods, even in the absence of binding central rules on government deficit and debt positions.     

Monetary Union, institutions and financial market integration: Italy, 1862–1905

Years into the single currency, EMU financial markets are not fully integrated. We argue that the phenomenon can be better understood by looking at financial markets’ behavior in the wake of Italy’s monetary unification (1862). Variables such as the spread of the telegraph, trade volumes, and the diffusion of the ‘single currency’ fail to explain why it took 25 years for prices across regional stock exchanges to converge. A single Italian financial market appeared only when the State prevailed upon local vested interests by enforcing nation-wide financial market legislation.     

Transatlantic Trade-Offs in the Age of Balanced Budgets and European Monetary Union

We develop a model of monetary and fiscal policies appropriate for considering U.S.-European policy interactions in an era of near-balanced budgets and European monetary union. We study the determinants of policy trade-offs and incentives for central banks and governments across the Atlantic. Smaller, more open economies face more favorable trade-offs, since openness enhances policy effectiveness via the exchange-rate channel. Changes in Europe's monetary arrangements do not affect U.S. trade-offs, although they alter the trade-offs facing European policy-makers. Fiscal trade-offs depend crucially on the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary. Changes in taxes and spending move both employment and inflation in the desired direction following a worldwide supply shock when spending is financed with distortionary taxes.     

Terms of Trade Shocks and the Current Account: Evidence from Five Industrial Countries

What is the effect of shocks to the terms of trade on a country's current account position? The Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect predicts that an adverse shock to the terms of trade will worsen the current account balance; in contrast, the prediction of intertemporal models of the current account is dependent on the duration of the shock. This paper examines several features of the terms of trade series of five OECD countries, and the relationship between terms of trade shocks and the current account balance. Median shocks to the terms of trade are found to be highly persistent, yet with a large transitory component, and to account for only a small share of the variability of current account balances in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In contrast, terms of trade shocks are found to account for a relatively large proportion of the variability of current account balances in Australia and New Zealand.

     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.     

Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

Endogenous Symmetry of Shocks in a Monetary Union

The monetary union issue, when assessed with the traditional inferences for optimal currency areas, misses an important dimension. Increased specialisation induced by reduced transaction costs, suggested by Krugman's lessons of Massachusetts, is only a part of the story. Even if agglomeration and inter-industry trade may occur as a result of reduced transaction costs, this tendency may be counteracted by the elimination of uncertainty associated with bilateral exchange rate variability within the monetary union.Thus, in contradiction to what is generally assumed on the basis of the reduction in transaction costs only, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to foster intra-industry trade in Europe, leading to more symmetric shocks between member states. The monetary union will endogenously create the conditions of its success. Empirical evidence is provided for EU countries' bilateral trade over the period 1980–1994, using disaggregated trade data.     

The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: The IS-LM model with optimal policy

The high correlations between saving and investment, which suggest a small variability of the current account, is explored within an IS-LM framework. While Feldstein and Horioka interpret this evidence to imply a low degree of capital mobility, the pattern of shocks to the model is also important. If the monetary authorities are pegging domestic rates to foreign returns, then we would expect the Feldstein-Horioka evidence even under high mobility. We explore whether such a rule is optimal when policymakers wish to avoid income variability where fiscal and monetary policy are coordinated and where monetary policy must act alone. We suggest that the Voicker Federal Reserve switched to the latter stance and created a dramatic exception to the Feldstein-Horioka paradox.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve

In this paper we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel to a monetary union (see Bofinger et al., J Econ Educ, 37:98–117 (2006), Walsh, J Econ Educ, 33:333–346 (2002)). We show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it prevents national interest rates from driving a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In particular small countries are in need for fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath.

Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

Fiscal Consolidations in the Central and Eastern European Countries

We study fiscal consolidations in the Central and Eastern European countries and what determines the probability of their success. We define consolidation events as substantive improvements in fiscal balances adjusting for the impact of cyclical effects. We use logit models for the period 1991–2003 to assess the determinants of the success of a fiscal adjustment. The results seem to suggest that for these countries expenditure based consolidations have tended to be more successful. By contrast, revenue-based consolidations have a tendency to be less successful. JEL no. C25, E62, H62     

Asset Prices as Indicators of Euro Area Monetary Policy: An Empirical Assessment of Their Role in a Taylor Rule

This paper estimates forward-looking and forecast-based Taylor rules for France, Germany, Italy, and the euro area. Performing extensive tests for over-identifying restrictions and instrument relevance, we find that asset prices can be highly relevant as instruments in policy rules. While asset prices improve Taylor rule estimates, different assets prove most relevant across countries and this result could be seen as complicating the tasks of the European Central Bank. Encompassing tests show that forecast-based outperform forward-looking Taylor rules. A policy implication is that central banks ought to release their own forecasts and the basis upon which they are generated.

Trade policy and protection in the European Community

The European Community is the world's largest trading entity. As a result, trade policy in the EC has an important impact on the world economy. This paper evaluates the formulation of trade policy in the EC and assesses the key instruments, both by sector and by target. The relative importance of tariff and non-tariff barriers is emphasised as is the role of anti-dumping. Finally, the impact of the single market programme and the Uruguay Round are assessed. Both will have a crucial bearing on the evolution of policy.     

Monetary Policy Analysis in a Small Open Credit-Based Economy

This paper describes a simple framework for monetary policy analysis in a small open economy where bank credit is the only source of external finance. At the heart of the model is the link between banks’ lending rates (which incorporate a premium over and above the marginal cost of borrowing) and firms’ net worth. In contrast to models in the Stiglitz-Weiss or Kiyotaki-Moore tradition, the supply of bank loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing rate. The central bank sets the refinance rate and provides unlimited access to liquidity at that rate. The model is used to study the effects of changes in official interest rates, under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. Various extensions are also discussed, including income effects, the cost channel, the role of land as collateral, and dollarization.