中国股票市场交易型的价格操纵研究

本文研究中国股票市场的交易型价格操纵问题。我们推广了Mei、Wu和Zhou(2005)的模型,研究在市场不允许卖空的条件下,交易型价格操纵发生的条件。我们的主要结果有:(1)非充分理性投资者的存在和有限套利的制约是交易型价格操纵获利的重要原因,投机者套利能力越弱,操纵者的价格操纵越容易获利;(2)当市场中投机者的总禀赋大于0时,即使不允许卖空,价格操纵者依然可以操纵价格来获得利润;(3)如果市场监管者无法杜绝操纵者通过对敲等手段来拉抬股价,则在市场中引入卖空机制反而可以减小股价对基本面的偏离程度,从而在某种程度上限制操纵者操纵股价的空间;(4)在股价被操纵的过程中,存在一个建仓期和抛盘期;操纵期内换手率更高、股价波动更大;在建仓期,回报率与换手率,换手率与回报波动率之间存在正相关关系;(5)我们利用中国股市的数据检验了我们的结论,发现理论结果和实证数据非常吻合。     

股票市场操纵行为的微观机理分析

本文通过对操纵股票市场交易价格的行为进行理论实证分析,剖析这种现象发生的原因、条件和本质,分析操纵市场行为对社会效率的影响,提出了规范股票投资行为、提升市场投资价值的建议.     

信息不对称、融资约束与投资—现金流敏感性——基于市场微观结构理论的实证研究

投资—现金流敏感性研究是当前投资理论研究的主流方向之一。当前针对这一问题的研究还存在着诸多争议,其中公司融资约束程度的度量问题是争论的焦点。本文借鉴市场微观结构理论中的信息不对称指标PIN值作为融资约束的代理指标,研究发现:信息不对称水平越高,则公司的投资支出越低。进一步的检验发现,信息不对称水平较高的公司,其投资—现金流敏感性也较高,并且信息不对称导致的融资约束与投资—现金流敏感性的关系并不是线性的。本文的研究不仅体现了新的研究视角、方法和思路,丰富了投资—现金流敏感性领域的相关文献,而且可以为我国资本市场的完善和企业的投融资决策提供参考。     

Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted

A Gibbard-Satterthwaite type theorem is established for random decision rules and rules that permit ties. The rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes. The theorem allows restrictions on the domain of rankings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D7, C7.     

操纵市场行为的法律规制

本文对证券欺诈行为之一的操纵市场行为进行了系统的探讨。就操纵市场行为的概念、特征阐明了自己的观点,并对现行证券法律法规所确立的操纵市场行为的归责原则进行考察,认为实行相对的过错推定更有利于保护一般投资者的积极性。在分析我国现有证券法律法规相关规定的缺陷后,提出应制定统一的证券交易法,以协调现行各个证券法律法规之间的矛盾;在加强行政责任和刑事责任的基础上,建立操纵市场行为的民事损害赔偿制度。     

Soft Strategic Information and IPO Underpricing

Using content analysis, we measure the impact of soft information, derived from words in initial public offering (IPO) registration documents, on IPO pricing efficiency. First, using 2,298 U.S. IPOs from 1996–2008, we find that an IPO document's strategic tone correlates positively with the stock's first-day return; more frequent usage of positive and/or less frequent usage of negative strategic words leads to more IPO underpricing. Second, we find that an IPO document's strategic tone is negatively correlated with the stock's long-run return. Together, these findings imply that investors initially misprice soft information in registration statements, which mispricing is eventually corrected. Additionally, we create new content-analysis libraries for strategic words and introduce a survey-based library creation method and word-weighting system.     

Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition

What shape can we expect market competition to exhibit? This question is addressed in the present paper. Firms are allowed to choose whether to act as quantity or price setters, whether to move early or delay as long as possible at the market stage, and whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial. Moreover, firms can endogenously determine the sequence of such decisions. It is shown that in correspondence of the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all firms first decide to delay, then to act as Cournot competitors, and finally stockholders decide to delegate control to managers. Hence, sequential play between either managerial or entrepreneurial firms, as well as simultaneous play between entrepreneurial firms, are ruled out.     

市场界定与企业多元化经营的战略选择

本文通过回顾和总结前人在企业多元化经营方面的研究成果和存在的缺点,联系实践分析了市场界定战备的含义,过程等重要因素,并说明市场界定这一营销战略中的重要概念是我们界定相关行业的有效手段。     

Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market

This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. We find that agents trade slowly even when the time between trades goes to 0. In fact, welfare loss due to strategic behaviour increases as the time between trades decreases. In the limit when the time between trades goes to 0, welfare loss is of order 1/ N , and not 1/ N ² as in the static models of the double auctions literature. The model is very tractable and closed-form solutions are obtained in a special case.     

融资融券与市场操纵:加剧还是抑制

本文结合股票市场高频交易数据构建收盘价操纵监测识别模型,利用多时点双重差分模型就融资融券对市场操纵的影响展开研究.结果 显示:融资融券的实施能够抑制标的证券操纵行为的发生,对我国股市的公正运行有促进作用;同时,对作用机制的分析显示,融资融券的实施通过提高股票流动性,而并非提高股价信息含量、缓解投资者信息不对称来抑制操纵行为;最后,横截面分析结果显示,融资融券在中小板、创业板及股市处于熊市时对市场操纵的抑制作用更显著.     

Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.     

Strategic Use of Environmental Information

Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

证券市场上的信息与市场有效性——质疑有效市场假说

有效证券市场被描述为“价格完全反映一切可获得信息的市场”。文章重新思考有效市场假说的逻辑基础 ,对有效市场假说中相对含糊的“信息”的含义展开分析。文章认为 ,决定证券基本价格的基本信息由于涉及未来的不确定性而天然是不完备的 ,因此基本信息并不能为证券定出一个惟一正确的价格 ,这是任何一种证券的本质特征。尽管如此 ,证券的交易却必须在确定的价格下进行 ,因此人为因素必然会对证券价格的形成和变化产生重大影响。人为因素的普遍存在使证券市场上广泛地存在投资者之间的相互博弈 ,这种相互博弈所造成的群体行为正是证券市场非理性行为的逻辑基础。     

Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as real estate agencies in the housing market and employment agencies (or newspapers) in the labour market, which puts traders into direct contact with each other. With heterogeneity of trader preferences, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on each side of the market trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade co-exist, namely a strategic bilateral bargaining process and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

信息化与中国流通创新的战略思考

实现信息化是流通产业发展的重要战略 ,是提高我国流通产业整体竞争力、实现流通现代化的必由之路。信息化建设为我国“十五”期间的流通创新提供了不竭的动力 ,信息化建设应成为我国流通创新的关键切入点     

略论战略性贸易政策在中国电子信息产业的适用性——基于市场结构视角

战略贸易政策总是与寡头垄断的市场结构相联系,且该产业应具有超额垄断利润和外部规模经济.绝大多数战略性贸易政策理论模型都建立在双寡头的Cournot模型的基础上.从产业组织理论和贸易类型两个角度看,目前中国电子信息产业属于垄断竞争市场结构,不适宜实施战略性贸易政策.而应考虑到国外同一产业的市场结构和本国的产业绩效,针对价值增值不同的产业环节,结合产业政策,促进产业市场集中度的提高,实行保护程度不同的贸易政策.     

市场不确定性与股票流动性——基于共性和微观结构的视角

市场不确定性与股票流动性有何联系?该联系受哪些因素影响?本文充分考虑内幕交易者的特征,为两者构建了理论模型,并结合沪深A股的数据证实:(1)市场不确定性越大,持股的风险越高,这降低了投资者的交易意愿,对流动性造成负面影响;(2)大宗交易制度将常规交易与大宗交易分离,减小了市场不确定性对个股的冲击,使"不确定性—流动性"关系减弱;(3)融资融券为资金或头寸短缺者提供了交易的可能,因此个股受不确定因素的影响更大,"不确定性—流动性"关系更强。文章为"当局积极干预证券市场、维持市场稳定"提供了政策依据。