Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision

The paper investigates whether price subsidization or public provision of a private good, x, is the more efficient redistributional instrument in addition to an optimal nonlinear income tax. The identity of high and low skill individuals is assumed to be private information generating a self-selection constraint. If the high skill person's consumption of x is sufficiently large relative to that of the low skill person, public provision is the better scheme. With the opposite situation the price subsidy may be the preferred instrument. The paper also characterizes the mixed scheme where all the instruments are used optimally. The mixed scheme can be degenerate with only public provision being used in addition to the income tax. At an optimum where both instruments are used, good x is subsidized, the low skill person is supplementing and the high skill person is forced to overconsume.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level

Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum.     

宪法税条款及其在我国的完善

租税国家下,宪法税条款的规定有利于税目的的实现和正当性的维持,有利于税权的合理配置,有利于推动国家的宪政进程.通过对诸国宪法的考察,可以得出人类宪政和税制文明的共同经验之一就是在宪法中明确规定关于税的条款.具体包括:税立法的民主性条款、禁止性税条款、税收公平原则、税收法定主义、征税目的和税权划分等条款.针对我国宪法税条款的缺失.可以从如下几个方面对其加以完善:明确税的立法权属于人民的代议机关--人大;设立禁止性的税条款;增加税权划分条款;肯认税收司法权;明确纳税人权利.     

A Note on the Composition of Public Expenditure under Capital Tax Competition

Keen and Marchand ( Journalof Public Economics, 1997, 66, 33–53) argue that undercapital tax competition, the composition of public expenditureis inefficient in that too much is spent on public inputs benefitinglocal business and too little on public goods benefiting residents.Their result depends on labor immobility. This note shows thatthe Keen-Marchand argument may not hold if both labor and capitalare mobile. An interesting case is identified where capital taxationdoes not distort the mix of public goods and public inputs, eventhough the overall level of public expenditure is inefficientlylow.     

A New Approach to Group Structure, Burden Sharing, and the Equilibrium Provision of Public Goods

In the received model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good, the usual practice is to proceed from assumptions about the group characteristics to inferences about an implied outcome. The approach advocated in this paper reverses the traditional direction. Assuming a Nash equilibrium, we ask how to characterize the diverse set of group characteristics which will support it. Approaching the problem from this angle we define three crucial characteristics of a group-equilibrium: consumer's free rider inducing supply, zero contribution-inducing wealth and voluntary surplus tribute which is the amount by which a person's actual income exceeds his/her zero-contribution inducing wealth. Defining these indicators we show how they form the foundation of a complete mapping between the distribution of individual characteristics of a group, and equilibrium public good supply. Certain questions such as the interaction between size of the group and heterogeneity of incomes and tastes not yet adequately addressed are shown to yield easily to this approach.     

我国农村公共品供给分析

当前我国农村公共品的供给相对城市而言严重不足 ,但农村公共品的主要供给者———基层政府在公共品供给不足的情况下却存在严重的财政困难 ,其原因即在于我国农村公共品的供给违背了公共品供给的受益原则、公平原则和最优原则。我国应通过改革户籍制度和完善财政税收政策来优化农村公共品的供给。     

公共品视角下的审计委托模式研究

现行审计委托模式是造成“独立审计不独立”,进而导致审计失败的主要原因。现代企业的“社会企业”特征,使会计报表及其审计信息具有公共品的属性,审计失败很大程度上是会计报表审计信息这一公共品私人供给模式的失败。公共品的非竞争性和非排他性特征决定了其公共供给模式较私人供给模式更有效率;税务机关作为特殊的公共部门,令其作为会计信息审计的委托人在独立性、激励和实践上更具优势。当然,会计报表审计的税务机关委托模式作为一个新的审计委托模式,其制度需不断完善。     

Tax Competition, Income Differentials and Local Public Services

This paper examines strategic tax setting between fiscal authorities in the presence of mobile workers who locate across these jurisdictions in response to differing tax structures and congestable local public amenities. We find that the nature of the tax setting outcomes depend crucially on the proximity between cities. For distant cities with the same size populations, the pressure on tax rates of a more mobile workforce depends on the whether mobile workers are net beneficiaries or net contributors. If mobile workers are either high or low income earners, cities lower tax rates. If mobile workers are middle income earners, cities raise tax rates. For close or neighbouring cities, workers locate in one of the cities and tax rates and local public amenities are dispersed.     

Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Note

The Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices. Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by existing literature for cases in which commodity taxes are set optimally to articulate the implications of their results. This approach also renders a clear insight on the nature of resource allocation and income redistribution effect involved in the public goods provision in a heterogeneous-consumers economy.     

农村公共产品供给与农民收入问题研究

阻碍农民增收和农村经济发展的根本原因在于改革开放以来农村公共产品供给不足,表现为农村公共产品供给与需求失衡;同时,政府将有限的财力和公共产品的大部分投向城市,形成了公共产品供给的城市化倾向,这又表现为城乡公共产品供给失衡.农村公共产品的长期短缺严重地影响了农村私人产品的产出效率.因此,作者提出了必须关注农村农民对公共产品的需求;建立起完善的农村公共产品体系等重要观点.     

Taxation and Migration in a Federal System

This paper discusses how taxation may affect migration, economic efficiency and income distribution. The institutional framework is a federal system, in which local authorities are responsible for the supply of public services and the financing of these services, and where the central authorities are in charge of income redistribution. The main conclusion is that a moderate policy of income redistribution is associated with greater centralization of the work force and greater economic inefficiency than is the case with both radical and more limited policies of redistribution.     

国外基本医疗保险体系中的商业参与——兼论公共物品供给

本文从国际经验借鉴的角度,根据基本医疗保险体系中的商业参与程度,选取了瑞士、澳大利亚和日本三个国家,对其基本医疗保险体系的特点和商业参与方式进行了阐述和总结。商业参与基本医疗保险这一公共物品的供给,是社会经济发展的必然,也是政府与市场的共同选择。当前,我国需要处理好政府部门与商保机构的衔接和职能分工,以提高基金运行效率、并维护参保者的合法权益。     

论公共产品效率与税收遵从的互动

公共产品效率最大化是构建公共财政体制的关键。公共产品效率不仅关系到资源配置、经济发展与社会和谐,也关系到纳税人权利受尊重和保护的程度、纳税人对政府的评价与信任等,最终将作用于纳税人的税收遵从决策。公共产品效率与税收遵从具有高度相关性。     

民办教育税收问题探讨

民办教育的税收待遇应综合考虑其公益性、营利性、非营利性而定。我国民办教育存在的税收问题有:民办教育与公办教育税收待遇差别较大、民办教育税收政策营利性与非营利性不分等。应从完善教育法制、对税收政策进行营利性与非营利性区分、加强教育税收管理等方面进行完善。     

农村公共品供给差异与均等化研究

由于各地区财政能力和公共品支出的不对称,我国各地区农村公共品的国际水平存在着显著差异。根据2009年我国各省市自治区农村公共品供给状况的分析,发现农村公共品的供给和均等化在东、中、西部地区存在明显的差异,在农村公共品供给方面排在前十名的大多是中部和东部地区,而排在居后位置的大多是西部地区。西部地区的财力与农村公共品的支出需求存在较大的不对称。为改变这种状况,应当建立和完善政府预算管理体制;走农业联社、集体农庄化的道路;有针对性的加大政府对各地区农村公共品的投资;多渠道多方面加大对农村公共品建设的投资。     

The Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods

When a public good is excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study the role of prices for publicly provided excludable public goods within an extension of the Stern-Stiglitz version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model.We show that for a public consumer good there is a range of circumstances in which charging a price for the public good decreases welfare. We find that a necessary condition for a positive price to be desirable is that the marginal valuation of the public good is increasing in leisure. However, even under this condition, welfare is initially decreasing in the price, implying that charging a lower than optimal price may be less efficient than setting a zero price. Thus, even when there is a case for charging a price for the public good, an attempt to implement the optimum in practice may be risky, as even setting a modest price to avoid overshooting the optimum may be Pareto inferior to charging no price at all. The policy case for a price may thus appear rather weak. We also find that producers using an intermediate excludable public good as an input should not be charged a price for using the good.     

外部效应显著类农村公共品供给主体问题探索

本文认为,现阶段中央政府与地方政府分项目、分比例承担外部效益显著类农村公共品供给职责,在初步增加农村公共品投入,缓解供需矛盾的同时,又产生了一系列的新问题。针对上述问题,本文提出了中央政府的职责是制定实施国家公共服务标准,实行转移支付,实现地区之间,特别是城乡之间基本公共服务的均等化等政策建议。     

解析公共税收的收入职能

税收的收入职能在人类社会不同历史发展阶段的具体表现是不同的,我们对税收收入职能的认识应该持有历史的、发展变化的观点。如何认识公共税收的收入职能,是我国公共税收建设中一个很重要的问题,因此,建议从公共税收收入职能的动因、职责范围及评判标准等方面进行全面剖析。     

国际税收竞争的实质及应对

国际税收竞争实质上是市场竞争规律在政府行政领域的体现形式。良性税收竞争有助于降低总体税负、减少经济扭曲、提升公共产品生产效率,但对此类竞争的国际协调难以取得实质成效。恶性税收竞争则会掠夺性地侵占他国税基,对此类竞争的遏制具备理论的必要性和可行性。政府可通过改革现行税制、精简规范收费、优化公共服务以及加强国际合作来应对国际税收竞争。